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Coming Together:
Prospects for the G8 Evian Summit
John Kirton, University of Toronto, and
Victoria Panova, Moscow State Institute for International Relations
Paper prepared for a conference on
"Governing Globalization: Corporate, Public and G8 Governance,"
INSEAD, Fontainebleau, France, May 27, 2003
Draft of May 20, 2003
The 29th annual G7/8 Summit, taking place in Evian-les-Bains, France on June 1-3, 2003, promises to be an unusually suspense-filled and potentially highly productive event. The suspense comes from lingering doubts about whether George Bush will even attend and how long he will stay, whether he and the French hosts will reinforce or repair their recent United Nations (UN)-bred divisions over Iraq, whether two larger lead-up Summits in St. Petersburg with the "East" and Evian with the "South" will energize or exhaust the G8, and whether continental European protestors will again consume the Summit in violence, destruction and death. The potential comes from Evian’s launch of a new Summit cycle with Russia now as a full member, its unprecedented outreach to countries around the world, its need to advance the ambitious action plans launched at Kananaskis last year, and the new challenges of building a democratic Iraq, containing North Korea, India-Pakistan and the Chinese-created Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) epidemic, and bringing economic growth, better corporate governance and clean water to the world. Seldom before has a G8 so divided confronted an agenda and opportunity so large.
As the Evian Summit approaches, the prospects are for a very mixed performance. Evian promises to be another Summit of solid achievement, rather than a historic event that defines a new generation of G8 and global governance. Propelling Evian towards a solid performance are the common vulnerabilities bred by a precarious international system, momentum from the highly successful Kananaskis Summit last year, the strong equalization of capabilities among G8 members, the unprecedented number and range of invited participants, and the highly experienced and politically secure G8 leaders who will attend. Inhibiting Evian are the deep divisions within the G8 itself over Iraq, and a French host that has been slow to produce a streamlined, focused Summit agenda and process. As Evian ends, the world could still be waiting to see what the French might do to boost their hosting performance with ministerial meetings in the second half of their year, and, above all, what George Bush is likely to do with his G8 when he hosts in his presidential re-election year of 2004.
As a conservatively oriented concert, the G8 performs best when it confronts a widespread array of serious, interrelated challenges, led by readily recognizable second shocks that expose the vulnerabilities and threaten the core interests and common democratic values that all G8 members share (Kirton 1989, 1993). As the first half of 2003 unfolds, the world is producing more than enough of such demands to call forth a forceful G8 response. These challenges arose simultaneously and interrelatedly in each of the political-security, economic, and North-South domains. In each field they offer some immediate threats that all G8 members are afflicted by, can readily recognize from earlier shocks, and can see as assaults on the common democratic values the G8 was created to protect.
In the political-security field, the first challenge is the physical and political reconstruction of Iraq. This includes repairing transatlantic unity after the divisive diplomacy of early 2003, identifying and eliminating all weapons of mass destruction (WMD), designing the model and raising the resources for the reconstruction of a post-Saddam Iraq, and dealing with the aftermath in the Middle East and Muslim world beyond. The second, closely related challenge, where arms control and nonproliferation again fuse with regional security and terrorism, is coping with the other two points of the "axis of evil" in North Korea and Iran, as well as India and Pakistan in between. The third is the ongoing war against terrorism, ranging from reconstructing Afghanistan to combating the al-Qaeda terrorist network and its allies in Chechnya, Saudi Arabia, and around the world. This unavoidable triple header, with the lead-up terrorist hits on Russia’s Chechnya and the Americans, British and French in Saudi Arabia and Morocco, inevitably make Evian more of a political-security summit than its French hosts had hoped it would be.
A second set of challenges comes in the core economic domain. After the hopes generated by G7 and global recovery in 2002, the first half of 2003 has seen growth sharply decline and deflation rear its ugly head throughout most of the G8. Europe has plunged back toward recession, Japan remains stagnant, and even the hitherto locomotive-like U.S. economy has stalled. The SARS outbreak in Asia, at its Communist Chinese epicentre, threatens to remove this great engine of demand from the global economy as well. The spectre that SARS might infect Japan, as it already has the United States and neighbouring Canada and Russia, raises an additional scare. Potential financial crises linger in Argentina and Brazil under their new leadership, and in Venezuela and Turkey with their old. The recent failure of the World Trade Organization (WTO) to meet its interim deadlines heightens the challenge of concluding the Doha development round by its designated and fast approaching date of 2005. And continuing failures of corporate governance within the G8 raise questions about whether these microeconomic engines of growth driven by multinational corporations (MNCs) will be able to fuel G8 and global recovery as well.
