2. Canada at the Denver Summit of the Eight

This longstanding coincidence of Taiwan's interests and Canada's G7 diplomacy was called into question by the major structural changes in the international system in the 1990's. The end of the European Cold War reduced the relevance of anti-Communist allies in a global containment strategy, and raised the question of membership for Russia, and potentially other claimants such as the PRC and Indonesia, in the G7 and WTO. Moreover globalization lead to a widespread trade liberalization and rivalry to secure new export markets among emerging economies, thus giving the PRC an enhanced ability to appeal to the individual economic interests of G7 members.

These pressures were evident at the “Denver Summit of the Eight”. In particular, the admission of Russia as a participant throughout the entire Summit, save for a brief one and a half hour session of the seven leaders devoted to economic affairs, had several consequences. (15) It reduced Japan's influence and role as the only voice of Asia, reinforced calls for the eventual admission of the PRC, promised to lower the G7's standards for Russian membership in the WTO, and effectively eliminated the G7's ability to deal with its core economic agenda and thereby deal proactively with protectionist pressures and the looming Asian currency crisis. More broadly the US decision to include Russia so fully, in return for Russian acquiescence in NATO enlargement, suggested the pre-eminence of a Eurocentric rather than Asian-sensitive conception of international order. Reinforcing these forces were the dynamics of relative capability in the leadup to Denver, as surging American economic strength, combined with stagnation in Japan and slow growth in much of the rest of the G7 provided limited room for other G7 members, including Canada, to temper the American approach. (16)

Canada adjusted readily to these forces, easily welcoming Russian participation, publicly accepting the limited economic discussion among leaders, and quietly working to soften any harsh G7 language over Hong Kong. But beneath these surface adjustments lay a continuity of policy that meant the traditional co-incidence between Canada's G7 diplomacy and Taiwan's interests remained intact.

In the first instance, the treatment of Russia marked an application and affirmation rather than an abandonment of the democratic principles historically at the heart of Canada's G7 diplomacy. Russia was extended virtually full participation only after it had become a certifiably democratic country by virtue of its 1996 Presidential elections. Moreover, the Denver session "at seven", together with the opening night sessions “at seven” on Bosnia and terrorism at Halifax and Lyon respectively, affirmed the G7's residual capacity to act alone in the event of Russian recidivism. With such stark recent reminders of G7 alternatives, the virtually full admission of a now democratic Russia at Denver provided a powerful incentive to the PRC to initiate a meaningful process of democratization should it wish to gain admission to the club that now dominated the post- Cold War era.

The force of this incentive was strengthened by the underlying consensus among G7 members about prospective PRC membership or partial association. Such ideas had become fashionable among retired officials and outside analysts. (17) However no-one in the US Government, or any other G7 government had considered including China in the G7. (18) There was an underlying if largely unarticulated conviction that China did not play by the rules of the game of democracy and free trade, to a degree unlikely to be changed by the APEC logic of ameliorating PRC's attitudes and action through inclusion, or what one official derisively termed "putting cowboy boots on Zemin." At the same time, no-one in the US Government argued that there was a need to create a de facto G8, with Russia included, because China was now a powerful threat that had to be countered.

Nor did Canada abandon its traditional support for forwarding democratic principles and human rights at the G7. In the immediate leadup to Denver, there was much attention across the G7 to issues involving China. Denver took place a mere two weeks before the transition in Hong Kong. (19) There was also an acute debate raging in the United States about American policy toward China, a debate that pitted the business community against those from the liberal-left who were concerned about human rights issues such as Tibet. The geopolitical right also saw China as the emerging threat. The US and Japan tacitly endorsed a gentle version of this view. Responding directly to the Chinese missiles fired at Taiwan the previous year, they issued new defence guidelines allowing military co-operation in the extended maritime reaches off Japan. The Chinese strongly opposed this move, viewing the extension of Japanese support for US military operations as aimed directly at them.

Such an atmosphere heightened the conflict between the G7's historic role as the moral centre for rendering judgments about the practices of non- democratic regimes, including the PRC, and the latter's desire to play to the individual commercial self-interest of G7 members. In preparations for Denver, the US, seeking a Congressional renewal of authority to trade with China on an MFN basis, proposed that the G7 issue a strong statement on Hong Kong. It was supported by Britain. Canada and other G7 members were cautious. However all came to agree that the Denver Summit should issue an extensive statement of support for democratic freedoms in Hong Kong.

In the leadup to Denver, the PRC learned that the draft G7 communiqué included a passage on Hong Kong. In keeping with their general aversion to having the G7 develop a view on China, they protested strongly. Yet none of the G7 suggested altering their proposed passage in response.

At Denver there was much private discussion among the leaders about China's intentions for Hong Kong, as well as an extensive treatment by the foreign ministers. The positions of the G7 members were consistent with those publicly seen in the earlier co-sponsorship of the UN resolution on human rights in Geneva and subsequently G7 members' decision to send representatives to attend the installation of the new legislature in Hong Kong (a ceremony which only the Americans and British ultimately boycotted). The US and the British pushed to have the G7 issue a strong statement of support for the preservation of democratic freedoms in Hong Kong. The Japanese, while quite concerned about the PRC takeover, were more cautious.

