

The G8 Summit Communiqués on Energy, 1975-2007

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Summary of Energy References in G8 Summit Communiqués

Year	Total E Words	% of Overall Words	Total E Paragraphs	% of Overall Paragraphs	Total Documents with E	% of Overall Documents	Total Dedicated E Documents	% of Overall Sections
1975	194	17.3	4	25	1	50	0	0
1976	30	1.9	1	3.8	1	100	0	0
1977	699	26.4	13	26	6	100	1	16.7
1978	700	22.5	18	36.7	1	50	0	0
1979	1310	62.7	25	65.8	1	50	0	0
1980	1745	44.2	30	54.5	1	20	0	0
1981	484	15.5	14	26.9	1	33.3	0	0
1982	165	9.3	4	14.8	1	50	0	0
1983	186	8.7	5	10.9	1	50	0	0
1984	220	6.8	3	4.5	2	40	0	0
1985	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1986	513	14.5	7	14.6	2	50	1	25
1987	38	0.7	3	3.2	2	28.6	0	0
1988	109	2.1	1	1.2	1	33.3	0	0
1989	297	4.2	1	0.7	7	63.6	0	0
1990	640	7.7	13	9.4	3	75	0	0
1991	1600	16.1	38	21.1	4	80	1	20
1992	1333	17.9	33	20.8	3	75	0	0
1993	374	7.5	7	8.5	2	66.7	0	0
1994	732	17.7	13	13.5	2	100	0	0
1995	913	7.2	14	5.3	2	50	0	0
1996	1524	7.2	21	10.1	2	28.6	0	0
1997	1960	10.5	34	11.5	3	50	0	0
1998	782	12.9	9	9.2	2	50	0	0
1999	941	6.3	13	4.3	2	50	0	0
2000	1003	7.3	22	5.4	4	80	0	0
2001	345	5.5	9	6.3	3	30	0	0
2002	1429	11.9	31	7.1	2	25	1	12.5
2003	8673	37.5	69	52.7	6	35.3	5	29.4
2004	6045	13.9	94	11.8	3	13.6	1	4.5
2005	6881	24.1	370	54	6	16.2	3	8.1
2006	16806	34.4	364	4.3	17	68	7	28
2007	18571	53.7	311	59.7	10	83.3	4	33.3
Average	2327	50.1	49.8	18.9	3.3	53	0.8	5.5

Note: The chart accounts for all official documents. Only documents with an English version were included in the calculations.

**Total E Words" refers to the number energy subjects within the official documents for the year specified. The words are calculated by paragraph because the paragraph is the unit of analysis. This number excludes document titles as well as references.

**% of Overall Words" refers to "Total E Words" as a percentage of the total number of words contained in all official documents for the year specified.

**Total E Paragraphs" refers to the number of paragraphs energy subjects are mentioned within the official documents for the year specified. Each point expressed in the documents is recorded as a separate paragraph.

**% of Overall Paragraphs" refers to "Total E Paragraphs" as a percentage of the total number of paragraphs within the official documents for the year specified.

**Total Documents with E" refers to the number of documents that contain energy subjects but the document itself is not dedicated to climate change.

**% of Overall Documents" refers to the "Total Documents with E" as a percentage of the total number of official documents contained in the year specified.

**Total Dedicated E Documents" refers to the number of documents that contain a energy subject in its title.

**% of Overall Sections" refers to "Total Dedicated E Documents" as a percentage of the total number of sections within the official documents for the year specified.

Introduction:

In response to the Russian announcement that energy security will be a central issue-area at the 2006 St. Petersburg Summit, this document outlines the G8's treatment of energy. This document is derived from the Leaders' Communiqués and other documents released at the annual G8 Summit since its inception in 1975 at Rambouillet, and it catalogues references to energy up to and including the 2005 Gleneagles Summit. A list of terms that were included and excluded can be found in Appendix B.

The Energy Issue Area Defined:

As an issue area within the G8, energy has consisted primarily of four component areas. By far the earliest, most ample and frequent has been the supply and price of traditional energy sources such as oil, natural gas, coal and nuclear power. A second, and close companion, has been alternative and renewable energy sources, as well as more demand side measures such as energy efficiency and conservation. A third has been nuclear safety, including the safe operation of civilian nuclear reactors and the transfer and use of nuclear materials. A fourth has been energy trade, including Soviet gas trade with Europe and Japan and Russia's energy pricing policies as part of its quest for accession to the WTO.

The Energy Catalogue:

1975 Rambouillet

Communiqué:

3. To assure in a world of growing interdependence the success of the objectives set out in this declaration, we intend to play our own full part and strengthen our efforts for closer international cooperation and constructive dialogue among all countries, transcending differences in stages of economic development, **degrees of resource endowment** and political and social systems.

4. The industrial democracies are determined to overcome high unemployment, continuing inflation and serious **energy** problems.

7. We also concentrated on the need for new efforts in the areas of world trade, monetary matters and **raw materials, including energy**.

13. World economic growth is clearly linked to the increasing availability of **energy** sources. We are determined to secure for our economies the **energy** sources needed for their growth. Our common interests require that we continue to cooperate in order to reduce our dependence on imported **energy** through **conservation** and the development of **alternative sources**. Through these measures as well as international cooperation between producer and consumer countries, responding to the long-term interests of both, we shall spare no effort in order to ensure more balanced conditions and a harmonious and steady development in the world **energy** market.

1976 Puerto Rico

Communiqué:

In the field of **energy**, we intend to make efforts to develop, conserve and use rationally the various **energy** resources and to assist the **energy** development objectives of developing countries.

1977 London

Communiqué:

We will further **conserve energy** and increase and diversify **energy production**, so that we reduce our dependence on **oil**. We agree on the need to increase **nuclear energy** to help meet the world's **energy** requirements. We commit ourselves to do this while reducing the risks of **nuclear proliferation**. We are launching an urgent study to determine how best to fulfill these purposes.

Appendix to Downing Street Summit Declaration

WORLD ECONOMIC PROSPECTS

The world has not yet fully adjusted to the depressive effects of the **1974 oil price rise**.

BALANCE-OF-PAYMENTS FINANCING

For some years to come **oilimporting** nations, as a group, will be facing substantial payments deficits and importing capital from **OPEC** [Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries] nations to finance them. The deficit for the current year could run as high as \$45 billion. Only through a reduction in our dependence on **imported oil** and a rise in capacity of **oilproducing** nations to import can that deficit be reduced.

This deficit needs to be distributed among the **oilconsuming** nations in a pattern compatible with their ability to attract capital on a continuing basis.

This IMF proposal should facilitate the maintenance of reasonable levels of economic activity and reduce the danger of resort to trade and payments restrictions. It demonstrates cooperation between **oilexporting** nations, industrial nations in stronger financial positions, and the IMF.

We agreed that the international monetary and financial system, in its new and agreed legal framework, should be strengthened by the early implementation of the increase in **quotas**. We will work towards an early agreement within the IMF on another increase in the **quotas** of that organization.

ENERGY

We welcome the measures taken by a number of governments to increase **energy** conservation, and most recently the program announced by the President of the United States. The increase in demand for **energy** and **oil imports** continues at a rate which places excessive pressure on the world's depleting **hydrocarbon resources**. We agree therefore on the need to do everything possible to strengthen our efforts still further.

We are committed to national and joint efforts to limit **energy** demand and to increase and **diversify supplies**. There will need to be greater exchanges of technology and joint research and development aimed at more efficient **energy** use, improved recovery and use of **coal** and other **conventional resources**, and the development of **new energy sources**.

Increasing reliance will have to be placed on **nuclear energy** to satisfy growing **energy** requirements and to help diversify sources of **energy**. This should be done with the utmost precaution with respect to the generation and **dissemination of material** that can be used for **nuclear weapons**. Our objective is to meet the **world's energy needs** and to make peaceful use of **nuclear energy** widely available, while avoiding the danger of the

spread of nuclear weapons. We are also agreed that, in order to be effective, **nonproliferation policies** should as far as possible be acceptable to both industrialized and developing countries alike. To this end, we are undertaking a preliminary analysis to be completed within two months of the best means of advancing these objectives, including the study of terms of reference for **international fuel cycle evaluation.**

The **oilimporting** developing countries have special problems both in securing and in paying for the **energy** supplies needed to sustain their economic development programs. They require additional help in expanding their domestic **energy** production and to this end we hope the World Bank, as its resources grow, will give special emphasis to projects that serve this purpose.

We intend to do our utmost to ensure, during this transitional period, that the **energy** market functions harmoniously, in particular through strict conservation measures and the development of all our **energy** resources. We hope very much that the **oilproducing** countries will take these efforts into account and will make their contribution as well.

We believe that these activities are essential to enable all countries to have continuing **energy** supplies now and for the future at reasonable prices consistent with sustained noninflationary economic growth; and we intend through all useful channels to concert our policies in continued consultation and cooperation with each other and with other countries.

NORTH-SOUTH RELATIONS

An International Fund for Agricultural Development has been created, based on common efforts by the developed **OPEC** and other developing nations.

1978 Bonn

Communiqué:

INTRODUCTION

1. We agreed on a comprehensive strategy covering growth, employment and inflation, international monetary policy, **energy**, trade and other issues of particular interest to developing countries.

ENERGY

4. In spite of some improvement, the present **energy** situation remains unsatisfactory. Much more needs to be done.

5. We are committed to reduce our dependence on **imported oil.**

6. We note that the European Community has already agreed at Bremen the following objectives for 1985: to reduce the Community's dependence on **imported energy** to fifty percent, to limit net **oil imports**, and to reduce to 0.8 the ratio between the rate of increase in **energy consumption** and the rate of increase in gross domestic product.

7. Recognizing its particular responsibility in the **energy** field, the United States will reduce its dependence on **imported oil**. The U.S. will have in place by the end of the year a comprehensive policy framework within which this effort can be urgently carried forward. By year-end, measures will be in effect that will result in **oil import** savings of approximately 2.5 million barrels per day by 1985. In order to achieve these goals, the U.S. will establish a strategic **oil reserve** of 1 billion barrels; it will increase **coal** production by two-thirds; it will maintain the ratio between growth in gross national product and growth in **energy** demand at or below 0.8; and its **oil consumption** will grow more slowly than **energy consumption**. The volume of **oil imported** in 1978 and 1979 should be less than that imported in 1977. In order to discourage excessive **consumption of oil** and to encourage the movement toward **coal**, the U.S. remains determined that the prices paid for **oil** in the U.S. shall be raised to the world level by the end of 1980.

8. We hope that the **oil exporting** countries will continue to contribute to a stable world **energy** situation.

9. Looking to the longer term, our countries will review their **national energy programs** with a view to speeding them up. General **energy targets** can serve as useful measures of the progress achieved.

10. Private and public investment to produce **energy** and to use it more efficiently within the industrial world should be increased. This can contribute significantly to economic growth.

11. The further development of **nuclear energy** is indispensable, and the slippage in the execution of **nuclear power programs** must be reversed. To promote the peaceful use of **nuclear energy** and reduce the risk of **nuclear proliferation**, the **nuclear fuel cycle studies** initiated at the London Summit should be pursued. The President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Canada have expressed their firm intention to continue as reliable suppliers of **nuclear fuel** within the framework of effective **safeguards**. The President intends to use the full powers of his office to prevent any interruption of **enriched uranium supply** and to ensure that existing agreements will be respected. The Prime Minister intends that there shall be no interruption of Canadian **uranium supply** on the basis of effective **safeguards**.

12. **Coal** should play an increasingly important role in the long term.

13. Joint or coordinated **energy** research and development should be carried out to hasten the development of new, including **renewable, energy sources** and the more efficient use of existing **sources**.

14. In **energy** development, the environment and human safety of the population must be safeguarded with greatest care.

15. To help developing countries, we will intensify our national development assistance programs in the **energy** field and we will develop a coordinated effort to bring into use **renewable energy** technologies and to elaborate the details within one year. We suggest that the OECD will provide the medium for cooperation with other countries.

16. We stress the need for improvement and coordination of assistance for developing countries in the **energy** field. We suggest that the World Bank explore ways in which its activities **in this field** can be made increasingly responsive to the needs of the developing countries, and to examine whether new approaches, particularly to financing **hydrocarbon** exploration, would be useful.

RELATIONS WITH DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

We also refer to our efforts with respect to developing countries in the field of **energy** as outlined in paragraphs 15 and 16.

1979 Tokyo

Communiqué:

2. But new challenges have arisen. Inflation, which was subsiding in most countries, is now regaining its momentum. Higher **oil prices** and **oil shortage** have reduced the room for manoeuvre in economic policy in all our countries. They will make inflation worse and curtail growth, in both the industrial and developing countries. The **nonoil developing countries** are among the biggest sufferers.

We are agreed on a common strategy to attack these problems. The most urgent tasks are to reduce **oil consumption** and to hasten the development of other **energy sources**.

Our countries have already taken significant actions to reduce **oil consumption**. We will intensify these efforts.

The European Community has decided to restrict 1979 **oil consumption** to 500 million tons (10 million **barrels** a day) and to maintain Community **oil imports** between 1980 and 1985 at an annual level not higher than in 1978. The Community is monitoring this commitment and France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom have agreed to recommend to their Community partners that each member country's contribution to these annual levels be specified. Canada, Japan, and the U.S. will each achieve the adjusted **import levels** to which they are pledged in the **IEA [International Energy Agency]** for 1979, will maintain their imports in 1980 at a level not higher than these 1979 levels, and will be monitoring this.

The seven countries express their will to take as goals for a ceiling on **oil imports** in 1985, the following figures:

For France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom: the 1978 figure.

Canada, whose **oil production** will be declining dramatically over the period between now and 1985, will reduce its annual average rate of growth of **oil consumption** to 1%, with the consequent reduction of **oil imports** by 50,000 **barrels** per day by 1985. Canada's targets for **imports** will therefore be 0.6 million **barrels** per day.

Japan adopts as a 1985 target a level not to exceed the range between 6.3 and 6.9 million **barrels** a day. Japan will review this target periodically and make it more precise in the light of current developments and growth projections, and do their utmost to reduce **oil imports** through **conservation, rationalization of use** and intensive development of **alternative energy sources** in order to move toward lower figures.

The United States adopts as a goal for 1985 import levels not to exceed the levels either of 1977 or the adjusted target for 1979, i.e., 8.5 million **barrels** per day.

These 1985 goals will serve as reference to monitor both **energy conservation** and the development of **alternative energy sources**.

A **high-level group of representatives** of our countries and of the EEC [European Economic Community] Commission, within the OECD, will **review periodically the results achieved**. Slight adjustments will be allowed to take account of special needs generated by growth.

In fulfilling these commitments, our guiding principle will be to obtain fair supplies of **oil** products for all countries, taking into account the differing patterns of **supply**, the efforts made to limit **oil imports**, the economic situation of each country, the quantities of **oil** available, and the potential of each country for **energy conservation**.

We urge other industrialized countries to set **similar objectives** for themselves.

We agree to take steps to bring into the open the working of **oil markets** by setting up a register of **international oil transactions**. We will urge **oil companies** and **oil exporting** countries to moderate spot market transactions. We will consider the feasibility of requiring that at the time of unloading **crude oil cargoes**, documents be presented indicating the **purchase price** as certified by the producer country. We will likewise seek to achieve better information on the **profit situation of oil companies** and on the use of the funds available to these companies.

We agree on the importance of **keeping domestic oil prices at world market prices** or raising them to this level as soon as possible. We will seek to minimize and finally eliminate administrative action that might put upward pressure on **oil prices** that result

from **domestic underpricing of oil** and to avoid new subsidies which would have the same effect.

Our countries will not buy **oil** for **governmental stockpiles** when this would place undue pressure on **prices**; we will consult about the decisions that we make to this end.

3. We pledge our countries to increase as far as possible **coal** use, production, and trade, without damage to the environment. We will endeavor to substitute **coal** for **oil** in the industrial and electrical sectors, encourage the improvement of **coal** transport, maintain positive attitudes toward investment for **coal** projects, pledge not to interrupt **coal** trade under longterm contracts unless required to do so by a national emergency, and maintain, by measures which do not obstruct **coal** imports, those levels of domestic **coal** production which are desirable for reasons of **energy**, regional and social policy.

We need to expand **alternative sources of energy**, especially those which will help to prevent further pollution, particularly increases of carbon dioxide and sulphur oxides in the atmosphere.

Without the expansion of **nuclear power** generating capacity in the coming decades, economic growth and higher employment will be hard to achieve. This must be done under conditions guaranteeing our peoples' safety. We will cooperate to this end. The **International Atomic Energy Agency** can play a key role in this regard.

We reaffirm the understanding reached at the Bonn Summit with respect to the reliable supply of **nuclear fuel** and minimizing the risk of **nuclear proliferation**.

New technologies in the field of **energy** are the key to the world's longerterm freedom from **fuel crises**. Large public and private resources will be required for the development and commercial application of those technologies. We will ensure that these resources are made available. An **International Energy Technology Group** linked to the OECD, **IEA** and other appropriate international organizations will be created to review the actions being taken or planned domestically by each of our countries, and to report on the need and potential for international collaboration, including financing.

We deplore the decisions taken by the recent **OPEC** Conference. We recognize that relative moderation was displayed by certain of the participants. But the unwarranted rises in **oil prices** nevertheless agreed are bound to have very serious economic and social consequences. **They** mean more worldwide inflation and less growth. That will lead to more unemployment, more balance-of-payments difficulty, and will endanger stability in developing and developed countries of the world alike. We remain ready to examine with **oil-exporting countries** how to define supply and demand prospects on the **world oil market**.

4. We agree that we should continue with the policies for our economies agreed at Bonn, adjusted to reflect current circumstances. **Energy shortages** and high **oil prices** have caused a real transfer of incomes. We will try, by our domestic economic policies, to

minimize the damage to our economies. But our options are limited. Attempts to compensate for the damage by matching income increases would simply add to inflation.

8. The **OPEC** countries have just as important a role to play. The latest decision substantially to increase **oil prices** will also severely increase the problems facing developing countries without **oil resources**, as well as the difficulties for developed countries in helping them. The decision could even have a crippling effect on some of the developing countries. In this situation we recognize, in particular, the need for the flow of financial resources to the developing countries to increase, including private and public, bilateral and multilateral resources. A good investment climate in developing countries will help the flow of foreign investment.

We will also place special emphasis on helping developing countries to exploit their **energy potential**. We strongly support the World Bank's program for **hydrocarbon** exploitation and urge its expansion. We will do more to help developing countries increase the use of **renewable energy**; we welcome the World Bank's coordination of these efforts.

1980 Venice

Communiqué:

I. INTRODUCTION

1. In this, our first meeting of the 1980s, the economic issues that have dominated our thoughts are the **price and supply of energy** and the implications for inflation and the level of economic activity in our own countries and for the world as a whole. Unless we can deal with the problems of **energy**, we cannot cope with other problems.

2. Successive large increases in the **price of oil**, bearing no relation to market conditions and culminating in the recent decisions by some members of the **Organization of [The] Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)** at Algiers, have produced the reality of even higher inflation and the imminent threat of severe recession and unemployment in the industrialized countries. At the same time they have undermined and in some cases virtually destroyed the prospects for growth in the developing countries. We believe that these consequences are increasingly coming to be appreciated by some of the **oilexporting** countries. The fact is that the industrialized countries of the free world, the **oilproducing** countries, and the **nonoil developing countries** depend upon each other for the realization of their potential for economic development and prosperity. Each can overcome the obstacles to that development, but only if all work together, and with the interests of all in mind.

ENERGY

7. We must break the existing link between economic growth and **consumption of oil**, and we mean to do so in this decade. This strategy requires **conserving oil** and

substantially increasing production and use of **alternative energy sources**. To this end, maximum reliance should be placed on the **price mechanism**, and **domestic prices for oil** should take into account representative **world prices**. Market forces should be supplemented, where appropriate, by effective fiscal incentives and administrative measures. **Energy** investment will contribute substantially to economic growth and employment.