The third set of challenges is that of North-South development, as Kananaskis had highlighted in 2002. In Africa a growing famine and infectious disease crisis cries out for an immediate response, even as Robert Mugabe’s repression in Zimbabwe and an opaque peer review process in the African Union threaten the Kananaskis-generated hope. In Asia the SARS epidemic adds a second region and shock. Despite a new willingness from donor countries to increase their development assistance and health expenditures, the simultaneous demands of Africa, Iraq, Afghanistan, and potentially North Korea threaten to overwhelm the promised and prospective help at hand.
To a greater extent than usual, these three sets of challenges are tightly interrelated, making it more difficult to focus on only a few. The aftermath of Iraq has a direct bearing on oil supply and prices and thus G8 and global economic growth and the resources available for assisting the developing world. The SARS outbreak is a health crisis that harms economic growth in China and Canada and further destroys prospects for development in poor countries in Asia and Africa should it spread there. While continental Europe remains less immediately affected than other G8 countries by the new Asian-centred threats from North Korea, SARS and Asian deflation, the functional and geographic interconnections will give all G8 members a similar sense of risk.
Moreover, in all cases, the G8’s core principle of open democracy is directly engaged as a key element in the solution. Creating a stable democracy in Iraq, as well as in Afghanistan and in the Middle East, is key to regional security and the war against terrorism, even as communist North Korea’s secrecy is a cause of the most immediate threat. Improved transparency and accountability in corporate governance, and an end to the secrecy in communist China and the opaqueness in the World Health Organization (WHO) that had created the global SARS threat are critical levers for generating global growth. And an adequate political peer review mechanism and end to the Mugabe regime in Zimbabwe, are vital to unleashing development in Africa.
In the face of such intense global demand, G8 seems ready to supply an appropriate democratic response, given the strong momentum flowing from the Kananaskis Summit the previous year. That Summit had been one of the most successful in Summit history. It had earned a grade of B+ from Nicholas Bayne, produced a historic high of 187 commitments, mobilized massive new monies for safely eliminating weapons of mass destruction, development assistance in Africa, and debt relief for the poorest, created a new G8 ministerial institution for development, included African leaders at the Summit as partners, and ended the civil society protest and violence that had afflicted Genoa the year before (Bayne 2003, Fratianni, Savona and Kirton 2003, Kirton et al. 2003).
In the year following Kananaskis, its commitments appear to be on track to being complied with to an adequate degree. A mere six months after Kananaskis, G8 members had already complied with its priority commitments in 13 major issue areas an average of +25% (G8 Research Group 2003). Compliance was perfect in regard to terrorism, high in arms control and conflict prevention, and still over +50% in African good governance, official development assistance (ODA), and the environment. Across member countries, interim compliance scores ranged from host Canada’s +77%, to Britain’s +44%, France’s +38%, and the United States +25%. As France is historically the least complying member of the G8, its relatively high interim score suggests a promising continuity and momentum from Canada’s Kananaskis to France’s Summit at Evian. As Evian approaches however, a red flag should be raised, as compliance appears to have risen only slightly, and remains at a level below the historic summit average.
Momentum-building continuity, based on the important feature of iteration in the agenda (Bayne 1999), also flows from the extensive, self-binding, built-in agenda the leaders at Kananaskis specified through "remits" for Evian (see Appendices A and B). This will help ensure that the leaders at Evian return to the issues and the implementation of their G8 Africa Action Plan, the progress, guidelines, and projects of their Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, and co-operative G8 action on transport security. To institutionalize such continuity, the Kananaskis leaders established several G8 bodies: a second year of work for their personal representatives for Africa, a mechanism to review annually the G8 Global Partnership, the new G8 Nuclear Safety and Security Group, and experts on transport security who will receive direction from G8 leaders conducting a semi-annual review. Together these additions suggest that France has lost some of its historic aversion to the "institutionalization" of the Summit system. And for the long-term future, Kananaskis specified a Summit hosting order, not just for the year ahead, as had been traditional, but for the next eight years to 2010. The shadow of the future thus lengthened a great deal for an institution that seemed determined to grow rather than stay the same or wither away.
The momentum from Kananaskis is reinforced by the determination of Canada, as its priority for Evian, to focus on completing the Kananaskis commitments, and keeping the Africa Action Plan and Global Partnership alive. At the start of the French-hosting season, Jean Chrétien had signalled that his core concern was making sure his Kananaskis legacy was fulfilled. This is reinforced by his own view, and of most others, that Kananaskis had been an outstanding success, and by the fact that Evian will be his last Summit.
