

# **The G8 Summit Communiqués on Nuclear Non-Proliferation, 1975-2005**

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November 2005

## **Introduction:**

In response to the Russian announcement that energy security will be a central issue-area at the 2006 St. Petersburg Summit, this document outlines the G8's treatment of nuclear non-proliferation as a related issue. This document is derived from the Leaders' Communiqués and other documents released at the annual G8 Summit since its inception in 1975 at Rambouillet, and it catalogues references to nuclear non-proliferation up to and including the 2005 Gleneagles Summit. A list of terms that were included and excluded can be found in Appendix B.

## **The Non-proliferation Issue Area Defined:**

As an issue area within the G8, non-proliferation includes references to containing the dangers of nuclear technology, including nuclear safety, nuclear weapons controls, "safe energy development," etc. It also includes instances when the G7/8 condemns a state's development of unsafe or non-peaceful nuclear programs.

In a G8 context, arms control can be defined as any efforts to reduce, redirect or otherwise control the horizontal and vertical increase of nuclear, chemical, biological, radiological conventional and dual use weapons, materials, technology and delivery systems. It also extends to efforts to address the "root causes" of arms proliferation, such as controlling excessive military spending by linking it to decreases in development assistance.

### ***Note:***

The 1996 Moscow Nuclear Safety and Security Summit Declaration appears in Appendix A.

## **The Non-proliferation Catalogue:**

### **1975 Rambouillet**

No references.

### **1976 Puerto Rico**

No references.

### **1977 London**

## ***Communiqué:***

We commit ourselves to do this while reducing the risks of **nuclear proliferation**. We are launching an urgent study to determine how best to fulfill these purposes.

### *Appendix to Downing Street Summit Declaration*

#### *ENERGY*

Increasing reliance will have to be placed on nuclear energy to satisfy growing energy requirements and to help diversify sources of energy. This should be done with the utmost precaution with respect to the generation and **dissemination of material** that can be used for **nuclear weapons**. Our objective is to meet the world's energy needs and to make peaceful use of nuclear energy widely available, while avoiding the danger of the **spread of nuclear weapons**. We are also agreed that, in order to be effective, **nonproliferation policies** should as far as possible be acceptable to both industrialized and developing countries alike. To this end, we are undertaking a preliminary analysis to be completed within two months of the best means of advancing these objectives, including the study of terms of reference for **international fuel cycle evaluation**.

#### 1978 Bonn

##### *Communiqué:*

#### *ENERGY*

To promote the **peaceful use of nuclear energy** and reduce the risk of **nuclear proliferation**, the **nuclear fuel cycle studies** initiated at the London Summit should be pursued. The President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Canada have expressed their firm intention to continue as **reliable suppliers of nuclear fuel** within the framework of effective **safeguards**. The President intends to use the full powers of his office to prevent any interruption of **enriched uranium supply** and to ensure that existing agreements will be respected. The Prime Minister intends that there shall be no interruption of Canadian **uranium supply** on the basis of effective **safeguards**.

#### 1979 Tokyo

##### *Communiqué:*

We reaffirm the understanding reached at the Bonn Summit with respect to the reliable supply of **nuclear fuel** and minimizing the risk of **nuclear proliferation**.

#### 1980 Venice

##### *Communiqué:*

#### *ENERGY*

13. We underline the vital contribution of nuclear power to a more secure energy supply. The role of nuclear energy has to be increased if world energy needs are to be met. We shall therefore have to expand our nuclear generating capacity. We will continue to give the highest priority to ensuring the health and safety of the public and to perfecting methods for dealing with **spent fuels** and disposal of **nuclear waste**. We reaffirm the importance of ensuring the reliable supply of **nuclear fuel** and minimizing the risk of **nuclear proliferation**.

14. The studies made by the **International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation Group**, launched at the London Summit in 1977, are a significant contribution to the use of **nuclear energy**. We welcome their findings with respect to: increasing predictable **supplies**; the most effective utilization of **uranium sources**, including the development of advanced technologies; and the minimization of **proliferation risks**, including support of **International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards**. We urge all countries to take these findings into account when developing policies and programs for the **peaceful use of nuclear energy**.

### **1981 Montebello**

#### *Communiqué:*

#### *ENERGY*

32. In most of our countries progress in constructing new nuclear facilities is slow. We intend in each of our countries to encourage greater public acceptance of nuclear energy, and **respond to public concerns about safety, health, nuclear waste management and nonproliferation**. We will further our efforts in the development of advanced technologies, particularly in **spent fuel management**.

### **1982 Versailles**

No references.

### **1983 Williamsburg**

No references.

### **1984 London**

No references.

### **1985 Bonn**

No references.

### **1986 Tokyo**

## *Statement on the Implications of the Chernobyl Nuclear Accident*

1. We, the Heads of State or Government of seven major industrial nations and the Representatives of the European Community, have discussed the implications of the accident at the **Chernobyl nuclear power station**. We express our deep sympathy for those affected. We remain ready to extend assistance, in particular medical and technical, as and when requested.

2. Nuclear power is and, properly managed, will continue to be an increasingly widely used source of energy. For each country the maintenance of safety and security is an international responsibility, and **each country engaged in nuclear power generation bears full responsibility for the safety of the design, manufacture, operation and maintenance of its installations**. Each of our countries meets exacting **standards**. Each country, furthermore, is responsible for prompt provision of detailed and complete information on **nuclear emergencies and accidents**, in particular those with potential transboundary consequences. Each of our countries accepts that responsibility, and we urge the Government of the Soviet Union, which did not do so in the case of **Chernobyl**, to provide urgently such information, as our [countries] and other countries have requested.

3. We note with satisfaction the Soviet Union's willingness to undertake discussions this week with the Director General of the **International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)**. We expect that these discussions will lead to the Soviet Union's participation in the desired postaccident analysis.

4. We welcome and encourage the work of the **IAEA** in seeking to improve international cooperation on the safety of **nuclear installations**, the handling of **nuclear accidents** and their consequences, and the provision of mutual emergency assistance. Moving forward from the relevant **IAEA** guidelines, we urge the early elaboration of an international convention committing the parties to report and exchange information in the event of **nuclear emergencies or accidents**. This should be done with the least possible delay.

### 1987 Venice

#### *Communiqué:*

##### *Environment*

31. We welcome the important progress achieved since Tokyo, particularly in the **International Atomic Energy Agency**, in enhancing effective international cooperation with regard to **safety in the management of nuclear energy**.

### 1988 Toronto

#### *Political Declaration:*

6. Since our last meeting, progress has been made between the United States and the Soviet Union in agreeing to reduce nuclear weapons in a manner which accords fully with the security interests of each of our countries. The **INF [IntermediateRange Nuclear Forces] Treaty**, the direct result of Western firmness and unity, is the first treaty ever actually to reduce **nuclear arms**. It sets vitally important precedents for future **arms control agreements**: asymmetrical reductions and intrusive verification arrangements. We now look for deep cuts in U.S. and Soviet strategic offensive arms. We congratulate President Reagan on what he has already accomplished, along with General Secretary Gorbachev, towards this goal.

### **1989 Paris**

#### ***Communiqué:***

##### *Environment*

We are committed to maintaining the **highest safety standards for nuclear power plants** and to strengthening international cooperation in safe operation of **power plants** and **waste management**, and we recognize that **nuclear power** also plays an important role in limiting output of greenhouse gases.

### **1990 Houston**

#### ***Communiqué:***

##### *THE ENVIRONMENT*

Countries should continue efforts to ensure highest worldwide **performance standards for nuclear and other energy** in order to protect health and the environment, and ensure the highest **safety**.

#### ***Statement on Transnational Issues:***

##### *Non-Proliferation*

We further endorse the EC's call for all states to apply **IAEA safeguards** on as universal a basis as possible.

We also urge **all nuclear suppliers** to adopt **nuclear export control measures** equivalent to the **Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines**.

Whether **NPT** parties or not, we commit ourselves to working actively to secure a satisfactory outcome to **nuclear non-proliferation** discussions in the forthcoming months, including those at the **Fourth Review Conference of the NPT**.

We hope that these discussions will contribute to the achievement of as broad a consensus as possible in favor of an equitable and stable **non-proliferation regime**. Such a regime should be based on an indispensable balance between the **non-proliferation** of arms and the **development of peaceful and safe uses of nuclear energy**.

We wish to highlight the importance of dealing with the related threat of ballistic missiles capable of delivering **nuclear**, chemical and biological weapons. We note especially the contribution of the **Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)** to our joint efforts to control missile **proliferation**. We applaud the recent decisions of additional nations to adhere to the **MTCR**, and we call upon all nations to observe the **MTCR Guidelines**.

***Chairman's Statement:***

A separate statement was issued on the transnational problems of terrorism and the **proliferation of nuclear**, chemical, and biological weapons, as well as ballistic missiles. These dangers, like the illicit trade in narcotics that will be addressed in tomorrow's Communiqué, know no boundaries. In the case of **nuclear proliferation**, the deliberations here take on added significance in this 20th anniversary year of the **Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty**.

The Korean peninsula remains an area of sharp concern, especially because the North has yet to sign and implement a **nuclear safeguards agreement**. We welcome the recent talks between North and South Korea and hope they mark a turning point in inter-Korean relations.

**1991 London**

***Communiqué:***

*Energy*

19. In this context, **nuclear power generation** contributes to diversifying **energy sources** and reducing greenhouse gas emissions. In developing **nuclear power** a an **economic energy source**, it is essential to achieve and maintain the highest available **standards of safety**, including in **waste management**, and to encourage co-operation to this end throughout the world. The safety situation in Central and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union deserves particular attention. This is an urgent problem and we call upon the international community to develop an effective means of coordinating its response.

***Declaration on Conventional Arms Transfers and NBC (Nuclear, Biological and Chemical) Non-proliferation:***

1. At our meeting in Houston last year, we, the Heads of State and Government and the representatives of the European Community, underlined the threats to international security posed by the **proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons** and of **associated missile delivery systems**. The Gulf crisis has highlighted the dangers posed

by the unchecked spread of these weapons and by excessive holdings of conventional weapons.

### *Conventional Arms Transfers*

2. We accept that many states depend on arms imports to assure a reasonable level of security and the inherent right of self-defence is recognised in the United Nations Charter. Tensions will persist in international relations so long as underlying conflicts of interest are not tackled and resolved. But the Gulf conflict showed the way in which peace and stability can be undermined when a country is able to **acquire a massive arsenal that goes far beyond the needs of self-defence and threatens its neighbours**. We are determined to ensure such abuse should not happen again. We believe that progress can be made if all states apply the three principles of transparency, consultation and action.

6. Iraqi aggression and the ensuing Gulf war illustrate the huge costs to the international community of military conflict.

### *NonProliferation*

7. We are deeply concerned about the **proliferation of nuclear**, biological and chemical weapons and missile delivery systems. We are determined to combat this menace by strengthening and expanding the **nonproliferation regimes**.

8. Iraq must fully abide by **Security Council Resolution 687**, which sets out requirements for the destruction, removal or rendering harmless under international supervision of its **nuclear**, biological and chemical warfare and missile capabilities; as well as for verification and longterm monitoring to ensure that Iraq's capability for such weapon systems is not developed in the future. Consistent with the **relevant UN resolutions**, we will provide every assistance to the **United Nations Special Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)** so that they can fully carry out their tasks.

9. In the **nuclear field**, we:

reaffirm our will to work to establish the widest possible consensus in favour of an equitable and stable **nonproliferation regime** based on a balance between **nuclear nonproliferation** and the **development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy**;

reaffirm the importance of the **Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty (NPT)** and call on all other nonsignatory states to subscribe to this agreement;

call on all other **nonnuclear** weapon states to submit all their **nuclear activities to IAEA safeguards**, which are the cornerstone of the international nonproliferation regime;

- urge all supplier states to adopt and implement the **Nuclear Suppliers Group** guidelines.

We welcome the decision of Brazil and Argentina to conclude a fullscope safeguard agreement with the **IAEA** and to take steps to bring the Treaty of Tlatelolco into force, as well as the accession of South Africa to the **NPT**.

10. Each of us will also work to achieve:

our common purpose of maintaining and reinforcing the **NPT** regime beyond 1995;

a strengthened and improved **IAEA safeguards system**;

new measures in the **Nuclear Suppliers Group** to ensure adequate **export controls** on **dualuse items**.

15. The spread of missile delivery systems has added a new dimension of instability to international security in many regions of the world. As the founders of the **Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)**, we welcome its extension to many other states in the last two years. We endorse the joint appeal issued at the Tokyo **MTCR** meeting in March 1991 for all countries to adopt these guidelines. These are not intended to inhibit cooperation in the use of space for peaceful and scientific purposes.

#### ***Chairman's Statement:***

2. The *political declaration* emphasises the theme of our common commitment to strengthening the international order and to reinforcing the multilateral approach. We have launched some ideas on making the UN more efficient and effective, for example in the field of emergency disaster relief. We deal with the Middle East in particular, following the Gulf War. (In this context we welcomed the recent reply by President Assad of Syria to President Bush, which we hope will open the way for progress toward a conference leading to direct negotiations. We wish every success to Jim Baker as he returns to the region).

3. The second declaration addresses ***conventional arms transfers and proliferation of chemical, nuclear, and biological weapons***. It brings together the various aspects of these important subjects, and charts a way forward, without claiming an exclusive role for any group or institution. The urgency of addressing our responsibilities has been brought home for us all by the **Gulf War**. For conventional arms we propose that the international community apply the three principles of transparency, consultation and action. The G7 strongly support our proposal for a UN arms register.

7. We look forward to *North and South Korea's* admission to the United Nations and the resumption shortly of highlevel dialogue between the two countries. North Korea's continuing failure to sign and implement a **nuclear safeguards agreement** remains an issue of major concern.

#### **1992 Munich**



**Communiqué:**

*Safety of Nuclear Power Plants in the New Independent States of the Former Soviet Union and in Central and Eastern Europe*

42. While we recognise the important role **nuclear power** plays in **global energy supplies**, the safety of Sovietdesign **nuclear power** plants gives cause for great concern. Each State, through its **safety authorities and plant operators**, is itself responsible for the safety of its **nuclear power plants**. The new States concerned of the former Soviet Union and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe must give high priority to eliminating this danger. These efforts should be part of a marketoriented reform of energy policies encouraging commercial financing for the development of the energy sector.

43. A special effort should be made to improve the **safety of these plants**. We offer the States concerned our support within the framework of a multilateral programme of action. We look to them to cooperate fully. We call upon other interested States to contribute as well.

44. The programme of action should comprise immediate measures in the following areas:

operational **safety** improvements;

nearterm **technical improvements** to **plants** based on **safety** assessments;

enhancing **regulatory regimes**.

Such measures can achieve early and significant safety gains.

45. In addition, the programme of action is to create the basis for longerterm **safety improvements** by the examination of:

the scope for replacing less safe **plants** by the development of **alternative energy sources** and the more **efficient use of energy**;

the potential for **upgrading plants** of more recent design.

Complementary to this, we will pursue the early completion of a **convention on nuclear safety**.

46. The programme of action should develop clear priorities, provide coherence to the measures and ensure their earliest implementation. To implement the immediate measures, the existing G-24 coordination mandate on **nuclear safety** should be extended to the new States concerned of the former Soviet Union and at the same time made more effective. We all are prepared to strengthen our bilateral assistance.

In addition, we support the setting up of a supplementary multilateral mechanism, as appropriate, to address immediate **operational safety and technical safety improvement measures** not covered by bilateral programmes. We invite the international community to contribute to the funding. The fund would take account of bilateral funding, be administered by a steering body of donors on the basis of consensus, and be coordinated with and assisted by the G-24 and the EBRD.

47. Decisions on **upgrading nuclear power plants** of more recent design will require prior clarification of issues concerning **plant safety, energy policy, alternative energy sources and financing**. To establish a suitable basis on which such decisions can be made, we consider the following measures necessary:

the necessary **safety** studies should be presented without delay;

together with the competent international organisations, in particular the **IEA**, the World Bank should prepare the required **energy studies** including **replacement sources of energy and the cost implications**. Based on these studies the World Bank and the EBRD should report as expeditiously as possible on potential financing requirements.

48. We shall review the progress made in this **action programme** at our meeting in 1993.

### ***Political Declaration: Shaping the New Partnership:***

#### II.

1. The end of the EastWest confrontation provides a historic opportunity, but also underlines the urgent need to curb the **proliferation of nuclear weapons**, other weapons of mass destruction and missiles capable of delivering them. We are firmly of the view that the indefinite extension of the **Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty** at the **1995 Review Conference** will be a key step in this process and that the process of **nuclear arms control** and reduction must be continued. The motivation for **nuclear proliferation** will also be reduced through efforts to advance regional security.

2. We urge countries not yet parties to the **NPT** to join. We look forward to the early adherence to the **NPT** as **nonnuclear-weapons States** of Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus as well as the other nonRussian States of the former Soviet Union. We shall continue through bilateral contacts and the International Science and Technology Centres in Moscow and Kiev our efforts to inhibit the spread of expertise on weapons of mass destruction. We attach the highest importance to the establishment in the former Soviet Union of effective **export controls** on **nuclear materials**, weapons and other sensitive goods and technologies and will offer training and practical assistance to help achieve this.

3. The world needs the most effective possible action to **safeguard nuclear materials** and to detect and prevent the **transfer or the illicit or clandestine production of nuclear weapons**. Nuclear cooperation will in future be conditional on adherence to the

**NPT** or an existing equivalent internationally binding agreement as well as on the adoption of fullscope **International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards**, as recently laid down by the **Nuclear Suppliers Group**. The **IAEA** must receive the resources necessary to strengthen the existing safeguards regime and to conduct effective special inspections of undeclared but suspect **nuclear sites** as one means of achieving this. We will support reference by the **IAEA** of unresolved cases of **proliferation** to the UN Security Council.

4. We reaffirm our willingness to share the benefits of **peaceful nuclear technology** with all other States, in accordance with our **nonproliferation** commitments.

5. We will continue to encourage all countries to adopt the guidelines of the **Missile Technology Control Regime** and welcome the recent decision by the plenary session of the **MTCR** to extend the scope of the guidelines to cover missiles capable of delivering all kinds of weapons of mass destruction. Each of us will continue our efforts to improve transparency and consultation in the transfer of conventional weapons and to encourage restraint in such transfers. Provision of full and timely information to the **UN Arms Register** is an important element in these efforts.

6. We will continue to intensify our cooperation in the area of export controls of sensitive items in the appropriate fora to reduce threats to international security. A major element of this effort is the informal exchange of information to improve and harmonize these **export controls**.

7. Arms control agreements which have been signed by the former Soviet Union, in particular the **START** and CFE treaties, must enter into force. The full implementation of the CFE Treaty will create the foundation for the new cooperative security framework in Europe. We welcome the farreaching followon agreement on **strategic nuclear weapons** concluded by the US and Russia in June as another major step towards a safer, more stable world. Further measures, in particular the unilaterally announced elimination of **groundlaunched shortrange nuclear weapons** by the United States and the former Soviet Union, should be carried out as soon as possible. We support Russia in its efforts to secure the **peaceful use of nuclear materials** resulting from the elimination of **nuclear weapons**. The Geneva negotiations for a convention on the effective global ban on chemical weapons must be successfully concluded this year. We call on all nations to become original signatories to this convention.