8. We welcome the recent decisions of the European Community (EC), the **International Energy Agency (IEA)** and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) regarding the need for longterm structural changes to reduce **oil consumption**, continuing procedures to monitor progress, the possible use of **oil ceilings** to deal with tight market conditions, and coordination of **stock policies** to mitigate the effect of market disruption. We note that the member countries of the **IEA** have agreed that their **energy policies** should result in their collective 1985 net **oil imports** being substantially less than their existing 1985 group objective, and that they will quantify the **reduction** as part of their continuing **monitoring** efforts. The potential for reduction has been estimated by the **IEA** Secretariat, given existing uncertainties, at around 4 million **barrels a day (MBD)**.

9. To conserve **oil** in our countries:

We are agreed that no new **baseload, oilfired generating capacity** should be constructed, save in exceptional circumstances, and that the **conversion of oilfired capacity** to other **fuels** should be accelerated.

We will increase efforts, including fiscal incentives where necessary, to accelerate the substitution of **oil** in industry.

We will encourage **oil** saving investments in residential and commercial buildings, where necessary by financial incentives and by establishing insulation standards. We look to the public sector to set an example.

In transportation, our objective is the introduction of increasingly **fuel-efficient vehicles**. The demand of consumers and competition among manufacturers are already leading in this direction. We will accelerate this progress, where appropriate, by arrangements or standards for improved automobile **fuel efficiency**, by **gasoline pricing and taxation** decisions, by research and development, and by making public transport more attractive.

10. We must rely on **fuels other than oil** to meet the **energy** needs of future economic growth. This will require early, resolute, and wideranging actions. Our potential to increase the **supply and use of energy sources other than oil** over the next ten years is estimated at the equivalent of **1520 MBD of oil**. We intend to make a coordinated and vigorous effort to realize this potential. To this end, we will seek a large increase in the use of **coal** and enhanced use of **nuclear power** in the mediumterm, and a substantial increase in production of **synthetic fuels**, in **solar energy** and other sources of **renewable energy** over the longer term.

11. We shall encourage the exploration and development of our indigenous **hydrocarbon resources** in order to secure maximum production on a long-term basis.

12. Together we intend to double **coal** production and use by early 1990. We will encourage long-term commitments by **coal** producers and consumers. It will be necessary to improve infrastructures in both exporting and importing countries, as far as is economically justified, to ensure the required supply and use of **coal**. We look forward to the recommendations of the **International Coal Industry Advisory Board**. They will be considered promptly. We are conscious of the environmental risks associated with increased **coal** production and combustion. We will do everything in our power to ensure that increased use of **fossil fuels**, especially **coal**, does not damage the environment.

13. We underline the vital contribution of **nuclear power** to a more secure **energy** supply. The role of **nuclear energy** has to be increased if world energy needs are to be met. We shall therefore have to expand our **nuclear generating capacity**. We will continue to give the highest priority to ensuring the health and safety of the public and to perfecting methods for dealing with **spent fuels** and disposal of **nuclear waste**. We reaffirm the importance of ensuring the reliable supply of **nuclear fuel** and minimizing the risk of **nuclear proliferation**.

14. The studies made by the **International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation Group**, launched at the London Summit in 1977, are a significant contribution to the use of **nuclear energy**. We welcome their findings with respect to: increasing predictable **supplies**; the most effective utilization of **uranium sources**, including the development of advanced technologies; and the minimization of **proliferation risks**, including support of **International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)** safeguards. We urge all countries to take these findings into account when developing policies and programs for the peaceful use of **nuclear energy**.

15. We will actively support the recommendations of the **International Energy Technology Group**, proposed at the Tokyo Summit last year, for bringing new **energy technologies** into commercial use at the earliest feasible time. As far as national programs are concerned, we will by mid1981 adopt a twophased approach; first, listing the numbers and types of **commercial scale plants** to be constructed in each of our countries by the mid1980s, and, second, indicating quantitative projections for expanding production by 1990, 1995 and 2000, as a basis for future actions. As far as international programs are concerned, we will join others in creating an international team to promote collaboration among interested nations on specific projects.

16. A **high-level group of representatives** of our countries and of the EEC Commission will review periodically the results **achieved in these fields**.

17. Our **comprehensive energy strategy** is designed to meet the requirements of the coming decade. We are convinced that it can reduce the demand for **energy**, particularly **oil**, without hampering economic growth. By carrying out this strategy we expect that, over the coming decade, the ratio between increases in collective **energy consumption**

and economic growth of our countries will be reduced to about 0.6, that the share of **oil** in our total **energy** demand will be reduced from fifty-three percent now to about forty percent by 1990, and that our collective **consumption of oil** in 1990 will be significantly below present levels so as to permit a balance between **supply** and demand at tolerable **prices**.

18. We continue to believe that international cooperation in **energy** is essential. All countries have a vital interest in a **stable equilibrium between energy supply and demand**. We would welcome a constructive dialogue on **energy** and related issues between energy producers and consumers in order to improve the coherence of their policies.

RELATIONS WITH DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

19. We are deeply concerned about the impact of the **oil price** increases on the developing countries that have to **import oil**. The increase in **oil prices** in the last two years has more than doubled the **oil bill** of these countries, which now amounts to over \$50 billion. This will drive them into ever increasing indebtedness, and put at risk the whole basis of their economic growth and social progress, unless something can be done to help them.

20. We approach in a positive spirit the prospect of global negotiations in the framework of the United Nations and the formulation of a new International Development Strategy. In particular, our object is to cooperate with the developing countries in **energy conservation and development**, expansion of exports, enhancement of human skills, and the tackling of underlying food and population problems.

21. A major international effort to help these countries increase their **energy production** is required. We believe that this view is gaining ground among **oil exporting** countries. We ask the World Bank to examine the adequacy of the resources and the mechanisms now in place for the exploration, development and production of conventional and **renewable energy sources** in **oil importing** developing countries, to consider means, including the possibility of establishing a new affiliate or facility by which it might improve and increase its lending programs for **energy assistance**, and to explore its findings with both **oil exporting** and industrial countries.

26. The democratic industrialized countries cannot alone carry the responsibility of aid and other different contributions to developing countries: it must be equitably shared by the **oil exporting** countries and the industrialized Communist countries.

MONETARY PROBLEMS

27. The situation created by large **oil generated payments imbalances**, in particular those of **oil importing** developing countries, requires a combination of determined actions by all countries to promote external adjustment and effective mechanisms for balance-of-payments financing. We look to the international capital market to continue to play the

primary role in rechanneling the substantial **oil surplus funds** on the basis of sound lending standards. We support the work in progress by our monetary authorities and the Bank for International Settlements designed to improve the supervision and security of the international banking system. The private banks could usefully supplement these efforts.

28. We urge **oilexporting** countries to increase their direct lending to countries with financial problems, thus reducing the strain on other recycling mechanisms.

VII. CONCLUSIONS

34. The economic message from this Venice Summit is clear. The key to success in resolving the major economic challenges which the world faces is to achieve and maintain a balance between **energy** supply and demand at reasonable levels and at tolerable prices.

1981 Montebello

Communiqué:

THE ECONOMY

3. The large payments deficits originating in the **197980 oil price increase** have so far been financed without imposing intolerable adjustment burdens but are likely to persist for some time.

4. We must involve our peoples in a greater appreciation of the need for change: change in expectations about growth and earnings, change in management and labor relations and practices, change in the pattern of industry, change in the direction and scale of investment, and change in **energy** use and supply.

RELATIONS WITH DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

18. We attach high priority to the resolution of the problems created for the **nonoil** developing countries by the damaging effects on them of the high cost of **energy** imports following the **two oil price shocks**. We call on the surplus **oilexporting** countries to broaden their valuable efforts to finance development in **nonoil** developing countries, especially in the field of **energy**. We stand ready to cooperate with them for **this purpose** and to explore with them, in a spirit of partnership, possible mechanisms, such as those being examined in the World Bank, which would take due account of the importance of their financial contributions.

ENERGY

28. We are confident that, with perseverance, the **energy** goals we set at Venice for the decade can be achieved, enabling us to break the link between economic growth and **oil consumption** through structural change in our **energy economies**.

29. Recognizing that our countries are still vulnerable and **energy** supply remains a potential constraint to a revival of economic growth, we will accelerate the development and use of all our **energy** sources, both **conventional and new**, and continue to promote **energy savings** and the **replacement of oil by other fuels**.

30. To these ends we will continue to rely heavily on **market mechanisms**, supplemented as necessary by government action.

31. Our capacity to deal with shortterm **oil** market problems should be improved, particularly through the holding of adequate levels of **stocks**.

32. In most of our countries progress in constructing new **nuclear facilities** is slow. We intend in each of our countries to encourage greater public acceptance of **nuclear energy**, and respond to public concerns about safety, health, **nuclear waste management** and **nonproliferation**. We will further our efforts in the development of advanced technologies, particularly in **spent fuel management**.

33. We will take steps to realize the potential for the economic production, trade and use of **coal** and will do everything in our power to ensure that its increased use does not damage the environment.

34. We also intend to see to it that we develop to the fullest possible extent sources of **renewable energy** such as **solar, geothermal and biomass energy**. We will work for practical achievements at the forthcoming **United Nations Conference on New and Renewable Sources of Energy**.

35. We look forward to improved understanding and cooperation with the **oil-exporting** countries in the interests of the world economy.

1982 Versailles

Communiqué:

[ENERGY]

-- The progress we have already made does not diminish the need for continuing efforts to economize on **energy**, particularly through the **price mechanism**, and to promote **alternative sources**, including **nuclear energy** and **coal**, in a longterm perspective. These efforts will enable us further to **reduce our vulnerability** to **interruptions** in the supply of **energy** and instability of **prices**. Cooperation to develop new **energy**

technologies, and to strengthen our capacity to deal with **disruptions**, can contribute to our common **energy security**. We shall also work to strengthen our cooperation with both **oil exporting** and **oil importing** developing countries.

[Development Assistance]

This is why we see a need for special temporary arrangements to overcome funding problems for IDA [International Development Association] VI, and for an early start to consideration of IDA VII. We will give special encouragement to programs or arrangements designed to increase food and **energy** production in developing countries which have to import these essentials, and to programs to address the implications of population growth.

1983 Williamsburg

Communiqué:

6. Special attention will be given to the flow of resources, in particular official development assistance, to poorer countries, and for food and **energy** production, both bilaterally and through appropriate international institutions.

8. We all share the view that more predictability and less volatility in **oil prices** would be helpful to world economic prospects. We agree that the fall in **oil prices** in no way diminishes the importance and urgency of efforts to **conserve energy**, to develop economic **alternative energy sources**, to maintain and, where possible, improve contacts between **oil exporting** and **importing** countries, and to encourage the growth of **indigenous energy production** in developing countries which at present lack it.

ANNEX: STRENGTHENING ECONOMIC COOPERATION FOR GROWTH AND STABILITY

(4) Policies Toward Productivity and Employment. While relying on market signals as a guide to efficient economic decisions, we will take measures to improve training and mobility of our labor forces, with particular concern for the problems of youth unemployment, and promote continued structural adjustment, especially by:

-- Continued efforts in each country, and improved international cooperation, where appropriate, on structural adjustment measures (e.g., regional, sectoral, **energy policies**).

1984 London

Communiqué:

(4) To maintain and wherever possible increase flows of resources including official development assistance and assistance through the international financial and development institutions, to the developing countries and particularly to the poorest

countries; to work with the developing countries to encourage more openness towards private investment flows; and to encourage practical measures in those countries to conserve resources and enhance indigenous food and **energy production**. Some of us also wish to activate the Common Fund for Commodities;

11. We have considered the possible implications of a further deterioration of the situation in the Gulf for the supply of **oil**. We are satisfied that, given the **stocks of oil** presently available in the world, the availability of **other sources of energy**, and the **scope for conservation** in the use of **energy**, adequate **supplies** could be maintained for a substantial period of time by international cooperation and mutually supportive action. We will continue to act together to that end.

The Iran-Iraq Conflict (Statement by the Chair)

5. We also considered the implications for **world oil supplies** on the lines set out in the Economic Declaration. We noted that the **world oil market** has remained relatively stable. We believe that the international system has both the will and the capacity to cope with any foreseeable problems through the continuation of the prudent and realistic approach that is already being applied.

1985 Bonn

No references.

1986 Tokyo

Communiqué:

2. For the industrialized countries, and indeed for the world economy, the recent decline in **oil prices** will help to sustain noninflationary growth and to increase the volume of world trade, despite the difficulties which it creates for certain **oilproducing** countries.

3. Among these are high unemployment, large domestic and external imbalances, uncertainty about the future behavior of exchanges rates, persistent protectionist pressures, continuing difficulties of many developing countries and severe debt problems for some, and uncertainty about mediumterm prospects for the levels of **energy prices**. If large **imbalances and other distortions** are allowed to persist for too long, they will present an increasing threat to world economic growth and to the open multilateral trading system. We cannot afford to relax our efforts. In formulating our policies, we need to look to the medium and longer term, and to have regard to the interrelated and structural character of current problems.

14. Bearing in mind that the recent **oil price decline** owes much to the **cooperative energy policies** which we have pursued during the past decade, we recognize the need for continuity of policies for achieving longterm **energy market stability** and **security of**

supply. We note that the current **oil market** situation enables countries which wish to do so to increase **stock levels**.

Statement on the Implications of the Chernobyl Nuclear Accident

1. We, the Heads of State or Government of seven major industrial nations and the Representatives of the European Community, have discussed the implications of the accident at the **Chernobyl nuclear power station**. We express our deep sympathy for those affected. We remain ready to extend assistance, in particular medical and technical, as and when requested.

2. **Nuclear power** is and, properly managed, will continue to be an increasingly widely used source of **energy**. For each country the maintenance of **safety** and **security** is an international responsibility, and each country engaged in **nuclear power generation** bears full responsibility for the safety of the design, manufacture, operation and maintenance of its installations. Each of our countries meets exacting **standards**. Each country, furthermore, is responsible for prompt provision of detailed and complete information on **nuclear emergencies and accidents**, in particular those with potential transboundary consequences. Each of our countries accepts that responsibility, and we urge the Government of the Soviet Union, which did not do so in the case of **Chernobyl**, to provide urgently such information, as our [countries] and other countries have requested.

3. We note with satisfaction the Soviet Union's willingness to undertake discussions this week with the DirectorGeneral of the **International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)**. We expect that these discussions will lead to the Soviet Union's participation in the desired postaccident analysis.

4. We welcome and encourage the work of the **IAEA** in seeking to improve international cooperation on the safety of **nuclear installations**, the handling of **nuclear accidents** and their consequences, and the provision of mutual emergency assistance. Moving forward from the relevant **IAEA** guidelines, we urge the early elaboration of an international convention committing the parties to report and exchange information in the event of **nuclear emergencies or accidents**. This should be done with the least possible delay.

1987 Venice

Communiqué:

Environment

31. We welcome the important progress achieved since Tokyo, particularly in the **International Atomic Energy Agency**, in enhancing effective international cooperation with regard to safety in the management of **nuclear energy**.

Statement on the Iraq Iran War and Freedom of Navigation in the Gulf:

The **free flow of oil** and other traffic through the Strait of Hormuz must continue unimpeded.

1988 Toronto

Political Declaration:

6. Since our last meeting, progress has been made between the United States and the Soviet Union in agreeing to reduce nuclear weapons in a manner which accords fully with the security interests of each of our countries. The **INF [IntermediateRange Nuclear Forces] Treaty**, the direct result of Western firmness and unity, is the first treaty ever actually to reduce **nuclear arms**. It sets vitally important precedents for future **arms control agreements**: asymmetrical reductions and intrusive verification arrangements. We now look for deep cuts in U.S. and Soviet strategic offensive arms. We congratulate President Reagan on what he has already accomplished, along with General Secretary Gorbachev, towards this goal.

1989 Paris

Communiqué:

Environment

36. We believe that industry has a crucial role in preventing pollution at source, in waste minimization, in **energy conservation**, and in the design and marketing of cost-effective clean technologies. The agricultural sector must also contribute to tackling problems such as water pollution, soil erosion and desertification.

37. Environmental protection is integral to issues such as trade, development, **energy**, transport, agriculture, and economic planning. Therefore, environmental considerations must be taken into account in economic decision-making. In fact good economic policies and good environmental policies are mutually reinforcing.

Clear assessments of the costs, benefits and resource implications of environmental protection should help governments to take the necessary decisions on the mix of price signals (e.g., taxes or expenditures) and regulatory actions, reflecting where possible the full value of **natural resources**.

41. We agree that increasing **energy** efficiency could make a substantial contribution to these goals. We urge international organizations concerned to encourage measures, including economic measures, to improve **energy conservation** and, more broadly, **efficiency in the use of energy** of all kinds and to promote **relevant techniques and technologies**.

We are committed to maintaining the highest safety standards for **nuclear power plants** and to strengthening international cooperation in safe operation of **power plants** and waste management, and we recognize that **nuclear power** also plays an important role in limiting output of greenhouse gases.

We express our concern that national, regional and global capabilities to contain and alleviate the consequences of maritime **oil spills** be improved. We urge all countries to make better use of the latest monitoring and clean-up technologies. We ask all countries to adhere to and implement fully the international conventions for the prevention of **oil pollution** of the oceans. We also ask the International Maritime Organization to put forward proposals for further preventive action.

1990 Houston

Communiqué:

THE ENVIRONMENT

65. We acknowledge that enhanced levels of cooperation will be necessary with regard to the science and impacts of climate change and economic implications of possible response strategies. We recognize the importance of working together to develop new technologies and methods over the coming decades to complement **energy conservation** and other measures to reduce carbon dioxide and other greenhouse emissions. We support accelerated scientific and economic research and analysis on the dynamics and potential impact of climate change, and on potential responses of developed and developing countries.

69. Efforts to protect the environment do not stop at the water's edge. Serious problems are caused by marine pollution, both in the oceans and in coastal areas. A comprehensive strategy should be developed to address land-based sources of pollution; we are committed to helping in this regard. We will continue our efforts to avoid **oil spills**, urge the early entry into force of the existing International Maritime Organization (IMO) Convention, and welcome the work of that organization in developing an **international oil spills convention**. We are concerned about the impact of environmental degradation and unregulated fishing practices on living marine resources. We support cooperation in the conservation of living marine resources and recognize the importance of regional fisheries organizations in this respect. We call on all concerned countries to respect the conservation regimes.

70. To cope with energy-related environmental damage, priority must be given to improvements in **energy efficiency** and to the development of **alternative energy sources**. For the countries that make such a choice, **nuclear energy** will continue to be an important contributor to our **energy supply** and can play a significant role in reducing the growth of greenhouse gas emissions. Countries should continue efforts to ensure highest worldwide performance standards for **nuclear** and other **energy** in order to protect health and the environment, and ensure the highest **safety**.

72. Multilateral development bank programs should be strengthened to provide greater protection for the environment, including environmental impact assessments and action plans, and to promote **energy efficiency**.

Statement on Transnational Issues:

Non-Proliferation

We further endorse the EC's call for all states to apply **IAEA safeguards** on as universal a basis as possible.

We also urge **all nuclear suppliers** to adopt **nuclear export control measures** equivalent to the **Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines**.

Whether **NPT** parties or not, we commit ourselves to working actively to secure a satisfactory outcome to **nuclear non-proliferation** discussions in the forthcoming months, including those at the Fourth Review Conference of the **NPT**.

We hope that these discussions will contribute to the achievement of as broad a consensus as possible in favor of an equitable and stable **non-proliferation regime**. Such a regime should be based on an indispensable balance between the **non-proliferation** of arms and the **development of peaceful and safe uses of nuclear energy**.

We wish to highlight the importance of dealing with the related threat of ballistic missiles capable of delivering **nuclear**, chemical and biological weapons. We note especially the contribution of the **Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)** to our joint efforts to control missile **proliferation**. We applaud the recent decisions of additional nations to adhere to the **MTCR**, and we call upon all nations to observe the **MTCR Guidelines**.