In regard to the Global Partnership, this means that Canada is concentrating in the preparatory process on getting the full commitment of US$20 billion in place, by securing firm pledges to add to the just over US$18 billion that all G8 members had together pledged as the Evian Summit drew near. Canada also seeks to involve new donors, beyond the G8, to complete the legal framework necessary to dismantle nuclear weapons, and to establish special bilateral agreements on particular aspects. On Africa, the Canadian emphasis is on encouraging the Africans to deliver on their commitments, especially in regard to the peer review process, in response to the promises made by the G8 at Kananaskis last year.
Further generating momentum is the vibrant ministerial process in the lead-up to Evian (See Appendix C). To be sure, the French have held fewer lead-up G8 ministerials than the energetic Canadians, largely by substituting for the 2002 stand-alone G8 Energy Ministers meeting an informal gathering on the margins of the annual meeting of the International Energy Association. However, the French have institutionalized the Canadian innovation of a G8 Development Co-operation Ministers meeting, by hosting the second such gathering in Paris in April 2003 (Whelan 2003). In doing so they have again shown their openness to G8 institutionalization for the twenty-first century, and their desire to keep the Kananaskis focus on African development alive. Another promising omen is the fact that the pre-Summit finance ministers preparatory meeting, held in Deauville on May 16-17, 2003, has generated twice as many commitments as its equivalent in Halifax had the year before. With the French host taking his American and Canadian colleagues on a tour of the nearby Normandy beaches, where North American and British forces had landed to liberate France and Europe in 1944, the instinct to come together in the G8 seems, symbolically as well as substantively, to be well underway. At the leaders level, led by Japan, bilateral and plurilateral pre-Summit diplomacy also suggests a similar desire to cross rather than continue the UN-created Iraq War divide (See Appendix D).
Changes in relative capability in the world and in the G8 also point strongly to Summit success. Within the world, the G8’s collective predominance continues to strengthen. Financial crises and political uncertainty continue to afflict the once promising big emerging markets in Latin America, beginning with Lula’s Brazil and the new Argentina. The real effects of the SARS crisis, and evidence that the communist Chinese authorities routinely lie about the data they provide to the international community, has damaged the long-assumed growth engines of Asia, starting with the now communist-governed Hong Kong and China itself. A China that declared that its gross domestic product (GDP) had grown almost 10% in 2002 is estimated to have fallen to a SARS-scarred negative 2% in the spring of 2003.
Within the G8 itself, there is a sharp shift toward equality among member countries, as strong equalizing shifts in exchange rates overwhelm the much smaller, often offsetting differences in real economic growth. In number-one America, a plunging dollar has, by mid-May 2003, declined 9% against the euro since the start of the year and by about 20% since May 2002. U.S. GDP has expanded at an annual rate of only 1.4% in the final quarter of 2002 and only 1.6% in the first quarter of 2003. Behind lies an historically high current account deficit, rising fiscal deficit, rising unemployment, and consumers with low confidence and high debt.
Number-two Japan, in contrast, has a rapidly rising currency, and even long-awaited year-over-year growth. Its insulation from the Asian SARS disease also suggests a brighter regional future. Yet its new growth rate has diminished ever quarter, to reach zero as the Summit approaches. It still confronts its long known problems of deflation, government budget deficits (at 7.7% of GDP), and private sector debt. Indeed, its fifth largest bank has gone bankrupt, two weeks before the Summit begins.
A similar story unfolds even more clearly in Europe. During the year to February 2003, the euro appreciated 24 percent against the U.S. dollar and the Japanese yen. In the year to April 2003, it gained 22% against the U.S. dollar. These increases overwhelm the small differentials with the U.S. that European GDP stagnation brings. Indeed, in the heartland, Germany has slipped into recession, with two consecutive quarters of GDP growth to April 2003 and a full 2003 figure estimated at 1%. Its current account deficit and unemployment rate are growing. Italy’s GDP is contracting as well. In Britain, the pound is stable, shedding only 0.8% against the dollar and 6% against the euro in the year ending April 2003. British growth in the first quarter of 2003 is the slowest in a year.
At the bottom, however, Canada is moving strongly ahead in both exchange rate and GDP growth. The Canadian dollar has surged to over US$0.74 by late May 2003. Canada continues to be the G7 growth leader, as it has been for the past several years. Canada is projected, by both the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), to be the growth leader again for 2003 as a whole. Growth was 2% in the first quarter of 2003 and is an estimated 2.5% for the whole year. Canada is the only G7 country with a budget surplus (of 1.4% of GDP).