### ***Chairman's Statement:***

#### *5. Korea*

We welcome the progress achieved in the dialogue between North and South Korea. It gives us reason to hope for a further reduction of tension.

We are concerned about **North Korea's suspected nuclear weapons programme**. The **IAEA Safeguards Agreement** must be fully implemented and an effective bilateral inspection regime must be put into practice.

## 6. China

The recent developments towards economic reform in the People's Republic of China are encouraging. We also want to see China making greater efforts towards political reform. The situation with regard to human rights calls for considerable further improvement. We welcome China's accession to the **NonProliferation Treaty** and her application of the guidelines and parameters of the **Missile Technology Control Regime**. We hope that China will play a more constructive role in the international sphere.

## 9. Latin America

The steps Argentina and Brazil have taken to allow full inspection of their **nuclear activities**, and their decision to give effect to the **Treaty of Tlateloco** and to consider signing the comprehensive **safeguards agreement with the IAEA**, will be conducive to cooperation in this sphere as well.

## 1993 Tokyo

### *Communiqué:*

#### *Russia and the Other Countries in Transition*

11. We welcome the progress made in the **nuclear safety program** agreed at the Munich Summit, including the establishment of the multilateral fund, in which we encourage broader participation. Urgent **safety measures**, coordinated through the G24, need to be implemented rapidly to secure real improvements at the **plants** still causing great concern. The states concerned bear the primary responsibility for respecting the fundamental principles of **nuclear safety**. Independent regulatory authorities should be strengthened and **nuclear safety** must be given higher priority in all the countries concerned, including the early closure of high risk reactors such as **Chernobyl**. We invite the World Bank, together with the **IEA**, to continue the dialogue with each of the countries concerned, and working with other lending institutions including the EBRD and the EIB, to support them in developing longer term energy strategies. Our aim is to agree as quickly as possible on a framework for coordinated action by all those involved following a countrybycountry approach. We will review the progress made in 1994.

In the light of existing international obligations, we emphasize our concern over the ocean dumping of **radioactive wastes** by Russia.

### *Political Declaration: Striving for a More Secure and Humane World :*

6. Enhanced cooperation is necessary in combatting the danger of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles. In particular, we:

Urge North Korea to retract immediately its decision to withdraw from the **NPT**, and to fully comply with its nonproliferation obligations, including the implementation of **IAEA**

safeguards agreement and the Joint Declaration on Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula;

Encourage the countries concerned of the former Soviet Union to ensure rapid, safe and secure elimination of **nuclear weapons** in accordance with current agreements, providing effective assistance to this end;

Urge Ukraine to ratify the **START Treaty**, and Ukraine and Kazakhstan to accede to the **NPT** as **nonnuclear weapon states**.

We also continue our efforts to strengthen the **nonproliferation regimes**, including the **Missile Technology Control Regime**, and to establish effective **export controls**. We reiterate the objectives of universal adherence to the **NPT** as well as the Treaty's indefinite extension in 1995 and **nuclear arms reduction**. We also call on those countries that have not done so to sign the Chemical Weapons Convention and to accede to the Biological Weapons Convention.

## **1994 Naples**

### ***Communiqué:***

#### *Nuclear safety*

1. We welcome the progress made in the **nuclear safety programme**, agreed by the Munich and Tokyo summits, concerning the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union.
2. An effective framework for coordinated action is now in place. The World Bank, working with other lending institutions including the EBRD and the EIB, and with the **IEA**, is helping countries develop **long-term energy strategies**. Some near-term safety improvements are on the way. More needs to be done and longer-term actions must be carried out. The IFIs are invited according to their mandate to make full use of their lending possibilities for this purpose.
3. We remain committed to the existing international initiatives to promote an early closure of **high risk reactors**. The closing down of the **Chernobyl nuclear power plant** is an urgent priority.

We are therefore putting forward to the Ukrainian Government an action plan for the closure of **Chernobyl**. This plan will require measures to be taken by the Ukrainian authorities as well as financial contributions from the international community.

The closure of **Chernobyl** would be accompanied by the early completion of three new **reactors** to adequate **safety standards**, by comprehensive reforms in the **energy sector**, increased **energy conservation** and the use of other **energy sources**.

4. In this context we welcome the contribution by the European Union. As a further step we are ready to provide for the **Action Plan** an initial amount of up to US \$200 million in grants, including a replenishment of the **Nuclear Safety Account** for this purpose. In addition, loans should be provided by the IFIs.

We call on other donors and international financial institutions to join us in supporting this **action plan** and will review progress regularly.

***Chairman's Statement:***

Following the death of Kim Il Sung, we must continue to seek a solution to the problem created by North Korea's decision to withdraw from the **IAEA**. We urge the DPRK to continue to engage the ROK and the international community, including a continuation of the talks with the US and going forward with the scheduled summit with the ROK. We also urge the DPRK to provide total transparency in its **nuclear program** through full and unconditional compliance with its **non-proliferation obligations** and to remove, once and for all, the suspicions surrounding its **nuclear activities**. We support the renewed efforts to resolve the North Korean **nuclear issue** through dialogue and we stress the importance of the DPRK's ensuring the continuity of **IAEA safeguards** and maintaining the freeze on its **nuclear program**, including no **reprocessing spent fuel** or **reloading its nuclear reactors**.

Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles is one of the most serious threats to international peace and security. We call upon all States that have not yet done so to accede to the **NPT** as **non-nuclear weapon states**. We declare our unequivocal support for the indefinite extension of the **Treaty** in 1995. We underline the importance of continuing **nuclear arms reduction**, and confirm our commitment to achieve universal, verifiable and comprehensive treaties to **ban nuclear tests and the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons**. We reaffirm our commitment for the earliest possible entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention and welcome the Special Conference of States parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. We support full implementation of the **UN Register of Conventional Arms**. We agree to cooperate to prevent **nuclear smuggling**. We assign priority to the problems of anti-personnel landmines, including efforts to curb their indiscriminate use, halt their export, assist in their clearance worldwide. We shall work together and with others for effective **export controls** to ensure that trade in armaments and sensitive **dual-use goods** is carried out responsibly. We encourage **non-proliferation** efforts in the Middle East and South Asia.

The meeting has also given us the opportunity for an exchange of views on the reform process in Russia, a historic task that President Yeltsin and the Russian government continue to bring forward with the confirmed support of the international community. President Yeltsin presented Russia's views on global economic and security issues. We intend to cooperate on such topics as transnational crime, money laundering, and **nuclear safety**.

## 1995 Halifax

### *Communiqué:*

#### *NUCLEAR SAFETY*

48. We affirm the importance of improving **nuclear safety** in countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the Newly Independent States and welcome efforts and progress made to date. We will continue to support these initiatives.

49. Recognizing that each country is responsible for the safety of its **nuclear facilities**, we congratulate President Kuchma of Ukraine on his decision to close the **Chernobyl nuclear power plant** by the year 2000. We reaffirm the commitments of support made last year at Naples under the **G-7 Action Plan for Ukraine's Energy Sector**. We are pleased to note the replenishment of the **Nuclear Safety Account** and the commitment of additional bilateral grants for short-term **safety upgrades** and preliminary decommissioning work in anticipation of the closure of **Chernobyl**.

50. Recognizing the economic and social burden that the closure of **Chernobyl** will place on Ukraine, we [pledge] [will continue] efforts to mobilize international support for appropriate **energy production**, **energy efficiency** and **nuclear safety** projects for Ukraine. Any assistance for replacement **power** for **Chernobyl** will be based on sound economic, environmental and financial criteria. We call upon the World Bank and the EBRD to continue their co-operation with Ukraine in devising a realistic long-term **energy strategy**, based on the results of the EBRD-funded least-cost investment study, and to increase their financial contribution in support of appropriate **energy sector reform** and **investment**. We also call on the World Bank to mobilize private sector support for **non-nuclear energy** and **energy conservation**.

### *Chairman's Statement:*

#### *Arms Control and Disarmament*

4. We welcome the indefinite extension of the **Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty** and the commitment of States party to the universalisation of the **Treaty** as well as their decisions to strengthen the review process and adopt a set of principles and objectives for **non-proliferation** and disarmament. The entry into force of **START I** is a major landmark in the process of **nuclear arms control**, which was greatly helped by the decision of Ukraine to accede to the **NPT**. We now look forward to the early ratification of **START II**. We support the safe and secure dismantlement of the **nuclear weapons** eliminated under **START I** and we welcome the work of the United States and Russia on measures to ensure that the **fissile material** from these weapons is rendered unusable for weapons purposes. The disposal of **weapons-grade plutonium** deserves particular attention and we encourage its further study.

5. We are encouraged by the growing international recognition of the need to complete without delay universal, comprehensive and verifiable treaties to ban **nuclear weapons tests** and to cut off the production of **fissile material** for **nuclear weapons** and other **nuclear explosive devices**. Recognizing the continuing dangers posed worldwide by criminal diversion and **illicit trafficking of nuclear materials**, and drawing on the decisions taken in Naples and the practical work undertaken by our experts since then, we resolve to work together to strengthen **systems of control, accounting and physical security for nuclear materials**; to expand our cooperation in the area of customs, law enforcement and intelligence and to strengthen through venues such as the **IAEA** and **INTERPOL** the international community's ability to combat **nuclear theft and smuggling**. We emphasize the importance of bringing the Chemical Weapons Convention into force at the earliest possible date, and call for rapid progress in developing verification systems for the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.

6. We urge all countries to support full implementation of the **UN Register of Conventional Arms**, and note that Article 26 of the UN Charter calls for "the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources". Regional organizations can help promote transparency and confidence-building measures that reduce excessive stockpiling of conventional weapons. We shall work with others for effective and responsible **export controls** on arms and sensitive **dual-use goods and technologies**.

#### *Middle East and Africa*

19. We call on all States to avoid any collaboration with Iran which might contribute to the acquisition of a **nuclear weapons capability**.

20. We reiterate our resolve to enforce full implementation of each and every relevant UN Security Council resolution concerning Iraq and Libya until they are complied with, and recall that such implementation would entail the reassessment of sanctions. We urge Iraq to reconsider its rejection of UN Security Council Resolution 986 which would permit the sale of **oil** and purchase of humanitarian goods.

#### *Asia-Pacific*

25. We call on North Korea to observe the agreements reached at the **NPT Review and Extension Conference**. We believe the **Agreed Framework between the United States and North Korea** offers a real prospect for resolving the North Korea **nuclear problem**, and we are encouraged by recent developments in this regard. We call on North Korea to fulfil its commitment to the **regime of IAEA safeguards** and to uphold the terms of the **Agreed Framework**. The support of the international community can be demonstrated inter alia through participation in the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO). We also believe that progress in the North-South dialogue will contribute to peace and security on the Korean Peninsula.



26. We are concerned about the potential for conflict in Kashmir and urge all parties to pursue a peaceful settlement. To help lower tension and build confidence on the subcontinent, as well as to strengthen the framework of global security, we urge India and Pakistan to support international arms control norms, accede to the **NPT** and refrain from taking further steps towards ballistic missile deployment or any other measures that might precipitate a regional arms race.

## **1996 Lyon**

### ***Communiqué:***

#### *VII. TOWARD SUCCESSFUL INTEGRATION OF COUNTRIES IN TRANSITION INTO THE GLOBAL ECONOMY*

We welcome the Moscow Summit declaration relating to Ukraine and the commitment of President KUCHMA to close reactor n° 1 at **Chernobyl** by the end of 1996, in the framework of the program to close the whole **plant** by the year 2000. We reaffirm our commitment to full implementation of the Memorandum concluded with Ukraine, through close cooperation with this country and the international financial institutions. In this regard, we welcome the financial decisions already taken by the international community, and we stress that all parties concerned must respect the agreed agenda of the comprehensive program.

### ***Chairman's Statement:***

#### *I. Global issues*

Major issues need to be treated at a global level. All countries are liable to benefit from more security provided by a strengthened United Nations Organization and by progress made in the field of **non-proliferation**, arms control and disarmament as well as by an efficient struggle against terrorism and transnational organized crime. All countries benefit from the enhancement of democracy and fundamental freedoms throughout the world. Protection of environment, **nuclear safety** and new types of epidemics are common challenges that must be properly handled. All countries are interested in seizing the opportunities provided by the information technologies. In this regard, we are committed to cooperate actively among ourselves and with other partners to deal with these global issues in a spirit of efficacy and solidarity.

#### *3. Non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament*

We affirm our undertaking to conclude a **Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)** so as to enable its signature by the outset of the 51st session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, this coming September. We call upon all the members of the Conference on Disarmament to agree that the **CTBT** must prohibit any **nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion**. Pending the entry into force of the **CTBT**, the **Nuclear Weapon States** should exercise utmost restraint.

Such a **treaty**, in our view, will be a major step in the accomplishment of a priority goal for the international community in the field of disarmament and **non-proliferation** and the implementation of the obligations contained in Article VI of the **Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)**. We reaffirm our commitment to the objectives set out in the document on **Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament** adopted on 11 May 1995 at the conclusion of the **NPT Review and Extension Conference**. We are determined to contribute to the effectiveness of the strengthened **NPT** review process before the next **Review Conference** in 2000, the first **preparatory committee** for which will meet in 1997.

In the same spirit, we take note of the signature by the Southeast Asian States in December 1995, in Bangkok, of the **Treaty** establishing a **nuclear weapon free zone** in Southeast Asia, and welcome the signature by China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States of the protocols to the **Treaty of Rarotonga** establishing a nuclear **weapon free zone** in the South-Pacific as well as the signature on April 11, by Member States of the Organization for African Unity, of the **Treaty of Pelindaba** establishing a **nuclear weapon free zone** in Africa, and of its relevant Protocols by the United States, France, the United Kingdom and China. The establishment of these new **nuclear weapon free zones** and the cooperation of **Nuclear Weapon States** in supporting the **relevant protocols** helps realize the objective of creating additional such zones by the **NPT Review Conference** in 2000.

We further underline the importance that we attach to the early start of negotiations, based on the agreed mandate within the Conference on Disarmament, on a treaty to ban the production of **fissile material for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices**. We look forward to the early entry into force of the **START II Treaty**. We regard the **ABM Treaty** as a cornerstone of strategic stability.

We again call upon all countries to support the continuing operation of the **United Nations Register of Conventional Arms** which represents an important mechanism for promoting transparency and building confidence among countries, at a global and regional level, and note that Article 26 of the UN Charter calls for "the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources". Regional organizations can help promote transparency and confidence-building measures that reduce excessive stockpiling of conventional weapons. We welcome with satisfaction the arrangement launched at Wassenaar in December 1995 to promote transparency and greater responsibility in transfers of conventional arms and **dual-use goods and technologies** and will cooperate on its prompt and full implementation. We welcome the results of the first Review Conference of the Treaty on Conventional armed Forces in Europe (CFE). The States Parties on that occasion renewed their commitment to ensure the integrity of the treaty and to fulfill all of its obligations. They committed themselves to launch a process of adaptation of the treaty in order to preserve its viability in the future. We salute the cooperative resolution of the CFE flank issue.

#### *4. Nuclear safety and security*

We welcome with satisfaction the substantial progress made in the field of **nuclear safety and security at the Moscow Summit** in April of this year.

We have taken an important step toward enhancing international cooperation so that the use of **nuclear energy** is conducted all over the world consistently with fundamental principles of **nuclear safety**. We reaffirm our commitment, made in Moscow, to the highest internationally recognized **nuclear safety level**. In this regard, we underline that nuclear safety has to prevail over all other considerations. We reaffirm our commitment to all the principles laid down in the **Convention on Nuclear Safety** and we urge all countries to ratify this **Convention**, as soon as possible, and to participate in the **peer review mechanisms**. We stress the necessity of further progress in the establishment of relevant domestic legislation and in the enhancement of the international regime of **nuclear liability** as well as in the preparation of an **international convention on the safety of radioactive waste management**. We remain committed to assisting countries in transition in developing efficient and fully **safety-oriented energy policies**.

We welcome the adoption of the program for preventing and combating **illicit trafficking in nuclear materials**, and strongly urge other States to associate themselves with this plan following the example of Ukraine. We reaffirm the need to strengthen measures to ensure **nuclear material accounting, control and physical protection**. We also acknowledge the need to identify appropriate strategies for the **management of fissile material** no longer required for defense purposes. The latter will be discussed on the occasion of a meeting of experts which will take place in Paris in October this year. We support the efforts of the **Nuclear Weapon States** to ensure that sensitive **nuclear material (separated plutonium and highly enriched uranium)** designated as not intended for use for meeting defense requirements be placed under **IAEA safeguards**.

In order to ensure rapid and efficient follow-up of the decisions regarding **non-proliferation** issues adopted at the Moscow Summit, we have taken the following initiatives :

. on our behalf, France will undertake demarches in order to encourage more countries to adopt the "**Programme for preventing and combatting illicit trafficking in nuclear material**";

. a meeting dedicated to the implementation of this **Programme**, with the participation of agencies and ministries involved in the prevention and fight against illicit trafficking will be held as soon as possible.

We call upon all States to contribute to the efficient and effective implementation of measures for the strengthened **safeguards system** proposed by the " Program 93+2 " for which a model protocol is being further elaborated by the open-ended committee of the **AIEA-Board of Governors**. This **program** is making an essential contribution to tighter regulation of **nuclear non-proliferation**. This **program** will help avoid a repeat of any situation where a country under full-scope **safeguards** could carry out undeclared **nuclear activities**.

## *II. Regional situations*

We call on all States to avoid any collaboration with Iran which might contribute to the acquisition of a **nuclear weapons** capability.

4. We urge the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) to develop the dialogue and cooperation with the Republic of Korea (ROK), this being the only means of achieving permanent peace on the Korean Peninsula and ensuring a more stable and more secure future for the Korean People. In this context, we support the initiatives taken with a view to initiating a process aimed at achieving a permanent peace agreement on the Korean Peninsula to replace the current Armistice Agreement, including the proposal of the US and the Republic of Korea on 16 April 1996 to convene a four-part meeting. We welcome the efforts being made within the "**Agreed Framework**" of 21 October 1994, in re-orienting the DPRK **nuclear program** in order to comply with its obligations under the **Non-Proliferation Treaty**. We call upon the DPRK to meet in full its commitments under its safeguards agreement with the **IAEA** and to make full disclosure of the facts concerning the history of its **nuclear program**. We call on the international community to join us in providing political and financial support for the **Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO)**.

### **1997 Denver**

#### ***Communiqué:***

##### *ENVIRONMENT*

###### *Oceans*

22. We must strengthen our efforts to protect the world's oceans. We will work to ensure an effective and integrated effort to deal with key issues, including sustainable fishing, shipping, marine pollution from land-based and off-shore activities, and **oil spill prevention and emergency response**. In this connection, we will also enhance cooperation in monitoring the ecology in the Northern Pacific, as well as in forecasting earthquakes and tsunamis in this region.