Chairman's Statement:

A separate statement was issued on the transnational problems of terrorism and the **proliferation of nuclear**, chemical, and biological weapons, as well as ballistic missiles. These dangers, like the illicit trade in narcotics that will be addressed in tomorrow's Communiqué, know no boundaries. In the case of **nuclear proliferation**, the deliberations here take on added significance in this 20th anniversary year of the **Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty**.

The Korean peninsula remains an area of sharp concern, especially because the North has yet to sign and implement a **nuclear safeguards agreement**. We welcome the recent talks between North and South Korea and hope they mark a turning point in inter-Korean relations.

1991 London

Communiqué:

Economic Policy

4. Over the last year, some of our economies have maintained good growth, while most have slowed down and some gone into recession. But a global recession has been avoided. The uncertainty created by the **Gulf crisis** is behind us. We welcome the fact that there are now increasing signs of economic recovery. Progress has been made too in reducing the largest trade and current account imbalances.

Energy

17. As the **Gulf crisis** showed, the supply and price of **oil** remain vulnerable to **political shocks**, which disturb the world economy. But these **shocks** have been contained by the effective operation of the market, by the welcome increase in supplies by certain **oil-exporting** countries and by the actions co-ordinated by the **International Energy Agency (IEA)**, particularly the use of **stocks**. We are committed to strengthen the **IEA's** emergency preparedness and its supporting measures. Since the **crisis** has led to improved relations between producers and consumers, contacts among all market participants could be further developed to promote communication, transparency and the efficient working of market forces.

18. We will work to secure stable worldwide **energy supplies**, to remove barriers to **energy trade and investment**, to encourage high **environmental and safety standards** and to promote international cooperation on **research and development** in all these areas. We will also seek to improve **energy efficiency** and to **price energy** from all **sources** so as to reflect costs fully, including **environmental costs**.

19. In this context, **nuclear power generation** contributes to diversifying **energy sources** and reducing greenhouse gas emissions. In developing **nuclear power** as an **economic energy source**, it is essential to achieve and maintain the highest available standards of **safety**, including in **waste management**, and to encourage co-operation to this end throughout the world. The safety situation in Central and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union deserves particular attention. This is an urgent problem and we call upon the international community to develop an effective means of coordinating its response.

20. The commercial development of **renewable energy sources** and their integration with **general energy systems** should also be encouraged, because of the advantages these sources offer for environmental protection and **energy security**.

21. We all intend to take a full part in the initiative of the European Community for the establishment of a **European Energy Charter** on the basis of equal rights and obligations of signatory countries. The aim is to promote free and undistorted energy trade, to enhance security of supply, to protect the environment and to assist economic

reform in Central and East European countries and the Soviet Union, especially by creating an open, non-discriminatory regime for commercial **energy investment**.

The Middle East

34. Many countries have suffered economically as a result of the **Gulf crisis**. We welcome the success of the **Gulf Crisis Financial Co-ordination Group** in mobilising nearly \$16 billion of assistance for those countries suffering the most direct economic impact of the **Gulf Crisis** and urge all donors to complete disbursements rapidly. Extensive assistance is being provided by Summit participants for the Mediterranean and the Middle East, as well as by the IMF and World Bank.

35. We believe that enhanced economic co-operation in this area, on the basis of the principles of non-discrimination and open trade, could help repair the damage and reinforce political stability. We welcome the plans of major **oil exporting** countries for providing financial assistance to others in the region and their decision to establish a **Gulf Development Fund**. We support closer links between the international financial institutions and Arab and other donors. We believe this would encourage necessary economic reforms, promote efficient use of financial flows, foster private sector investment, stimulate trade liberalisation and facilitate joint projects, e.g., in water management, which would draw on our technical skills and expertise.

Environment

55. The **burning oil wells** and polluted seas in the **Gulf** have shown that we need greater international capacity to prevent and respond to environmental disasters. All international and regional agreements for this purpose, including those of the International Maritime Organization (IMO), should be fully implemented.

57. We call for greater efforts in co-operation in environmental science and technology, in particular:

b) the development and diffusion of **energy and environment technologies**, including proposals for innovative technology programmes.

Prime Minister's Statement:

In the context of Eastern Europe - and more widely - we have discussed environmental challenges and **energy**. We will all take a full part in the establishment of a **European Energy Charter**.

We have agreed to work to secure ***stable energy supplies worldwide***, to remove barriers to ***trade and investment in energy***, to encourage high environmental and safety standards and to cooperate on research and development.

Declaration on Conventional Arms Transfers and NBC (Nuclear, Biological and Chemical) Non-proliferation:

1. At our meeting in Houston last year, we, the Heads of State and Government and the representatives of the European Community, underlined the threats to international security posed by the proliferation of **nuclear**, biological and chemical weapons and of associated missile delivery systems. The **Gulf crisis** has highlighted the dangers posed by the unchecked spread of these weapons and by excessive holdings of conventional weapons.

Conventional Arms Transfers

2. We accept that many states depend on arms imports to assure a reasonable level of security and the inherent right of self-defence is recognised in the United Nations Charter. Tensions will persist in international relations so long as underlying conflicts of interest are not tackled and resolved. But the **Gulf conflict** showed the way in which peace and stability can be undermined when a country is able to acquire a massive arsenal that goes far beyond the needs of self-defence and threatens its neighbours. We are determined to ensure such abuse should not happen again. We believe that progress can be made if all states apply the three principles of transparency, consultation and action.

6. Iraqi aggression and the ensuing **Gulf war** illustrate the huge costs to the international community of military conflict.

NonProliferation

7. We are deeply concerned about the **proliferation of nuclear**, biological and chemical weapons and missile delivery systems. We are determined to combat this menace by strengthening and expanding the **nonproliferation regimes**.

8. Iraq must fully abide by **Security Council Resolution 687**, which sets out requirements for the destruction, removal or rendering harmless under international supervision of its **nuclear**, biological and chemical warfare and missile capabilities; as well as for verification and longterm monitoring to ensure that Iraq's capability for such weapon systems is not developed in the future. Consistent with the **relevant UN resolutions**, we will provide every assistance to the **United Nations Special Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)** so that they can fully carry out their tasks.

9. In the **nuclear field**, we:

reaffirm our will to work to establish the widest possible consensus in favour of an equitable and stable **nonproliferation regime** based on a balance between **nuclear nonproliferation** and the **development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy**;

reaffirm the importance of the **Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty (NPT)** and call on all other nonsignatory states to subscribe to this agreement;

call on all other **nonnuclear** weapon states to submit all their **nuclear activities** to **IAEA safeguards**, which are the cornerstone of the international nonproliferation regime;

- urge all supplier states to adopt and implement the **Nuclear Suppliers Group** guidelines.

We welcome the decision of Brazil and Argentina to conclude a fullscope safeguard agreement with the **IAEA** and to take steps to bring the Treaty of Tlatelolco into force, as well as the accession of South Africa to the **NPT**.

10. Each of us will also work to achieve:

our common purpose of maintaining and reinforcing the **NPT** regime beyond 1995;

a strengthened and improved **IAEA safeguards system**;

new measures in the **Nuclear Suppliers Group** to ensure adequate **export controls** on **dualuse items**.

15. The spread of missile delivery systems has added a new dimension of instability to international security in many regions of the world. As the founders of the **Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)**, we welcome its extension to many other states in the last two years. We endorse the joint appeal issued at the Tokyo **MTCR** meeting in March 1991 for all countries to adopt these guidelines. These are not intended to inhibit cooperation in the use of space for peaceful and scientific purposes.

Chairman's Statement:

2. The *political declaration* emphasises the theme of our common commitment to strengthening the international order and to reinforcing the multilateral approach. We have launched some ideas on making the UN more efficient and effective, for example in the field of emergency disaster relief. We deal with the Middle East in particular, following the **Gulf War**. (In this context we welcomed the recent reply by President Assad of Syria to President Bush, which we hope will open the way for progress toward a conference leading to direct negotiations. We wish every success to Jim Baker as he returns to the region).

3. The second declaration addresses **conventional arms transfers and proliferation of chemical, nuclear, and biological weapons**. It brings together the various aspects of these important subjects, and charts a way forward, without claiming an exclusive role for any group or institution. The urgency of addressing our responsibilities has been brought home for us all by the **Gulf War**. For conventional arms we propose that the

international community apply the three principles of transparency, consultation and action. The G7 strongly support our proposal for a UN arms register.

7. We look forward to *North and South Korea's* admission to the United Nations and the resumption shortly of highlevel dialogue between the two countries. North Korea's continuing failure to sign and implement a **nuclear safeguards agreement** remains an issue of major concern.

1992 Munich

Communiqué:

Safety of Nuclear Power Plants in the New Independent States of the Former Soviet Union and in Central and Eastern Europe

42. While we recognise the important role **nuclear power** plays in **global energy supplies**, the safety of Sovietdesign **nuclear power** plants gives cause for great concern. Each State, through its **safety authorities and plant operators**, is itself responsible for the safety of its **nuclear power plants**. The new States concerned of the former Soviet Union and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe must give high priority to eliminating this danger. These efforts should be part of a **marketoriented reform of energy policies** encouraging commercial financing for the development of the **energy sector**.

43. A special effort should be made to improve the **safety of these plants**. We offer the States concerned our support within the framework of a multilateral programme of action. We look to them to cooperate fully. We call upon other interested States to contribute as well.

44. The programme of action should comprise immediate measures in the following areas:

operational **safety** improvements;

nearterm **technical improvements to plants** based on **safety** assessments;

enhancing **regulatory regimes**.

Such measures can achieve early and significant safety gains.

45. In addition, the programme of action is to create the basis for longerterm **safety improvements** by the examination of:

the scope for replacing less safe **plants** by the development of **alternative energy sources** and the more **efficient use of energy**;

the potential for **upgrading plants** of more recent design.

Complementary to this, we will pursue the early completion of a **convention on nuclear safety**.

46. The programme of action should develop clear priorities, provide coherence to the measures and ensure their earliest implementation. To implement the immediate measures, the existing G-24 coordination mandate on **nuclear safety** should be extended to the new States concerned of the former Soviet Union and at the same time made more effective. We all are prepared to strengthen our bilateral assistance.

In addition, we support the setting up of a supplementary multilateral mechanism, as appropriate, to address immediate **operational safety and technical safety improvement measures** not covered by bilateral programmes. We invite the international community to contribute to the funding. The fund would take account of bilateral funding, be administered by a steering body of donors on the basis of consensus, and be coordinated with and assisted by the G-24 and the EBRD.

47. Decisions on **upgrading nuclear power plants** of more recent design will require prior clarification of issues concerning **plant safety, energy policy, alternative energy sources and financing**. To establish a suitable basis on which such decisions can be made, we consider the following measures necessary:

the necessary **safety** studies should be presented without delay;

together with the competent international organisations, in particular the **IEA**, the World Bank should prepare the required **energy studies** including **replacement sources of energy and the cost implications**. Based on these studies the World Bank and the EBRD should report as expeditiously as possible on potential financing requirements.

48. We shall review the progress made in this **action programme** at our meeting in 1993.

Political Declaration: Shaping the New Partnership:

II.

1. The end of the EastWest confrontation provides a historic opportunity, but also underlines the urgent need to curb the **proliferation of nuclear weapons**, other weapons of mass destruction and missiles capable of delivering them. We are firmly of the view that the indefinite extension of the **Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty** at the **1995 Review Conference** will be a key step in this process and that the process of **nuclear arms control** and reduction must be continued. The motivation for **nuclear proliferation** will also be reduced through efforts to advance regional security.

2. We urge countries not yet parties to the **NPT** to join. We look forward to the early adherence to the **NPT** as **nonnuclear-weapons States** of Ukraine, Kazakhstan and

Belarus as well as the other non-Russian States of the former Soviet Union. We shall continue through bilateral contacts and the International Science and Technology Centres in Moscow and Kiev our efforts to inhibit the spread of expertise on weapons of mass destruction. We attach the highest importance to the establishment in the former Soviet Union of effective **export controls on nuclear materials**, weapons and other sensitive goods and technologies and will offer training and practical assistance to help achieve this.

3. The world needs the most effective possible action to **safeguard nuclear materials** and to detect and prevent the **transfer or the illicit or clandestine production of nuclear weapons**. Nuclear cooperation will in future be conditional on adherence to the **NPT** or an existing equivalent internationally binding agreement as well as on the adoption of fullscope **International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards**, as recently laid down by the **Nuclear Suppliers Group**. The **IAEA** must receive the resources necessary to strengthen the existing safeguards regime and to conduct effective special inspections of undeclared but suspect **nuclear sites** as one means of achieving this. We will support reference by the **IAEA** of unresolved cases of **proliferation** to the UN Security Council.

4. We reaffirm our willingness to share the benefits of **peaceful nuclear technology** with all other States, in accordance with our **nonproliferation** commitments.

5. We will continue to encourage all countries to adopt the guidelines of the **Missile Technology Control Regime** and welcome the recent decision by the plenary session of the **MTCR** to extend the scope of the guidelines to cover missiles capable of delivering all kinds of weapons of mass destruction. Each of us will continue our efforts to improve transparency and consultation in the transfer of conventional weapons and to encourage restraint in such transfers. Provision of full and timely information to the **UN Arms Register** is an important element in these efforts.

6. We will continue to intensify our cooperation in the area of export controls of sensitive items in the appropriate fora to reduce threats to international security. A major element of this effort is the informal exchange of information to improve and harmonize these **export controls**.

7. Arms control agreements which have been signed by the former Soviet Union, in particular the **START** and CFE treaties, must enter into force. The full implementation of the CFE Treaty will create the foundation for the new cooperative security framework in Europe. We welcome the far-reaching follow-on agreement on **strategic nuclear weapons** concluded by the US and Russia in June as another major step towards a safer, more stable world. Further measures, in particular the unilaterally announced elimination of **groundlaunched shortrange nuclear weapons** by the United States and the former Soviet Union, should be carried out as soon as possible. We support Russia in its efforts to secure the **peaceful use of nuclear materials** resulting from the elimination of **nuclear weapons**. The Geneva negotiations for a convention on the effective global ban on chemical weapons must be successfully concluded this year. We call on all nations to become original signatories to this convention.

Chairman's Statement:

5. Korea

We welcome the progress achieved in the dialogue between North and South Korea. It gives us reason to hope for a further reduction of tension.

We are concerned about **North Korea's suspected nuclear weapons programme**. The **IAEA Safeguards Agreement** must be fully implemented and an effective bilateral inspection regime must be put into practice.

6. China

The recent developments towards economic reform in the People's Republic of China are encouraging. We also want to see China making greater efforts towards political reform. The situation with regard to human rights calls for considerable further improvement. We welcome China's accession to the **NonProliferation Treaty** and her application of the guidelines and parameters of the **Missile Technology Control Regime**. We hope that China will play a more constructive role in the international sphere.

9. Latin America

The steps Argentina and Brazil have taken to allow full inspection of their **nuclear activities**, and their decision to give effect to the **Treaty of Tlateloco** and to consider signing the comprehensive **safeguards agreement with the IAEA**, will be conducive to cooperation in this sphere as well.

1993 Tokyo

Communiqué:

Russia and the Other Countries in Transition

11. We welcome the progress made in the **nuclear safety program** agreed at the Munich Summit, including the establishment of the multilateral fund, in which we encourage broader participation. Urgent **safety measures**, coordinated through the G24, need to be implemented rapidly to secure real improvements at the **plants** still causing great concern. The states concerned bear the primary responsibility for respecting the fundamental principles of **nuclear safety**. Independent regulatory authorities should be strengthened and **nuclear safety** must be given higher priority in all the countries concerned, including the early closure of high risk reactors such as **Chernobyl**. We invite the World Bank, together with the **IEA**, to continue the dialogue with each of the countries concerned, and working with other lending institutions including the EBRD and the EIB, to support them in developing longer term energy strategies. Our aim is to agree as quickly as possible on a framework for coordinated action by all those involved following a countrybycountry approach. We will review the progress made in 1994.

In the light of existing international obligations, we emphasize our concern over the ocean dumping of **radioactive wastes** by Russia.

Political Declaration: Striving for a More Secure and Humane World :

6. Enhanced cooperation is necessary in combatting the danger of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles. In particular, we:

Urge North Korea to retract immediately its decision to withdraw from the **NPT**, and to fully comply with its nonproliferation obligations, including the implementation of **IAEA** safeguards agreement and the Joint Declaration on Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula;

Encourage the countries concerned of the former Soviet Union to ensure rapid, safe and secure elimination of **nuclear weapons** in accordance with current agreements, providing effective assistance to this end;

Urge Ukraine to ratify the **START Treaty**, and Ukraine and Kazakhstan to accede to the **NPT** as **nonnuclear weapon states**.

We also continue our efforts to strengthen the **nonproliferation regimes**, including the **Missile Technology Control Regime**, and to establish effective **export controls**. We reiterate the objectives of universal adherence to the **NPT** as well as the Treaty's indefinite extension in 1995 and **nuclear arms reduction**. We also call on those countries that have not done so to sign the Chemical Weapons Convention and to accede to the Biological Weapons Convention.

1994 Naples

Communiqué:

Environment

1. Environment is a top priority for international cooperation. Environmental policies can contribute to enhancing growth, employment and living standards, for example through investments in appropriate technologies, **energy efficiency improvements** and cleaning up polluted areas.

Nuclear safety

1. We welcome the progress made in the **nuclear safety programme**, agreed by the Munich and Tokyo summits, concerning the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union.
2. An effective framework for coordinated action is now in place. The World Bank, working with other lending institutions including the EBRD and the EIB, and with the IEA, is helping countries develop long-term energy strategies. Some near-term safety

improvements are on the way. More needs to be done and longer-term actions must be carried out. The IFIs are invited according to their mandate to make full use of their lending possibilities for this purpose.

3. We remain committed to the existing international initiatives to promote an early closure of high risk reactors. The closing down of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant is an urgent priority.

We are therefore putting forward to the Ukrainian Government an action plan for the closure of Chernobyl. This plan will require measures to be taken by the Ukrainian authorities as well as financial contributions from the international community.

The closure of Chernobyl would be accompanied by the early completion of three new reactors to adequate safety standards, by comprehensive reforms in the energy sector, increased energy conservation and the use of other energy sources.

4. In this context we welcome the contribution by the European Union. As a further step we are ready to provide for the Action Plan an initial amount of up to US \$200 million in grants, including a replenishment of the **Nuclear Safety Account** for this purpose. In addition, loans should be provided by the IFIs.

We call on other donors and international financial institutions to join us in supporting this **action plan** and will review progress regularly.

Chairman's Statement:

Following the death of Kim Il Sung, we must continue to seek a solution to the problem created by North Korea's decision to withdraw from the **IAEA**. We urge the DPRK to continue to engage the ROK and the international community, including a continuation of the talks with the US and going forward with the scheduled summit with the ROK. We also urge the DPRK to provide total transparency in its **nuclear program** through full and unconditional compliance with its **non-proliferation obligations** and to remove, once and for all, the suspicions surrounding its **nuclear activities**. We support the renewed efforts to resolve the North Korean **nuclear issue** through dialogue and we stress the importance of the DPRK's ensuring the continuity of **IAEA safeguards** and maintaining the freeze on its **nuclear program**, including no **reprocessing spent fuel** or **reloading its nuclear reactors**.

Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles is one of the most serious threats to international peace and security. We call upon all States that have not yet done so to accede to the **NPT** as **non-nuclear weapon states**. We declare our unequivocal support for the indefinite extension of the **Treaty** in 1995. We underline the importance of continuing **nuclear arms reduction**, and confirm our commitment to achieve universal, verifiable and comprehensive treaties **to ban nuclear tests and the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons**. We reaffirm our commitment for the earliest possible entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention and welcome the Special Conference of States parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons

Convention. We support full implementation of the **UN Register of Conventional Arms**. We agree to cooperate to prevent **nuclear smuggling**. We assign priority to the problems of anti-personnel landmines, including efforts to curb their indiscriminate use, halt their export, assist in their clearance worldwide. We shall work together and with others for effective **export controls** to ensure that trade in armaments and sensitive **dual-use goods** is carried out responsibly. We encourage **non-proliferation** efforts in the Middle East and South Asia.