Russian is even more strongly on the rise, propelled like Canada by both currency and real economy growth. The ruble strengthened against the U.S. dollar in 2002 by 5.9%. GDP growth in 2002 was 4.3%. It rose to 6% during the first three months of 2003. Unemployment decreased by 4% to hit 8%. The growth in real income of the population was 9%. Russia’s rise to economic respectability and prospective superpower strength is evident in several other developments. In October 2002 Russia was excluded from the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) black list. Russian debt to the IMF declined to just US$6.4 billion, against its quota of US$8 billion. In 2002 payments to the IMF were around US$1.6 billion. The external debt of the central government is US$125.5 billion (3,995.9 billion rubles), with Russia having paid US$14.5 billion during the past year. It is estimated that Russian debt in 2003 will be 40% of its GDP, the normal level for the European Union countries. All the technicalities concerning Russia joining the WTO were agreed on in 2002.
As Summits succeed when they have constricted participation in membership, but diffuse participation in invited guests, the prospects for Evian appear promising indeed. For the Evian Summit features the core eight attending for the first time as full equal members, along with the largest guest list invited to the longest Summit by far (see Appendix E). Evian is in fact an extended, funnel-like sequence of five Summits in two cities. It starts in St. Petersburg with an EU-Russia Summit and a symbolic EU-G8 Summit, and continues in Evian with a "G27" Summit on the afternoon of June 1, a NEPAD-G8 gathering over dinner on the evening of June 1, and finally, the G8 Summit on June 2-3. For the first time, there will be no gathering of G7 leaders without Russia.
Despite these participatory advantages, risks with the particular formula for meeting abound. Evian’s anti-Kananaskis cadence of going from broader to narrower gatherings could foster an impression that the G8 is indeed a directoire, with outsiders coming to plead their case before the G8 alone decides what happens at the end of the day. Moreover, with its EU-St. Petersburg start, it also could appear to reinforce a Euro-centricity appropriate to the 19th-century world, at a time when the major challenges arise in Asia, the Middle East, and Africa beyond. It is also the antithesis of the style most favoured by the Americans, who spoke immediately after Kananaskis of having a short Summit at an already prepared site when they hosted in 2004. As a practical matter, when the G8 leaders finally sit down by themselves on June 2, they could be personally exhausted and media saturated, rather than energized to make new decisions that the world would want to hear and see.
As Evian approaches, it is unclear if the G8 members’ deep common principles of open democracy, individual liberty, and social advancement can transcend the recently UN-created divisions over Iraq. One promising sign is that the great Iraq divide came with a kaleidoscope of cross-cutting cleavages. The "interventionist four" came from North America, Asia, and Europe, and from left wing, centrist, and right-wing leaders alike. A second promising sign is that the recent most terrorist attacks, including those in the Middle East, are producing a common aversion that inspires the unity and "spirit of September 11" to return. Growth inhibiting scandals of corporate governance in most G8 countries also drive their shared democratization desires to a deeper, more domestic plane.
Yet the UN divisions over Iraq remain intense, especially as hosts France and Russia, along with Germany, continue to seek UN cover for any move to reconstruct Iraq. This difference speaks directly to a deeper division that raises the central constitutional conflict of the era. Will the G8’s foundational 1975 principle of intervention, and by extension pre-emption, for democracy trump the UN Charter’s central principle of absolute non-interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states, except after a clear interstate act of aggression takes place? In 1999, over Kosovo and Chechnya, all G7 members stood united behind the 1975 principle of democratic intervention, and dragged a reluctant Russia along. Central to solving the great fissure at Evian will be how Russia, now a full G8 member with strongly rising capabilities — the new Russia for the new Europe — will assess its identity and interests now.