##### *NUCLEAR SAFETY*

35. We reaffirm our commitments from the **1996 Moscow Summit on Nuclear Safety and Security** to give an absolute priority to **safety** in the use of **nuclear energy**. We note that further substantial progress is still required in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and in the Newly Independent States, especially by strengthening regulatory authorities, enhancing **reactor safety** and improving **safety culture**. We consider further joint efforts to this end a major priority. In this regard, we attach the greatest importance to the full implementation of the **Nuclear Safety Account** agreements.

36. We note with satisfaction the entry into force by the **Nuclear Safety Convention** and the preparations now underway for the first review meeting to be held in April 1999. We applaud the rapid progress made in developing the **Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management** and encourage finalization. We welcome the forthcoming adoption of the **Protocol to amend the Vienna Convention** on civil liability for **nuclear damage** and of a new Supplementary Funding Convention. These conventions will facilitate international **safety cooperation** and provide for increased compensation for victims in the event of a **nuclear accident**.

#### *GLOBAL ENERGY ISSUES*

37. We decided to convene a **ministerial on energy issues** in Moscow next year, and request our officials to start preparations for such a meeting. Its results will be discussed at our next Summit.

#### *NON-PROLIFERATION, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT*

73. Since the **Moscow Summit on Nuclear Safety and Security**, we have taken important steps to implement the agreed "**Programme for Preventing and Combating Illicit Trafficking in Nuclear Materials**." We will expand participation in this program to include countries in Central and Eastern Europe, and in Central Asia and the Caucasus.

74. Further regarding the safe and effective management of **fissile material**, with respect to such materials no longer required for defense purposes, we will continue our cooperation through concrete initiatives, in particular the French-German-Russian project to build a pilot plant in Russia to produce MOX fuel from weapons plutonium, which is open to additional states, and the related U.S.-Russian cooperation on the conversion of **weapons plutonium**.

75. We have worked together to advance our common **non-proliferation**, arms control, and disarmament goals. The **Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty** is an historic milestone, and we call upon all States to sign and ratify it rapidly to ensure its early entry into force. We welcome the entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention. We advocate its full, effective and universal implementation, and look forward to the early ratification of the Convention by the States that have not yet done so. Recognizing that enhancing confidence in compliance would reinforce the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, we reaffirm our determination to complete as soon as possible through negotiation a legally-binding and effective verification mechanism.

76. We reaffirm our unwavering commitment to full implementation of the objectives set forth in the **Non-Proliferation Treaty**. To that end, we welcome the IAEA's recent adoption of a program on strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the **safeguards system**. We urge all States to conclude additional protocols with the IAEA at the earliest possible date. We reaffirm our commitment to the immediate

commencement and early conclusion of a **convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices**.

77. We welcome the progress on strategic arms control made at Helsinki in March, and look forward to the early entry-into-force of the **START II** agreement and the initiation of **START III** negotiations. We reaffirm the key role of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty in strengthening European security, and welcome the decision to conclude its adaptation as expeditiously as possible. We welcome the recent agreement among Russia, Kazakstan, Kyrgystan, Tajikistan, and China on reduction of military forces along their borders and consider it an important contribution to the region's security.

78. We endorse unequivocally efforts by the UN Special Commission and the **IAEA** to eliminate weapons of mass destruction capabilities in Iraq and to monitor compliance. We reaffirm the importance of implementing the U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework and full compliance by North Korea with its **non-proliferation obligations**. We therefore place great value on the continuing role of the **IAEA** in monitoring the freeze on North Korea's **nuclear program**, implementing **safeguards**, and helping preserve all information relating to the DPRK's past activity. We welcome the conclusion of negotiations for the EU to participate in the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) and call for further international support for KEDO, including the provision of funds. We stress the importance of Four Party talks and the necessity of North-South dialogue. We call on North Korea to halt its development, deployment and export of ballistic missiles.

79. We welcome the emerging high-level dialogue between India and Pakistan. We encourage both countries to bring their activities into conformity with **international non-proliferation norms**. Consistent with our support for the **CTBT's** early entry into force, we encourage both countries to adhere to that **treaty**.

#### *EXPORT CONTROL REGIMES*

81. We underline our support for the arrangements that make up the **international export control regimes**. The Zangger Committee and the **Nuclear Suppliers Group**, the **Missile Technology Control Regime**, and, for those who are members, the **Australia Group export control regime**, all contribute critically to the global application and enforcement of international **export control norms**.

#### ***Foreign Ministers' Progress Report:***

##### *Nonproliferation*

##### *Illicit Nuclear Trafficking*

2. We commend the work of the **Non-Proliferation Experts Group** to fulfill the mandate granted to it at Moscow and Lyon to implement the "**Program for Preventing and Combating Illicit Trafficking in Nuclear Material**," agreed to at the April 1996 **Nuclear Safety and Security Summit** in Moscow.

We encourage the undertaking of more enhanced information-sharing and cooperation among our law enforcement, intelligence, and customs services in the fight against **illicit nuclear trafficking**, conducted whenever possible on the basis of already-existing agreements, treaties, and arrangements, as provided for in the advisory "Framework for Enhanced Cooperation and Information-Sharing" proposed by Russia and agreed to by the **NPEG** at its May 12-13, 1997, meeting.

4. We endorse the agreement of our **nonproliferation experts** to establish specific tasks and a means of communication for the "Points of Contact" system called for by the **Program**, and the corresponding Terms of Reference and provisional format for the exchange of information on significant **illicit nuclear trafficking** incidents.

5. To broaden the scope and effectiveness of our efforts to combat **illicit nuclear trafficking**, we continue to encourage expanded participation in the **Program**. To this end, we have asked the United States, as current Chair of the Eight, to continue its contacts, initiated by France, with potential future participants. In order to maintain overall direction of the **Program** after participation in it has been expanded. We agreed that the chair should seek to organize periodic meetings of new participants under the auspices of the Eight to discuss **Program** activities and exchange views on **illicit nuclear trafficking**. We welcome the intention of the United States to organize the first such meeting in November 1997 to be held in Vienna.

6. We welcome the progress made in international efforts to develop **nuclear forensics capabilities**, under the auspices of the **IAEA**, as well as through the meetings held by the International Technical Working Group (ITWG).

#### *Plutonium Management*

7. We welcome the conclusions of **the group of experts**, convened pursuant to the April 1996 **Moscow Summit on Nuclear Safety and Security** to examine options and identify possible development of international cooperation for the **safe and effective management of fissile material** designated as no longer required for defense purposes. Our **experts** concluded that the most timely and technically viable option is the consumption of **plutonium as mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel in nuclear reactors**, and as a complementary option, the **immobilization of plutonium** in glass or ceramic form mixed with **high-level radioactive waste**. The experts also concluded that interim storage will be required, whatever longer-term management options are selected. These conclusions were also endorsed by the **Non-Proliferation Experts Group** last November in Paris.

8. Such an approach to the management of surplus **weapons plutonium** would serve the international community's **nonproliferation** objectives and would make an important practical contribution to **nuclear arms** reduction. The non-proliferation objective should be given priority in the planning and implementation of cooperation programs. Due consideration should also be given to technical, economic, financial, environmental and other relevant factors.

9. International cooperation will accelerate efforts to address the **management of surplus weapons plutonium**. We therefore welcome the announcement by France, Germany, and Russia of their plans, which are open to additional states, to build a demonstration-scale **MOX fuel fabrication facility** in Russia. In this regard, we welcome efforts by Canada and Russia, in collaboration with France and Germany, to investigate the feasibility of producing CANDU **MOX fuel**. The United States and Russia are also planning cooperation in the area of converting **weapons components** to materials suitable for disposition, in coordination with other international efforts. Participation in these and other related initiatives is being considered by others among us.

10. We reiterate the importance of ensuring transparency in the management of plutonium designated as no longer required for defense purposes. Implementation of all options should include appropriate international verification as soon as it is practicable to do so and stringent **standards of material protection, control, and accountancy**, with the objective of building confidence that surplus **weapons plutonium** will not again be used for **nuclear explosives** or diverted to unlawful purposes. In this context, we welcome the progress reported in the work in Vienna on the elaboration of the "**Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium**." We also welcome the progress reported by the United States and Russia on their efforts with the **IAEA** to agree on measures to submit to **IAEA** verification **weapons fissile material** designated as no longer required for defense purposes.

11. In order to sustain and build upon the momentum generated by these initiatives, developed in the wake of the **Moscow Summit**, the **Non-Proliferation Experts Group** should begin discussion of possible arrangements for coordinating and implementing **plutonium management** efforts. The **Non-Proliferation Experts Group** should submit a report to the Heads by next year's Summit in Birmingham.

### ***Confronting Global, Economic and Financial Challenges:***

#### *UKRAINE*

37. We have made significant progress in implementing the 1995 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with Ukraine on **Chernobyl Closure**. We reaffirm our commitment to assist Ukraine, within the context of the MOU, in mobilizing funds for **energy projects** to help meet its **power needs** in 2000 and beyond after **Chernobyl's** closure. To date, projects have been agreed totaling over \$1 billion. We call upon Ukraine to continue to undertake the reforms necessary for sustainable growth, particularly in its **energy sector**.

38. We agreed on the importance of securing the environmental safety of the sarcophagus covering the remains of the destroyed **Chernobyl** reactor. This task is inevitably beyond the resources of Ukraine alone. This is a major challenge for the international community. We have decided to add to the commitments we undertook in the MOU with Ukraine. We endorse the setting up of a multilateral funding mechanism and have agreed that the G-7 will contribute \$300 million over the lifetime of the project. We call upon



concerned governments and other donors to join us at a special pledging conference this fall to ensure full implementation of this project.

## **1998 Birmingham**

### ***Communiqué:***

#### *Promoting sustainable growth in the global economy*

10. Considering the new competitive pressures on our **electric power sectors**, we reaffirm the commitment we made at the **1996 Moscow Summit** to the safe operation of **nuclear power plants** and the achievement of high **safety standards** worldwide, and attach the greatest importance to the full implementation of the **Nuclear Safety Account** grant agreements. We reaffirm our commitment to the stated mission of **the Nuclear Safety Working Group (NSWG)**. We agreed to deepen Russia's role in the activities of the **NSWG**, with a view to eventual full membership in the appropriate circumstances. We acknowledge successful cooperation on the pilot project of the **International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER)** and consider it desirable to continue international cooperation for **civil nuclear fusion development**.

#### *Non-Proliferation and Export Controls*

24. The **proliferation** of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems threatens the security of every nation. Our countries have been in the forefront of efforts to prevent **proliferation**, and we have worked closely together to support international **non-proliferation regimes**. We pledge to continue and strengthen this co-operation. As a key element of this co-operation, we reaffirm our commitment to ensure the effective implementation of **export controls**, in keeping with our undertakings within the **non-proliferation regimes**. We will deny any kind of assistance to programmes for weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. To this end, we will where appropriate undertake and encourage the strengthening of laws, regulations and enforcement mechanisms. We will likewise enhance amongst ourselves and with other countries our co-operation on **export control, including for instance on the exchange of information**. We will ask our experts to focus on strengthening **export control** implementation. And we will broaden awareness among our industrial and business communities of **export control** requirements.

### ***Political Statement:***

#### *INDIAN NUCLEAR TESTS*

We condemn the **nuclear tests** which were carried out by India on 11 and 13 May. Such action runs counter to the will expressed by 149 signatories to the **CTBT** to cease **nuclear testing**, to efforts to strengthen the **global non-proliferation regime** and to steps to enhance regional and international peace and security. It has been met by immediate international concern and opposition, from governments and more widely. We

underline our full commitment to the **Non-Proliferation Treaty** and to the **Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty** as the cornerstones of the global **non-proliferation regime** and the essential foundations for the pursuit of **nuclear disarmament**. We express our grave concern about the increased risk of **nuclear and missile proliferation** in South Asia and elsewhere. We urge India and other states in the region to refrain from further tests and the deployment of **nuclear weapons** or ballistic missiles. We call upon India to rejoin the mainstream of international opinion, to adhere unconditionally to the **NPT** and the **CTBT** and to enter into negotiations on a global treaty to stop the **production of fissile material for nuclear weapons**. India's relationship with each of us has been affected by these developments. We are making this clear in our own direct exchanges and dealings with the Indian Government and we call upon other states similarly to address their concerns to India. We call upon and encourage Pakistan to exercise maximum restraint in the face of these tests and to adhere to **international non-proliferation norms**.

## 1999 Cologne

### *Communiqué:*

#### *IX. Promoting Non-proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament*

35. We recognize the continuing need to **protect and manage weapons-grade fissile material, especially plutonium**. In past years, G8 countries have worked on the issue of managing **weapons-grade nuclear material** no longer required for defense purposes. We affirm our intention to establish arrangements for the safe management of such **fissile material**. We strongly support the concrete initiatives being undertaken by G8 countries and others for scientific and technical cooperation necessary to support future large-scale disposition programs. We invite all interested countries to support projects for early implementation of large-scale programs and urge establishment of a joint strategy. We recognize that an international approach to financing will be required involving both public and private funds, and we will review potential increases in our own resource commitments prior to the next G8 Summit.

36. We are deeply concerned about recent missile flight tests and developments in missile proliferation, such as actions by North Korea. We undertake to examine further individual and collective means of addressing this problem and reaffirm our commitment to the objectives of the **Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)**.

37. Effective **export control mechanisms** are essential for achieving a broad range of our arms control and **non-proliferation objectives**. We will continue to look for ways to strengthen these mechanisms. At the same time we stress the role of the **Nuclear Suppliers' Group** in preventing **nuclear proliferation**.

38. One year after the **nuclear tests** by India and Pakistan, we reiterate our concerns and reaffirm our statement from the Birmingham Communiqué. Recent missile tests have further increased tension in the region. We encourage both countries to follow first

positive steps already undertaken by joining international non-proliferation and disarmament efforts and taking the steps set out in UN Security Council resolution 1172.

#### *X. Tackling Global Challenges*

46. We renew the commitment we made at the **1996 Moscow Summit** to safety first in the use of **nuclear power** and the achievement of **high safety standards** worldwide. In this regard, we attach great importance to the results of the **Nuclear Safety Convention peer review meeting** and to the **International Atomic Energy Agency Conference on Strengthening Nuclear Safety in Eastern Europe**.

47. We reaffirm our commitment to strengthen cooperation in the field of **nuclear safety**. We welcome the concerted efforts to address the Year 2000 computer problem ("Millennium Bug") in this area. With regard to the **Nuclear Safety Account**, we continue to attach great importance to full and timely implementation of the grant agreements.

#### **G7 Statement:**

##### *IV. Nuclear Safety/Ukraine*

16. We renew our commitment to the successful implementation of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the G7 and Ukraine. We welcome Ukraine's renewed firm commitment to the closure of **Chernobyl** on schedule by the year 2000. Our overriding goal is the closure of the **Chernobyl power plant** by the agreed timetable.

17. We note that significant progress has been made in carrying out the **Shelter Implementation Plan** to secure the environmental safety of the sarcophagus covering the remains of the destroyed **Chernobyl reactor**. To date, contributions to the **Chernobyl Shelter Fund** total US \$393 million, including US \$50 million from Ukraine. We have agreed that the G7 will help ensure the continued financing and the progress in the work under the **Shelter Implementation Plan**. We call on concerned governments and private-sector donors to join us in this effort. To this end, we plan to hold a pledging conference before the next summit.

18. We reaffirm our commitment to assist Ukraine, within the context of the MoU, in mobilizing funds for **energy projects** to help meet its **power needs**. To date, projects have been agreed totaling over US \$746 million. In addition, in the field of **nuclear safety** US \$485 million have been granted, not including the **Shelter Implementation Plan**. We look to the Government of Ukraine to accelerate the fundamental reforms in the **energy sector**, including improvements in cash collection and privatization, to encourage financially viable investments in **power generation** and distribution and in **energy efficiency**. We commend the steady work that has allowed Ukraine, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and EURATOM to enter into the final phase of negotiations on loans to complete two **reactors** at Rivne and Khmelnytsky. We call on

the parties to take the necessary steps to provide for an early agreement on loans for safe, cost-effective, and financially and environmentally sound projects.

## **2000 Okinawa**

### ***Communiqué:***

#### *Nuclear Safety*

71. We renew the commitment we made at the **1996 Moscow Summit** to **safety** first in the use of **nuclear power** and achievement of **high safety standards** world wide. We agreed to continue to co-operate in promoting a **high standard of nuclear safety**. We continue to attach great importance to the full and timely implementation of the **Nuclear Safety Account Grant Agreement**.

#### *Toward a 21st century of greater world stability*

#### *Disarmament, Non-proliferation and Arms Control*

74. We welcome the successful outcome of the 2000 **Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)** Review Conference. We are determined to implement the conclusions reached at this Conference, including the early entry into force of the **Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)** and the immediate commencement and the conclusion within five years of negotiations for the **Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty**. We remain committed to promoting universal adherence to and compliance with the **NPT**.
75. We look forward to the early entry into force and full implementation of the **Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) II** and to the **conclusion of START III** as soon as possible, while preserving and strengthening the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability and as a basis for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons, in accordance with its provisions. We welcome the ratification of the **CTBT** and **START II** by Russia.
76. The transparent, safe, secure, environmentally sound and irreversible disposition and management of **weapon-grade plutonium** no longer required for defence purposes remains vital. The agreement on **plutonium disposition** reached between the United States and Russia, reinforced by their statement of intention concerning non-separation of additional **weapon-grade plutonium**, marks a critical milestone. The co-operation among the G8 countries has yielded significant results and our next steps should build on this co-operation and related international projects.
77. Our goal for the next Summit is to develop an international financing plan for **plutonium management** and disposition based on a detailed project plan, and a multilateral framework to co-ordinate this co-operation. We will expand our co-operation to other interested countries in order to gain the widest possible international support, and will explore the potential for both public and private funding.

78. We welcome the reinforcement of global regimes to prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. We also recognise the need to examine and promote further multilateral measures to curb missile proliferation. In this regard, we strongly support the important work of the **Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)** and will consider the proposal for a **Global Monitoring System**. We will work to increase the level of international contributions to the Russian chemical weapons destruction programme. We commit ourselves to work with others to conclude the negotiations on the Verification Protocol to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention as early as possible in 2001.

***G8 Statement on Korean Peninsula:***

We strongly support all efforts by the ROK and the DPRK to reduce tension and establish lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula that contribute to stability in Northeast Asia. We reiterate also our strong support for the ROK's engagement policy which is contributing to positive developments. We welcome the constructive attitude shown by the DPRK, and take note of the reconfirmation of its moratorium on missile-launch as a positive step. We call on the DPRK to continue such efforts. In this context, we look forward to a constructive response to international concerns over security, **non-proliferation**, humanitarian and human rights issues.

***G8 Statement on Regional Issues:***

*SOUTH ASIA*

We call on both India and Pakistan to join international efforts to strengthen the **non-proliferation** and disarmament regime. While welcoming those positive statements and steps that have been made, we reiterate our call for them to carry out fully the concrete measures set out in the UNSCR 1172, including signing and ratifying the **CTBT**.

***G7 Statement:***

*Nuclear Safety/Ukraine*

We welcome the decision taken by President Kuchma to close the **Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant (NPP)** on 15 December this year. We continue to co-operate with the Government of Ukraine in addressing the problems associated with the permanent shutdown of the **Chernobyl NPP**.