The meeting has also given us the opportunity for an exchange of views on the reform process in Russia, a historic task that President Yeltsin and the Russian government continue to bring forward with the confirmed support of the international community. President Yeltsin presented Russia's views on global economic and security issues. We intend to cooperate on such topics as transnational crime, money laundering, and **nuclear safety**.

1995 Halifax

Communiqué:

NUCLEAR SAFETY

48. We affirm the importance of improving **nuclear safety** in countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the Newly Independent States and welcome efforts and progress made to date. We will continue to support these initiatives.

49. Recognizing that each country is responsible for the safety of its **nuclear facilities**, we congratulate President Kuchma of Ukraine on his decision to close the **Chernobyl nuclear power plant** by the year 2000. We reaffirm the commitments of support made last year at Naples under the **G-7 Action Plan for Ukraine's Energy Sector**. We are pleased to note the replenishment of the **Nuclear Safety Account** and the commitment of additional bilateral grants for short-term **safety upgrades** and preliminary decommissioning work in anticipation of the closure of **Chernobyl**.

50. Recognizing the economic and social burden that the closure of **Chernobyl** will place on Ukraine, we [pledge] [will continue] efforts to mobilize international support for appropriate **energy production**, **energy efficiency** and **nuclear safety** projects for Ukraine. Any assistance for replacement **power** for **Chernobyl** will be based on sound economic, environmental and financial criteria. We call upon the World Bank and the EBRD to continue their co-operation with Ukraine in devising a realistic long-term **energy strategy**, based on the results of the EBRD-funded least-cost investment study, and to increase their financial contribution in support of appropriate **energy sector reform** and **investment**. We also call on the World Bank to mobilize private sector support for **non-nuclear energy** and **energy conservation**.

Chairman's Statement:

Arms Control and Disarmament

4. We welcome the indefinite extension of the **Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty** and the commitment of States party to the universalisation of the **Treaty** as well as their decisions to strengthen the review process and adopt a set of principles and objectives for **non-proliferation** and disarmament. The entry into force of **START I** is a major landmark in the process of **nuclear arms control**, which was greatly helped by the decision of Ukraine to accede to the **NPT**. We now look forward to the early ratification of **START II**. We support the safe and secure dismantlement of the **nuclear weapons** eliminated under **START I** and we welcome the work of the United States and Russia on measures to ensure that the **fissile material** from these weapons is rendered unusable for weapons purposes. The disposal of **weapons-grade plutonium** deserves particular attention and we encourage its further study.

5. We are encouraged by the growing international recognition of the need to complete without delay universal, comprehensive and verifiable treaties to ban **nuclear weapons tests** and to cut off the production of **fissile material** for **nuclear weapons** and other **nuclear explosive devices**. Recognizing the continuing dangers posed worldwide by criminal diversion and **illicit trafficking of nuclear materials**, and drawing on the decisions taken in Naples and the practical work undertaken by our experts since then, we resolve to work together to strengthen **systems of control, accounting and physical security for nuclear materials**; to expand our cooperation in the area of customs, law enforcement and intelligence and to strengthen through venues such as the **IAEA** and **INTERPOL** the international community's ability to combat **nuclear theft and smuggling**. We emphasize the importance of bringing the Chemical Weapons Convention into force at the earliest possible date, and call for rapid progress in developing verification systems for the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.

6. We urge all countries to support full implementation of the **UN Register of Conventional Arms**, and note that Article 26 of the UN Charter calls for "the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources". Regional organizations can help promote transparency and confidence-building measures that reduce excessive stockpiling of conventional weapons. We shall work with others for effective and responsible **export controls** on arms and sensitive **dual-use goods and technologies**.

Middle East and Africa

19. We call on all States to avoid any collaboration with Iran which might contribute to the acquisition of a **nuclear weapons capability**.

20. We reiterate our resolve to enforce full implementation of each and every relevant UN Security Council resolution concerning Iraq and Libya until they are complied with, and recall that such implementation would entail the reassessment of sanctions. We urge

Iraq to reconsider its rejection of UN Security Council Resolution 986 which would permit the sale of **oil** and purchase of humanitarian goods.

Asia-Pacific

25. We call on North Korea to observe the agreements reached at the **NPT Review and Extension Conference**. We believe the **Agreed Framework between the United States and North Korea** offers a real prospect for resolving the North Korea **nuclear problem**, and we are encouraged by recent developments in this regard. We call on North Korea to fulfil its commitment to the **regime of IAEA safeguards** and to uphold the terms of the **Agreed Framework**. The support of the international community can be demonstrated inter alia through participation in the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO). We also believe that progress in the North-South dialogue will contribute to peace and security on the Korean Peninsula.

26. We are concerned about the potential for conflict in Kashmir and urge all parties to pursue a peaceful settlement. To help lower tension and build confidence on the subcontinent, as well as to strengthen the framework of global security, we urge India and Pakistan to support international arms control norms, accede to the **NPT** and refrain from taking further steps towards ballistic missile deployment or any other measures that might precipitate a regional arms race.

1996 Lyon

Communiqué:

VII. TOWARD SUCCESSFUL INTEGRATION OF COUNTRIES IN TRANSITION INTO THE GLOBAL ECONOMY

We welcome the Moscow Summit declaration relating to Ukraine and the commitment of President KUCHMA to close reactor n° 1 at **Chernobyl** by the end of 1996, in the framework of the program to close the whole **plant** by the year 2000. We reaffirm our commitment to full implementation of the Memorandum concluded with Ukraine, through close cooperation with this country and the international financial institutions. In this regard, we welcome the financial decisions already taken by the international community, and we stress that all parties concerned must respect the agreed agenda of the comprehensive program.

Chairman's Statement:

I. Global issues

Major issues need to be treated at a global level. All countries are liable to benefit from more security provided by a strengthened United Nations Organization and by progress made in the field of **non-proliferation**, arms control and disarmament as well as by an efficient struggle against terrorism and transnational organized crime. All countries

benefit from the enhancement of democracy and fundamental freedoms throughout the world. Protection of environment, **nuclear safety** and new types of epidemics are common challenges that must be properly handled. All countries are interested in seizing the opportunities provided by the information technologies. In this regard, we are committed to cooperate actively among ourselves and with other partners to deal with these global issues in a spirit of efficacy and solidarity.

3. Non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament

We affirm our undertaking to conclude a **Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)** so as to enable its signature by the outset of the 51st session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, this coming September. We call upon all the members of the Conference on Disarmament to agree that the **CTBT** must prohibit any **nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion**. Pending the entry into force of the **CTBT**, the **Nuclear Weapon States** should exercise utmost restraint.

Such a **treaty**, in our view, will be a major step in the accomplishment of a priority goal for the international community in the field of disarmament and **non-proliferation** and the implementation of the obligations contained in Article VI of the **Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)**. We reaffirm our commitment to the objectives set out in the document on **Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament** adopted on 11 May 1995 at the conclusion of the **NPT Review and Extension Conference**. We are determined to contribute to the effectiveness of the strengthened **NPT** review process before the next **Review Conference** in 2000, the first **preparatory committee** for which will meet in 1997.

In the same spirit, we take note of the signature by the Southeast Asian States in December 1995, in Bangkok, of the **Treaty** establishing a **nuclear weapon free zone** in Southeast Asia, and welcome the signature by China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States of the protocols to the **Treaty of Rarotonga** establishing a nuclear **weapon free zone** in the South-Pacific as well as the signature on April 11, by Member States of the Organization for African Unity, of the **Treaty of Pelindaba** establishing a **nuclear weapon free zone** in Africa, and of its relevant Protocols by the United States, France, the United Kingdom and China. The establishment of these new **nuclear weapon free zones** and the cooperation of **Nuclear Weapon States** in supporting the **relevant protocols** helps realize the objective of creating additional such zones by the **NPT Review Conference** in 2000.

We further underline the importance that we attach to the early start of negotiations, based on the agreed mandate within the Conference on Disarmament, on a treaty to ban the production of **fissile material for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices**. We look forward to the early entry into force of the **START II Treaty**. We regard the **ABM Treaty** as a cornerstone of strategic stability.

We again call upon all countries to support the continuing operation of the **United Nations Register of Conventional Arms** which represents an important mechanism for

promoting transparency and building confidence among countries, at a global and regional level, and note that Article 26 of the UN Charter calls for "the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources". Regional organizations can help promote transparency and confidence-building measures that reduce excessive stockpiling of conventional weapons. We welcome with satisfaction the arrangement launched at Wassenaar in December 1995 to promote transparency and greater responsibility in transfers of conventional arms and **dual-use goods and technologies** and will cooperate on its prompt and full implementation. We welcome the results of the first Review Conference of the Treaty on Conventional armed Forces in Europe (CFE). The States Parties on that occasion renewed their commitment to ensure the integrity of the treaty and to fulfill all of its obligations. They committed themselves to launch a process of adaptation of the treaty in order to preserve its viability in the future. We salute the cooperative resolution of the CFE flank issue.

4. Nuclear safety and security

We welcome with satisfaction the substantial progress made in the field of **nuclear safety and security at the Moscow Summit** in April of this year.

We have taken an important step toward enhancing international cooperation so that the use of **nuclear energy** is conducted all over the world consistently with fundamental principles of **nuclear safety**. We reaffirm our commitment, made in Moscow, to the highest internationally recognized **nuclear safety level**. In this regard, we underline that nuclear safety has to prevail over all other considerations. We reaffirm our commitment to all the principles laid down in the **Convention on Nuclear Safety** and we urge all countries to ratify this **Convention**, as soon as possible, and to participate in the **peer review mechanisms**. We stress the necessity of further progress in the establishment of relevant domestic legislation and in the enhancement of the international regime of **nuclear liability** as well as in the preparation of an **international convention on the safety of radioactive waste management**. We remain committed to assisting countries in transition in developing efficient and fully **safety-oriented energy policies**.

We welcome the adoption of the program for preventing and combating **illicit trafficking in nuclear materials**, and strongly urge other States to associate themselves with this plan following the example of Ukraine. We reaffirm the need to strengthen measures to ensure **nuclear material accounting, control and physical protection**. We also acknowledge the need to identify appropriate strategies for the **management of fissile material** no longer required for defense purposes. The latter will be discussed on the occasion of a meeting of experts which will take place in Paris in October this year. We support the efforts of the **Nuclear Weapon States** to ensure that sensitive **nuclear material (separated plutonium and highly enriched uranium)** designated as not intended for use for meeting defense requirements be placed under **IAEA safeguards**.

In order to ensure rapid and efficient follow-up of the decisions regarding **non-proliferation** issues adopted at the Moscow Summit, we have taken the following initiatives :

. on our behalf, France will undertake demarches in order to encourage more countries to adopt the "**Programme for preventing and combatting illicit trafficking in nuclear material**" ;

. a meeting dedicated to the implementation of this **Programme**, with the participation of agencies and ministries involved in the prevention and fight against illicit trafficking will be held as soon as possible.

We call upon all States to contribute to the efficient and effective implementation of measures for the strengthened **safeguards system** proposed by the " Program 93+2 " for which a model protocol is being further elaborated by the open-ended committee of the **AIEA-Board of Governors**. This **program** is making an essential contribution to tighter regulation of **nuclear non-proliferation**. This **program** will help avoid a repeat of any situation where a country under full-scope **safeguards** could carry out undeclared **nuclear activities**.

II. Regional situations

We call on all States to avoid any collaboration with Iran which might contribute to the acquisition of a **nuclear weapons** capability.

4. We urge the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) to develop the dialogue and cooperation with the Republic of Korea (ROK), this being the only means of achieving permanent peace on the Korean Peninsula and ensuring a more stable and more secure future for the Korean People. In this context, we support the initiatives taken with a view to initiating a process aimed at achieving a permanent peace agreement on the Korean Peninsula to replace the current Armistice Agreement, including the proposal of the US and the Republic of Korea on 16 April 1996 to convene a four-part meeting. We welcome the efforts being made within the "**Agreed Framework**" of 21 October 1994, in re-orienting the DPRK **nuclear program** in order to comply with its obligations under the **Non-Proliferation Treaty**. We call upon the DPRK to meet in full its commitments under its safeguards agreement with the **IAEA** and to make full disclosure of the facts concerning the history of its **nuclear program**. We call on the international community to join us in providing political and financial support for the **Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO)**.

1997 Denver

Communiqué:

ENVIRONMENT

Oceans

22. We must strengthen our efforts to protect the world's oceans. We will work to ensure an effective and integrated effort to deal with key issues, including sustainable fishing, shipping, marine pollution from land-based and off-shore activities, and **oil spill prevention and emergency response**. In this connection, we will also enhance cooperation in monitoring the ecology in the Northern Pacific, as well as in forecasting earthquakes and tsunamis in this region.

NUCLEAR SAFETY

35. We reaffirm our commitments from the **1996 Moscow Summit on Nuclear Safety and Security** to give an absolute priority to **safety** in the use of **nuclear energy**. We note that further substantial progress is still required in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and in the Newly Independent States, especially by strengthening regulatory authorities, enhancing **reactor safety** and improving **safety culture**. We consider further joint efforts to this end a major priority. In this regard, we attach the greatest importance to the full implementation of the **Nuclear Safety Account** agreements.

36. We note with satisfaction the entry into force by the **Nuclear Safety Convention** and the preparations now underway for the first review meeting to be held in April 1999. We applaud the rapid progress made in developing the **Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management** and encourage finalization. We welcome the forthcoming adoption of the **Protocol to amend the Vienna Convention** on civil liability for **nuclear damage** and of a new Supplementary Funding Convention. These conventions will facilitate international **safety cooperation** and provide for increased compensation for victims in the event of a **nuclear accident**.

GLOBAL ENERGY ISSUES

37. We decided to convene a **ministerial on energy issues** in Moscow next year, and request our officials to start preparations for such a meeting. Its results will be discussed at our next Summit.

NON-PROLIFERATION, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

73. Since the **Moscow Summit on Nuclear Safety and Security**, we have taken important steps to implement the agreed "**Programme for Preventing and Combating**

Illicit Trafficking in Nuclear Materials." We will expand participation in this program to include countries in Central and Eastern Europe, and in Central Asia and the Caucasus.

74. Further regarding the safe and effective management of **fissile material**, with respect to such materials no longer required for defense purposes, we will continue our cooperation through concrete initiatives, in particular the French-German-Russian project to build a pilot plant in Russia to produce MOX fuel from weapons plutonium, which is open to additional states, and the related U.S.-Russian cooperation on the conversion of **weapons plutonium**.

75. We have worked together to advance our common **non-proliferation**, arms control, and disarmament goals. The **Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty** is an historic milestone, and we call upon all States to sign and ratify it rapidly to ensure its early entry into force. We welcome the entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention. We advocate its full, effective and universal implementation, and look forward to the early ratification of the Convention by the States that have not yet done so. Recognizing that enhancing confidence in compliance would reinforce the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, we reaffirm our determination to complete as soon as possible through negotiation a legally-binding and effective verification mechanism.

76. We reaffirm our unwavering commitment to full implementation of the objectives set forth in **the Non- Proliferation Treaty**. To that end, we welcome the **IAEA's** recent adoption of a program on strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the **safeguards system**. We urge all States to conclude additional protocols with the **IAEA** at the earliest possible date. We reaffirm our commitment to the immediate commencement and early conclusion of a **convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices**.

77. We welcome the progress on strategic arms control made at Helsinki in March, and look forward to the early entry-into-force of the **START II** agreement and the initiation of **START III** negotiations. We reaffirm the key role of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty in strengthening European security, and welcome the decision to conclude its adaptation as expeditiously as possible. We welcome the recent agreement among Russia, Kazakstan, Kyrgystan, Tajikistan, and China on reduction of military forces along their borders and consider it an important contribution to the region's security.

78. We endorse unequivocally efforts by the UN Special Commission and the **IAEA** to eliminate weapons of mass destruction capabilities in Iraq and to monitor compliance. We reaffirm the importance of implementing the U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework and full compliance by North Korea with its **non- proliferation obligations**. We therefore place great value on the continuing role of the **IAEA** in monitoring the freeze on North Korea's **nuclear program**, implementing **safeguards**, and helping preserve all information relating to the DPRK's past activity. We welcome the conclusion of negotiations for the EU to participate in the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) and call for further international support for KEDO, including the provision of funds. We

stress the importance of Four Party talks and the necessity of North-South dialogue. We call on North Korea to halt its development, deployment and export of ballistic missiles.

79. We welcome the emerging high-level dialogue between India and Pakistan. We encourage both countries to bring their activities into conformity with **international non-proliferation norms**. Consistent with our support for the **CTBT's** early entry into force, we encourage both countries to adhere to that **treaty**.

EXPORT CONTROL REGIMES

81. We underline our support for the arrangements that make up the **international export control regimes**. The Zangger Committee and the **Nuclear Suppliers Group**, the **Missile Technology Control Regime**, and, for those who are members, the **Australia Group export control regime**, all contribute critically to the global application and enforcement of international **export control norms**.

Foreign Ministers' Progress Report:

Nonproliferation

Illicit Nuclear Trafficking

2. We commend the work of the **Non-Proliferation Experts Group** to fulfill the mandate granted to it at Moscow and Lyon to implement the "**Program for Preventing and Combating Illicit Trafficking in Nuclear Material**," agreed to at the April 1996 **Nuclear Safety and Security Summit** in Moscow.

We encourage the undertaking of more enhanced information-sharing and cooperation among our law enforcement, intelligence, and customs services in the fight against **illicit nuclear trafficking**, conducted whenever possible on the basis of already-existing agreements, treaties, and arrangements, as provided for in the advisory "Framework for Enhanced Cooperation and Information-Sharing" proposed by Russia and agreed to by the **NPEG** at its May 12-13, 1997, meeting.

4. We endorse the agreement of our **nonproliferation experts** to establish specific tasks and a means of communication for the "Points of Contact" system called for by the **Program**, and the corresponding Terms of Reference and provisional format for the exchange of information on significant **illicit nuclear trafficking** incidents.

5. To broaden the scope and effectiveness of our efforts to combat **illicit nuclear trafficking**, we continue to encourage expanded participation in the **Program**. To this end, we have asked the United States, as current Chair of the Eight, to continue its contacts, initiated by France, with potential future participants. In order to maintain overall direction of the **Program** after participation in it has been expanded. We agreed that the chair should seek to organize periodic meetings of new participants under the auspices of the Eight to discuss **Program** activities and exchange views on **illicit nuclear**

trafficking. We welcome the intention of the United States to organize the first such meeting in November 1997 to be held in Vienna.

6. We welcome the progress made in international efforts to develop **nuclear forensics capabilities**, under the auspices of the **IAEA**, as well as through the meetings held by the International Technical Working Group (ITWG).

Plutonium Management

7. We welcome the conclusions of **the group of experts**, convened pursuant to the April 1996 **Moscow Summit on Nuclear Safety and Security** to examine options and identify possible development of international cooperation for the **safe and effective management of fissile material** designated as no longer required for defense purposes. Our **experts** concluded that the most timely and technically viable option is the consumption of **plutonium as mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel in nuclear reactors**, and as a complementary option, the **immobilization of plutonium** in glass or ceramic form mixed with **high-level radioactive waste**. The experts also concluded that interim storage will be required, whatever longer-term management options are selected. These conclusions were also endorsed by the **Non-Proliferation Experts Group** last November in Paris.

8. Such an approach to the management of surplus **weapons plutonium** would serve the international community's **nonproliferation** objectives and would make an important practical contribution to **nuclear arms** reduction. The non-proliferation objective should be given priority in the planning and implementation of cooperation programs. Due consideration should also be given to technical, economic, financial, environmental and other relevant factors.