Since Summits succeed when the leaders are in firm political control of their domestic polities, the prospects for Evian, at first glance, appear promising indeed. Coming to Evian will be host Jacques Chirac of France, George W. Bush of the United States, Tony Blair of Britain, Gerhard Schroeder of Germany, Junichiro Koizumi of Japan, Silvio Berlusconi of Italy, Jean Chrétien of Canada, and Vladimir Putin of Russia. As this exact group had gathered for the G8 in both 2002 and 2001, there is unusual leadership continuity, and thus no need to waste time on socializing newcomers — apart from the Greek EU president — into the club. There is also an unusually high degree of G8 leadership experience, led by Chrétien’s nine years, Chirac’s eight, and Blair’s seven. This "1939 club" could be called on to bridge the Iraq divide. There is also considerable electoral security, as none of the leaders is likely to face elections in the year following the Summit. Host Chirac is still at the beginning of the five-year term he won in 2002. Chrétien has already announced his resignation effective February 2004, Schroeder was re-elected in 2002, and Berlusconi elected on May 2001. Koizumi was appointed Prime Minister on April 2001 and Putin elected in March 2000. In Britain, Tony Blair’s Labour party was elected with a strong majority in June 2001; Bush, too, was elected in 2001. Apart from Koizumi in Japan, where two-year prime ministerships are normal, only George Bush could potentially be distracted by the looming presidential election in November 2004.
In addition, all leaders are domestically popular politicians, but in large part because their publics have rallied behind their respective national positions on the Iraq war. Before the war, at the end of February 2003, Bush still sported a substantial majority approval rating, but one well down from his unprecedented post–September 11 peak. Japan’s Koizumi had plunged to under 50% from the extraordinary highs he had initially enjoyed. Britain’s Blair was similarly sagging under the weight of domestic opposition to a war against Iraq. Only in the anti-attack or ambivalent G7 members were the leaders enjoying surging popularity. However, the coalition victory has carried Bush to new highs and pushed Blair to majority levels. But while it has led Canadians to rally behind their Anglo-American cousins, it has left France, Germany, and Russia still entrenched in their leader’s anti-attack stance. The divisive temptation to play to the voter back home thus endures.
At the beginning of their presidency, the French had said they wished to replicate the Kananaskis model, chose Evian as the site on this basis, and intended to focus on the single African theme. Yet they soon moved to 15 agenda items, for a ceremony-saturated Summit with dozens of guests, taking place in two cities and countries over five days. This ballooning format reflects a unilateral French decision, acquiesced to by the others, rather than a consensus among the G8. While Britain and Canada applaud the meeting with the African leaders, even in a pre-Summit sequence, the Americans, as in 1989, have strongly sought to cut the number of invited guests back. Yet all are prisoners of their public commitment at Kananaskis to come to St. Petersburg as the French and Russians wished.
For their agenda, the French offered a changing array of 12 to 15 items with evolving names, making it difficult for G8 partners to determine precisely what was to be discussed at the Summit at what time. France’s initial four themes had migrated by May into three: growth, security and sustainable development, into which the 15 items would be stuffed. The stuffing, and removal of the traditional opening dinner, has left very little time for leaders to be alone. By the end of April, all the preparatory process could produce were agreements on oceans and transportation safety, on shoulder-mounted weapons that could shoot down civilian airliners (MANPADS), on potable drinking water, and perhaps on polio. While worthy, these seemed to be very little for such a large event.
The combined, four-day sherpa and sous-sherpa meeting that took place at Evian in mid May was very tense. Many proposals were proposed by the Anglo-American coalition while the French insisted on having their way. Yet the meetings did produce some advance.
Physically, the G8 leaders will start in St. Petersburg, where they will have entirely ceremonial meetings with leaders of the EU and Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). There was some discussion of getting G8 leaders together for dinner but that is unlikely to take place. G8 leaders will depart on the morning of June 1 for a meeting of 27 world leaders in Evian (including the G8) in the afternoon. In the late afternoon, the G8 will huddle alone to discuss Africa and NEPAD. Then they will meet their African guests. The next morning the G8 proper starts. It will end one and a half days later with a "chair’s summary" that will resemble the traditional communiqué in its length and in its reference to earlier issued documents. At the end the chair will brief the media, and several other delegations may as well. The world will be waiting to see if the Americans stay to do so, or rush to get out of France as soon as they can.
Substantively, Evian is destined to produce agreed upon communiqué text or separate documents on seven subjects: the Global Partnership; famine; fresh water, marine/oceans issues, and tanker safety; AIDS/SARS; counter-terrorism capacity building; and a responsible market economy. Less likely but still very possible are agreements on five additional items: corruption and transparency (related to the responsible market economy, perhaps as an appendix or addendum); trade and development (a Doha-related text); health; science and technology for sustainable development; and security of transport (mostly MANPADS). Least likely is an agreement on nonproliferation and WMD regarding radioactive source security, designed to ensure that radioactive materials used medically will not produce dirty bombs.