We reaffirm our commitment made at the Cologne Summit to continue our support for the **Shelter Implementation Plan (SIP)**. We welcome the results of the Pledging Conference in July to ensure full implementation of the **SIP**. We appreciate the contribution of the non-G7 donors.

We urge the Government of Ukraine to **accelerate its power sector reforms**, particularly improvement of cash collection and privatisation, which will attract financially viable **investments in the energy sector**. We look forward to receiving the report of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development in this respect. In the meantime, we affirm our commitment in line with the Memorandum of Understanding to assist the Ukraine in the preparation and implementation of **energy projects based on least cost principles**.

## 2001 Genoa

### *G8 Statement on Regional Issues:*

#### *KOREAN PENINSULA*

2. We reaffirm our support for the implementation of the Agreed Framework, including **KEDO**. We expect the DPRK to implement its announced moratorium on missile launches and a constructive response to international concerns over security, **non-proliferation**, humanitarian and human rights issues that is essential to the reduction of tensions in the region and to further integration of the DPRK into the international community.

### *G7 Statement:*

#### *Nuclear Safety*

We welcome Ukraine's permanent closure of the **Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant** on 15 December 2000, which was a vital accomplishment in support of **nuclear safety**.

## 2002 Kananaskis

### *Chair's Summary:*

- We agreed on a set of six **non-proliferation Principles** aimed at preventing terrorists - or those who harbour them - from acquiring or developing **nuclear**, chemical, radiological and biological weapons; missiles; and related materials, equipment or technologies. We called on other countries to join us in implementing these Principles.
- We launched a new ***G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction***, under which we will undertake cooperative projects on the basis of agreed guidelines. We committed to raise up to US\$ 20 billion to support such projects over the next ten years.

***Statement by the G8 Leaders: G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction:***

The attacks of September 11 demonstrated that terrorists are prepared to use any means to cause terror and inflict appalling casualties on innocent people. We commit ourselves to prevent terrorists, or those that harbour them, from acquiring or developing **nuclear, chemical, radiological and biological weapons; missiles; and related materials, equipment and technology**. We call on all countries to join us in adopting the set of **non-proliferation principles** we have announced today.

In a major initiative to implement those principles, we have also decided today to launch a new **G8 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction**. Under this initiative, we will support specific cooperation projects, initially in Russia, to address **non-proliferation, disarmament, counter-terrorism and nuclear safety issues**. Among our priority concerns are the destruction of chemical weapons, the **dismantlement of decommissioned nuclear submarines**, the disposition of **fissile materials** and the employment of former weapons scientists. We will commit to raise up to \$20 billion to support **such projects** over the next ten years. A range of financing options, including the option of bilateral debt for program exchanges, will be available to countries that contribute to this **Global Partnership**. We have adopted a set of guidelines that will form the basis for the negotiation of specific agreements for new projects, that will apply with immediate effect, to ensure effective and efficient project development, coordination and implementation. We will review over the next year the applicability of the guidelines to existing projects.

Recognizing that this **Global Partnership** will enhance international security and safety, we invite other countries that are prepared to adopt its common principles and guidelines to enter into discussions with us on participating in and contributing to this initiative. We will review progress on this **Global Partnership** at our next Summit in 2003.

*The G8 Global Partnership: Principles to prevent terrorists, or those that harbour them, from gaining access to weapons or materials of mass destruction*

The G8 calls on all countries to join them in commitment to the following **six principles to prevent terrorists or those that harbour them from acquiring or developing nuclear, chemical, radiological and biological weapons; missiles; and related materials, equipment and technology**.

1. Promote the adoption, universalization, full implementation and, where necessary, strengthening of multilateral treaties and other international instruments whose aim is to prevent the **proliferation** or illicit acquisition of **such items**; strengthen the institutions designed to implement these instruments.
2. Develop and maintain appropriate effective measures to **account for and secure such items in production, use, storage and domestic and international transport**; provide assistance to states lacking sufficient resources to account for and **secure these items**.

3. Develop and maintain appropriate effective **physical protection measures applied to facilities which house such items**, including defence in depth; provide assistance to states lacking sufficient resources to protect their facilities.
4. **Develop and maintain effective border controls, law enforcement efforts and international cooperation to detect, deter and interdict in cases of illicit trafficking in such items**, for example through installation of detection systems, training of customs and law enforcement personnel and cooperation in tracking these items; provide assistance to states lacking sufficient expertise or resources to strengthen their capacity to detect, deter and interdict in cases of illicit trafficking in these items.
5. **Develop, review and maintain effective national export and transshipment controls over items on multilateral export control lists**, as well as items that are not identified on such lists but which may nevertheless contribute to the development, production or use of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and missiles, with particular consideration of end-user, catch-all and brokering aspects; provide assistance to states lacking the legal and regulatory infrastructure, implementation experience and/or resources to develop their export and transshipment control systems in this regard.
6. **Adopt and strengthen efforts to manage and dispose of stocks of fissile materials designated as no longer required for defence purposes**, eliminate all chemical weapons, and minimize holdings of dangerous biological pathogens and toxins, based on the recognition that the threat of terrorist acquisition is reduced as the overall quantity of such items is reduced.

*The G8 Global Partnership: Guidelines for New or Expanded Cooperation Projects*

The G8 will work in partnership, bilaterally and multilaterally, to develop, coordinate, implement and finance, according to their respective means, new or expanded cooperation projects to address (i) **non-proliferation**, (ii) disarmament, (iii) counter-terrorism and (iv) **nuclear safety** (including environmental) issues, with a view to enhancing strategic stability, consonant with our international security objectives and in support of the multilateral **non-proliferation regimes**. Each country has primary responsibility for implementing its **non-proliferation**, disarmament, counter-terrorism and nuclear safety obligations and requirements and commits its full cooperation within the **Partnership**.

Cooperation projects under this initiative will be decided and implemented, taking into account international obligations and domestic laws of participating partners, within appropriate bilateral and multilateral legal frameworks that should, as necessary, include the following elements:

- i. Mutually agreed effective monitoring, auditing and transparency measures and procedures will be required in order to ensure that cooperative activities meet agreed objectives (including irreversibility as necessary), to confirm work



- performance, to account for the funds expended and to provide for adequate access for donor representatives to work sites;
- ii. The projects will be implemented in an environmentally sound manner and will maintain the highest appropriate level of safety;
  - iii. Clearly defined milestones will be developed for each project, including the option of suspending or terminating a project if the milestones are not met;
  - iv. The material, equipment, technology, services and expertise provided will be solely for peaceful purposes and, unless otherwise agreed, will be used only for the purposes of implementing the projects and will not be transferred. Adequate measures of physical protection will also be applied to prevent theft or sabotage;
  - v. All governments will take necessary steps to ensure that the support provided will be considered free technical assistance and will be exempt from taxes, duties, levies and other charges;
  - vi. Procurement of goods and services will be conducted in accordance with open international practices to the extent possible, consistent with national security requirements;
  - vii. All governments will take necessary steps to ensure that adequate liability protections from claims related to the cooperation will be provided for donor countries and their personnel and contractors;
  - viii. Appropriate privileges and immunities will be provided for government donor representatives working on cooperation projects; and
  - ix. Measures will be put in place to ensure effective protection of sensitive information and intellectual property.

Given the breadth and scope of the activities to be undertaken, the G8 will establish an appropriate mechanism for the annual review of progress under this initiative which may include consultations regarding priorities, identification of project gaps and potential overlap, and assessment of consistency of the cooperation projects with international security obligations and objectives. Specific bilateral and multilateral project implementation will be coordinated subject to arrangements appropriate to that project, including existing mechanisms.

For the purposes of these guidelines, the phrase "new or expanded cooperation projects" is defined as cooperation projects that will be initiated or enhanced on the basis of this **Global Partnership**. All funds disbursed or released after its announcement would be included in the total of committed resources. A range of financing options, including the option of bilateral debt for program exchanges, will be available to countries that contribute to this **Global Partnership**.

The **Global Partnership's** initial geographic focus will be on projects in Russia, which maintains primary responsibility for implementing its obligations and requirements within the **Partnership**.

In addition, the G8 would be willing to enter into negotiations with any other recipient countries, including those of the Former Soviet Union, prepared to adopt the guidelines, for inclusion in the **Partnership**.

Recognizing that the **Global Partnership** is designed to enhance international security and safety, the G8 invites others to contribute to and join in this initiative.

With respect to **nuclear safety and security**, the partners agreed to establish a new **G8 Nuclear Safety and Security Group** by the time of our next Summit.

### 2003 Evian

#### *Chair's Summary:*

##### *2. Enhancing Sustainable Development*

**Nuclear safety.** In accordance with our statement at Kananaskis, we established the G8 **Nuclear Safety and Security Group**, and adopted its mandate and the Core Principles shared by each of us, to promote the **safe and secure** use of **civil nuclear technology**.

##### *3. Improving Security*

Non-proliferation. We adopted a Statement on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and endorsed an Action Plan on the prevention of radiological terrorism and the **securing of radioactive sources**.

##### *4. Regional Issues*

North Korea. We addressed the North Korean **nuclear issue** in our Statement on non-proliferation. We support the efforts made by the different parties to seek by peaceful means a comprehensive solution to the North Korean **nuclear issue** and to other matters, including unresolved humanitarian problems such as the abductions. We also support the Peace and Prosperity Policy pursued by the Republic of Korea.

Iran. We addressed the proliferation implications of Iran's **advanced nuclear programme** in our Statement on **non-proliferation**.

***Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction: A G8 Action Plan:*** Entire document is relevant in terms of non-proliferation, as follows:

The Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, which we launched last year at the Kananaskis Summit, has made significant progress over the past year toward realising the objective of preventing terrorists, or those who harbour them, from acquiring or developing nuclear, chemical, radiological, and biological weapons; missiles; and related materials, equipment, and technology.

With our determined commitment, significant progress has been made :

" Substantial sums have already been pledged by Partners towards their Kananaskis commitment to raise up to \$20 billion over ten years ;

" The Russian government has made welcomed decisions to ensure implementation of guidelines, in particular full exemption of assistance from taxation, duties and other charges. Other guidelines have also been intensively addressed ;

" The recent conclusion of the Multilateral Nuclear Environment Programme for the Russian Federation has demonstrated substantial progress in translating the Global Partnership initiative into concrete actions ;

" All Partners have actively engaged in determining co-operation projects to be undertaken, and some significant projects have already been launched or expanded, in accordance with our priorities identified in Kananaskis ;

" Outreach activities have been undertaken to invite and facilitate non-G8 countries to participate and contribute, as a result of which Finland, Norway, Poland, Sweden and Switzerland have indicated their interest in joining the Global Partnership as donors. We commit ourselves to an active programme to continue the implementation of the initiative and to achieve substantial progress by the next Summit. Our goals are :

" To pursue the universal adoption of the non-proliferation principles ;

" To reach our Kananaskis commitment of raising up to \$20 billion over ten years through contributions from new donors or additional pledges from Partners ;

" To significantly expand project activities, building upon preparatory work to establish implementing frameworks and to develop plans for project activities, as well as to sustain steady progress in projects already underway. We will continue to review progress in initiation and implementation of projects over the coming year, and to oversee co-ordination of projects, in order to review priorities, avoid gaps and overlaps, and assess consistency of projects with international security objectives, in accordance with our priorities ;

" To resolve all outstanding implementation challenges and to review the implementation of all guidelines in practice, keeping in mind the need for uniform treatment of Partners, reflecting our co-operative approach ;

" To expand participation in the Global Partnership to interested non-G8 donor countries that are willing to adopt the Kananaskis documents. While still focusing on projects in Russia, we mandate the Chair to enter into preliminary discussions with new or current recipient countries including those of the former Soviet Union that are prepared to adopt the Kananaskis documents, as the Ukraine has already done ;

" To inform other organisations, parliamentary representatives, and publics of the importance of the Global Partnership.

***Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction: G8 Senior Officials Group Annual Report:*** Entire document is relevant in terms of non-proliferation, as follows:

Our Leaders decided at the Kananaskis Summit to launch a new G8 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction to prevent terrorists, or those that harbour them, from acquiring or developing weapons of mass destruction. Their Statement set the scope of co-operation projects under this initiative to address non-proliferation, disarmament, counter-terrorism and nuclear safety issues. Among the priority concerns they identified the destruction of chemical weapons, the dismantlement of decommissioned nuclear submarines, the disposition of fissile materials and the employment of former weapon scientists. It was agreed to review progress on the Global Partnership at the Evian Summit. The Global Partnership Senior Officials Group, established to review progress of the initiative and to co-ordinate projects, has undertaken an active work plan to implement this initiative, first under the Canadian Chair and then in 2003 under the French Chair. In the first year of Global Partnership activities, the Senior Officials Group can report substantial progress to translate the Global Partnership initiative into concrete projects. At the same time, much work remains to be done, and the Senior Officials Group has outlined a challenging action plan to be accomplished before the next Summit.

The Senior Officials Group's activities over the past year have focused on four objectives: implementation and translation of the guidelines, as necessary, into concrete actions and agreements; initiation and development of concrete projects; financial contributions in conformity with the Kananaskis commitment to raise up to \$20 billion over the next ten years; and outreach activities towards non-G8 countries to expand participation in the Partnership. For each, the objective was to ensure that the Kananaskis promises were being translated into practice. In order to do so, work has been pursued with determination on resolution of outstanding implementation problems, successful negotiation of implementing agreements, development and initiation of concrete projects based on allocated funds, national financial commitments to raise up to \$20 billion over ten years, and inviting third countries to participate in the initiative and contribute to projects under the Partnership.

#### 1. Implementation of Kananaskis guidelines

The Kananaskis Statement defined a set of guidelines that will form the basis for the negotiation of specific agreements governing projects. Implementation of these guidelines has been a primary task of the Senior Officials, and was addressed at each Senior Officials Group meeting. In the course of their discussions, Senior Officials noted the difficulties and obstacles that were hindering the initiation of projects, and have conducted an in-depth review of the outstanding issues related to the negotiation of bilateral and multilateral agreements required for projects falling under the scope of the Global Partnership.

We welcome the important progress that has been made on the issue of tax exemption on the basis of high-level political decisions. Several bilateral and multilateral agreements include such provisions. Nonetheless, these agreements have yet to be tested in practice. Full exemption from taxes, duties, levies and other charges is essential for projects to

succeed; progress registered in this field is positive and has to be pursued. Another essential issue for Partners is liability protection. The efficacious implementation of the guideline which states that "adequate liability protection from claims related to the co-operation project to be provided for donors countries, their personnel and contractors" has been discussed extensively by Senior Officials. All Partners agree that adequate liability protections are essential for project implementation, while recognising that the protections differ depending on respective national requirements. Partners reinforced the need to have adequate liability provisions in all bilateral and multilateral frameworks and welcomed progress in this regard. Partners agreed that there should be uniform treatment of donors in this respect.

The guideline regarding "adequate access to work sites" has also been under consideration by Senior Officials. The new proposal to simplify access to sites by reducing prior notification delay from 45 to 30 days through a procedure of annual lists has been considered as an improvement on past practice though still judged insufficient by some Partners. It should be evaluated over the next year.

Other guidelines such as monitoring, auditing and accountancy of funds, or the implementation of projects in an environmentally sound manner, and establishment of project milestones have not been raised as presenting problems. Some of these guidelines have been satisfactorily translated into bilateral agreements. However, the Senior Officials will duly address such issues as they may arise during the implementation of projects.

The Senior Officials have also noted in their discussions the importance of the guidelines concerning the assurance that "the material, equipment, technology, services and expertise provided will be solely for peaceful purposes" and "appropriate privileges and immunities will be provided for government donor representatives".

After one year, Senior Officials can report some progress regarding the implementation of the guidelines and welcome Russian efforts in that respect. They recognise that, given the importance of practical implementation of guidelines for engagement of new projects, sustained and broadened efforts in this field are necessary.

2. Partners report on the state of advancement of co-operation projects, and specific projects for new co-operation

A number of specific co-operation projects are moving forward into their concrete phase. For example, in the chemical weapons field, the Gorny facility was completed and went into operation, and has already destroyed 400 tonnes of yperite. After the conclusion of an agreement, the construction of the Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility in Kambarka can start in the next months. Construction of the Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility for nerve agents at Schuchye was initiated as well as other related infrastructure projects. They are important milestones in the field of chemical weapons destruction. It is also to be reported that Italy and Russia have recently signed an Additional Protocol related to the Schuchye chemical destruction plant. A new stage in dismantling former nuclear submarines has been reached with the concrete and tangible results for implementation of new projects in Saïda Bay and at Zvezda Shipyard in the Far Eastern Region, as well as the funding of other projects for dismantlement of decommissioned nuclear submarines. Agreement has also been reached on a programme to end Russian production of weapons-grade plutonium and on acceleration of efforts to secure Russian fissile material and nuclear warheads, while significant progress can be

noted in the negotiations on international support for Russia's plutonium disposition programmes, including increased pledges and substantial agreement on concepts for effective programme management and oversight. We look forward to completion of these negotiations. The safety and security of biological research facilities is being improved. With respect to employment of former weapons scientists, in addition to the continued efforts in the multilateral International Science and Technology Centre framework, new bilateral engagements have been initiated with former non-conventional weapons production facilities to assist in their reconversion to develop and manufacture commercial products.

The Senior Officials Group has followed closely the developments of bilateral contacts as well as multilateral consultations that preside over engagement of new projects. Additional efforts should be made to identify and start new projects. Partners have had an active programme of experts meeting and exchanges, including visits on the sites and seminars for dealing with concrete technical issues. This was the case for the seminar of experts on ecological problems in nuclear submarines decommissioning held in Vladivostok, and the meeting of submarine experts organised by Russia in Severodvinsk, followed by informal experts meeting on the same subject held by the presidency. Interested experts in the chemical fields also met in the margins of the Organisation for the Prohibition Chemical Weapons Executive Council sessions to discuss plans of countries to fund projects as well as outstanding needs. The Conference of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Co-operation Initiative hosted by the European Commission in Brussels under EU, US and Canadian Chairmanship also furthered the aims of the Global Partnership by facilitating information exchange, outreach to other countries and co-ordination of projects.

All Partners have engaged in intensive bilateral consultations with Russia to identify fields of co-operation and select specific projects to be carried forward. The Russian side identified lists of specific projects that were presented to individual Partners. These lists were studied in depth by Partners who have responded, others are still in the process of discussion of projects. They have all, while keeping in mind the full scope of the Global Partnership, addressed those priorities identified among others by Leaders in Kananaskis (destruction of chemical weapons, dismantlement of decommissioned nuclear submarines, disposition of fissile materials and employment of former weapons scientists). They have also taken into account the two priorities on which Russia has put special emphasis (destruction of chemical weapons, dismantlement of decommissioned submarines).

Despite all these efforts and active endeavours, Senior Officials note that for practical implementation of projects to progress as fast and as effectively as expected, sustained and broadened efforts will be needed.

### 3. Financial Commitments

Leaders in Kananaskis committed collectively to raise up to \$20 billion to support Partnership projects over a ten year period. Over the past year, this collective commitment has been translated into firm national commitments of up to: United States - \$10 billion; Germany - €1.5 billion; UK - \$750 million; France - €750 million; Japan - \$200 million; Italy - €1 billion; Canada - Can\$1 billion. The EU has pledged €1 billion and Russia \$2 billion. It is also to be noted that Partners have appropriated in their budgets of FY 2003 adequate funds for this year's projects.