9. International cooperation will accelerate efforts to address the **management of surplus weapons plutonium**. We therefore welcome the announcement by France, Germany, and Russia of their plans, which are open to additional states, to build a demonstration-scale **MOX fuel fabrication facility** in Russia. In this regard, we welcome efforts by Canada and Russia, in collaboration with France and Germany, to investigate the feasibility of producing **CANDU MOX fuel**. The United States and Russia are also planning cooperation in the area of converting **weapons components** to materials suitable for disposition, in coordination with other international efforts. Participation in these and other related initiatives is being considered by others among us.

10. We reiterate the importance of ensuring transparency in the management of plutonium designated as no longer required for defense purposes. Implementation of all options should include appropriate international verification as soon as it is practicable to do so and stringent **standards of material protection, control, and accountancy**, with the objective of building confidence that surplus **weapons plutonium** will not again be used for **nuclear explosives** or diverted to unlawful purposes. In this context, we welcome the progress reported in the work in Vienna on the elaboration of the "**Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium**." We also welcome the progress reported by the United States and Russia on their efforts with the **IAEA** to agree on

measures to submit to **IAEA** verification **weapons fissile material** designated as no longer required for defense purposes.

11. In order to sustain and build upon the momentum generated by these initiatives, developed in the wake of the **Moscow Summit**, the **Non-Proliferation Experts Group** should begin discussion of possible arrangements for coordinating and implementing **plutonium management** efforts. The **Non-Proliferation Experts Group** should submit a report to the Heads by next year's Summit in Birmingham.

Confronting Global, Economic and Financial Challenges:

UKRAINE

37. We have made significant progress in implementing the 1995 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with Ukraine on **Chernobyl Closure**. We reaffirm our commitment to assist Ukraine, within the context of the MOU, in mobilizing funds for **energy projects** to help meet its **power needs** in 2000 and beyond after **Chernobyl's** closure. To date, projects have been agreed totaling over \$1 billion. We call upon Ukraine to continue to undertake the reforms necessary for sustainable growth, particularly in its **energy sector**.

38. We agreed on the importance of securing the environmental safety of the sarcophagus covering the remains of the destroyed **Chernobyl** reactor. This task is inevitably beyond the resources of Ukraine alone. This is a major challenge for the international community. We have decided to add to the commitments we undertook in the MOU with Ukraine. We endorse the setting up of a multilateral funding mechanism and have agreed that the G-7 will contribute \$300 million over the lifetime of the project. We call upon concerned governments and other donors to join us at a special pledging conference this fall to ensure full implementation of this project.

1998 Birmingham

Communiqué:

Promoting sustainable growth in the global economy

9. A crucial factor in ensuring sustainable development and global growth is an **efficient energy market**. We therefore endorse the results of our **Energy Ministers' Meeting** in Moscow in April. We shall continue cooperation on **energy matters** in the G8 framework. We recognise the importance of soundly based political and economic stability in the regions of **energy production and transit**. With the objective of ensuring **reliable, economic, safe and environmentally-sound energy supplies** to meet the projected increase in demand, we commit ourselves to encourage the development of **energy markets**. Liberalisation and restructuring to encourage efficiency and a competitive environment should be supported by transparent and non-discriminatory national legislative and regulatory frameworks with a view to establishing equitable

treatment for both government and private sectors as well as domestic and foreign entities. These are essential to attract the new **investment** which our **energy sectors** need. We also recognise the importance of international co-operation to develop **economically viable international energy transmission networks**. We shall pursue this co-operation bilaterally and multilaterally, including within the framework and principles of the **Energy Charter Treaty**.

10. Considering the new competitive pressures on our **electric power sectors**, we reaffirm the commitment we made at the **1996 Moscow Summit** to the safe operation of **nuclear power plants** and the achievement of high **safety standards** worldwide, and attach the greatest importance to the full implementation of the **Nuclear Safety Account** grant agreements. We reaffirm our commitment to the stated mission of **the Nuclear Safety Working Group (NSWG)**. We agreed to deepen Russia's role in the activities of the **NSWG**, with a view to eventual full membership in the appropriate circumstances. We acknowledge successful cooperation on the pilot project of the **International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER)** and consider it desirable to continue international cooperation for **civil nuclear fusion development**.

Non-Proliferation and Export Controls

24. The **proliferation** of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems threatens the security of every nation. Our countries have been in the forefront of efforts to prevent **proliferation**, and we have worked closely together to support international **non-proliferation regimes**. We pledge to continue and strengthen this co-operation. As a key element of this co-operation, we reaffirm our commitment to ensure the effective implementation of **export controls**, in keeping with our undertakings within the **non-proliferation regimes**. We will deny any kind of assistance to programmes for weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. To this end, we will where appropriate undertake and encourage the strengthening of laws, regulations and enforcement mechanisms. We will likewise enhance amongst ourselves and with other countries our co-operation on **export control, including for instance on the exchange of information**. We will ask our experts to focus on strengthening **export control** implementation. And we will broaden awareness among our industrial and business communities of **export control** requirements.

Year 2000 Bug

25. The Year 2000 (or Millennium) Bug problem, deriving from the way computers deal with the change to the year 2000, presents major challenges to the international community, with vast implications, in particular in the defence, transport, telecommunications, financial services, **energy** and environmental sectors, and we noted the vital dependence of some sectors on others.

Political Statement:

INDIAN NUCLEAR TESTS

We condemn the **nuclear tests** which were carried out by India on 11 and 13 May. Such action runs counter to the will expressed by 149 signatories to the **CTBT** to cease **nuclear testing**, to efforts to strengthen the **global non-proliferation regime** and to steps to enhance regional and international peace and security. It has been met by immediate international concern and opposition, from governments and more widely. We underline our full commitment to the **Non-Proliferation Treaty** and to the **Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty** as the cornerstones of the global **non-proliferation regime** and the essential foundations for the pursuit of **nuclear disarmament**. We express our grave concern about the increased risk of **nuclear and missile proliferation** in South Asia and elsewhere. We urge India and other states in the region to refrain from further tests and the deployment of **nuclear weapons** or ballistic missiles. We call upon India to rejoin the mainstream of international opinion, to adhere unconditionally to the **NPT** and the **CTBT** and to enter into negotiations on a global treaty to stop the **production of fissile material for nuclear weapons**. India's relationship with each of us has been affected by these developments. We are making this clear in our own direct exchanges and dealings with the Indian Government and we call upon other states similarly to address their concerns to India. We call upon and encourage Pakistan to exercise maximum restraint in the face of these tests and to adhere to **international non-proliferation norms**.

1999 Cologne

Communiqué:

IX. Promoting Non-proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament

35. We recognize the continuing need to **protect and manage weapons-grade fissile material, especially plutonium**. In past years, G8 countries have worked on the issue of managing **weapons-grade nuclear material** no longer required for defense purposes. We affirm our intention to establish arrangements for the safe management of such **fissile material**. We strongly support the concrete initiatives being undertaken by G8 countries and others for scientific and technical cooperation necessary to support future large-scale disposition programs. We invite all interested countries to support projects for early implementation of large-scale programs and urge establishment of a joint strategy. We recognize that an international approach to financing will be required involving both public and private funds, and we will review potential increases in our own resource commitments prior to the next G8 Summit.

36. We are deeply concerned about recent missile flight tests and developments in missile proliferation, such as actions by North Korea. We undertake to examine further individual and collective means of addressing this problem and reaffirm our commitment to the objectives of the **Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)**.

37. Effective **export control mechanisms** are essential for achieving a broad range of our arms control and **non-proliferation objectives**. We will continue to look for ways to strengthen these mechanisms. At the same time we stress the role of the **Nuclear Suppliers' Group** in preventing **nuclear proliferation**.

38. One year after the **nuclear tests** by India and Pakistan, we reiterate our concerns and reaffirm our statement from the Birmingham Communiqué. Recent missile tests have further increased tension in the region. We encourage both countries to follow first positive steps already undertaken by joining international non-proliferation and disarmament efforts and taking the steps set out in UN Security Council resolution 1172.

X. Tackling Global Challenges

46. We renew the commitment we made at the **1996 Moscow Summit** to safety first in the use of **nuclear power** and the achievement of **high safety standards** worldwide. In this regard, we attach great importance to the results of the **Nuclear Safety Convention peer review meeting** and to the **International Atomic Energy Agency Conference on Strengthening Nuclear Safety in Eastern Europe**.

47. We reaffirm our commitment to strengthen cooperation in the field of **nuclear safety**. We welcome the concerted efforts to address the Year 2000 computer problem ("Millennium Bug") in this area. With regard to the **Nuclear Safety Account**, we continue to attach great importance to full and timely implementation of the grant agreements.

48. There has been real progress since the Birmingham Summit in tackling the "Millennium Bug". But there is still much to do. We will maintain vigorous programs of action to ensure our own Year 2000 readiness and to minimize the potential impact on our countries and on the world as a whole. We urge all other governments to do the same. In these efforts, high priority should be given to the key infrastructure sectors * **energy**, telecommunications, financial services, transport and health * as well as to defense, the environment and public safety. Public confidence will be crucial and will depend heavily upon transparency and openness as to the state of preparation in critical sectors. Governments, international organizations, infrastructure providers and information technology suppliers will need to ensure a regular flow of reliable information to the general public. It will be important, as the date approaches, for responsible bodies to have in place contingency plans to cope with system failures that may occur in the most sensitive areas despite intensive preparations. We urge third countries to do the same. We will maintain close cooperation among ourselves and with others on this as well as other aspects of the problem. We shall convene a special G8 conference on contingency planning later this year.

G7 Statement:

IV. Nuclear Safety/Ukraine

16. We renew our commitment to the successful implementation of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the G7 and Ukraine. We welcome Ukraine's renewed firm commitment to the closure of **Chernobyl** on schedule by the year 2000. Our overriding goal is the closure of the **Chernobyl power plant** by the agreed timetable.

17. We note that significant progress has been made in carrying out the **Shelter Implementation Plan** to secure the environmental safety of the sarcophagus covering the remains of the destroyed **Chernobyl reactor**. To date, contributions to the **Chernobyl Shelter Fund** total US \$393 million, including US \$50 million from Ukraine. We have agreed that the G7 will help ensure the continued financing and the progress in the work under the **Shelter Implementation Plan**. We call on concerned governments and private-sector donors to join us in this effort. To this end, we plan to hold a pledging conference before the next summit.

18. We reaffirm our commitment to assist Ukraine, within the context of the MoU, in mobilizing funds for **energy projects** to help meet its **power needs**. To date, projects have been agreed totaling over US \$746 million. In addition, in the field of **nuclear safety** US \$485 million have been granted, not including the **Shelter Implementation Plan**. We look to the Government of Ukraine to accelerate the fundamental reforms in the **energy sector**, including improvements in cash collection and privatization, to encourage financially viable investments in **power generation** and distribution and in **energy efficiency**. We commend the steady work that has allowed Ukraine, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and EURATOM to enter into the final phase of negotiations on loans to complete two **reactors** at Rivne and Khmelnytsky. We call on the parties to take the necessary steps to provide for an early agreement on loans for safe, cost-effective, and financially and environmentally sound projects.

2000 Okinawa

Communiqué:

Life Science

Human Genome

60. Working together and with existing institutions to encourage and facilitate investment in the development and use of **sustainable energy**, underpinned by enabling domestic environments, will assist in mitigating the problems of climate change and air pollution. To this end, the increased use of **renewable energy sources** in particular will improve the quality of life, especially in developing countries. We therefore call on all stakeholders to identify the barriers and solutions to elevating the level of **renewable energy supply** and distribution in developing countries. We invite

stakeholders to join in a **Task Force** to prepare concrete recommendations for consideration at our next Summit regarding sound ways to better encourage the use of **renewables** in developing countries.

61. We welcome the IMO efforts to pursue practical reform of current international regimes on maritime pollution, in particular the **1992 Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage** and the **1992 International Oil Pollution Compensation (IOPC) Convention** with respect to, inter alia, better compensation.

Nuclear Safety

71. We renew the commitment we made at the **1996 Moscow Summit** to **safety** first in the use of **nuclear power** and achievement of **high safety standards** world wide. We agreed to continue to co-operate in promoting a **high standard of nuclear safety**. We continue to attach great importance to the full and timely implementation of the **Nuclear Safety Account Grant Agreement**.

Toward a 21st century of greater world stability

Disarmament, Non-proliferation and Arms Control

74. We welcome the successful outcome of the 2000 **Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)** Review Conference. We are determined to implement the conclusions reached at this Conference, including the early entry into force of the **Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)** and the immediate commencement and the conclusion within five years of negotiations for the **Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty**. We remain committed to promoting universal adherence to and compliance with the **NPT**.
75. We look forward to the early entry into force and full implementation of the **Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) II** and to the conclusion of **START III** as soon as possible, while preserving and strengthening the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability and as a basis for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons, in accordance with its provisions. We welcome the ratification of the **CTBT** and **START II** by Russia.
76. The transparent, safe, secure, environmentally sound and irreversible disposition and management of **weapon-grade plutonium** no longer required for defence purposes remains vital. The agreement on **plutonium disposition** reached between the United States and Russia, reinforced by their statement of intention concerning non-separation of additional **weapon-grade plutonium**, marks a critical milestone. The co-operation among the G8 countries has yielded significant results and our next steps should build on this co-operation and related international projects.
77. Our goal for the next Summit is to develop an international financing plan for **plutonium management** and disposition based on a detailed project plan, and a multilateral framework to co-ordinate this co-operation. We will expand our co-operation to other interested countries in order to gain the widest possible international support, and will explore the potential for both public and private funding.

78. We welcome the reinforcement of global regimes to prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. We also recognise the need to examine and promote further multilateral measures to curb missile proliferation. In this regard, we strongly support the important work of the **Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)** and will consider the proposal for a **Global Monitoring System**. We will work to increase the level of international contributions to the Russian chemical weapons destruction programme. We commit ourselves to work with others to conclude the negotiations on the Verification Protocol to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention as early as possible in 2001.

G8 Statement on Korean Peninsula:

We strongly support all efforts by the ROK and the DPRK to reduce tension and establish lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula that contribute to stability in Northeast Asia. We reiterate also our strong support for the ROK's engagement policy which is contributing to positive developments. We welcome the constructive attitude shown by the DPRK, and take note of the reconfirmation of its moratorium on missile-launch as a positive step. We call on the DPRK to continue such efforts. In this context, we look forward to a constructive response to international concerns over security, **non-proliferation**, humanitarian and human rights issues.

G8 Statement on Regional Issues:

SOUTH ASIA

We call on both India and Pakistan to join international efforts to strengthen the **non-proliferation** and disarmament regime. While welcoming those positive statements and steps that have been made, we reiterate our call for them to carry out fully the concrete measures set out in the UNSCR 1172, including signing and ratifying the **CTBT**.

G7 Statement:

World Economy

We are concerned about the adverse effect on world economic growth of recent developments in **world crude oil markets**. In this context, we highlight the need for greater stability of **oil markets** to help ensure sustained growth and prosperity in both **oil producing** countries and **oil consuming** countries.

Nuclear Safety/Ukraine

We welcome the decision taken by President Kuchma to close the **Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant (NPP)** on 15 December this year. We continue to co-operate with the Government of Ukraine in addressing the problems associated with the permanent shutdown of the **Chernobyl NPP**.

We reaffirm our commitment made at the Cologne Summit to continue our support for the **Shelter Implementation Plan (SIP)**. We welcome the results of the Pledging Conference in July to ensure full implementation of the **SIP**. We appreciate the contribution of the non-G7 donors.

We urge the Government of Ukraine to **accelerate its power sector reforms**, particularly improvement of cash collection and privatisation, which will attract financially viable **investments in the energy sector**. We look forward to receiving the report of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development in this respect. In the meantime, we affirm our commitment in line with the Memorandum of Understanding to assist the Ukraine in the preparation and implementation of **energy projects based on least cost principles**.

2001 Genoa

Communiqué:

A Legacy for the Future

Environment

27. We recognise the importance of **renewable energy** for sustainable development, **diversification of energy supply**, and preservation of the environment. We will ensure that **renewable energy sources** are adequately considered in our national plans and encourage others to do so as well. We encourage continuing **research and investment in renewable energy technology**, throughout the world. **Renewable energy** can contribute to poverty reduction. We will help developing countries strengthen institutional capacity and market-oriented national strategies that can attract private sector investment in renewable energy and other clean technologies. We call on MDBs and national development assistance agencies to adopt an innovative approach and to develop market-based **financing mechanisms for renewable energy**. We urge the Global Environment Facility (GEF) to continue supporting environmental protection on a global scale and fostering good practices to **promote efficient energy use** and the development of **renewable energy sources** in the developing world, and stress the need to commit adequate resources to its third replenishment. We thank all those who participated in the work of the **Renewable Energy Task Force** established in Okinawa. **G8 energy ministers** will hold a meeting in the coming year to discuss these and other **energy-related issues**.

G8 Statement on Regional Issues:

KOREAN PENINSULA

2. We reaffirm our support for the implementation of the Agreed Framework, including **KEDO**. We expect the DPRK to implement its announced moratorium on missile launches and a constructive response to international concerns over security, **non-**

proliferation, humanitarian and human rights issues that is essential to the reduction of tensions in the region and to further integration of the DPRK into the international community.

G7 Statement:

World Economy

High and volatile oil prices are a concern for the world economy, in particular for the most vulnerable developing countries. Increased and **diversified energy supplies**, **improved energy efficiency**, expanded infrastructure and **stable oil markets** are important objectives. **Oil producing** and **oil consuming** countries should remain in close contact.

Nuclear Safety

We welcome Ukraine's permanent closure of the **Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant** on 15 December 2000, which was a vital accomplishment in support of **nuclear safety**.

2002 Kananaskis

Chair's Summary:

- We agreed on a set of six **non-proliferation Principles** aimed at preventing terrorists - or those who harbour them - from acquiring or developing **nuclear**, chemical, radiological and biological weapons; missiles; and related materials, equipment or technologies. We called on other countries to join us in implementing these Principles.
- We launched a new ***G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction***, under which we will undertake cooperative projects on the basis of agreed guidelines. We committed to raise up to US\$ 20 billion to support such projects over the next ten years.

Statement by the G8 Leaders: G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction:

The attacks of September 11 demonstrated that terrorists are prepared to use any means to cause terror and inflict appalling casualties on innocent people. We commit ourselves to prevent terrorists, or those that harbour them, from acquiring or developing **nuclear**, chemical, radiological and biological weapons; missiles; and **related materials, equipment and technology**. We call on all countries to join us in adopting the set of **non-proliferation principles** we have announced today.

In a major initiative to implement those principles, we have also decided today to launch a new **G8 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction**. Under this initiative, we will support specific cooperation projects, initially

in Russia, to address **non-proliferation**, disarmament, counter-terrorism and **nuclear safety issues**. Among our priority concerns are the destruction of chemical weapons, the **dismantlement of decommissioned nuclear submarines**, the disposition of **fissile materials** and the employment of former weapons scientists. We will commit to raise up to \$20 billion to support **such projects** over the next ten years. A range of financing options, including the option of bilateral debt for program exchanges, will be available to countries that contribute to this **Global Partnership**. We have adopted a set of guidelines that will form the basis for the negotiation of specific agreements for new projects, that will apply with immediate effect, to ensure effective and efficient project development, coordination and implementation. We will review over the next year the applicability of the guidelines to existing projects.

Recognizing that this **Global Partnership** will enhance international security and safety, we invite other countries that are prepared to adopt its common principles and guidelines to enter into discussions with us on participating in and contributing to this initiative. We will review progress on this **Global Partnership** at our next Summit in 2003.

The G8 Global Partnership: Principles to prevent terrorists, or those that harbour them, from gaining access to weapons or materials of mass destruction

The G8 calls on all countries to join them in commitment to the following **six principles to prevent terrorists or those that harbour them from acquiring or developing nuclear, chemical, radiological and biological weapons; missiles; and related materials, equipment and technology**.