On the Global Partnership, the first of the Kananaskis legacy issues, the prospects are for the completion of donations to the US$20 billion funding package agreed to at Kananaskis, a multilateral agreement, and an end to the road blocks of the past year, so countries can sign contracts, spend and get people in to decommission submarines, and do the other work. Here the Summit has proven useful in creating deadlines to produce agreement in time for a public announcement. This agreement, which has come together over the previous eight weeks, comes from all countries compromising, with Russia moving the most on the obstacles relating to liability and taxation. New donors, starting with Russia’s neighbours, will come forward. A further conference might take place. There are, however, no plans to expand the Global Partnership financially, as enough money has now been mobilized. Geographically, with Ukraine seeking entry, there has been some discussion of admitting the CIS states. In a few months, once real projects are up and running in Russia, the time for geographic expansion could well come.
On Africa, the second Kananaskis legacy issue, uncertainty prevails. In general terms, Africa is one of the 12-15 items the French have identified. It is linked to the water, corporate social responsibility, EITI (see below), and peace and security items as well. On the key issue of the New Plan for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) peer review, the onus is on Africa, as G8 leaders are waiting to hear what their African partners have done and intend to do. At Evian, the African Personal Representatives (APRs) will release their own final report on implementation of the G8 Africa Action Plan. It should show that some G8 countries, such as Britain and Canada, have done reasonably well in implementing their commitments, while others have done less. Zimbabwe will hang like a cloud over the discussion, but it is not central to what the G8 plans to do.
Another core African issue is that of APR succession, critical to ensuring that Africa will live on as a G8 priority once Evian ends and the U.S. becomes Summit host. The APRs in a separate process are still writing their report to leaders. They aim at recommending, in their May 19th meeting, the form that APR succession will take. As of mid May there was no consensus, and a very broad range of options was at play. The issue is led, not by France but by Canada, which seeks an effective follow-up mechanism. It is also led by the British, who proposed, in the first specific suggestion, that G8 sous-sherpas for Africa be added to the main Summit preparatory team. A further idea is that the G8 APR group be expanded to include African APRs. It is likely that the APRs will outline the options in their report to leaders, and the leaders themselves at Evian will decide which one to pursue
In keeping with recent Summits, Evian is likely to do little on the key challenge of sustaining global economic growth. There should be language in the communiqué, and possibly in stand-alone papers, on the macroeconomic situation and growth, on structural reforms (making the Germans and Japanese nervous), on financial crisis prevention and resolution, and on debt relief. No large steps are likely to come.
The most concrete move among the traditional economic issues is likely to be on heavily indebted poor countries. The decision will most likely appear in the chairman’s summary, but could come in a stand-alone statement, depending on the Deauville finance ministers meeting. The leaders will likely look at what comes out of Deauville and pick what they want to give added emphasis to. It will probably not be a pledging session, like Halifax in 2002, but an emphasis on getting others to put money in.
On trade, the leaders are likely to highlight specific issues such as intellectual property, agriculture, and patents, promising to solve these issues where WTO deadlines have been missed. However they are unlikely to ask the Quadrilateral Trade Ministers to do any follow-on work. The statement on trade will be read carefully to see G8 intentions for the WTO’s ministerial meeting at Cancun in September. APEC trade ministers on same date as the Summit will also release a similar statement directed at Cancun.
The initial French theme of a "responsible market economy" has become fused with several cognate concepts – a specific British initiative on an extractive industries transfer initiative (EITI), an American concern with corruption, and a broader emphasis on corporate social responsibility. Three different approaches will thus come together at the summit. The first, narrow approach is on transparency in payments for resource-extracting industries (EITI), where Britain is pushing for G8 action. The second is the U.S. focus on corruption and transparency. Whereas the British focus is on corporations and their corporate responsibility, the U.S. approach focuses on governments and creating problems for governments that take bribes. The third approach, favoured by the French, on a responsible market economy, seeks a statement of high principles, from governments and corporations together, to avoid corrupt practices. These three approaches have produced three papers: a G8 presidency paper on a responsible market economy, a combined UK-U.S. paper on corruption and transparency, and a British paper on EITI. These are now being melded into one. The likely result is a paper on a responsible market economy, containing some elements of the British EITI, and perhaps including an annex on corruption and transparency. In no case are binding disciplines likely to come.
Environmental issues will come under corporate social responsibility, and in specific items on science and technology, water and oceans/maritime safety. The centrepiece could well be science and technology for sustainable development, in the form of a paper on breakthrough developments in science and technology and R&D. The British, supported by the Japanese, are driving the process here. On water, Evian is also likely to leverage the EU’s pledge of 1 billion euros on water, by inspiring donations from other states. The Summit will also call for strong measures on maritime safety, perhaps even a pledge, resisted thus far by the Japanese, to phase out or otherwise deal with tankers with single hulls.