#### 4. Outreach strategy and modalities

Following the Leaders' invitation to other countries prepared to adopt the Kananaskis documents (statement, principles and guidelines) to enter discussions with Partners on participating in and contributing to this initiative, and their commitment to review this question at their next Summit, intense outreach activities have been developed. These activities were driven forward by the Canadian Chair, which sustained its efforts in this direction under the new French Chair. Contacts were made with countries that expressed an interest, and information was given on the content, aims and work of the Global Partnership. Meetings with interested countries were organised in Ottawa. Following bilateral additional consultations, an information meeting, co-chaired by Canada, France and the United States, was held in Paris on 8 April in order to encourage and facilitate potential donors to participate in the Global Partnership. Russia briefed potential donors about possible co-operation projects on the chemical weapons destruction and the dismantlement of decommissioned submarines. They were informed of the inclusive character of the Partnership and offered the possibility, having endorsed the Kananaskis documents, to make a formal announcement of their interest and their intention to pledge. The Chair indicated that the G8 would be ready to give due recognition to the new donors at the Evian Summit. Potential new donors were also informed of the possibility of having back-to-back meetings of the enlarged Partnership group with the G8 Senior Officials Group meetings until future structures are decided upon. A similar information meeting with interested countries was also organised by the United States in Washington on 25 April.

Although the initial Global Partnership focus was on projects in Russia as stated by the Leaders, the Partnership may extend to other recipient countries, including in particular those of the Former Soviet Union, prepared to adopt the Kananaskis documents. The Leaders stated the G8 willingness to enter in negotiations with such countries. In that respect, an official application was presented by the Ukraine. After discussion in the Senior Officials Group, it has answered positively, in principle, while recalling that the Partnership was still in its initial phase and thus focused on Russian projects. The Chair has expressed its readiness to enter into preliminary discussions with interested recipients willing to adhere to the Kananaskis documents in order to prepare for their future inclusion in the Partnership. Some partners are already pursuing relevant projects in former Soviet States outside Russia.

While encouraging the importance of the universal adoption of non-proliferation principles, Senior Officials have been eager to underline the importance of Global Partnership and to publicise its objectives and activities to third countries as well as the United Nations, the European Union, the Non Proliferation Treaty Prepcom and others. In this respect, Senior Officials welcome the EU plan to organise an inter-parliamentary conference on Global Partnership in November 2003. This conference, to be held in Strasbourg on 21 November 2003, is fully supported by the G8 Partners and Chair, and the future EU Presidency, who view the event as an important step to provide information on the Global Partnership to parliamentarians whose support for funding the initiative will be essential over the ten-year period.

Senior Officials reviewing their activities over the year since Kananaskis note the progress achieved in implementing guidelines, the advancement of new projects, financial commitments and outreach activities, while recognising that in all these fields, further work has to be done. All of the Kananaskis documents thus remain under Senior Officials Group consideration and review, as part of a global ongoing process in order to yield substantive results.

***Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: A G8 Declaration:*** Entire document is relevant in terms of non-proliferation, as follows:

1. We recognise that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery poses a growing danger to us all. Together with the spread of international terrorism, it is the pre-eminent threat to international security.
2. This global challenge requires a multifaceted solution. We need to tackle it individually and collectively - working together and with other partners, including through relevant international institutions, in particular those of the United Nations system.
3. We have a range of tools available to tackle this threat : international treaty regimes; inspection mechanisms such as those of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons; initiatives to eliminate WMD stocks such as the G8 Global Partnership ; national and internationally-co-ordinated export controls; international co-operation and diplomatic efforts; and if necessary other measures in accordance with international law.
4. While all of these instruments are necessary, none is sufficient by itself. Not all proliferation challenges require the same remedies. We need to deploy the tools which are most effective in each case. We remain committed to work with and strengthen all these instruments and, where appropriate, to pursue the universalisation of relevant treaties and instruments.
5. Last year, at Kananaskis, we endorsed a set of Principles to prevent the spread of WMD and materials of mass destruction to terrorists and those that harbour them. Since then, events in the world have underscored the relevance of those Principles and the urgency of implementing them.
6. We reaffirm our commitment to the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, and we urge all states which have not yet joined them to do so. We consider these three treaties to be essential instruments to maintain international peace and security and cornerstones of non-proliferation and disarmament.  
We reaffirm our support for the IAEA, which should be granted the necessary means to implement its monitoring tasks.
7. North Korea's uranium enrichment and plutonium production programs and its failure



to comply with its IAEA safeguards agreement undermine the non-proliferation regime and are a clear breach of North Korea's international obligations. We strongly urge North Korea to visibly, verifiably and irreversibly dismantle any nuclear weapons programs, a fundamental step to facilitate a comprehensive and peaceful solution.

8. We will not ignore the proliferation implications of Iran's advanced nuclear program. We stress the importance of Iran's full compliance with its obligation under the NPT. We urge Iran to sign and implement an IAEA Additional Protocol without delay or conditions. We offer our strongest support to comprehensive IAEA examination of this country's nuclear program.

9. We call on all States to establish effective procedures and machinery to control the transfer of materials, technology and expertise which may contribute to the development, production or use of WMD and their means of delivery. We likewise call on all States to establish and implement effective national standards for secure storage and handling of such materials with a view to effectively prevent proliferation and eliminate the risk that terrorists gain access to them. We agree, individually and collectively, to give support to this end where it is most needed.

***Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Securing Radioactive Sources: A G8 Statement:*** Entire document is relevant in terms of non-proliferation, as follows:

At Kananaskis, we, the Heads of State and Government of the eight major industrialised democracies and the Representatives of the European Union, endorsed six principles and launched the Global Partnership to prevent terrorists or those that harbour them from gaining access to weapons and materials of mass destruction. Today, at Evian, in another concrete demonstration of our commitment to these principles, we have agreed to improve the security of radioactive materials. Radioactive sources are found in everyday life and have beneficial applications in medicine, agriculture, research, and industry. Certain poorly protected sources pose a real threat because they could be manipulated by terrorists to construct a radiological dispersion device or a "dirty bomb". We commit ourselves to employing high standards that reduce the vulnerability of radioactive sources to acquisition by terrorists. We urge all countries to take measures to strengthen regulatory control of high-risk sources within their territories. In that context, we welcome the initiatives taken by G8 countries and the European Union aimed at developing an appropriate legal framework to this end.

We welcome the findings of the 2003 Conference on Security of Radioactive Sources. We also recognise the essential role of the International Atomic Energy Agency in combating radiological terrorism and endorse its efforts to establish international standards that ensure the long term security and control of high-risk radioactive sources. We have decided to undertake the following actions to reinforce and complement the IAEA's activities as well as to ensure the unavailability of radioactive sources to terrorists. The Group of Eight will:

1. Identify elements of the IAEA's Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources that are of the greatest relevance to preventing terrorists or those that harbour them from gaining access to high-risk radioactive sources.
2. Consider developing recommendations on how those elements could be applied at the national level. Those elements may include, as necessary:
  - 2.1. National registers for tracking sources;
  - 2.2. Programs for recovering orphan sources;
  - 2.3. National regulations limiting export of high-risk sources to States that have effective controls;
  - 2.4. Notification requirements to recipient States of exports;
  - 2.5. National measures to penalise theft or misuse of radioactive sources;
  - 2.6. National physical protection measures and access controls;and
  - 2.7. National laws to ensure the safe and secure disposal of high-risk spent sealed sources.
3. Work towards agreement on and implementation of these recommendations by the time of our next meeting in 2004.
4. Encourage all countries to strengthen controls on radioactive sources and observe the Code of Conduct when the revisions to it have been completed and approved.
5. Enhance international co-operation on locating, recovering, and securing high-risk radioactive sources.
6. Support and advance the IAEA's programs to improve the security of radioactive sources, including considering the provision of additional resources as necessary to the Nuclear Security Fund in order to promote the implementation of the Code of Conduct and the recommendations for its application.
7. In conjunction with the IAEA, convene an international conference in 2005, in France, to further discuss and raise awareness of the radioactive source problem, and to assess progress in implementing the findings of the 2003 International Conference on Security of Radioactive Sources.
8. Continue to work on this issue and will review the implementation of the plan of action, as set out in the technical annex to this Statement, at the 2004 G8 Summit.

***Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Securing Radioactive Sources: A G8 Action Plan:*** Entire document is relevant in terms of non-proliferation, as follows:

1. Background

The risks associated with radioactive sources have been the subject of increasing attention for several years now, particularly by the IAEA, with respect to safety and possible radiological accidents. But 11 September 2001 highlighted the risk posed by the

use of certain highly radioactive sources for malevolent or terrorist purposes, i.e. the exposure of populations to radiation, or the use of one or more sources in a radiological dispersion device.

In either case, this could have a major psychological impact on the population, going well beyond the actual radiological or chemical consequences produced-which would themselves be limited. Consequently, the international community must imperatively concern itself with the question of the security of these sources.

## 2. G8 approach

The G8, recognising the vital need to strengthen arrangements for the prevention of acts of radiological terrorism, desires to give a strong political impetus to the consideration of this issue. The Evian Summit provides an occasion for the G8 to express international awareness of this issue at the highest level, to reaffirm its support for the IAEA work in this domain, to call on States to mobilise to improve the safety and security of the sources they produce, possess, use, import or export, and to develop a medium- and long-term approach aimed at reinforcing the security of sources and the mechanisms for co-operation between States.

The G8 welcomes the initiatives taken by G8 countries and the European Union aimed at developing a legal framework for the registration, administration and control of radioactive sources. This work, performed in close co-operation with the IAEA, can provide a valuable input to wider international efforts in this area.

The utilisation of radioactive sources yields important benefits in many peaceful applications (including medicine, agriculture, the environment, industry, and so forth). Conscious of the vulnerability of many States with regard to the control and monitoring of sources used in these applications, the G8 agreed on the following approach to strengthen the safety and security of radioactive sources:

### 2.1 Support of the IAEA work

The Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources represents an essential feature of the IAEA work. The G8 encourages as many States as possible to observe the principles contained in the Code when the revisions to it have been completed and approved, with a view to improving national systems for the control of sources. The G8 lends its political support to the Agency for the implementation of its action in this field. It undertakes to promote the application of the Code of Conduct, collectively or individually, when the revisions to the Code have been completed and approved, and to encourage States to request the assistance of the Agency in this sphere (see Document 1-Support of the IAEA work).

### 2.2 Support for the most vulnerable States

The G8 States are mobilising individually or in partnership, notably with the IAEA, to assist the most vulnerable States in taking steps to account and securely manage all high-level radioactive sources in their territory, including the search for and securing of sources no longer under regulatory control. They call on the other producers or exporters

of highly radioactive sources to do likewise. They will exchange information and consult to review progress achieved in this sphere.

### 2.3 Mechanisms for the control of radioactive sources

The G8 undertakes to carry out a long term review of the means to strengthen control over radioactive sources and international co-operation in this sphere. The following avenues in particular are being explored:

2.3.1 Political commitments by States producing, possessing, using, importing or exporting radioactive sources to uphold the "principles of safe and secure management of radioactive sources", inspired by the relevant sections of the IAEA Code of Conduct (see Document 2-Political commitment by States producing, exporting and holding radioactive sources).

2.3.2 Identification of the elements of the completed Code of Conduct that are of the greatest relevance in preventing terrorism and encouragement to implement them world-wide. These may include national registers for radioactive sources, national measures to penalise thief or misuse of such sources and national physical protection and access control measures (see Document 3-Recommendations to States on the security of radioactive sources).

### 2.4 International conference on radioactive sources

The G8 welcomes the success of the International Conference on Security of Radioactive Sources held in Vienna on 11-13 March of this year, which emphasised in its findings the necessity of improving the control and security of radioactive sources at the national level and called for international initiatives in this sphere.

It supports the proposal by France to hold in France, in the first half of 2005, the fourth international conference on this topic and to include both the safety and the security aspects of radioactive sources, in order to review the actions undertaken and to map out perspectives for the future (see Document 4-International Conference on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources). This conference will also serve to support the actions already in progress (e.g. IAEA programmes, and bilateral and multilateral co-operation), encouraging all national and international players in their chosen course.

### Document 1

#### Support of the IAEA work

The G8 reaffirms its support for the actions undertaken by the IAEA in favour of the safety and security of radioactive sources, and declares its readiness to co-operate with the Agency on this issue.

More specifically,

1. The G8 contributes financially to the Agency's Nuclear Security Fund and is co-operating with the Agency through contributions in kind, within the framework of the

programme for protection against nuclear and radiological terrorism, via inter alia the secondment of experts, training programmes, evaluation on request of national systems for the control of sources, participation in campaigns for the detection and securing of uncontrolled sources, and in technical co-operation projects for the supply of equipment for the detection of illegal movements of radioactive sources (as part of the fight against the illicit trafficking in radioactive materials).

2. The G8 members will promote - individually and collectively - the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources when the revisions to it have been completed and approved, and invite States to work through the Agency for its application.

3. The G8 will consider requests for assistance from the Agency in response to a radiological accident or malevolent act, to secure the incriminated source(s) and, where necessary, to treat persons who have been radiated by these sources. It will also consider requests for assistance, as needed, for preventive actions (e.g. the search for and securing of sources).

4. The G8 will consider supplying to the IAEA the information at its disposal concerning particular emergency situations involving a radioactive source, or information liable to assist the Agency in dealing with such emergency situations where so requested. It will also consider similar request from non IAEA members.

## Document 2

### Political commitments by States producing, exporting and holding radioactive sources

1. Radioactive sources are used in a wide range of applications, including agriculture, the environment, industry, medicine, research and others. There are estimated to be several million radioactive sources of all kinds and sizes disseminated around the world.

The great majority of these sources present no serious threat, even if they should be handled with the customary caution: this notably applies to smoke detectors or instrument calibration sources. Certain sources, on the other hand, call for strict safety and security measures owing to their highly radioactive nature. The main objectives are to prevent malevolent acts (theft, sabotage, or transformation into a radiological dispersion device) and avoid radiological accidents.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) considers that roughly a hundred countries lack the legislative and regulatory framework needed to control radioactive sources adequately.

2. The G8 Heads of State and Government appeal to the international community of States, calling upon them to:

2.1. Account for the sources in their possession on their territory,

2.2. Take steps (where necessary with the assistance of the IAEA) to secure all high level radioactive sources,

### 2.3. Search for, locate and secure sources believed missing ("orphan" sources).

This short and medium-term approach being conducted by States at the national level may be accompanied by international co-operation aimed at the most vulnerable States. The work performed by G8 countries and the European Union aimed at developing, in close co-operation with the IAEA, a legal framework for the registration, administration and control of radioactive sources can provide a valuable input to wider international efforts in this area.

3. International assistance is being intensified under the auspices of the IAEA. This may take the following forms, and in particular:

3.1. Campaigns to search for and locate orphan sources, based on information gathered locally or from the initial producer and/or exporter of these sources,

3.2. Securing these sources on-site and, in extreme circumstances, evacuating them to specialised facilities,

3.3. Install appropriate instruments at border crossings and strategic points which aim to detect illegal movements of radioactive materials.

4. These assistance missions, which are liable to take place over an extended period of time, may be implemented with the aid of international financing (via the G8 Global Partnership, the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund, European or national funding, etc).

5. The States that produce and distribute radioactive sources have a special responsibility with regard to the safety and security of these sources. The G8 initially, and subsequently the other producer and exporting States as well, will give consideration to the type and nature of commitment the radioactive source producer and/or exporting States might enter into.

This commitment could take the form of an individual declaration by these States to the IAEA, in which they affirm their determination to uphold the "principles of safe and secure management of radioactive sources".

### Document 3

#### Recommendations to States on the security of radioactive sources

1. The IAEA Code of Conduct contains points contributing to the safety or the security of radioactive sources, or both. In its findings, the International Conference in Vienna, in March 2003, also identified points that ought to help strengthen the security of radioactive sources and render terrorist access to these sources more difficult.

The G8 proposes that these points be considered by States in implementing control and monitoring systems within their territory.

2. The G8 will direct a working group to identify those elements of the IAEA Code of Conduct that are of greatest relevance to prevent terrorists from gaining access to radioactive sources and to develop recommendations for national consideration on the

implementation of those elements, in close consultation with the IAEA. These recommendations will take into account the findings of the 2003 International Conference on Security of Radioactive Sources and could consider addressing, in particular, the following:

- 2.1. Establishing a national register to track sources throughout their life-cycle,
- 2.2. Setting up an outline for creating a national mechanism for the recovery and securing of "orphan" or poorly-controlled sources within their national territory,
- 2.3. Establishing a series of guidelines with respect to the control of exports of sources, conditions attaching to them, and mechanisms (e.g. notifications) for monitoring these exports,
- 2.4. Developing national measures as necessary to combat malevolent acts involving radioactive sources,
- 2.5. Identifying possible measures to be taken by the State in order to safeguard and restrict access to sources,
- 2.6. Identifying measures that the State could take regarding the conditioning and/or encouraging the recycling of sources at the end of their life,
- 2.7. Putting in place a system which aims to detect the passage of radioactive sources at strategic points such as border crossings.

#### Document 4

#### International Conference on the Safety and the Security of Radioactive Sources

1. The international Conference on Security of Radioactive Sources held in Vienna in March 2003, co-chaired by Russia and the United States, set in motion a process for reinforcing and accelerating international co-operation in the field of safety and security of radioactive sources, and more especially from the standpoint of security. But it also follows on from the previous international conferences on safety and security held in Dijon (France) in 1998 and in Buenos Aires (Argentina) in 2001.

2. Over the next two years, it would be desirable to consolidate the political impetus given to this issue in 2003 (through the Vienna Conference in March and the Evian Summit in June). A progress report should be drawn up on action taken to secure radioactive sources by:

2.1. The competent international organisations, e.g. the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the World Customs Organisation (WCO), Interpol, the European Commission, etc.,

2.2. States, at both national as well as bilateral and multilateral levels: safety and/or security authorities, export control bodies, customs administration, public or private agencies or enterprises with expertise in the field of radioactive sources (management, detection, search and location, securing, etc).

3. Consultations should be conducted, after the Evian Summit, with the main States concerned in order to give substance to the initiatives launched. In particular, the

proposals aimed at making sources more secure need to be refined: these could include inter alia recommendations made on the basis of measures contained in the IAEA Code of Conduct and of the findings of the March 2003 International Conference.

Consideration will also be given to the need to launch campaigns to secure poorly-controlled radioactive sources, and to search for, locate and secure "orphan" radioactive sources, with international funding (mainly via the G8 Global Partnership and the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund). National expert groups could meet to discuss these themes at the IAEA in the second half of 2003 and in 2004.

4. France will organise a fourth conference in the first half of 2005, which will draw up a progress report on the process begun in 2003. This conference could work according to the following guidelines:

4.1. Consolidating the IAEA's international efforts with regard to radioactive sources (via its Action Plan, Code of Conduct, assistance in the detection of illicit trafficking in radioactive materials, campaigns to locate orphan sources, and so on), and States in their national initiatives, as well as supporting bilateral and multilateral co-operative ventures,

4.2. Evaluating the main projects in progress,

4.3. Preparing a provisional assessment of the campaigns to secure poorly-controlled sources (covering safety and security aspects), and campaigns to search for, locate and secure orphan sources.