1. Promote the adoption, universalization, full implementation and, where necessary, strengthening of multilateral treaties and other international instruments whose aim is to prevent the **proliferation** or illicit acquisition of **such items**; strengthen the institutions designed to implement these instruments.
2. Develop and maintain appropriate effective measures to **account for and secure such items in production, use, storage and domestic and international transport**; provide assistance to states lacking sufficient resources to account for and **secure these items**.
3. Develop and maintain appropriate effective **physical protection measures applied to facilities which house such items**, including defence in depth; provide assistance to states lacking sufficient resources to protect their facilities.
4. **Develop and maintain effective border controls, law enforcement efforts and international cooperation to detect, deter and interdict in cases of illicit trafficking in such items**, for example through installation of detection systems, training of customs and law enforcement personnel and cooperation in tracking these items; provide assistance to states lacking sufficient expertise or resources to strengthen their capacity to detect, deter and interdict in cases of illicit trafficking in these items.

5. **Develop, review and maintain effective national export and transshipment controls over items on multilateral export control lists**, as well as items that are not identified on such lists but which may nevertheless contribute to the development, production or use of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and missiles, with particular consideration of end-user, catch-all and brokering aspects; provide assistance to states lacking the legal and regulatory infrastructure, implementation experience and/or resources to develop their export and transshipment control systems in this regard.
6. **Adopt and strengthen efforts to manage and dispose of stocks of fissile materials designated as no longer required for defence purposes**, eliminate all chemical weapons, and minimize holdings of dangerous biological pathogens and toxins, based on the recognition that the threat of terrorist acquisition is reduced as the overall quantity of such items is reduced.

The G8 Global Partnership: Guidelines for New or Expanded Cooperation Projects

The G8 will work in partnership, bilaterally and multilaterally, to develop, coordinate, implement and finance, according to their respective means, new or expanded cooperation projects to address (i) **non-proliferation**, (ii) disarmament, (iii) counter-terrorism and (iv) **nuclear safety** (including environmental) issues, with a view to enhancing strategic stability, consonant with our international security objectives and in support of the multilateral **non-proliferation regimes**. Each country has primary responsibility for implementing its **non-proliferation**, disarmament, counter-terrorism and nuclear safety obligations and requirements and commits its full cooperation within the **Partnership**.

Cooperation projects under this initiative will be decided and implemented, taking into account international obligations and domestic laws of participating partners, within appropriate bilateral and multilateral legal frameworks that should, as necessary, include the following elements:

- i. Mutually agreed effective monitoring, auditing and transparency measures and procedures will be required in order to ensure that cooperative activities meet agreed objectives (including irreversibility as necessary), to confirm work performance, to account for the funds expended and to provide for adequate access for donor representatives to work sites;
- ii. The projects will be implemented in an environmentally sound manner and will maintain the highest appropriate level of safety;
- iii. Clearly defined milestones will be developed for each project, including the option of suspending or terminating a project if the milestones are not met;
- iv. The material, equipment, technology, services and expertise provided will be solely for peaceful purposes and, unless otherwise agreed, will be used only for the purposes

of implementing the projects and will not be transferred. Adequate measures of physical protection will also be applied to prevent theft or sabotage;

- v. All governments will take necessary steps to ensure that the support provided will be considered free technical assistance and will be exempt from taxes, duties, levies and other charges;
- vi. Procurement of goods and services will be conducted in accordance with open international practices to the extent possible, consistent with national security requirements;
- vii. All governments will take necessary steps to ensure that adequate liability protections from claims related to the cooperation will be provided for donor countries and their personnel and contractors;
- viii. Appropriate privileges and immunities will be provided for government donor representatives working on cooperation projects; and
- ix. Measures will be put in place to ensure effective protection of sensitive information and intellectual property.

Given the breadth and scope of the activities to be undertaken, the G8 will establish an appropriate mechanism for the annual review of progress under this initiative which may include consultations regarding priorities, identification of project gaps and potential overlap, and assessment of consistency of the cooperation projects with international security obligations and objectives. Specific bilateral and multilateral project implementation will be coordinated subject to arrangements appropriate to that project, including existing mechanisms.

For the purposes of these guidelines, the phrase "new or expanded cooperation projects" is defined as cooperation projects that will be initiated or enhanced on the basis of this **Global Partnership**. All funds disbursed or released after its announcement would be included in the total of committed resources. A range of financing options, including the option of bilateral debt for program exchanges, will be available to countries that contribute to this **Global Partnership**.

The **Global Partnership's** initial geographic focus will be on projects in Russia, which maintains primary responsibility for implementing its obligations and requirements within the **Partnership**.

In addition, the G8 would be willing to enter into negotiations with any other recipient countries, including those of the Former Soviet Union, prepared to adopt the guidelines, for inclusion in the **Partnership**.

Recognizing that the **Global Partnership** is designed to enhance international security and safety, the G8 invites others to contribute to and join in this initiative.

With respect to **nuclear safety and security**, the partners agreed to establish a new **G8 Nuclear Safety and Security Group** by the time of our next Summit.

2003 Evian

Chair's Summary:

2. Enhancing Sustainable Development

Science and technology for sustainable development. We adopted an Action Plan on how best to use science and technology for sustainable development focused on three areas:

- global observation;
- **cleaner, more efficient energy** and the fight against air pollution and climate change;
- agriculture and biodiversity.

Those of us who have ratified the Kyoto Protocol reaffirm their determination to see it enter into force.

Nuclear safety. In accordance with our statement at Kananaskis, we established the **G8 Nuclear Safety and Security Group**, and adopted its mandate and the Core Principles shared by each of us, to promote the **safe and secure** use of **civil nuclear technology**.

3. Improving Security

Non-proliferation. We adopted a Statement on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and endorsed an Action Plan on the prevention of radiological terrorism and the **securing of radioactive sources**.

4. Regional Issues

North Korea. We addressed the North Korean **nuclear issue** in our Statement on non-proliferation. We support the efforts made by the different parties to seek by peaceful means a comprehensive solution to the North Korean **nuclear issue** and to other matters, including unresolved humanitarian problems such as the abductions. We also support the Peace and Prosperity Policy pursued by the Republic of Korea.

Iran. We addressed the proliferation implications of Iran's **advanced nuclear programme** in our Statement on **non-proliferation**.

Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction: A G8 Action Plan:

Entire document is relevant in terms of non-proliferation.

Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction: G8 Senior Officials Group Annual Report:

Entire document is relevant in terms of non-proliferation.

Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: A G8 Declaration:

Entire document is relevant in terms of non-proliferation.

Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Securing Radioactive Sources: A G8 Statement:

Entire document is relevant in terms of non-proliferation.

Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Securing Radioactive Sources: A G8 Action Plan:

Entire document is relevant in terms of non-proliferation.

2004 Sea Island

Chair's Summary:

At Evian, we recognized the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, together with international terrorism, as the pre-eminent threat to international peace and security. Determined to prevent, contain, and roll back **proliferation**, we adopted a **G-8 Action Plan on Nonproliferation** to reinforce the global nonproliferation regime. This **Action Plan** enhances and expands ongoing efforts, such as the **Proliferation Security Initiative**, which now includes all G-8 members, and the **G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction**. The Action Plan addresses transfers of **enrichment and reprocessing equipment and technologies**, and takes steps to strengthen the **International Atomic Energy Agency** and to counter bioterrorism. The **Action Plan** calls on all states to implement the recently passed U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540, and addresses the proliferation challenges in North Korea, Iran, and Libya.

We welcomed the increasing strength of the global economy. We agreed it was important to take advantage of the strong global economic environment to implement further reforms to accelerate growth in our countries. We noted the recent pledge by **oil producers** to increase production. We recognized the need for **balanced energy policies**, which increase **energy supplies** and encourage more **efficient energy use** and **conservation**, including through **new technologies**.

We also discussed regional challenges, including:

* North Korea: We addressed the DPRK **nuclear issue** in our **G-8 Action Plan on Nonproliferation**. We support the Six-Party Talks as well as efforts by all concerned parties to achieve a comprehensive solution by diplomatic means to the DPRK **nuclear issue** and to other security and humanitarian issues, such as the abductions.

G8 Global Partnership Annual Report:

Entire document is relevant in terms of non-proliferation.

G8 Action Plan on Non-Proliferation:

Entire document is relevant in terms of non-proliferation.

2005 Gleneagles

Chair's Summary:

Climate Change

We have issued a statement setting out our common purpose in tackling climate change, **promoting clean energy** and achieving sustainable development.

We resolved to take urgent action to meet the challenges we face. The Gleneagles Plan of Action which we have agreed demonstrates our commitment. We will take measures to develop **markets for clean energy technologies**, to increase their availability in developing countries, and to help vulnerable communities adapt to the impact of climate change.

Global Economy, Oil and Trade

We discussed the outlook for global economic growth, which we expect to remain robust. We recognised that maintaining this growth is a challenge, and reaffirmed that each of our countries must play its part to support long-term sustainable growth. Higher and more volatile **oil prices** are an issue of particular concern both to us and to vulnerable developing countries. We emphasise the need for concrete actions to reduce market volatility through more comprehensive transparent and timely data.

We issued statements on the global economy and **oil**, trade, and on action to reduce Intellectual Property Right piracy and counterfeiting.

Regional Issues and Proliferation

We reaffirmed that the **proliferation** of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, together with international terrorism, remain the pre-eminent threats to international peace and security. We reaffirmed our commitments and called on all States to uphold in full **international norms on non-proliferation** and to meet their arms control and disarmament obligations. We emphasised our determination to meet proliferation challenges decisively, through both national and multilateral efforts. We expressed particular concern about the **threat of proliferation in North Korea and Iran.**

On Iran we support the efforts of France, Germany and the UK, with the EU, to address through negotiation the concerns about Iran's **nuclear programme**, and expressed once again the importance of Iran combating terrorism, supporting peace in the Middle East and respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms.

On North Korea, we support the Six Party Talks and urged North Korea to return promptly to them. We call on North Korea to abandon its **nuclear weapons-related programmes**. Action is also long overdue for North Korea to respond to the international community's concern over its human rights record and the abductions issue.

Communiqué:

Climate Change, Energy and Sustainable Development

Entire section is relevant in terms of climate change and clean energy.

Climate Change, Clean Energy and Sustainable Development:

Entire section is relevant in terms of climate change and clean energy.

Gleneagles Plan of Action: Climate Change, Clean Energy and Sustainable Development:

Entire section is relevant in terms of climate change and clean energy.

Global Economy and Oil:

2. But challenges remain, especially persistent global imbalances and **high and volatile oil prices**.

4. Strong global growth has boosted **energy demand** and, together with **capacity constraints** and **supply uncertainties**, has led to **high and volatile oil prices**. We discussed the risks that sustained **high energy prices** pose for global economic growth. **Oil demand** is currently projected to continue its strong growth. Significant investments will be needed, in the short-, medium-, and long-terms, in **exploration, production, and energy infrastructure** to meet the needs of a growing global economy. A number of measures could help to ease the tightness of the **oil market**.

5. We agreed that **secure, reliable and affordable energy sources** are fundamental to economic stability and development, and recognised the important role that **energy conservation and efficiency, technology and innovation** can play. And we have separately published a Plan of Action on these issues in addressing climate change.

6. We encourage **oil-producing countries** to take all the necessary steps to foster a favourable investment climate sufficient to support strong global economic growth. In particular, **oil-producing countries** should ensure open markets with transparent business practices and stable **regulatory frameworks for investment in the oil sector**, including increased opportunity for foreign investment. In this context, we emphasise the important role played by the dialogue between **oil producing countries and oil**

consuming countries in the **International Energy Forum (IEF)**. Furthermore, we agree to consider measures to encourage the expansion of **refinery capacity**.

7. We emphasise the need for concrete actions to reduce market volatility through more comprehensive, transparent and timely data. A factor exacerbating uncertainty is the lack of transparency in **the markets**, which could be ameliorated by a **universally agreed reporting system for oil supply and demand** to be applied by **oil producing and consuming countries and oil companies**. Reliable and timely data on **supply, demand and stocks** facilitate timely adjustment to shifts in **supply and demand** while contributing to more solidly based investment decisions. We therefore welcome and support the **Joint Oil Data Initiative (JODI)** launched by several international organisations, including the **IEA**, and now managed by the Secretariat of the **International Energy Forum (IEF)** and urges all countries to contribute to the success of this initiative, so that market transparency benefits considerably from the establishment of robust **world oil market data**.

G8 Statement on Non-Proliferation:

Entire section is relevant in terms of non-proliferation.

GPWG Annual Report Consolidated Report Data: Annex 2005:

Entire section is relevant in terms of non-proliferation.

2006 St. Petersburg

Chair's Summary:

We met in St.Petersburg for our annual Summit, 15-17 July 2006, to discuss collective approaches to pressing international issues. On July 17 we were joined for our discussion on priority themes of the Russian Presidency (global **energy security**, development of modern education systems and fight against infectious diseases) as well as globalization, international trade and Africa by the leaders of Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Africa and by the heads of the African Union, the Commonwealth of Independent States, the **International Energy Agency**, the **International Atomic Energy Agency**, the United Nations, UNESCO, the World Bank, the World Health Organization, and the World Trade Organization.

Global Energy Security

We discussed challenges to global **energy security** and set out our common goals and approaches aimed at ensuring sufficient, reliable and environmentally responsible supplies of **energy** at prices reflecting market fundamentals.

We agreed that dynamic and sustainable development of our civilization depends on reliable access to **energy**. It is best assured by strengthened partnership between **energy producing and consuming countries**, including enhanced dialogue on growing **energy interdependence**, security of supply and demand issues. We stressed that open,

transparent, efficient and competitive **energy** markets are the cornerstone for our common **energy security** strategy. We also recognized that governments and relevant international organizations play an important role in this area.

We adopted the St.Petersburg Plan of Action to enhance global **energy security** through efforts to increase transparency, predictability and stability of the global **energy** markets, improve the investment climate in the **energy** sector, promote **energy efficiency** and **energy saving**, diversify energy mix, ensure physical safety of critical **energy** infrastructure, reduce **energy poverty** and address climate change and sustainable development.

In this Plan we undertook to reduce barriers to **energy** investment and trade, making it possible for companies from **energy** producing and consuming countries to invest in and acquire upstream and downstream assets internationally. We also stressed the need for better risks sharing between all stakeholders in the **energy** supply chain through economically sound diversification between different types of contracts, including market-based long-term and spot contracts, timely decision-making and appropriate adherence and enforcement of contractual agreements.

Energy saved is energy produced. Therefore, we have adopted a comprehensive approach to energy saving and **energy efficiency**.

Those of us who have or are considering plans related to the use of safe and secure **nuclear energy** underlined its important contribution to global **energy security**.

Meeting our multiple goals and objectives in the area of global **energy security** we will act to reduce **energy poverty** in developing countries.

We reaffirmed our commitments to meet the objectives of reducing greenhouse gas emissions and dealing with climate change, including through promoting an inclusive dialogue on further action in the future.

Other Issues

Having discussed the state of the world economy, we concluded that global growth remains strong and has become more broadly based. We also discussed high and volatile **energy prices**, global imbalances and growing protectionism. We re-iterated our commitment to address global imbalances, working together to remove distortions to the global adjustment process, promote liberalization of trade and investment, and modernize the international financial institutions.

International Security

We recognized that proliferation of **weapons of mass destruction**, along with international terrorism, remains the central threat to international peace and security. Therefore, the international community must firmly respond to that challenge and take resolute actions to curb that threat. We reaffirmed our determination and commitment to

act in concert and together with other States and organizations to fight **WMD** proliferation, including with a view to preventing **WMD** falling into the hands of terrorists.

We recognize States' rights under the **Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons** (NPT) to access to the benefits of **nuclear energy**. We discussed the concrete proposals contained in the Initiative of the President of the Russian Federation on multinational centres to provide **nuclear fuel** cycle services and the Initiative of the President of the United States on the **Global Nuclear Energy Partnership** as well as the recent initiative tabled at the IAEA by France, Germany, the Netherlands, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States regarding a concept for a multilateral mechanism for reliable access to enrichment services for **nuclear fuel**. We agreed to continue to discuss these issues jointly with the IAEA with a view to ensuring that all States that conscientiously fulfill their non-proliferation obligations have guaranteed access to the benefits of the peaceful use of **nuclear energy**.

We addressed the proliferation implications of Iran's advanced **nuclear** programme and confirmed our commitment to see those implications resolved. We fully supported the proposals presented to Iran in June 2006 on behalf of China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States of America with the support of the High Representative of the European Union for a long-term comprehensive agreement with Iran based on cooperation and mutual respect. Iran not having shown willingness to engage in serious discussion of those proposals and having failed to take the steps needed to allow negotiations to begin, specifically the suspension of all enrichment related and reprocessing activities, as required by the IAEA and supported in the United Nations Security Council Presidential Statement, we supported the decision of those countries' Ministers to return the issue of Iran to the United Nations Security Council. Iran has a serious choice to make and we invited it to make the right decision - to react positively to the concrete proposals presented to it on 6 June 2006.

We addressed **nuclear** and other security concerns as well as humanitarian issues regarding the DPRK. We expressed support for UN Security Council resolution 1695 of 15 July 2006, which condemns the launches by the DPRK of ballistic missiles on 5 July 2006. We urge the DPRK to reestablish its preexisting commitment to a moratorium on missile launching. These missile launches intensify our deep concern over the DPRK's **nuclear weapons** programs and we strongly urge the DPRK to abandon all **nuclear weapons** and existing **nuclear** programs. We strongly support the Six Party talks, and urge the DPRK to promptly return to them without precondition and to cooperate in implementing the Joint Statement of September 2005 in good faith. We also urge the DPRK to respond to other security and humanitarian concerns of the international community, including early resolution of the abduction issue.

We support the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, announced by Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin and U.S. President George Bush on 15 July. We looked forward to working together with other like-minded nations and the IAEA to expand and accelerate efforts that develop partnership capacity to combat **nuclear**

terrorism on a determined and systematic basis. We trust that, through their participation in this new **Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism**, all countries that share our common goals of suppressing and mitigating the consequences of acts of **nuclear** terrorism will - on a voluntary basis and on the basis of independent responsibility of each country for the steps taken within its jurisdiction - reinforce joint efforts to increase international cooperation, in accordance with international law and national legislation, in combating this threat.

Keynote address at European Business Leaders Convention by Matti Vanhanen, president, European Council

I feel privileged to be here with you in the lovely city of St. Petersburg today and it is a great honour to speak at your meeting. You have chosen a very crucial topic, Europe's **energy** needs and the role of Russia, at a time when **energy** is very much at the forefront of the international agenda and Finland's EU Presidency.

Energy is one of the key issues for Finland's EU Presidency. There are many obvious reasons for this. Global demand for **energy** is growing fast. **Oil** prices are high and volatile. At the same time, the need to fight climate change and protect the environment creates further challenges for our **energy policies**. There is a clear link between the development of **energy policy** and environmental protection, especially as regards climate change.

Developing the external dimension of EU **energy policy** will be a leading theme during our presidency. This is mainly about finding a common understanding with our external partners on how to develop a mutually beneficial framework, which satisfies both consumers and provides a fair long-term outlook for producers. Russia is a strategic partner to the EU, and this is especially true in **energy**, where Russia and the EU have complementary needs – the EU as a customer and Russia as a supplier.

During our Presidency, there will be a number of occasions, including summits, at which we can discuss these issues. On 20 October in Lahti, European leaders will have the opportunity for a more informal exchange of views on energy relations. President Putin will attend the dinner in connection with this meeting. At the EU-Russia summit in November we can promote energy cooperation between the EU and Russia, which is one of the priority issues during the Finnish Presidency. Much sooner, next week here in Saint Petersburg, global **energy security** will be in the spotlight at the G8 Summit. I am looking forward to that opportunity to address this issue.

Ratification of the **Energy** Charter by Russia and the conclusion of negotiations on its Transit Protocol would be a welcome and concrete step. The **Energy Charter Treaty** would bring about transparency and dispute settlement mechanisms that would enable mutual confidence and encourage investment, while also introducing long-term stability.