In the field of health, there will be a follow-up to the Global Fund for AIDS, Malaria and Tuberculosis. Despite the United States recent US$1 billion donation, the G8 will emphasize, not pledges of new money, but getting on with spending the money already committed. Russia may mount an initiative on contributing to the fund by training African specialists in the Russian Federation. In addition, the communiqué will mention SARS.
With such a diffuse agenda and no opening dinner of their own, many of the burning political security issues could largely be left to the foreign ministers, meeting in Paris on May 22-23. On conflict prevention at Evian there will be a special African dimension. How the difficult question of Iraq reconstruction is handled remains unclear.
With such a diffuse agenda and unambitious array of likely accomplishments, it will be easier for the surrounding media to focus on the body language and handshakes between Chirac and Bush, or be diverted by protestors of the continental European style. Moreover, as there is an aversion against any further institutionalization of the Summit, there are unlikely to be many new working groups created to give Evian an institutional legacy to make up for its substantive shortcomings. With no compelling single vision or achievement to rally around, it is all the more likely that the lingering disagreements over Iraq will intrude, or that President Bush, like his father before him, will become bored or frustrated with the whole G8 affair. On the road from Evian, in the second half of the French year, it may be the foreign ministers who pick up the slack, on issues such as Iraq, Middle East, and Korea, as Colin Powell and his colleagues try to reduce a still substantial intra-G8 divide.
What is clear is that the Americans are already planning for their 2004 Summit, and seeking to do it differently than the French have in 2003. The efficient Americans will hold all the preparatory meetings in Washington. They have a short list of five locations for the Summit. Crawford, Texas is, tellingly, not on the list. It will take some time before George Bush bonds with the Summit and discovers its true value as he moves into his campaign for re-election in 2004. The Evian G8 will thus serve as an important institutional insurance policy, bridging the UN-generated divisions over Iraq, and keeping the momentum of Kananaskis and multilateralism alive, until the Americans decide how to lead the G8 for themselves.
"We will continue our dialogue with our African partners. At our next Summit, we will review progress on the implementation of the G8 Africa Action Plan on the basis of a final report from our Personal representatives for Africa." (p. 2)
"We welcomed the offer of the President of France to host our next Summit in June 2001. We agreed that Russia will assume the 2006 G8 presidency and host our annual Summit that year." (p. 3)
"…we will continue to consult with our African partners on how we can best assist their own efforts." (p. 2)
"We will continue to maintain a constructive dialogue with our African partners in order to achieve effective implementation of our Action Plan and to support the objectives of NEPAD. We will take the necessary steps to ensure the effective implementation of our Action Plan and will review progress at our next Summit based on a final report from our Personal representatives for Africa." (p. 3)
"We will review over the next year the applicability of the guidelines to existing projects." (p. 1)
"We will review progress on this Global Partnership at our next Summit in 2003." (p. 1)
"Given the breadth and scope of the activities to be undertaken, the G8 will establish an appropriate mechanism for the annual review of progress under this initiative which may include consultations regarding priorities, identification of project gaps and potential overlap, and assessment of consistency of the co-operation projects with international security obligations and objectives. Specific bilateral and multilateral project implementation will be co-ordinated subject to arrangements appropriate to that project, including existing mechanisms." (p. 4)
"With respect to nuclear safety and security, the partners agreed to establish a new G8 Nuclear Safety and Security Group by the time of our next Summit." (p. 4).
"In order to ensure timely implementation of this initiative, we will review progress every six months, providing direction as required to G8 experts. G8 experts will pursue these priorities and will promote policy coherence and coordination in all relevant international organizations (ICAO, IMO, WCO, ILO), in partnership with industry." (p. 3)
"In 2006, we have agreed that Russia will assume the presidency and host our annual summit…The G8 Summit cycle will begin again in 2003 in France, followed by the United States (2004), the United Kingdom (2005), Russia (2006), Germany (2007), Japan (2008), Italy (2009) and Canada (2010). (p. 1)
"We will continue our dialogue with our African partners. At our next Summit, we will review progress on the implementation of the G8 Africa Action Plan on the basis of a final report from our Personal representatives for Africa."