4.4. This conference would be attended by all of the aforementioned operational actors concerned by this issue.

## **2004 Sea Island**

### ***Chair's Summary:***

At Evian, we recognized the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, together with international terrorism, as the pre-eminent threat to international peace and security. Determined to prevent, contain, and roll back **proliferation**, we adopted a **G-8 Action Plan on Nonproliferation** to reinforce the global nonproliferation regime. This **Action Plan** enhances and expands ongoing efforts, such as the **Proliferation Security Initiative**, which now includes all G-8 members, and the **G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction**. The Action Plan addresses transfers of **enrichment and reprocessing equipment and technologies**, and takes steps to strengthen the **International Atomic Energy Agency** and to counter bioterrorism. The **Action Plan** calls on all states to implement the recently passed U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540, and addresses the proliferation challenges in North Korea, Iran, and Libya.

We also discussed regional challenges, including:

\* North Korea: We addressed the DPRK **nuclear issue** in our **G-8 Action Plan on Nonproliferation**. We support the Six-Party Talks as well as efforts by all concerned



parties to achieve a comprehensive solution by diplomatic means to the DPRK **nuclear issue** and to other security and humanitarian issues, such as the abductions.

**G8 Global Partnership Annual Report:** Entire document is relevant in terms of non-proliferation, as follows:

At the Kananaskis Summit in June 2002, G8 Leaders launched the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, committing to support projects, initially in Russia, to address nonproliferation, disarmament, counter-terrorism and nuclear safety issues. Building on the efforts of the first year of the Partnership, G8 members have taken important steps forward in the past twelve months, guided by the action goals approved by Leaders at Evian in 2003, and can report that substantial progress has been made. This annual report summarizes the results of these efforts, addressing the Evian Action goals and other Global Partnership activities.

The French Presidency led work on this initiative in the Global Partnership Senior Officials Group (GPSOG). The new Senior Group undertook responsibilities for the Global Partnership among other nonproliferation issues at the beginning of the U.S. Presidency in January 2004. The new Global Partnership Working Group (GPWG) is responsible for expert-level implementation of the initiative, under the guidance of the Senior Group, which has taken an active interest in the Global Partnership.

**• Progress on Global Partnership Action Plan Goals**

- Reaching the Kananaskis funding target

*Evian Action Plan Goal:*

*to reach our Kananaskis commitment of raising up to \$20 billion over ten years through contributions from new donors or additional pledges from partners.*

The national pledges of G8 members include commitments of up to: Canada – Can\$1 billion; France - € 750 million; Germany - \$1.5 billion; Japan - \$200 million; Italy - € 1 billion; United Kingdom - \$750 million; United States - \$10 billion. The European Union has pledged € 1 billion and Russia \$2 billion. Members to date have concentrated on establishing program frameworks, implementing programs, and ensuring budgetary allocations to realize their pledges. A number of members have emphasized that additional progress on implementation of current projects in Russia, with corresponding expenditure of funds, is necessary before parliaments will approve increased pledges. Some countries have also emphasized the importance of increased Russian funding.

Six new countries that joined the Global Partnership last year – Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Sweden and Switzerland -- have committed about \$200 million to specific projects. Recently, Finland announced an increase in its commitment to € 15 million.

The G8 members have reaffirmed their commitment to raise up to \$20 billion over ten years. Under its Strategy Against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, the European Union intends to reinforce its cooperative threat reduction programs by increasing funding after 2006, for which the creation of a new European Community budget line is being considered.

- Expand project activities

*Evian Action Plan goal:*

*To significantly expand project activities, building upon preparatory work to establish implementing frameworks and to develop plans for project activities, as well as to sustain steady progress in projects already under way. We will continue to review progress in initiation and implementation of projects over the coming year, as well as oversee coordination of projects, in order to review priorities, avoid gaps and overlaps, and assess consistency of projects with international security objectives, in accordance with our priorities.*

The GPSOG and the GPWG regularly reviewed project implementation over the past year. Such cooperation has resulted in strong progress.

**Implementing frameworks.** Some G8 members have in place long-standing implementation frameworks for Global Partnership projects. Others, building upon the work of the previous year, have now successfully established the legal basis for specific Global Partnership cooperation with Russia . For example, both Germany and Italy signed agreements with the Russian Federation for cooperation in the areas of nuclear submarine dismantlement and chemical weapons destruction. The United Kingdom and the Russia Federation signed an agreement for cooperation in the nuclear area. Germany concluded an agreement with the Russian Federation on cooperation in the area of physical protection of nuclear materials. New EU Joint Action projects are implemented under the umbrella of bilateral agreements between European Union member states and the Russian Federation . Japan and Russia concluded an implementing agreement for a pilot project to dismantle a Victor III class nuclear submarine. Canadian and Russian officials have completed the text of a framework agreement for Global Partnership cooperation.

The United Kingdom and Canada signed a memorandum of understanding allowing the construction of a railway line at the chemical weapon destruction facility at Shchuch'ye, to be funded by Canada and implemented with the United Kingdom 's assistance. This partnership in action may serve as the model for future cooperation for countries that lack a bilateral agreement with the Russian Federation .

A number of members have used the Multilateral Nuclear Environmental Program in the Russian Federation (MNEPR) framework agreement as a model for new bilateral agreements, or have referred to the MNEPR framework in their agreements. On the other

hand, some implementing frameworks have expired and negotiations for others have not been concluded because of differences among the parties.

**Initiation and implementation of projects.** With implementing agreements in place and other groundwork prepared in the first year of the Partnership, momentum on project implementation increased significantly in the Global Partnership's second year. Highlights of major areas are summarized below.

In Northwest Russia, the United Kingdom has funded the dismantlement of two Oscar class submarines and projects to ensure safe and secure spent nuclear fuel management at Andreeva Bay . In November 2003, Germany initiated a project to support the dismantlement of submarines, including the refurbishment of the Nerpa shipyard for that purpose and construction of a long-term intermediate storage facility for 120 reactor compartments at Saida Bay . France is considering the support of nuclear general-purpose submarine dismantlement and remediation in Gremikha. Canada is poised to sponsor dismantlement projects. Italy plans to assist with dismantlement following ratification of the negotiated agreement by the parliaments of Italy and the Russian Federation . Norway is funding the dismantlement of two Victor I class nuclear submarines. A number of members, including Canada, the European Union, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United Kingdom are providing substantial contributions for work to be initiated through the Northern Dimension Environmental Partnership (NDEP). In the Pacific Far East, Japan's pilot project, dismantlement of one Victor III class nuclear submarine, will be completed by autumn 2004, with further work to dismantle other submarines to follow. In the past year, the United States has funded the dismantlement of one strategic nuclear submarine and 109 strategic sea-launched ballistic missiles. Russia has committed to provide about US \$65 million annually for submarine dismantlement, rehabilitation of shore-bases and decommissioning of nuclear-powered service vessels.

The European Union, Finland, Germany, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States are engaged in cooperation to increase the security of fissile and/or radioactive materials. Canada is poised to do so following completion of the Canadian-Russian bilateral framework agreement.

Canada, France, Japan, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States have made substantial commitments, totaling \$800 million, to the plutonium disposition program in the Russian Federation . Initiation of this project awaits completion of the multilateral agreement for support for this program. In the meanwhile, the United States, France, the European Union and Japan are financing initial steps supporting the design, costing, and licensing of plutonium disposition facilities. The United States has begun implementation of its cooperation with the Russian Federation to eliminate Russian production of weapon-grade plutonium.

Many Global Partnership countries are supporting projects related to chemical weapons destruction. Cooperation projects begun in previous years have led to the destruction of over 640 tons of chemical weapons. Canada, the European Union, Finland, France,

Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Russia, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States are making contributions to chemical weapons destruction at sites including Gornyy, Shchuch'ye, and Kambarka. Norway, the EU, Czech Republic and Canada are channeling funding through the UK programme for projects at Shchuch'ye. Italy has further committed to contributions for work at Pochep. The Russian Federation has strongly requested that the Global Partnership members, including new donor countries, allocate more resources to the field of chemical weapons destruction.

France, Sweden, and the United States are engaged in cooperative bio-safety and bio-security projects.

A number of Global Partnership members are actively engaged in support of employment and redirection of former weapons scientists for work in peaceful civilian projects. Focus of these efforts is increasingly turning toward facilitating the transition of institutes and scientists to sustainable income-producing activities. The International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) is a primary channel for these programs. In addition, some countries, including the United Kingdom and the United States, are working bilaterally in closed nuclear cities and in other engagement programs. Canada joined the ISTC this year and is already contributing substantially to ISTC activities.

G8 members have noted that much work remains to be done, and that sustained and broadened efforts are needed to achieve timely and effective project implementation. Some Global Partnership participants have expressed the view that a wider range of projects should be pursued, consistent with the areas identified by Leaders at Kananaskis.

**Project coordination.** The GPSOG and the GPWG have actively considered coordination of projects under the Global Partnership to ensure exchange of information among interested countries for the purposes described in the action plan goal. The guiding principle has been to rely on existing coordination mechanisms, wherever available, rather than create additional expert consultative groups within the G8. In the chemical area, interested experts have been meeting on the margins of the Executive Council of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). Where there are no existing bodies for a program area, an effort has been made to identify an effective arrangement. The GPSOG and subsequently the GPWG considered coordination needs with respect to nuclear submarine dismantlement and physical protection of nuclear materials.

With respect to nuclear submarine dismantlement, some members identified a need for more effective coordination of activities and made proposals in this regard. Members have discussed the roles of several organizations where such information can be exchanged, including the Northern Dimension Environmental Program (NDEP) under the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the IAEA Contact Experts Group, and the Council of the Multilateral Environmental Nuclear Program in the Russian Federation (MNEPR). . The GPWG will continue to review this matter and ensure effective coordination is undertaken.

With increased Global Partnership activities in the area of nuclear physical protection, consideration is being given to how to facilitate coordination and exchange of information, taking into account the sensitive nature of the sites where projects are undertaken.

Some G8 members have stated that master plans developed for specific areas of cooperation would provide a sound basis for coordination of project activities, as well as for subsequent reporting. These members noted that some plans currently exist, but that others could be developed. It was also noted that the Russian Federation has a major role to play in developing and maintaining these master plans.

**Information-sharing on projects.** The French Presidency initiated and developed a *Consolidated Report of Global Partnership Projects*, a comprehensive listing of Global Partnership commitments. The U.S. Presidency has maintained and updated this document, including adding project information from the six new Global Partnership donors. (See Annex.) Members have agreed this report should be made available to the general public and to other interested governments. The GPWG is currently addressing how the Consolidated Report might be improved by providing additional data and considering proposals for more detailed data-sharing among participating governments. G8 members agree that it is important to explain to the general public and parliaments concrete results achieved with Global Partnership funding and highlight the benefits in terms of enhanced security.

- Resolve outstanding implementation challenges

*Evian action plan goal:*

*To resolve all outstanding implementation challenges and to review the implementation of all guidelines in practice, keeping in mind the need for uniform treatment of Partners, reflecting our cooperative approach.*

The Kananaskis statement defined a set of guidelines that would form the basis for negotiation of specific agreements. The GPSOG and the GPWG have given careful attention to review of guideline implementation in practice. A number of members have expressed a positive assessment of Russia's efforts to implement the Kananaskis guidelines and welcomed progress in that area. Members have also affirmed the importance of continued review by the GPWG of guideline implementation and facilitation of resolution of any problems that might arise.

Since the Evian Summit, GP participants have concluded negotiation of additional bilateral implementing agreements for cooperation, as noted above. Some agreements remain under negotiation, pending resolution of outstanding issues with respect to guidelines, such as adequate liability protections. There is a difference of views on liability protections, related to respective national requirements. Some G8 members believe that the issue could be resolved on the basis of the terms of the liability protocol to the MNEPR framework agreement that has been signed by some MNEPR members,

while others do not agree. Negotiations continue in order to reach a satisfactory resolution.

Most G8 members have reported good progress on implementation of guidelines as projects moved into the concrete phase, noting that in practice many detailed matters arise which are worked out among the implementing entities. A number of countries noted that transparency in implementation and well-organized cooperation among the Russian authorities is a key concern and important to effective program implementation. Countries supporting cooperation projects in Russia continue to emphasize the importance of monitoring, especially access to work sites, while recognizing that appropriate procedures are required regarding access to sensitive sites. Transparent contractor selection processes, financial accounting and auditing are also important to assure taxpayers that funds are spent for the intended purposes. Following the recent reorganization of Russian Federation ministries responsible for implementation of nuclear and chemical weapons destruction projects, the Russian Federation has worked with G8 countries in the GPWG to review effects of the reorganization on implementation progress, and to address their questions regarding ensuring effective implementation of projects during the transition period.

- Expand participation to other countries

*Evian Action Plan goal:*

*To expand participation in the Global partnership to interested non-G8 donor countries that are willing to adopt the Kananaskis documents. While still focusing on projects in Russia, we mandate the Chair to enter into preliminary discussions with new or current recipient countries including those of the former Soviet Union that are prepared to adopt the Kananaskis documents, as the Ukraine has already done.*

In the Kananaskis statement, Leaders invited other countries prepared to adopt the Kananaskis documents (statement, principles, and guidelines) to enter into discussions with Partners on participating in and contributing to this initiative. The Senior Group and the Global Partnership Working Group have focused on this goal.

**Additional donors.** As a result of outreach efforts under the Canadian and French Presidencies, last June the G8 welcomed the participation of Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Sweden, and Switzerland to the Global Partnership as donors. The new donors participated in meetings of the Global Partnership Senior Officials Group in 2003 and of the Global Partnership Working Group in 2004. With initial commitments totaling about \$200 million, these donors are cooperating with Russia to implement a number of projects, including some already under way.

In 2004, the U.S. Presidency, with the support of other G8 and the non-G8 donors, has led outreach efforts to invite additional countries to participate in and contribute to the Global Partnership, with the objective of widening both political and financial support. The outreach efforts began with extending an invitation to eight potential new donor

participants to attend the Global Partnership Working Group meeting held in London in March 2004, where information was provided on the content, aims, and work of the Global Partnership. As a result of this meeting, the Chair engaged in further informal discussions with some of these countries. Subsequently, at the end of March, the Chair of the Senior Group sent a formal letter of invitation to those countries. The letter conveyed that a formal announcement of their interest and intention to pledge, accompanied by endorsement of the Kananaskis documents, would be welcomed, and encouraged a response in time for recognition by Leaders at the June Sea Island Summit. Other G8 countries have reinforced the Chair's invitation through various contacts. A number of invitee countries have been giving serious consideration to participation in the Global Partnership. Australia, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Ireland, the Republic of Korea, and New Zealand have communicated that they would like to participate as Global Partnership donors and that they are committed to the Kananaskis principles and guidelines. After being welcomed by Leaders, the Chair of the Global Partnership Working Group will invite their participation at future GPWG meetings.

**Recognition of recipients.** Recognizing that the spread of weapons and materials of mass destruction is a global threat, the Kananaskis statement expressed the Leaders' intent that the Partnership extend to other recipient countries prepared to adopt the Kananaskis documents, including in particular those of the former Soviet Union. Although the Leaders agreed to an initial focus on projects in Russia, they also announced G8 willingness to enter into negotiations with other countries. At Evian, Leaders made a positive response in principle to the January 2003 official application presented by Ukraine, while recalling that the Partnership was still in its initial phase. Following the Evian Summit, the Chair of the GPSOG engaged in further discussions with the Government of Ukraine, and a further assurance of Ukraine's commitment to the Kananaskis principles and guidelines was received in December 2003. The U.S. Presidency has held further consultations with Ukraine and other countries of the former Soviet Union that have expressed interest in participation in the Partnership.

In their 2004 meetings, the Senior Group and Global Partnership Working Group have given careful consideration to expansion of participation to other recipient countries, including to a proposal to recognize Ukraine formally and a proposal that certain other former Soviet states be invited to seek participation as recipients. All members have stated their support in principle for such expansion and have noted that, regardless of expansion, projects in the Russian Federation will remain the principal focus. It was recognized that Partnership states will participate in projects according to their national interests and resources. The Senior Group and the GPWG will continue to work with other former Soviet states to discuss their participation in the Partnership.

A further proposal has been made that the Global Partnership include cooperation projects with countries in other regions. A number of members expressed positive views toward inclusion of countries where recent developments have led to new opportunities for disarmament and nonproliferation cooperative activities, with Iraq, Libya, Albania and others mentioned as examples. Some members expressed the view that cooperation with these countries should be funded over and above the \$20 billion Global Partnership

target. Others have suggested that these programs should be funded outside the Global Partnership. It was agreed that the GPWG and the Senior Group will discuss this matter further, while providing a forum for interested Global Partnership members to review and coordinate activities to be implemented in such countries.

- Informing others about the Global Partnership

*Evian Action Goal:*

*To inform other organizations, parliamentary representatives and publics of the importance of the Global Partnership.*

G8 members sponsor and participate in ongoing outreach efforts to ensure that other organizations, parliamentary representatives, and publics are informed about the importance and progress of the Global Partnership. The European Commission organized an Inter-Parliamentary Conference on the Global Partnership at the European Parliament in Strasbourg in November 2003, with attendance by members of parliaments, governmental representatives, international organizations and non-governmental organizations. Under the umbrella of the EU's Nonproliferation and Disarmament Cooperation Initiative, the United Kingdom hosted an expert-level conference in London in March 2004. Senior and expert level officials have addressed the Global Partnership in a number of forums sponsored by nongovernmental organizations. In addition, the GPWG *Consolidated Report of Global Partnership Projects* is to be posted on the Internet for the information of interested organizations and publics. Some members have published specific reports of their national efforts under the Global Partnership; others include information on Global Partnership activities in published reports with a larger scope. Such reports can be an important element in providing greater public visibility of the Global Partnership.

#### • **The Way Forward**

- Action goals for the coming year

The Global Partnership Working Group, under the guidance of the Senior Group, will take as its agenda the Global Partnership elements of the Leaders Action Plan on Nonproliferation. The GPWG carry forward the work of the past two years, including encouraging initiation and implementation of cooperation projects; review of implementation guidelines, including facilitating resolution of problems; ensuring necessary project coordination; and expanding participation to other donor and recipient countries.

- Organizational arrangements

The Senior Group and the Global Partnership Working Group have reviewed the current structures for supporting implementation of the Global Partnership. As part of this review, G8 and non-G8 Global Partnership participating members discussed whether the



GPWG should be spun-off from the G8 framework, considering that its expanded membership includes a number of non-G8 countries. Global Partnership members reached consensus that the current affiliation with the G8 framework is important to continue. Benefits include the political support of the G8 countries, including their support for translating financial commitments into budgetary allocations, as well as the advantages of secretariat functions for the G8 Presidency. Participating countries that are not G8 members will continue to attend meetings of the GPWG. Meetings in the G8 format will also continue, including for consideration of G8 decisions.