The EU has many instruments to develop the external dimension of **energy policy**. I

would now like to make a few comments on the basic tenets that should underpin the development of the EU's **energy policy**, especially its external dimension and the role of Russia.

First of all, I think that we need to recognise the fact that the cornerstone for **energy security** is a well functioning **energy market**. Markets are not only about customers: suppliers are also part of the system. Therefore, we cannot limit ourselves to looking at the **energy market** only from an EU perspective: relevant suppliers need to be included in the picture too. An effective market does not stop at the EU's border and this is what the development of the external dimension of the EU's **energy policy** is all about.

At EU level, we support the extension of internal market principles to our neighbouring countries. An important concrete step in this direction has just been taken with the entry into force of the **Energy Community Treaty** on 1 July. At present, this **Treaty** covers the countries of South-East Europe, and is thus also an important factor in regional integration. However, the objective is to extend the Energy Community to other neighbours of the Union as well.

Another possible way to extend the EU's internal **energy market** is through the European Neighbourhood Policy. The Neighbourhood Policy already covers most of the EU's Eastern and Mediterranean neighbours, many of which are important **energy producers** or transit countries.

We need truly European **energy markets**, European not in the EU meaning, but pan-European including Norway, Russia, the Ukraine and other EU partners.

Well-functioning markets need to be developed more globally as well. Open and efficient markets are one of the keys to ensuring **energy security**. I would also like to emphasize the importance of a stable regulatory environment. After all, the ownership of energy companies is not the key issue, but whether they operate within a healthy regulatory framework. Many European **energy companies** are publicly owned, and most Russian companies are privately owned. Transparent and predictable regulatory frameworks generate investment at all levels of the **energy chain**. And investment is what we need to respond to the growing challenges.

This brings me to my second point, which is about infrastructure. We need more investment in the **energy sector** at all levels. The infrastructure for energy transfer is inadequate both within the EU and Europe at large. Overall, the **energy infrastructure** is still too national, with not enough cross-border networks. Cross-border capacity is very limited and transport routes are too few. Without an adequate network, markets cannot function properly. A more networked **energy infrastructure** would also contribute to **energy security**, by providing alternative supply routes.

Investment is also needed in extraction and production. I think that it is reasonable to assume that Russia needs to invest more in its **energy sector** in order to remain the strong

producer it is today. Its commitments with regard to the supply of **energy** are such that greater investment is essential. I believe that foreign investment has a crucial part to play in this process both financially and in technological terms. This is where a transparent and predictable regulatory framework is of paramount importance.

Adequate **energy** supply is never only about production. **Energy** use is the other side of the coin. I believe that investing in more **efficient energy** use is one way of ensuring adequate supply. There is a huge potential for **energy** saving and conservation. **Energy efficiency** can be increased at all stages: production, transit and consumption. **Energy** saving is one of the key elements in a sustainable **energy policy**. This is a field where the EU and European companies have much to offer Russia and others too. I think that we should make further efforts to foster cooperation with the aim of increasing **energy efficiency**.

So, what does this mean in concrete terms for the relationship between the EU and Russia as regards **energy**? I am convinced that market logic means that the EU will remain Russia's main **energy** customer and Russia the EU's main supplier. Demand and supply fit nicely, in geographical terms too. It is reasonable to assume that, in the future, Russia will develop its Asian markets, but this will take time and investment. And common sense tells us that supplies will come from new sources closer to the Asian markets.

During the Finnish presidency of the EU, Russia has an excellent opportunity to demonstrate its willingness to work constructively with the EU as a reliable supplier and **energy** partner.

The key in developing this **energy** relationship between Russia and the EU is reciprocity. The EU wants to be an open market for Russian **energy** and companies. I think that at the same time it is fair to assume that open EU markets will be met by opening Russian markets, which in concrete terms would mean openness to greater foreign involvement in the **energy** sector, opening **energy** infrastructure up to competition, including transit, and strengthening the regulatory framework by making it more predictable and more transparent. A solid regulatory framework would dispel any fears of **energy** being used for political ends.

I believe that in addition to cooperation with the EU, Russia's accession to the WTO can do much to help all this happen. I look forward to working with Russia during our Presidency on laying the ground for a mutually beneficial **energy** partnership between the European Union and Russia.

Energy trade with Russia should be based on business interests, long-term contracts and market prices.

During the Finnish Presidency, we want to agree on a mandate for renewing the present Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the EU and Russia after 2007. This is also a good opportunity to consider EU-Russia **energy** relations and their contractual

basis. I very much welcome the Commission's broad vision of aiming for a free-trade area with Russia, once Russia is a member of the WTO.

Energy is a basic need, and therefore a strategic commodity. **Energy security** is a fair concern. However, legitimate concerns about **energy security** should not obscure the fact that all markets create a degree of interdependence, which in itself is a basis for cooperation, not conflict. European integration is built on this idea. We need to recognise the growing interdependence between producing, consuming and transit countries. Intensified international cooperation is needed to ensure stable development of our **energy** markets, which is a necessary basis for economic development. The EU is ready and willing to be an active partner in this cooperation.

Diversification of **energy** sources is essential for **energy security**. Together with functioning markets, diversification makes **energy** systems more able to cope with external disruptions. In Finland, we have deliberately built a wide **energy** mix. We rely on **oil, gas, hydroelectric power**, wood and peat to name a few. Additional **nuclear power** capacity is being built as we speak. No individual **energy** source is dominant and our **energy** system is complemented by an integrated Nordic electricity market.

Renewable energy sources play an extremely significant role in Finland. The most important of these is wood-based **fuel**, providing over 20 per cent of total energy demand. The promotion of **renewable energy** sources is a priority for Finland, both in its own right and as the holder of the EU Presidency, not least because of their importance in limiting CO2 emissions. However, one model does not fit all. National circumstances are very different. For some countries, for instance, wind **energy** is a more natural option than bio-**energy**.

In the discussion on EU **energy policy**, one should always keep in mind that the choice of **energy** sources is a matter for the Member States. This becomes most evident when looking at national policies on **nuclear power**. There is wide agreement that this competence should be kept at the national level in future. However, a strong national competence in **energy policy** does not mean that the EU has only a marginal role to play. I am convinced that, in **energy**, we need more Europe, not less. The EU has a crucial role to play in building a real internal market in **energy**, which should be complemented by ensuring extensive connections to external suppliers as well.

The Finnish Presidency attaches great importance to the effective implementation of internal markets in electricity and **gas**. One might observe – with hindsight – that the slowness of the EU in liberalising its **energy** market has been a strategic mistake. The EU would be in a better position in terms of **energy security**, if markets had been opened earlier. This would have led to more cross-border connections and a more robust common **energy** market. At the same time we should not lose sight of the fact that **energy** markets are built by companies, not governments.

A crucial challenge for the European Union is to bring concrete benefits to our citizens and to our businesses. I hope that **energy** – especially an understanding with Russia on the road ahead – will be among the concrete results of the Finnish Presidency.

Joint Statement by George Bush and Vladimir Putin

The United States and the Russian Federation believe that strengthening their cooperation in civil **nuclear energy** is in the strategic interests of both our countries. It will serve as an additional assurance of access for other nations to economical and environmentally safe peaceful **nuclear energy**.

The United States and the Russian Federation are working together to meet the challenges posed by the combination of proliferation of **weapons of mass destruction** and international terrorism. We recognize the devastation that could befall our peoples and the world community if **nuclear weapons** or materials or other **weapons of mass destruction** were to fall into the hands of terrorists. We are closely cooperating to lessen that unacceptable danger, including by strengthening the **nonproliferation** regime and ensuring the security of **nuclear weapons** and fissile materials.

Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy

The United States and the Russian Federation are convinced that reliable and sufficient **energy** supplies are the cornerstone of sustainable economic development and prosperity for all nations, and a necessary condition for maintaining international stability. Today **nuclear energy** is a proven technology for providing reliable electric power without emission of **greenhouse gases**, and is an essential part of any solution to meet growing **energy** demand.

We share the view that **nuclear energy** has an essential role in the promotion of **energy security**, which is an issue of special concern for the leaders of the G-8. Advancing **nuclear energy** will require further development of innovative technologies that reduce the risk of proliferation, provide for safe management of waste, are economically viable, and are environmentally safe.

Being consistent in our approach to assure access to the benefits of **nuclear energy** for all nations complying with their **non-proliferation** obligations, we have each proposed initiatives on the development of a global **nuclear energy** infrastructure, specifically the Russian proposal to establish a system of international centers to provide **nuclear fuel** services, including **uranium** enrichment, under IAEA safeguards, and the U.S. proposal for the **Global Nuclear Energy Partnership** to develop innovative **nuclear** reactor and **fuel** cycle technologies.

Following up on these initiatives, the United States and the Russian Federation intend to work together, actively involving the IAEA, to allow all nations to enjoy the benefits of **nuclear energy** without pursuing uranium enrichment and spent **fuel** reprocessing capabilities.

The United States and the Russian Federation together with four other **nuclear fuel** supplier states have also proposed a concept for reliable access to **nuclear fuel** for consideration and development at the IAEA.

We call upon other countries to join us to facilitate the safe and secure expansion of **nuclear energy** worldwide.

Proceeding from our national interests and common goals, and recognizing the benefits of civil commercial **nuclear trade**, we express our intent to develop bilateral cooperation in the peaceful use of **nuclear energy**.

We have directed our Governments to begin negotiations with the purpose of concluding an agreement between the United States and the Russian Federation on cooperation in the peaceful use of **nuclear energy**.

Countering Nuclear Proliferation

We recognize the vital role of the NPT in the prevention of **nuclear** proliferation and the importance of the IAEA in implementing safeguards required by the NPT. We are working with our G-8 partners to make the **Additional Protocol** an essential norm for verifying compliance with **nuclear** safeguards obligations. We welcome the establishment of the IAEA Committee on Safeguards and Verification. We are actively fulfilling our obligations under Article VI of the NPT by substantially reducing **nuclear** forces as we implement the Moscow Treaty of May 24, 2002.

We reiterate our support for effective measures to prevent transfers of sensitive **nuclear** equipment, materials and technologies to states that may seek to use them for weapons purposes, or allow them to fall into terrorists' hands, and will work together to this end.

We reiterate our commitments undertaken under the Bratislava Joint Statement on Nuclear Security Cooperation of February 24, 2005. We have made substantial progress in the implementation of those commitments and we reaffirm our goal of completing **nuclear security** upgrades by the end of 2008.

We applaud the extension of UN Security Council Resolution 1540, the adoption by the **UN General Assembly of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism**, and the decision by the States Parties to strengthen the **Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material**.

We look forward to reinforcing our partnership with India. We welcome the important **nonproliferation** commitments India has made, and India's closer alignment with the **nonproliferation** regime mainstream. We look forward to working with India on civil **nuclear** cooperation to address its **energy** requirements, and on further enhancing the global **nonproliferation** regime.

We will continue to work together to strengthen the global **non-proliferation** regime.

Through our cooperation in the field of **nuclear nonproliferation** we seek to improve the security of our own peoples and of all others in the world community. In doing so, we are building on the unique historic roles and responsibilities of the United States and the Russian Federation in **nuclear** science and technology, both military and civilian. We are united in our determination to help make the benefits of **nuclear energy** securely available to all for peaceful purposes.

Joint Statement by George Bush and Vladimir Putin on the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism

Entire section is relevant in terms of nuclear terrorism.

Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism: Joint Fact Sheet

Entire section is relevant in terms of nuclear terrorism.

Joint Statement by Stephen Harper and Vladimir Putin

Canada and the Russian Federation enjoy a rich and diverse bilateral relationship. Today we reaffirm our commitment to reinforce key areas of joint endeavour. **Energy** cooperation is addressed in a separate Statement.

We are committed to building further our cooperation under the **Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction**. The Partnership has become a key large-scale international initiative which has contributed to the enhancement of international security and safety. The Partnership already demonstrates tangible results, and cooperation between our two countries has led to significant progress in all priority areas. We are particularly pleased with the excellent bilateral collaboration and spirit of partnership that has developed through working together on this program.

Joint Statement by Stephen Harper and Vladimir Putin on Canada-Russia Energy Cooperation

Canada and Russia have many interests in common in the development of their national **energy** sectors and in supporting well-functioning international **energy** markets. Our two countries are major producers and exporters of **energy**, and play an important role in enhancing global **energy security**.

We welcome the important and timely discussion of global **energy security** at the G8 Summit in Saint-Petersburg. Together, G8 countries can underscore the key principles that need to underpin our national **energy policies** and will help us meet today's global **energy**, environment and development challenges.

In taking joint action to enhance global **energy security** and to address environmental challenges, we will focus on diversification of **energy** sources, encouraging investment in the **energy** sector, in addition to **energy efficiency**, scientific and technological cooperation, **renewables** and **alternative sources of energy**.

We will fully respect market principles and ensure that open, clear and predictable policy and regulatory frameworks are in place. We will also ensure that transparent tax, legal, regulatory and commercial conditions are in place to remove barriers to trade and encourage mutual investments in the **energy** industry.

We welcome close cooperation between Canadian and Russian **energy** industry players and will work to facilitate these relationships, with a view to promoting international trade, particularly in the area of liquefied natural **gas** (LNG). We believe that such growth and development of the LNG market will play an important role in enhancing global **energy security**.

Canada and Russia look forward to the possibility of enhanced civil **nuclear** cooperation and, in this regard, completing arrangements that will help facilitate mutually beneficial trade in **uranium**.

We intend to develop our cooperative dialogue on **energy security** both through enhancing our bilateral relationship and through existing multilateral fora, with the goal of implementing agreements reached at the G8 Summit in Saint-Petersburg.

Press Briefing with President Putin

Along with this, you are absolutely right, it is difficult to imagine effectively resolving economic, financial and **energy** problems without economies that are developing as quickly as those of China or India. And it is certainly true that the leader of development, the most powerful and promising country on the American continent, is Brazil. And if our partners consider it possible to put these issues in practice then of course we would support decisions of this kind.

VP: Today at the press conference with the President of the United States we already said that we are satisfied with how the six-country forum began its work and we consider that this forum must be used to develop common approaches towards resolving this problem. The question consists not in toughening our positions but in uniting them. And as a matter of fact this is the most difficult thing to do but could also be the most effective way to resolve the Iranian **nuclear** question.

Global Energy Security

Entire section is relevant in terms of energy security.

Update on Africa

Our Commitments

Since the late 1990s, G8 Summits have given Africa a high priority. At Gleneagles last year the G8 agreed to a further set of measures to reduce poverty and support sustainable development in Africa. We are continuing to work in partnership with Africa, in particular in support of the AU and NEPAD, with a special focus this year on infectious diseases, education and **energy security**. This report reviews progress on G8 commitments on Africa since the last G8 Summit, while respecting the critical role of African ownership of the reform process.

Progress Made

Promoting Good and Responsive Governance: We have, with our international partners, secured the entry into force of the UN Convention against Corruption in December 2005: 22 African and 3 G8 countries are among those who have ratified. 25 African countries have signed up to the African Peer Review Mechanism and 3 have completed the process. Good progress has been made in improving transparency and accountability including in the **oil and gas** industries through the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), in which 15 African countries and 23 companies take part. We have successfully completed work at the OECD to strengthen significantly anti-bribery requirements for those applying for export credits and credit guarantees.

We are helping Africa construct the road, rail, **energy** and other networks necessary for growth including through our support to the Infrastructure Consortium for Africa inaugurated in October 2005, which has already identified and secured funding decisions on eleven regional projects from NEPAD's Short Term Action Plan (STAP) worth \$740m. We are helping Africa attract the private financing and inward investment which will drive growth including through the NEPAD-OECD Africa Investment Initiative, the Enhanced Private Sector Assistance for Africa and the Investment Climate Facility, launched at the World Economic Summit in June. We continue to provide significant support to the development of agriculture in Africa. Increasingly, the AU/NEPAD Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) is providing a framework for collective action.

Continuing Work

We have made substantial progress since Gleneagles. Our key steps over the next year include:

- tackling infectious diseases, strengthening education and enhancing **energy security** in Africa and the wider world. The details are set out in our separate statements;

G8 Summit Declaration on Counter-Terrorism

We recognize the urgency of enhancing our cooperation with regard to counter terrorist and other criminal attacks on critical **energy** infrastructure facilities. We announce a plan

of action to secure global critical **energy** infrastructure, including defining and ranking vulnerabilities of critical **energy** infrastructure sites, assessing emerging and potential risks of terrorist attacks, and developing best practices for effective security across all **energy** sectors within our countries.

We reaffirm our commitment to collaborative work, with our international partners, to combat the terrorist threat, including:

- suppressing attempts by terrorists to gain access to weapons and other means of mass *destruction*;

G8 Statement on Strengthening the UN's Counter-Terrorism Program

At Gleneagles, we welcomed the adoption by the **General Assembly of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism**, initiated by the Russian Federation. We call upon all States to ratify this instrument and look forward to its early entry into force. We reiterate our call for the UN General Assembly to conclude swiftly the draft Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism, which will complement the broad legal framework set out in Security Council resolutions and the other international conventions and protocols related to terrorism. It is time to conclude this negotiation.

Statement on Non-Proliferation

The proliferation of **weapons of mass destruction (WMD)** and their means of delivery, together with international terrorism remain the pre-eminent threat to international peace and security. The international community must therefore boldly confront this challenge, and act decisively to tackle this threat. We reaffirm our determination and commitment to work together and with other states and institutions in the fight against the proliferation of **WMD**, including by preventing them from falling into hands of terrorists.

As an essential element of our efforts to confront proliferation, we are determined to fulfil arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation obligations and commitments under relevant international treaties, conventions and multilaterally agreed arrangements to which we are parties or in which we participate. We call on all other states to meet their obligations and commitments in full in this regard. We rededicate ourselves to the re-invigoration of relevant multilateral fora, beginning with the Conference on Disarmament. These efforts will contribute to the further reinforcement of the global **non-proliferation** regime.

We call on all states not Party to the **Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)**, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) and the 1925 Geneva Protocol to accede to them without delay and those states that have not yet done so to subscribe to the Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation. We urge all states concerned to strictly observe a moratorium on **nuclear** weapon test explosions or any other **nuclear** explosions.

Nuclear Non-Proliferation: NPT

We reaffirm our full commitment to all three pillars of the NPT. We call on all states to comply with their NPT obligations, including IAEA safeguards as well as developing effective measures aimed at preventing trafficking in **nuclear** equipment, technology and materials.

IAEA Safeguards

We stress the importance of the IAEA safeguards system. We are seeking universal adherence to IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreements for the effective implementation of Article III of the NPT and to the Additional Protocol. In this context we urge all states that have not yet done so, to sign, ratify and implement these instruments promptly. We are actively engaged in efforts toward this goal, with a view to make comprehensive safeguards agreements together with an Additional Protocol the universally accepted verification standard. We will also work together vigorously to establish the Additional Protocol as an essential new standard in the field of **nuclear** supply arrangements.

Peaceful use of nuclear energy

We recall that Article IV of the NPT stipulates that nothing in the Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of **nuclear energy** for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of the Treaty. We are committed to facilitate the exchange of equipment, materials and information for the peaceful use of **nuclear energy**. Full compliance with **NPT non-proliferation** obligations, including safeguards agreements, is an essential condition for such exchange.