"We welcomed the offer of the President of France to host our next Summit in June 2001. We agreed that Russia will assume the 2006 G8 presidency and host our annual Summit that year." (p. 3)
"We will take the necessary steps to ensure the effective implementation of our Action Plan and will review progress at our next Summit based on a final report from our Personal Representatives for Africa." (p. 3)
"Given the breadth and scope of the activities to be undertaken, the G8 will establish an appropriate mechanism for the annual review of progress under this initiative which may include consultations regarding priorities, identification of project gaps and potential overlap, and assessment of consistency of the co-operation projects with international security obligations and objectives. Specific bilateral and multilateral project implementation will be co-ordinated subject to arrangements appropriate to that project, including existing mechanisms." (p. 4)
"With respect to nuclear safety and security, the partners agreed to establish a new G8 Nuclear Safety and Security Group by the time of our next Summit." (p. 4).
"In order to ensure timely implementation of this initiative, we will review progress every six months, providing direction as required to G8 experts. G8 experts will pursue these priorities and will promote policy coherence and coordination in all relevant international organizations (ICAO, IMO, WCO, ILO), in partnership with industry. (p. 3)
"In 2006, we have agreed that Russia will assume the presidency and host our annual summit…The G8 Summit cycle will begin again in 2003 in France, followed by the United States (2004), the United Kingdom (2005), Russia (2006), Germany (2007), Japan (2008), Italy (2009) and Canada (2010). (p. 1)
2002
| September 27 | G8 Development Cooperation Ministers Meeting, Windsor |
| September 27 | G7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, Washington |
| October 25 | Statement by G8 Foreign Ministers in Connection with Terrorist Hostage Taking in Moscow |
2003
| February 21-22 | G7 Finance Ministers, Paris |
| April 11-12 | G8 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, Washington |
| April 24 | G8 Development Ministers, Paris |
| April 25-27 | G8 Environment Ministers, Paris |
| April 29 | G8 Energy Ministers, Paris |
| May 5 | G8 Justice and Home Affairs Ministers, Paris |
| May 22-23 | G8 Foreign Ministers, Paris |
| May 16-17 | G7 Finance Ministers, Deauville, France |
| May 30-31 | G8-EU Summit, St. Petersburg |
| June 1-3 | G7/8 Summit, Evian-les-Bains, France |
2003
| April 29 | Blair visits Putin in Moscow |
| April 29 | Koizumi visits Chirac |
| April 30 | Koizumi visits Schroeder |
| April 30 | Chirac, Schroeder, and Berlusconi in Brussels |
| May 1 | Koizumi visits Greece (EU) |
| May 5 | Bush cancelled visit to Chrétien |
| May 22-23 | Koizumi visits Bush |
India
Mexico
Brazil
China
South Africa
Saudi Arabia
Egypt
Senegal
Malaysia
Morocco
Argentina
Australia
South Korea
Turkey
Algeria
Cambodia (Prince Sihanouk)
Cameroon (MM Paul Biya)
Cyprus (M. Vassaliou)
Gabon (Omar Bongo)
Pakistan (Benazir Bhutto)
Philippines (Corazon Aquino)
Portugal (Mario Suares)
Venezuela (Carlos Andres Perez)
Yugoslavia (only socialist country)
Zimbabwe (Robert Mugabe)
Perez de Cuellar?
Bayne, Nicholas (2003), "Impressions of the Kananaskis Summit," in Michele Fratianni, Paolo Savona and John Kirton, eds., Sustaining Global Growth and Development: G7 and IMF Contributions and Challenges (Ashgate: Aldershot).
Bayne, Nicholas (1999), "Continuity and Leadership in an Age of Globalisation," pp. 21-45, in Michael Hodges, John Kirton and Joseph Daniels, eds. The G8’s Role in the New Millennium (London: Ashgate).
Fratianni, Michele, Paolo Savona and John Kirton (2003), "Introduction, Observations and Conclusions," in Michele Fratianni, Paolo Savona and John Kirton, eds., Governing Globalization: Corporate, Public and G8 Governance (to be submitted to Ashgate Publishing).
Kirton, John (1993), "The Seven Power Summit and the New Security Agenda", pp. 335-357 in David Dewitt, David Haglund and John Kirton, eds., Building a New Global Order: Emerging Trends in International Relations (Toronto: Oxford University Press).
Kirton, John (1989), "Contemporary Concert Diplomacy: The Seven-Power Summit and the Management of International Order." Paper prepared for the International Studies Association Annual Conference, March 29–April 1, London, England.
Whelan (2003), Interview with Susan Whelan, Minister for International Cooperation, Canada, with Professor John Kirton, Ottawa, May 15.
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