***G8 Action Plan on Non-Proliferation:*** Entire document is relevant in terms of non-proliferation, as follows:

At Evian, we recognized the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, together with international terrorism, as the pre-eminent threat to international peace and security. This challenge requires a long-term strategy and multi-faceted approaches.

Determined to prevent, contain, and roll back proliferation, today, at Sea Island, we announce an action plan to reinforce the global nonproliferation regime. We will work together with other concerned states to realize this plan.

All states must fulfill their arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation commitments, which we reaffirm, and we strongly support universal adherence to and compliance with these commitments under the relevant multilateral treaties. We will help and encourage states in effectively implementing their obligations under the multilateral treaty regimes, in particular implementing domestically their obligations under such treaties, building law enforcement capacity, and establishing effective export controls. We call on all states that have not already done so to subscribe to the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation.

We strongly support UN Security Council Resolution 1540, calling on all states to establish effective national export controls, to adopt and enforce effective laws to criminalize proliferation, to take cooperative action to prevent non-state actors from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, and to end illicit trafficking in such weapons, their means of delivery, and related materials. We call on all states to implement this resolution promptly and fully, and we are prepared to assist them in so doing, thereby helping to fight the nexus between terrorism and proliferation, and black markets in these weapons and related materials.

## **1. Nuclear Nonproliferation**

The trafficking and indiscriminate spread of sensitive nuclear materials, equipment, and technology that may be used for weapons purposes are a threat to us all. Some states seek uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing capabilities for weapons programs contrary to their commitments under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear

Weapons (NPT). We reaffirm our commitment to the NPT and to the declarations made at Kananaskis and Evian, and we will work to prevent the illicit diversion of nuclear materials and technology. We announce the following new actions to reduce the risk of nuclear weapons proliferation and the acquisition of nuclear materials and technology by terrorists, while allowing the world to enjoy safely the benefits of peaceful nuclear technology.

- To allow the world to safely enjoy the benefits of peaceful nuclear energy without adding to the danger of weapons proliferation, we have agreed to work to establish new measures so that sensitive nuclear items with proliferation potential will not be exported to states that may seek to use them for weapons purposes, or allow them to fall into terrorist hands. The export of such items should only occur pursuant to criteria consistent with global nonproliferation norms and to states rigorously committed to those norms. We shall work to amend appropriately the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines, and to gain the widest possible support for such measures in the future. We aim to have appropriate measures in place by the next G8 Summit. In aid of this process, for the intervening year, we agree that it would be prudent not to inaugurate new initiatives involving transfer of enrichment and reprocessing equipment and technologies to additional states. We call on all states to adopt this strategy of prudence. We will also develop new measures to ensure reliable access to nuclear materials, equipment, and technology, including nuclear fuel and related services, at market conditions, for all states, consistent with maintaining nonproliferation commitments and standards.
  - We seek universal adherence to IAEA comprehensive safeguards and the Additional Protocol and urge all states to ratify and implement these agreements promptly. We are actively engaged in outreach efforts toward this goal, and ready to offer necessary support.
  - The Additional Protocol must become an essential new standard in the field of nuclear supply arrangements. We will work to strengthen NSG guidelines accordingly. We aim to achieve this by the end of 2005.
- We support the suspension of nuclear fuel cycle cooperation with states that violate their nuclear nonproliferation and safeguards obligations, recognizing that the responsibility and authority for such decisions rests with national governments or the Security Council.
- To enhance the IAEA's integrity and effectiveness, and strengthen its ability to ensure that nations comply with their NPT obligations and safeguards agreements, we will work together to establish a new Special Committee of the IAEA Board of Governors. This committee would be responsible for preparing a comprehensive plan for strengthened safeguards and verification. We believe this committee should be made up of member states in compliance with their NPT and IAEA commitments.

- Likewise, we believe that countries under investigation for non-technical violations of their nuclear nonproliferation and safeguards obligations should elect not to participate in decisions by the IAEA Board of Governors or the Special Committee regarding their own cases.

## **2. Proliferation Security Initiative**

We reiterate our strong commitment to and support for the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and the Statement of Interdiction Principles, which is a global response to a global problem. We will continue our efforts to build effective PSI partnerships to interdict trafficking in weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and related materials. We also will prevent those that facilitate proliferation from engaging in such trafficking and work to broaden and strengthen domestic and international laws supporting PSI. We welcome the increasing level of support worldwide for PSI, which now includes all G8 members. The Krakow meeting commemorating PSI's first anniversary, attended by 62 countries, evidences growing global support.

We will further cooperate to defeat proliferation networks and coordinate, where appropriate, enforcement efforts, including by stopping illicit financial flows and shutting down illicit plants, laboratories, and brokers, in accordance with national legal authorities and legislation and consistent with international law. Several of us are already developing mechanisms to deny access to our ports and airports for companies and impose visa bans on individuals involved in illicit trade.

We encourage all states to strengthen and expand national and international measures to respond to clandestine procurement activities. Directly, and through the relevant international mechanisms, we will work actively with states requiring assistance in improving their national capabilities to meet international norms.

## **3. The Global Partnership Against Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction**

Since its launch by G8 Leaders two years ago at Kananaskis, the Global Partnership has become a significant force worldwide to enhance international safety and security. Global Partnership member states, including the six new donors that joined at Evian, have in the past year launched new cooperative projects in Russia and accelerated progress on those already underway. While much has been accomplished, significant challenges remain. We recommit ourselves to our Kananaskis Statement, Principles, and Guidelines as the basis for Global Partnership cooperation.

- We recommit ourselves to raising up to \$20 billion for the Global Partnership through 2012.
- Expanding the Partnership to include additional donor countries is essential to raise the necessary resources and to ensure the effort is truly global. Today we welcome the decisions of Australia, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Ireland, the Republic of Korea, and New Zealand to join.

- We will continue to work with other former Soviet states to discuss their participation in the Partnership. We reaffirm that Partnership states will participate in projects according to their national interests and resources.
- We reaffirm that we will address proliferation challenges worldwide. We will, for example, pursue the retraining of Iraqi and Libyan scientists involved in past WMD programs. We also support projects to eliminate over time the use of highly-enriched uranium fuel in research reactors worldwide, secure and remove fresh and spent HEU fuel, control and secure radiation sources, strengthen export control and border security, and reinforce biosecurity. We will use the Global Partnership to coordinate our efforts in these areas.

#### **4. Nonproliferation Challenges**

- The DPRK's announced withdrawal from the NPT, which is unprecedented; its continued pursuit of nuclear weapons, including through both its plutonium reprocessing and its uranium enrichment programs, in violation of its international obligations; and its established history of missile proliferation are serious concerns to us all. We strongly support the Six-Party Process, and strongly urge the DPRK to dismantle all of its nuclear weapons-related programs in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner, a fundamental step to facilitate a comprehensive and peaceful solution.
- We remain united in our determination to see the proliferation implications of Iran's advanced nuclear program resolved. Iran must be in full compliance with its NPT obligations and safeguards agreement. To this end, we reaffirm our support for the IAEA Board of Governors' three Iran resolutions. We note that since Evian, Iran has signed the Additional Protocol and has committed itself to cooperate with the Agency, and to suspend its enrichment and reprocessing related activities. While we acknowledge the areas of progress reported by the Director General, we are, however, deeply concerned that Iran's suspension of enrichment-related activity is not yet comprehensive. We deplore Iran's delays, deficiencies in cooperation, and inadequate disclosures, as detailed in IAEA Director General reports. We therefore urge Iran promptly and fully to comply with its commitments and all IAEA Board requirements, including ratification and full implementation of the Additional Protocol, leading to resolution of all outstanding issues related to its nuclear program.
- We welcome Libya's strategic decision to rid itself of its weapons of mass destruction and longer-range missiles, to fully comply with the NPT, the Additional Protocol, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and to commit not to possess missiles subject to the Missile Technology Control Regime. We note Libya has cooperated in the removal of nuclear equipment and materials and taken steps to eliminate chemical weapons. We call on Libya to continue to cooperate fully with the IAEA and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

#### **5. Defending Against Bioterrorism**

Bioterrorism poses unique, grave threats to the security of all nations, and could endanger public health and disrupt economies. We commit to concrete national and international steps to: expand or, where necessary, initiate new biosurveillance capabilities to detect bioterror attacks against humans, animals, and crops; improve our prevention and response capabilities; increase protection of the global food supply; and respond to, investigate, and mitigate the effects of alleged uses of biological weapons or suspicious outbreaks of disease. In this context, we seek concrete realization of our commitments at the fifth Review Conference of the BWC. The BWC is a critical foundation against biological weapons' proliferation, including to terrorists. Its prohibitions should be fully implemented, including enactment of penal legislation. We strongly urge all non-parties to join the BWC promptly.

## **6. Chemical Weapons Proliferation**

We support full implementation of the CWC, including its nonproliferation aspects. We strongly urge all non-parties to join the CWC promptly, and will work with them to this end. We also urge CWC States Parties to undertake national legislative and administrative measures for its full implementation. We support the use of all fact-finding, verification, and compliance measures, including, if necessary, challenge inspections, as provided in the CWC.

## **7. Implementation of the Evian Initiative on Radioactive Source Security**

At Evian we agreed to improve controls on radioactive sources to prevent their use by terrorists, and we have made substantial progress toward that goal. We are pleased that the IAEA approved a revised Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources in September 2003. We urge all states to implement the Code and recognize it as a global standard.

We have agreed to export and import control guidance for high-risk radioactive sources, which should only be supplied to authorized end-users in states that can control them. States should ensure that no sources are diverted for illicit use. We seek prompt IAEA approval of this guidance to ensure that effective controls are operational by the end of 2005 and applied in a harmonized and consistent manner. We support the IAEA's program for assistance to ensure that all countries can meet the new standards.

## **8. Nuclear Safety and Security**

Since the horrific 1986 accident at Chernobyl, we have worked with Ukraine to improve the safety and security of the site. We have already made a large financial contribution to build a safe confinement over the remnants of the Chernobyl reactor. We are grateful for the participation and contributions made by 21 other states in this effort. Today, we endorse international efforts to raise the remaining funds necessary to complete the project. We urge Ukraine to support and work closely with us to complete the confinement's construction by 2008 in a way that contributes to radiological safety, in particular in Ukraine and neighboring regions.

An effective, efficient nuclear regulatory system is essential for our safety and security. We affirm the importance for national regulators to have sufficient authority, independence, and competence.

## **2005 Gleneagles**

### ***Chair's Summary:***

#### *Regional Issues and Proliferation*

We reaffirmed that the **proliferation** of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, together with international terrorism, remain the pre-eminent threats to international peace and security. We reaffirmed our commitments and called on all States to uphold in full **international norms on non-proliferation** and to meet their arms control and disarmament obligations. We emphasised our determination to meet proliferation challenges decisively, through both national and multilateral efforts. We expressed particular concern about the **threat of proliferation in North Korea and Iran**.

On Iran we support the efforts of France, Germany and the UK, with the EU, to address through negotiation the concerns about Iran's **nuclear programme**, and expressed once again the importance of Iran combating terrorism, supporting peace in the Middle East and respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms.

On North Korea, we support the Six Party Talks and urged North Korea to return promptly to them. We call on North Korea to abandon its **nuclear weapons-related programmes**. Action is also long overdue for North Korea to respond to the international community's concern over its human rights record and the abductions issue.

**G8 Statement on Non-Proliferation:** Entire section is relevant in terms of non-proliferation, as follows:

#### **GLENEAGLES STATEMENT ON NON-PROLIFERATION**

1. We acknowledge, as we did at Evian and Sea Island, that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery means, together with international terrorism, remain the pre-eminent threats to international peace and security. The threat of the use of WMD by terrorists calls for redoubled efforts.
2. All States have a role to play in meeting the challenge of WMD proliferation by upholding international arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation norms. All must meet their obligations in full, and ensure effective implementation. We reaffirm our commitments in this regard. And we emphasise our determination to meet proliferation challenges decisively, through both national efforts and effective multilateralism.
3. At Sea Island, we agreed an Action Plan on Non-Proliferation. During the past year, we have worked intensively with our international partners on all its aspects.  
**Universalising and reinforcing the non-proliferation regime**

4. Multilaterally agreed norms provide an essential basis for our non-proliferation efforts. We strongly support universal adherence to and compliance with these norms. We will work to strengthen them, including through improved verification and enforcement. We call on all States not party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, an IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the Hague Code of Conduct Against the Proliferation of Ballistic Missiles, to accede without delay. We remain ready to assist States to this end.

5. We welcome the agreement by the international community of the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, initiated by the Russian Federation. We look forward to its early entry into force.

#### **United Nations**

6. We acknowledge the role of the UN Security Council in addressing the challenges of proliferation. We welcome the fact that the majority of UN members have responded to UNSCR 1540 by submitting reports on their domestic nonproliferation provisions including export controls, and their contribution to international co-operation. We urge those who have not yet done so to submit reports without delay. It is essential that all states meet their obligations in full, by enacting and enforcing national legal and regulatory measures including appropriate criminal and civil penalties for violations, and by committing to international co-operation on non-proliferation. We stand ready to consider all requests from states seeking to develop their national procedures. We urge the 1540 Committee to work quickly and effectively, drawing on the support of relevant international organisations. We also urge the Security Council to consider how best to ensure that the work of the committee makes an enduring contribution to non-proliferation.

7. We welcome the attention given to non-proliferation by the UN Secretary General in his report “In Larger Freedom”. We stand ready to engage actively at the meeting of Heads of State and Government for the High Level Plenary Event of the General Assembly in September. We acknowledge the role of the Conference on Disarmament in advancing our non-proliferation and disarmament objectives and call on it to resume substantive work.

8. We look forward to strengthening the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA) by State Parties at the Diplomatic Conference in October.

#### **Proliferation Security Initiative**

9. We reaffirm our commitment to the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and its Statement of Interdiction Principles, which is a global response to a global problem. We welcome the increasing international endorsement for the Initiative. We call on all States to commit themselves to deepen co-operation in order to counter trafficking in WMD, delivery means and related materials.

10. We also call for enhanced efforts to combat proliferation networks and illicit financial flows by developing, on an appropriate legal basis, co-operative procedures to identify, track and freeze relevant financial transactions and assets.

#### **Nuclear Non-Proliferation**

#### **Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)**

11. We emphasise that the NPT remains the cornerstone of nuclear non-proliferation. We reaffirm our full commitment to all three pillars of the Treaty. While we note with regret that it was not possible to achieve consensus at the 2005 Review Conference, we welcome the fact that all States Parties reaffirmed the validity of the Treaty. We remain determined that threats and challenges to the nuclear nonproliferation regime be addressed on the basis of the NPT. For our part, we pledge ourselves to redouble our efforts to uphold and strengthen the Treaty.

#### **International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)**

12. Safeguards are an essential tool for the effective implementation of the NPT. We reaffirm our full support for the IAEA. We are working for the implementation of a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol to become the

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universally accepted norm for verifying compliance with NPT safeguards obligations. The Additional Protocol must become an essential new standard in the field of nuclear supply arrangements. We will continue to work together to strengthen NSG guidelines accordingly. We welcome the establishment of the Committee on Safeguards and Verification, which will review the IAEA's ability to ensure compliance with NPT obligations and safeguards Agreements in the light of recent non-proliferation challenges.

#### **Enrichment and Reprocessing Technology**

13. Since Sea Island, we have worked to develop further measures to prevent the export of sensitive nuclear items with proliferation potential to states that may seek to use them for weapons purposes or allow them to fall into terrorist hands, while allowing the world to enjoy safely the benefits of peaceful nuclear technology. We agreed at Sea Island that the export of such items should occur only pursuant to criteria consistent with global non-proliferation norms and to states rigorously committed to these norms. Over the past year, we have made progress in the development of such criteria. We welcome the decision at the recent Plenary Session of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to work actively with a view to reaching consensus on this issue. In aid of this process, we continue to agree, as we did at Sea Island, that it would be prudent in the next year not to inaugurate new initiatives involving transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technologies to additional states. We continue to call on all states to adopt this strategy of prudence. We also welcome the adoption by the NSG of important measures which restrict nuclear transfers to States which have violated their non-proliferation and safeguards obligations.

14. We believe that strengthened conditions on the supply of sensitive technology should be accompanied by new measures to ensure that those states which forgo the nuclear fuel cycle and meet all nuclear non-proliferation obligations enjoy assured access to the market for nuclear fuel and related services. We welcome the efforts of the Expert Group, established by the Director-General of the IAEA, which has recently reported on possible Multinational Approaches to the Fuel Cycle. We will work together with all interested partners for a way forward which provides genuine access while minimising the risks of proliferation.

#### **Proliferation Challenges**

15. The example of Libya's important renunciation of weapons of mass destruction demonstrates that the international community responds positively to States which desire to be a part of the global non-proliferation mainstream. In this spirit, we are



working with determination to address current proliferation challenges.

16. We express profound concern over the threat posed by DPRK's nuclear weapons programme, particularly following its recent statements that it has manufactured nuclear weapons and in the light of its missile programmes and history of missile proliferation. The DPRK has violated its commitments under the NPT and its

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IAEA safeguards agreement. We reiterate the necessity for the DPRK promptly to return to full compliance with the NPT, and dismantle all its nuclear weapons-related programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner. It is also essential that the DPRK not contribute to missile proliferation elsewhere, and maintain indefinitely its moratorium on the launching of missiles. We reaffirm our full support for the Six-Party talks, which represent an important opportunity to achieve a comprehensive solution. It is essential that the DPRK return to the Six Party Talks immediately without preconditions, and participate constructively to this end.

17. We remain united in our determination to see the proliferation implications of Iran's advanced nuclear programme resolved. It is essential that Iran provide the international community with objective guarantees that its nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes in order to build international confidence. We welcome the initiative of France, Germany and the United Kingdom, and the High Representative of the European Union to reach agreement with Iran on long-term arrangements which would provide such objective guarantees as well as political and economic co-operation. We call upon Iran to maintain the suspension of all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities while negotiations on the long term arrangements proceed. We reiterate the need for Iran to co-operate fully with IAEA requests for information and access, to comply fully with all IAEA Board requirements, and to resolve all outstanding issues related to its nuclear programme. We also urge Iran to ratify the Additional Protocol without delay and, pending its ratification, to act fully in accordance with its provisions.

#### **Defending against biological threats**

18. We reaffirm our strong commitment to strengthening our defences against biological threats. Over the last year, our efforts have focussed on enhancing protection of the food supply. We will continue efforts to address biological threats and support work in other relevant international groups.

19. This year marks the 30<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the entry into force of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. New biological threats mean that full compliance with the Convention remains as relevant today as it was at its inception. We encourage States Party to take a full part in the ongoing programme of work which this year will discuss the content, promulgation and adoption of codes of conduct for scientists. Further, we look forward to a substantive and forward-looking Review Conference in 2006.

20. 2005 also marks the 80<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the opening for signature of the 1925 Geneva Protocol prohibiting the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and bacteriological methods of warfare. We emphasise the continuing vital relevance of this multilateral rejection of the use in war of chemical and biological weapons.