Prime Minister Chrétien's and Foreign Minister Axworthy's interventions were consistent with Canada's very strong policy of engaging China. Its fixed axis was a commitment that no country would outflank Canada as a friend of China in the region. It was a policy held in place by sunk political capital, Team Canada visits, the memories of Trudeau in the early 1970's, a judgement that blockades and isolation were ineffective and un- Canadian, and a hope of commercial advantage. In the particular case of Hong Kong, it was complicated by the fact that 500,000 Canadians living in Canada were of Hong Kong origin and that an estimated 100,000 - 200,000 individuals with Canadian passports were currently residing in Hong Kong. (20) A further complication was the fact that the ceremony installing the new Chief Executive was also the one installing the appointed legislature which replaced the democratically- elected one Canada supported. Canada's position on Hong Kong reflected national interests derived from its "constructive engagement" approach to China. However, this approach was not antithetical to Taiwanese interests, as one of its pillars was to induce democratization in China. In this respect, a policy of cooperation and accommodation enabled Canada to further open China's economy and, given China's dislike of international criticism, permitted Canada to engage with China in human rights dialogue and criminal justice reform.

Despite these cautions, Canada fully shared the general anxiety about PRC behaviour, and the conviction that a clear statement of concern was required. At the foreign ministers' discussion Axworthy stressed the importance of human rights and the adoption by the PRC of the two UN covenants on human rights, while noting the large number of Canadians directly connected to Hong Kong. Both he and Chrétien also stressed the importance of holding free elections for a new legislature within a year, a commitment they felt they had successfully recorded in the concluding communiqué. (21)

The leaders agreed that they would co-ordinate their positions on the handover, and specified their core concerns in the Denver communiqué. The extensive communiqué statement on China, employing language the US had been using for months, was noteworthy for its clear call for democratic elections for a new Legislative Council, and respect for the initial British-Sino accord. The G7 statement, included in the Denver communiqué unchanged from the draft of a week earlier, read:

We recognize the historic nature of China's imminent resumption of sovereignty over Hong Kong. Considering our durable interests in this financial and economic centre, we welcome and place weight on China's commitments, contained in the 1984 UK-PRC Joint Declaration and in the 1990 PRC Basic Law. These include ensuring Hong Kong's continued stability and prosperity and preserving its way of life, its high degree of autonomy - including an independent monetary and economic system - its fundamental freedoms and the rule of law. These will provide the essential underpinnings for Hong Kong's future economic success. We look forward to democratic elections in Hong Kong for a new legislature as soon as possible. We take serious note of China's assurances in the Joint Declaration and Basic Law that the provisions of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights will continue to apply in Hong Kong.

Denver thus contributed to the high degree of international attention over Hong Kong that helped the transition proceed with no overt repression in the ensuing months.

A further area where Canada maintained its consistent G7 position, despite the adjustments of the moment, was accession to the WTO. At the Spring 1997 news conference in Europe announcing NATO's enlargement and Russia's participation in the Denver Summit of the Eight, US Secretary of State Madeline Albright and Treasury Under-Secretary Larry Summers had indicated that the US looked forward to Russia joining the WTO on "commercially acceptable" terms. The Denver Summit of the Eight communiqué, in contrast, noted: "We support the goal of early Russian accession to the WTO on the basis of conditions generally acceptable to newly acceding members." The apparent softening raised the question of whether Russia might be a precursor for an early and special arrangement for the PRC to enter the WTO.

However there was no G7 support for such a relaxation. It was generally felt that Russia would be unable to meet the conditions within the one year that some had earlier envisaged. A Canadian specialist estimated that it might take up to a decade for Russia to do so. The communiqué of the G7, meeting alone, affirmed this strict condition. It read: "We attach a high priority to expanding the membership of the WTO, on the basis of commitments to adhere to WTO rules and to provide commercially meaningful market access." In the case of China, the US in particular, with a major trade deficit with the PRC, remained strongly insistent that China accede to the WTO only when it fulfilled all the normal conditions. (22) Canada's position was broadly similar, although Canada was prepared to support early access once the PRC met basic conditions for financial services liberalization and access for agricultural products. (23)

A third area of Canadian continuity at Denver was in arms control, particularly in Canada's skillful use of the Denver Summit to secure support for the Ottawa Process aimed at outlawing landmines. In the week before the Summit, Prime Minister Blair announced British support for the initiative. At Denver Canada secured the endorsement of French President Jacques Chirac. Indeed, all of the Denver participants agreed with Canada in principle on the initiative, while Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov indicated that Russia might move toward an actual ban. Although the United States, in part due to its responsibilities on the Korean peninsula, remained opposed, the move toward G7 unanimity highlighted the differences between the group and a PRC committed to keeping its capacity to manufacture, use and sell landmines.

In the area of regional security, however, Canada did decline an opportunity to move to the forefront of concern for human rights. At Denver, Japan's Hashimoto led off with a call for the G7 to be concerned about the situation in Cambodia. Canada, which placed neither Cambodia nor the Korean peninsula among its Denver priorities, regarded this as an effort to "hijack" the agreed upon agenda. Madeline Albright further pressed for an agreement to have Pol Pot brought to trial for war crimes he had committed in Cambodia, and to create a permanent war crimes tribunal for this purpose. In the interim she asked that Canada, as a country whose law apparently permitted action against genocide anywhere, to charge and extradite Pol Pot so that proceedings against him could commence. In response, Axworthy promised only that Ottawa would consider the request.