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### **Chemical Weapons Convention**

21. We continue to support full implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, including its non-proliferation aspects. While acknowledging the obligation to destroy chemical weapons within the time limits provided for by the chemical weapons convention and to destroy or convert chemical weapons production facilities, we recall that States Party agreed in 2003 to an Action Plan which requires all to have national implementing measures in place by the time of the Conference of States Party scheduled for this November. We urge those States Party who have not yet done so to take all necessary steps to ensure the deadline is met. We stand ready to provide appropriate assistance. We support the use of consultations and cooperation, as well as fact-finding, verification, and compliance measures, including, if necessary, challenge inspections, as provided in the CWC.

### **Global Partnership against Proliferation of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction**

22. We reaffirm our commitment to the Global Partnership against the Proliferation of Weapons and materials of Mass Destruction, and to the Kananaskis Statement, Principles, and Guidelines. We will work to build on the considerable progress we have made to implement co-operative projects to which the G8 and thirteen other countries now contribute. We renew our pledge to raise up to \$20 billion over ten years to 2012 for Global Partnership priorities, initially in Russia. In this context, we will embark on new projects according to these priorities. We welcome Ukraine's participation, and continue to discuss with a number of countries of the Former Soviet Union their interest in joining the Partnership. We reaffirm our openness in principle to a further expansion of the Partnership to donor and recipient partners which support the Kananaskis documents.

### **Nuclear Safety and Security**

23. We welcome continued co-operation with the IAEA in the area of nuclear and radiological safety and security, including on strengthening regulatory infrastructures and the interface between safety and security. We support the establishment of the Global Threat Reduction Initiative and welcome the progress which has been made so far. We welcome the results of the IAEA's International Conference on Nuclear Security which was held in London in March. We have all signed the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management and urge others to join us.

24. Since the horrific accident in 1986, we have worked with Ukraine to improve the safety and security of the Chernobyl site. This year, together with the EU and 16 other countries, we have increased pledged funding for the construction of a new safe confinement over the remnants of the reactor to approximately \$1 billion. We welcome Ukraine's political and financial commitment to this project, and urge Ukraine to ensure that the project can be completed safely by 2009.

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### **Radioactive Source Safety and Security**

25. At Evian we resolved to improve controls on radioactive sources to prevent their use by terrorists. We welcome the fact that more than 70 countries have committed to implement the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and urge all other states to adopt the Code. We welcome the IAEA

endorsement of the international import and export framework for the control of radioactive sources. We will work towards having effective controls applied by the end of 2005, in a harmonised and consistent manner. We commend the results of the IAEA's International Conference on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources which was held in Bordeaux, France in June. We will strengthen our co-operation to improve the security of radioactive sources world wide.

***GPWG Annual Report Consolidated Report Data: Annex 2005:***

Entire section is relevant in terms of non-proliferation.

**Appendix A:  
Moscow Nuclear Safety and Security Summit Declaration**

*April 20, 1996*

1. The end of the cold war and the political and economic reforms in Russia have opened a new era in our relationship and have provided the international community with real possibilities for cooperation in the fields of nuclear safety and security. The Moscow meeting is an important step in the realization of these objectives. We are determined, at this summit and beyond, to work together to ensure the safety of nuclear power and to promote greater security for nuclear materials.

2. We are committed to give an absolute priority to safety in the use of nuclear energy. As we approach the tenth anniversary of the Chernobyl accident, it is our shared objective that such a catastrophe cannot reoccur.

We are ready to cooperate among ourselves so that the use of nuclear energy is conducted all over the world consistently with fundamental principles of nuclear safety. Further, we are committed to measures which will enable nuclear power, already a significant contributor to electricity supply in those countries choosing to exploit it, to continue in the next century to play an important role in meeting future world energy demand consistent with the goal of sustainable development agreed at the Rio Conference in 1992.

We recognize the importance of openness and transparency to obtain public trust which is a key factor for the use of nuclear energy.

3. The security of all nuclear material is an essential part of the responsible and peaceful use of nuclear energy. In particular, the safe management of fissile material, including material resulting from the dismantling of nuclear weapons, is imperative, not least as a safeguard against any risk of illicit trafficking in nuclear materials.

4. In the spirit of the decisions adopted during the New York Conference of May 1995 on review and extension of the Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT), including the Decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, we will increase

our cooperation in the field of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament by promoting universal adherence to the NPT, working vigorously to strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards system and through effective and responsible export control measures. We are issuing a separate statement on CTBT. We renew our commitment to the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on a non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

### **Nuclear Safety**

5. Recognizing that the prime responsibility for nuclear safety rests with national governments, it is of the first importance to continue to enhance international collaborative efforts to promote a high level of nuclear safety worldwide.

### **Safety of Civilian Nuclear Reactors**

6. Nuclear safety has to prevail over all other considerations. We reaffirm our commitment to the highest internationally recognized safety level for the siting, design, construction, operation and regulation of nuclear power installations.

7. The promotion of an effective nuclear safety culture in each country with nuclear installations is essential to that end.

8. Sustainable nuclear safety also requires a supportive economic and legal environment whereby both operators and national regulatory bodies can fully assume their independent responsibilities.

9. Nuclear safety can also be enhanced by greater international transparency in nuclear power activities, in particular by means of peer reviews, and this should lead to existing reactors which do not meet current safety requirements being brought to an acceptable level of safety or ceasing operation.

10. The adoption of the Convention on Nuclear Safety, which reaffirms these fundamental safety principles, is a major accomplishment in this field. We urge all countries to sign this Convention and to complete internal procedures to join so that the Convention can be brought into force expeditiously certainly before the end of 1996.

11. National efforts have been made in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the Newly Independent States to improve nuclear safety levels, often in cooperation with multilateral and bilateral programmes. In this regard, we acknowledge these important efforts to upgrade reactor safety and improve safety culture, but note that further substantial progress is still required. We reaffirm our commitment to cooperate fully for this purpose.

### ***Nuclear Liability***

12. An effective nuclear liability regime must assure adequate compensation to victims of, and for damage caused by, nuclear accidents. In addition, to secure the degree of private sector involvement needed to undertake vital safety improvements, the regime should at the same time protect industrial suppliers from unwarranted legal action.

13. The essential principles in this area are the exclusive and strict liability of the operator of the nuclear installations and ensuring needed financial security for adequate compensation.

14. It is essential that countries with nuclear installations that have not yet done so establish an effective regime for liability for nuclear damage corresponding to these principles.

15. It is important to work together on enhancing the international regime of liability for nuclear damage with a view to ensuring that it will attract wide adherence and accommodate any state which may wish to become a party. We encourage the experts to make further progress to this end. In this connection, the reinforcement of regional cooperation is welcomed.

### ***Energy Sector Strategies in Transition Countries***

16. Efficient market-oriented strategies for energy sector reform are essential to promote nuclear safety. This will generate adequate resources for investment in safety upgrades and maintenance, and encourage energy conservation. All countries in transition should pursue such market-oriented reforms and investment strategies based upon least cost planning, giving due regard to nuclear safety and environmental criteria, and to energy efficiency and conservation.

17. The International Financial Institutions have played a leading role in developing market-oriented energy sector reforms and investment plans. Their continued involvement and support is critical to ensure further progress.

### **Nuclear Waste Management**

#### ***International Convention***

18. National authorities must ensure radioactive waste is managed safely and that provisions are made for its proper handling, storage and ultimate disposal. These are essential elements for any nuclear energy programme.

19. The development of the Convention on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, based on these principles, is of paramount importance. We call on all countries generating nuclear waste with nuclear installations to participate actively in the preparation of this Convention under the auspices of the IAEA and to encourage its effective finalization and prompt adoption.

### ***Ocean Dumping***

20. We commit ourselves to ban dumping at sea of radioactive waste and encourage all states to adhere at the earliest possible date to the 1993 amendment of the London Convention.

### **Nuclear Material Security**

#### ***Programme on Preventing and Combatting Illicit Trafficking in Nuclear Material***

21. Illicit trafficking of nuclear material is a public safety and nonproliferation concern. We recognized the importance of this issue at our meetings in Naples and Halifax. As risks continue to exist, we have agreed on, and released, a programme on preventing and combatting illicit trafficking in nuclear material to ensure increased cooperation among our governments in all aspects of prevention, detection, exchange of information, investigation and prosecution in cases of illicit nuclear trafficking.

We call on other governments to join us in implementing this programme.

### **Nuclear Material Control, Accountancy and Physical Protection**

22. We reaffirm the fundamental responsibility of nations to ensure the security of all nuclear materials in their possession and the need to ensure that they are subject to effective systems of nuclear material accounting and control and physical protection. These systems should include regulations, licensing and inspections. We express our support for the IAEA safeguards regime, which plays a critical role in providing assurance against the diversion of nuclear material going undetected. We underline the need for the urgent strengthening of IAEA capabilities to detect undeclared nuclear activities. We note that these measures are also conducive to preventing illicit trafficking of nuclear material.

23. We recognize the importance of continually improving systems and technologies for controlling and protecting nuclear materials. We urge nations to cooperate bilaterally, multilaterally and through the IAEA to ensure that the national systems for controlling nuclear materials remain effective. We are encouraged by the wide array of cooperative projects underway in this field under bilateral and multilateral auspices and pledge to sustain and increase these efforts.

24. We urge ratification by all states of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and encourage the application of the IAEA recommendations on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.

25. We pledge our support for efforts to ensure that all sensitive nuclear material (separated plutonium and highly enriched uranium) designated as not intended for use for meeting defence requirements is safely stored, protected and placed under IAEA safeguards (in the Nuclear Weapon

States, under the relevant voluntary offer IAEA-safeguards agreements) as soon as it is practicable to do so.

***Safe and Effective Management of Weapons Fissile Material Designated as No Longer Required for Defence Purposes***

26. Major steps have been taken in recent years towards nuclear disarmament. This has created substantial stocks of fissile material designated as no longer required for defence purposes. It is vital, as mentioned above, that these stockpiles are safely managed and eventually transformed into spent fuel or other forms equally unusable for nuclear weapons and disposed of safely and permanently.

27. The primary responsibility for the safe management of weapons fissile material rests with the nuclear weapons states themselves, but other states and international organizations are welcome to assist where desired.

28. We welcome the steps that the United States and the Russian Federation have taken to blend highly-enriched uranium (HEU) from dismantled nuclear weapons to low-enriched uranium (LEU) for peaceful non-explosive purposes, and the cooperation programs of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States of America and other states with the Russian Federation for the safe storage, the peaceful uses of fissile material released by the dismantlement of nuclear weapons, and their safe and secure transportation for that purpose; we encourage other efforts along these lines.

29. We are determined to identify appropriate strategies for the management of fissile material designated as no longer required for defence purposes. Options include safe and secure long-term storage, vitrification or other methods of permanent disposal, and conversion into mixed-oxide fuel (MOX) for use in nuclear reactors. We have agreed to share relevant experience and expertise to elaborate and implement these strategies. We welcome plans to conduct small-scale technology demonstrations related to these options, including the possibility of establishing pilot projects and plants. We shall convene an international meeting of experts in order to examine available options and identify possible development of international cooperation in the implementation of these national strategies, bearing in mind technical economic, non-proliferation, environmental and other relevant considerations. The meeting will take place in France by the end of 1996.

30. We recognize the importance of ensuring transparency in the management of highly enriched uranium and plutonium designated as no longer required for defence purposes.

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A background document on "Nuclear Safety", "Nuclear Material Control, Accountancy and Physical Protection" and "Safe and effective management of weapons fissile material designated as no longer required for defence purposes" is being released separately.

**Appendix B: Inclusions and Exclusions**

**List of Subjects Included:**

**1977**

- “nuclear proliferation” (1977 Communiqué)
- “nuclear weapons” (1977 Energy Appendix)
- “nonproliferation policies” (1977 Energy Appendix)
- “international fuel cycle evaluation” (1977 Energy Appendix)

**1978**

- “safeguards” (1978 Communiqué)
- “national energy programs” (1978 Communiqué)
- “enriched uranium supply” (1978 Communiqué)

**1979**

- “International Energy Agency (IEA)” (1979 Communiqué)
- “International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA]” (1979 Communiqué)
- “International Energy Technology Group” (1979 Communiqué)

**1980**

- “monitoring” (1980 Communiqué)
- “nuclear waste” (1980 Communiqué)

**1982**

- “energy security” (1982 Communiqué)

**1986**

- “Chernobyl” (1986 Communiqué)
- “nuclear emergencies and accidents” (1986 Communiqué)
- “[nuclear] safety” (1986 Communiqué)
- “standards” (1986 Communiqué)

**1988**

- “INF [IntermediateRange Nuclear Forces] Treaty” (1988 Political Declaration)
- “arms control agreement” (1988 Political Declaration)

**1990**

- “Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines” (1990 Statement on Transnational Issues)
- “nuclear export control measures” (1990 Statement on Transnational Issues)
- “IAEA safeguards” (1990 Statement on Transnational Issues)
- “NPT” (1990 Communiqué)

**1991**

- “Security Council Resolution 687” (1991 Declaration on Conventional Arms Transfers and NBC Non-proliferation)
- “United Nations Special Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)” (1991 Declaration on Conventional Arms Transfers and NBC Non-proliferation)



“Treaty of Tlatelolco” (1991 Declaration on Conventional Arms Transfers and NBC Non-proliferation)  
“dual-use items” (1991 Declaration on Conventional Arms Transfers and NBC Non-proliferation)  
“Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)” (1991 Declaration on Conventional Arms Transfers and NBC Non-proliferation)  
“UN Arms Register” (1991 Declaration on Conventional Arms Transfers and NBC Non-proliferation)  
“START” (1991 Declaration on Conventional Arms Transfers and NBC Non-proliferation)

## **1992**

“safety authorities and plant operators” (1992 Communiqué)  
“regulatory regimes” (1992 Communiqué)  
“convention on nuclear safety” (1992 Communiqué)  
“transfer or the illicit or clandestine production of nuclear weapons” (1992 Political Declaration: Shaping the New Partnership)

## **1993**

“nuclear safety program” (1993 Communiqué)  
“radioactive wastes” (1993 Communiqué)  
“Joint Declaration on Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” (1993 Political Declaration)

## **1994**

“high risk reactors” (1994 Communiqué)  
“Nuclear Safety Account” or “Action Plan” (1994 Communiqué)

## **1995**

“G7 Action Plan for Ukraine’s Energy Sector” (1995 Communiqué)  
“fissile material” (1995 Chairman’s Statement)  
“weapons-grade plutonium” (1995 Chairman’s Statement)  
“START II” (1995 Chairman’s Statement)  
“illicit trafficking of nuclear materials” (1995 Chairman’s Statement)  
“systems of control, accounting and physical security for nuclear materials” (1995 Chairman’s Statement)  
“INTERPOL” (1995 Chairman’s Statement)  
“nuclear theft and smuggling” (1995 Chairman’s Statement)  
“Agreed Framework between the United States and North Korea” (1995 Chairman’s Statement)  
“Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO)” (1995 Chairman’s Statement)

## **1996**

“nuclear weapon free zone” (1996 Chairman’s Statement)  
“Treaty of Rarotonga” (1996 Chairman’s Statement)  
“Treaty of Pelindaba” (1996 Chairman’s Statement)  
“1996 Moscow Summit on Nuclear Safety and Security” (1996 Chairman’s Statement)  
“nuclear safety” (1996 Chairman’s Statement)

“Convention on Nuclear Safety” (1996 Chairman’s Statement)  
“peer review mechanisms”  
“nuclear liability”  
“international convention on the safety of radioactive waste management”  
“Programme for preventing and combatting illicit trafficking in nuclear material”  
“Program 93+2”

### **1997**

“Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management” (1997 Communiqué)  
“Protocol to amend the Vienna Convention [regarding nuclear damage]” (1997 Communiqué)  
“ministerial on energy issues” (1997 Communiqué)  
“Programme for Preventing and Combating Illicit Trafficking in Nuclear Materials.” (1997 Communiqué)  
“fissile material” (1997 Communiqué)  
“Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty” (1997 Communiqué)  
“convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices” (1997 Communiqué)  
“international export control regimes” (1997 Communiqué)  
“Australia Group export control regime” (1997 Communiqué)  
“export control norms” (1997 Communiqué)  
“weapons plutonium” (1997 Communiqué)  
“START II and START III” (1997 Communiqué)  
“Non-Proliferation Experts Group (NPEG)” (1997 Foreign Ministers’ Progress Report)  
“nuclear forensics capabilities” (1997 Foreign Ministers’ Progress Report)  
“MOX-fuel” (1997 Foreign Ministers’ Progress Report)  
“Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium”

### **1998**

“Energy Ministers’ Meeting” (1998 Communiqué)  
“reliable, economic, safe and environmentally-sound energy supplies” (1998 Communiqué)  
“economically viable international energy transmission networks” (1998 Communiqué)  
“Energy Charter Treaty” (1998 Communiqué)  
“electric power sectors” (1998 Communiqué)  
“the Nuclear Safety Working Group (NSWG)” (1998 Communiqué)  
“International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER)” (1998 Communiqué)  
“civil nuclear fusion development” (1998 Communiqué)

### **1999**

“protect and manage weapons-grade fissile material, especially plutonium” (1999 Communiqué)  
“nuclear / missile tests” (1999 Communiqué)  
“Nuclear Safety Convention peer review meeting” (1999 Communiqué)  
“International Atomic Energy Agency Conference on Strengthening Nuclear Safety in Eastern Europe” (1999 Communiqué)  
“Chernobyl Shelter Fund” or “Shelter Implementation Plan” (1999 G7 Statement)

## **2000**

“Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty” (2000 Communiqué)

“Global Monitoring System” (2000 Communiqué)

“plutonium disposition” (2000 Communiqué)

## **2002**

“G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction” or “Action Plan” (2002 Chair’s Summary)

“dismantlement of decommissioned nuclear submarines” (Statement by the G8 Leaders: G8 Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction)

“six principles to prevent terrorists or those that harbour them from acquiring or developing nuclear, chemical, radiological and biological weapons; missiles; and related materials, equipment and technology” (Statement by the G8 Leaders: G8 Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction)

## **2004**

“Proliferation Security Initiative” (2004 Chair’s Summary)

“G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction” (2004 Chair’s Summary)

“enrichment and reprocessing equipment and technologies” (2004 Chair’s Summary)

## **List of Subjects Excluded:**

### **1991**

“conventional arms transfers” (1991 Declaration on Conventional Arms Transfers and NBC (Nuclear, Biological and Chemical) Non-proliferation)

“biological weapons” (1991 Declaration on Conventional Arms Transfers and NBC (Nuclear, Biological and Chemical) Non-proliferation)

“chemical weapons” (1991 Declaration on Conventional Arms Transfers and NBC (Nuclear, Biological and Chemical) Non-proliferation)

“CFE [Conventional Armed Forces in Europe] treaties” (1991 Political Declaration: Shaping the New Partnership)

### **1996**

“somatic cell nuclear transfer” (1996 Communiqué)

“Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty” (1996 Chairman’s Statement)

“Arms Control Agreement” (1996 Decisions Regarding Bosnia Herzegovina)

### **1997**

“Chemical Weapons Convention” (1997 Communiqué)

“Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention” (1997 Communiqué)

“weapons of mass destruction” (1997 Communiqué)

### **1999**

“[missile] proliferation” (1999 Communiqué)