An expansion of the peaceful use of **nuclear energy** must be carried forward in a manner consistent with nuclear **non-proliferation** commitments and standards. In this regard, it is important to develop and implement mechanisms assuring access to **nuclear fuel** related services to states as an alternative to pursuing enrichment and reprocessing activities. In this respect we appreciate the recent potentially complementary Initiative of the President of the Russian Federation on multinational centres to provide **nuclear fuel** cycle services and the Initiative of the President of the United States on the **Global Nuclear Energy Partnership** as well as the recent initiative tabled at the IAEA by France, Germany, the Netherlands, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States regarding a concept for a multilateral mechanism for reliable access to enrichment services for **nuclear fuel**. We will work to elaborate further these initiatives. To further strengthen this common approach we will:

- continue reviewing multinational approaches to the **fuel** cycle, including international centres to provide **nuclear fuel** cycle services, with the IAEA, as well as relevant practical, legal and organizational solutions;
- facilitate developing credible international assurances of access to **nuclear fuel** related services; while
- those of us who have or are considering plans relating to use and/or development of safe and secure **nuclear energy** will promote research and development for safer, more efficient, more environmentally friendly and more proliferation resistant **nuclear energy** systems, including relevant technologies of the **nuclear fuel** cycle. Until advanced systems are in place, appropriate interim solutions could be pursued to address back-end **fuel** cycle issues in accordance with national choices and **non-proliferation** objectives.

Enrichment and Reprocessing

In accordance with approaches agreed upon at the G8 summits at Sea Island and in Gleneagles, we support the development of measures to prevent transfers of sensitive **nuclear** equipment, materials and technologies to states that may seek to use them for weapons purposes, or allow them to fall into terrorists' hands.

We will exercise enhanced vigilance with respect to the transfers of **nuclear** technology, equipment and material, whether in the trigger list, in the dual-use list, or unlisted, which could contribute to enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, and will be particularly vigilant with respect to attempts to acquire such technology, equipment and material by covert and illicit means.

We agreed at Sea Island that the export of such items should occur only pursuant to criteria consistent with global **non-proliferation** norms and to those states rigorously committed to these norms. Over the last two years we have made significant progress in the development of such criteria. We welcome the progress noted by the **Nuclear Suppliers Group** and its commitment to work actively with a view to reaching consensus on this issue by 2007.

India

We look forward to reinforcing our partnership with India. We note the commitments India has made, and encourage India to take further steps towards integration into the mainstream of strengthening the **non-proliferation** regime, so as to facilitate a more forthcoming approach towards **nuclear** cooperation to address its **energy** requirements, in a manner that enhances and reinforces the global **non-proliferation** regime.

Libya

The international community's positive response to Libya's renunciation of **weapons of mass destruction** demonstrates the benefits that follow a strategic decision to cooperate

with the international community and be a part of the global **nonproliferation** mainstream.

Iran

We remain seriously concerned over the proliferation implications of Iran's advanced **nuclear** programme and we remain united in our commitment to see those implications resolved.

DPRK

These missile launches intensify our deep concern over the DPRK's **nuclear weapons** programmes. We reiterate the necessity for the DPRK promptly to return to full compliance with the NPT. We strongly urge the DPRK to abandon all **nuclear weapons** and existing **nuclear** programmes. We reaffirm our full support for the September 19, 2005 Joint Statement and the Six-Party talks. We urge the DPRK to expeditiously return to these talks without precondition and to cooperate to settle the outstanding issues of concern on the basis of this Statement, which reaffirms the common objective of Six Parties; all participants should intensify their efforts to achieve the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner and to maintain peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia.

Press Briefing with Vladimir Putin

The first point concerns **energy security**. I think that all of you who have read the document will have noted a certain shift in accent in the very concept of **energy security**. Previously, **energy security** was interpreted as meaning stable supply of **energy** resources to the main consumers. Now we have convinced our partners that **energy security** is a much broader concept that extends to the extraction, transport and sale of **energy**. All these links in the chain, the representatives of all these links, bear equal and collective responsibility, and I think that this is very important indeed.

QUESTION: Mr President, you adopted a text on **energy security** today. This text indicates that **gas** prices could rise again next year. Could you give some more detail on this?

VLADIMIR PUTIN: This is a strange way in which you have linked the declaration adopted today to a possible price rise for natural **gas**. On the contrary, the more security we have in the **energy** sector, the more stable prices remain.

QUESTION (IZVESTIA): Everyone thought that **energy security** would lead to stormy debates at this summit, but in the end everything seems to have gone quite smoothly. Why is this?

VLADIMIR PUTIN: Yes, that's what I did. And the position of the authorities of the Russian Federation does coincide with that of many NGOs on a lot of issues, more than I

expected, to be honest; for example, on environmental security, **energy**, education and many other subjects we discussed today.

QUESTION (Norwegian TV): Mr. Putin, I would like to ask about the Barents Sea oil extraction and related environmental protection measures. This has to do with **energy security**.

The next question is that of the Barents Sea. There is an enormous potential there for supplying Europe with **energy**. More so, not only Europe, but other markets as well, including North America.

Report on the G8 Global Partnership

The destruction of chemical weapons, dismantlement of decommissioned **nuclear submarines**, employment of former weapons scientists, and disposal of fissile material were identified as priorities at Kananaskis. The Russian Federation considers the first two areas of cooperation as being of primary importance for the implementation of the GP projects in Russia.

Dismantlement of nuclear submarines and related work

Dismantlement of **nuclear submarines** withdrawn from the Russian Navy is another priority area identified at Kananaskis. This is a complex activity, including transport of the submarines, defuelling, dismantlement and safe storage of the reactor compartments.

In addition to the dismantlement of submarines, the Global Partnership projects also addressed the development of infrastructure to ensure **nuclear** material from the dismantlement process is made safe and secure. Key projects underway include: the German-financed construction of a long-term interim storage facility for 150 reactor compartments at Sayda Bay - the operation of the first section of the storage facility will start on July 18, 2006; the rehabilitation of the temporary storage facility for spent **nuclear fuel** at Andreeva Bay funded by the UK, Norway and Sweden; refitting of the **nuclear waste** incinerator in Zvezdochka shipyard funded by France; a multi-use naval vessel for the transport of **nuclear** (and related) materials funded by Italy; and a Spent **Nuclear** Fuel storage facility at the Atomflot site, Murmansk funded by the UK. Canada funded environmental improvements at Zvezdochka.

The parties continue to use successfully the Framework Agreement on a **Multilateral Nuclear Environment Programme** in the Russian Federation, which provided the basis for the implementation of the Northern Dimensional Environmental Programme's (NDEP) "**Nuclear** Window", that includes a number of **nuclear** multilateral and bilateral projects, such as rehabilitation programmes at Gremikha funded by France, the NDEP and the EU.

As of December 1, 2005, the parties have accumulated 70,114 mln. euro in the NDEP's "**Nuclear** Window". Up to now, three contracts have been concluded for the 19,1 mln. euro. The parties are planning to provide up to 150 mln. euro for this Programme by the end of 2008.

Other areas of co-operation

Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials: The G8 Gleneagles Statement and the Sea Island G8 Action Plan on **Non-Proliferation** highlighted the importance of addressing the security of **nuclear** materials, equipment and technology as well as **radioactive** sources.

A number of donors have now established programmes with Russia and Ukraine to upgrade the physical protection of and account for **nuclear** materials. These include the US, UK, Germany, Canada, Norway, Sweden, and the EU.

The US and Russia, with additional financial support from several other countries, are co-operating on the construction of **fossil fuel** power plants that, when completed, will allow the permanent closure of the three remaining Russian reactors that are producing weapon-grade plutonium. Canada, Finland, the Netherlands, the UK and New Zealand have also contributed funds to support these projects.

In Ukraine, a further step towards **nuclear** safety has been made with the replenishment of the Chernobyl Shelter Fund providing the necessary financial resources for completion of the new shelter. A number of donors are engaged in projects with Ukraine to enhance export control and border security systems to help prevent the illicit trafficking in **WMD** across *national borders*.

Countries participating in the Global Partnership note the following achievements in implementation

Coordination and Transparency: The growing pace of interaction and number of projects and other activities demands close cooperation, coordination and transparency. This has led to the creation of various informal structures between Russia and individual donor countries or a number of donor countries active in the same area. As an example, groups are in place to facilitate coordination for **nuclear submarine** dismantlement projects in Andreeva Bay, Gremikha, elimination of RTGs, and construction of the chemical weapons destruction facility at Shchuch'ye. This practice can be emulated for other activities.

Legal issues: The legal basis for the Global Partnership has continued to expand. Since the last year one bilateral agreement in the area of chemical weapons destruction was concluded between Russia and France. Three other agreements involving dismantlement of **nuclear submarines** were signed with France, Japan and EBRD. As well, the practice

of "piggy-backing", whereby a third country or organisation uses an established bilateral agreement between another donor and Russia, has proven useful.

Taxation: In 2006, the Government of the Russian Federation introduced an amendment to its national legislation to improve the system of tax exemption for organizations receiving foreign assistance for the destruction of **WMD**.

Countries participating in the Global Partnership will pursue the following goals

Financing: It is essential for the success of the Partnership that all participants continue to turn financial pledges into concrete activities. The partners welcome that Russia has substantially increased its own funding for the GP since the commencement of the initiative. Russia has already expended more than \$1 billion for chemical weapons destruction and near \$220 million for **nuclear submarine** dismantlement. The partners acknowledge that one of the essential factors of successful projects is a predictable, coordinated, targeted and efficient assistance.

Priorities: Significant work remains to be done to complete successfully current programmes by 2012 to address all Kananaskis priorities. The GP participating countries agree on the need to reflect more widely the entire set of priorities set out at Kananaskis. The GP countries recognize that financial assistance for chemical weapons destruction in the Russian Federation will be needed mainly in the years 2006-2009. They take note of the interest of some partners to expand cooperation in the field of dismantlement of **nuclear submarines** in the Far East of the Russian

Report of the Nuclear Safety and Security Group

Entire section is relevant in terms of nuclear safety and security.

Final Press Briefing with President Putin

First, we have worked out a common approach to ensuring global **energy security**. Our joint strategy is based on the common understanding that humanity shares a common **energy** future and that we all bear collective responsibility for this future. The decisions taken will enable us to ensure long-term improvement to the global **energy security** system. What is important is that practically all aspects are covered - making **energy** infrastructure more reliable, diversifying production and supply, and developing **energy** saving technology and alternative **energy** sources. This will also enable us to make **energy** markets more transparent and predictable and give them a foundation that takes into account the interests of all the participants in the global **energy** chain.

I am convinced that these measures will lead to the formation of a stable and favourable trade and investment environment in the global **energy** sector. I think that the fact that we have succeeded in agreeing on a formula for the development of **nuclear energy** that has been accepted by everyone is also one of the summit's indisputable achievements.

Moreover, we have also held in-depth discussions on assistance measures for countries that are vulnerable in **energy** terms. Of course, there are no simple solutions in this area and a lot more time and effort are still required from all of us to resolve effectively the **energy** problems in the developing countries and the poorest countries.

Environmental protection and reducing the effects of climate change are also important aspects of global **energy security**. In this respect I note the G8's readiness to fulfill all previous environmental commitments and to work out new, effective steps to protect the environment.

We have reached agreements on issues of strategic and regional stability. We are ready to continue coordinating our work on the **non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction**. In this respect I note that the G8 countries share a common position regarding the need to resolve the Iranian and North Korean **nuclear** issues through exclusively peaceful and diplomatic means.

One example I already mentioned yesterday is the document on **energy security**, which we worded in such a way as to include in its definition the security of delivery and sales, as well as the security of **energy** consumption and supply. We raised those issues for the first time and found our partners' understanding on the need to provide the security of **energy** infrastructure. All of this, plus the decisions on additional efforts to fight infectious diseases, [is the main result].

The discussion on world trade was also very important for global development; Mr. ElBaradei made a useful contribution to today's **energy** debate; in other words, we think this was a good summit.

QUESTION (Alexandra Kasharnitskaya, Television Channel RUSSIA TODAY): Vladimir Vladimirovich, my first question is about North Korea. Could you give some more detail on the agreements reached on North Korea. Regarding Iran, Russia has agreed in principle to imposing political and economic sanctions if Iran fails to fulfill the resolution. Is the same thing possible with regard to North Korea? And a second question regarding the energy charter: yesterday you said that Russia agrees with the main principles of the **energy** charter, so what is stopping the signature from going ahead?

PUTIN: A resolution was just adopted on North Korea and adopted unanimously what's more. President [of China] Hu Jintao told us about the results of the talks the Chinese deputy premier held in North Korea and expressed cautious optimism that the North Korean issue can be resolved through political and diplomatic means. The objective is to create conditions for establishing a **nuclear**-free zone in the Korean Peninsula and reach an agreement on the missile issue. We will work hard on these objectives. The matter now is how to return as soon as possible to the negotiating table.

Finally, the **energy** charter. First, the **energy** charter implies access, mutual access, to **energy** production and transport infrastructure. Of course, we can give our partners

access to both production and transport infrastructure, but the question arises as to what they will give us access to in return. Where is their production and where is their transport infrastructure? And we are not just talking about separate pipeline systems here, but, looking at what we ourselves have, about mainline pipeline systems, which our partners simply do not have. We are not against the idea of working on these principles, but we need to know first what we will get in return.

Second, the **energy** sector is the heart of our economy today, and we would like our partners to understand this and to also let us into the heart of their economies. Unfortunately, the restrictions that applied under the COCOM lists have been lifted only in word and in practice we still face considerable restrictions on high-technology transfers to Russia. We would like to see at least gradual change in this area. The sooner the better.

Finally, the charter and the additional protocol still contain some completely unresolved issues. And I would advise you and European journalists here to take a closer look at what is written in the charter. If you look closely you will see that the document contains internal contradictions. Our European partners agree to the principle of working based on long-term contracts, but at the same time they insist that certain sections of pipeline transport systems could be sold and rented out. But how can we then ensure **energy** supplies on a long-term basis for our consumers in western Europe? We would not know in this case how to calculate the final price. We could calculate it for a year ahead, but after that we would have to start incorporating the risks into the price and the price that you pay would start to rise. Once this is clearly understood I think that the tone of negotiations on this issue will change completely.

And one last point: we do not oppose the ideas set out in the charter. What's more, we are putting them into practice. We do open our market, our production sector, to our western partners and they give us access to their transport systems. The best example of this are the contracts between Gazprom and German partners such as BASF. I think that talks with E.ON will also end soon. We have given them access to one of our biggest deposits, have valued their assets using market methods and have taken part of their transport assets in Germany. We also have agreements now with other partners. We could take a share in assets in Central Europe in exchange for access to our deposits. Overall, I want to point out that we only have two large **oil** and **gas** companies with state participation. The rest are all private, and we have more than 20 large companies. Most of them have foreign capital and some companies, such as BP, are seeing their reserves growing in large part because the Russian government opens access to these reserves. And I think that our partners are satisfied with this joint work.

QUESTION (EL PAIS newspaper, Spain): Good afternoon, I am from Spain. You said yesterday that there was an intensive discussion on the Middle East. Could you explain what made this discussion so intensive? And second, what impact do you hope the global **energy security** programme will have on **oil** markets?

VLADIMIR PUTIN: The situation in the world is already having an impact on global

energy markets, including for **oil**. How much does a barrel cost now? It already costs more than \$70, and if things continue this way it will soon cost \$80. The greater the instability in the regions where large amounts of **energy** resources are produced, the higher the prices. This has always been the case and always will be, and we are seeing an example of this with the escalating conflict in the Middle East.

2007 Heiligendamm Summit

Chair's Summary:

Heiligendamm Process: We discussed global challenges with the Leaders of Brazil, China, India, Mexico, and South Africa. We acknowledged our respective responsibilities and the need to develop common solutions. We therefore agreed to launch a new topic-driven dialogue on key world economic issues with the aim of reaching concrete results until the G8 Summit in Italy 2009. The topics of this dialogue include issues relating to the freedom of investment and investment conditions, including corporate social responsibility; the promotion and protection of innovation; **energy efficiency** and technology cooperation; and development policy. The road map of this process is described by a joint declaration of the G8 Presidency and Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Africa.

Climate Change, Energy Efficiency and Energy Security: Combating climate change is one of the major challenges for mankind and it has the potential to seriously damage our natural environment and the global economy. We noted with concern the recent IPCC report and its findings. We are convinced that urgent and concerted action is needed and accept our responsibility to show leadership in tackling climate change. In setting a global goal for emissions reductions in the process we have agreed in Heiligendamm involving all major emitters, we will consider seriously the decisions made by the European Union, Canada and Japan which include at least a halving of global emissions by 2050. We have agreed that the UN climate process is the appropriate forum for negotiating future global action on climate change. We are committed to moving forward in that forum and call on all parties to actively and constructively participate in the UN Climate Change Conference in Indonesia in December 2007 with a view to achieving a comprehensive post 2012-agreement (post Kyoto-agreement) that should include all major emitters. To address the urgent challenge of climate change, it is vital that the major emitting countries agree on a detailed contribution for a new global framework by the end of 2008 which would contribute to a global agreement under the UNFCCC by 2009. We reiterate the need to engage major emitting economies on how best to address the challenge of climate change. We stress that further action should be based on the UNFCCC principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and capabilities. Technology, **energy efficiency** and market mechanisms, including emission trading systems or tax incentives, are key to mastering climate change as well as enhancing **energy security**. We reaffirmed the **energy security** principles we agreed at St. Petersburg. In our discussion with the emerging economies we agreed that **energy efficiency** and technology cooperation will be crucial elements of our follow-up dialogue.

Counter Terrorism: We adopted a Statement on Counter-Terrorism. We condemned all acts of terrorism, whatever their alleged motivation, in the strongest terms and reaffirmed that there could be no justification for such acts. We pledged to work closely together to react efficiently to new and continuing threats stemming from terrorist activities. We defined specific areas of further joint work to counter terrorism including, among others, responding to the terrorist and criminal abuse of modern communication and information technology, protecting critical **energy** infrastructures, improving transportation security, countering terrorist recruitment and preventing **nuclear terrorism**. We reaffirmed our support for the central role of the United Nations in the international fight against terrorism; in this context, we are providing a Report on G8 Support to the United Nations' Counter-Terrorism Efforts.

Non-Proliferation: We adopted a statement on this issue. Preventing the proliferation of **weapons of mass destruction** and their means of delivery are critical to international peace and security. We remain resolute in our shared commitment to counter the global proliferation challenge. In this regard, we reaffirm our commitment to the multilateral treaty system which provides the normative basis for all **non-proliferation** efforts. To be successful, we need to work jointly with other partners and through relevant international institutions, in particular those of the United Nations system, and reiterate the key role of the United Nations Security Council in addressing the challenge of proliferation. We also stress the importance of developing and implementing mechanisms of multilateral approaches to the **nuclear fuel** cycle. In this regard, we appreciate suggested initiatives listed in the statement. We remain committed to resolving regional proliferation challenges by diplomatic means.

Nuclear Safety and Security: The **Nuclear Safety and Security Group (NSSG)** provided technically informed, strategic policy advice on selected **nuclear** safety and **radiation** protection issues, discussed **nuclear** safety improvement programs for operating **Nuclear** Power Plants (e.g. in Armenia, Ukraine), and furthered international activities on the safety and security of **radioactive** sources. The G8 commitments with regard to **Chernobyl** were reaffirmed.

Iran: We reiterate our profound concerns over the proliferation implications of the Iranian **nuclear** program. We urge Iran to comply with its international obligations and UNSCR 1696, 1737 and 1747, in particular its obligation to suspend all enrichment related activities. We deeply deplore the fact that, as evidenced by the IAEA Director General's latest report to the Security Council, Iran has expanded its enrichment programme. We urge Iran to engage on the proposals put forward in June 2006 on behalf of China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States of America and reiterate that we remain committed to a negotiated solution. We call on Iran to meet the requirements for the resumption of negotiations. Should Iran continue not to heed the call of the Security Council, we shall support further appropriate measures as agreed in UNSCR 1747. We also call on Iran to play a more responsible and constructive role in

the Middle East region and condemn the threats towards Israel by the Iranian government and the repeated denial of the Holocaust by representatives of the Iranian government.

North Korea: We urge North Korea to return to full compliance with its obligations under the **NPT** and, in accordance with the Joint Statement of 19 September 2005 and UNSC-Resolutions 1695 and 1718, to abandon all **nuclear weapons** and existing **nuclear** programs as well as ballistic missile programs. We fully support the Six Party Talks and swift implementation of the initial actions agreed on 13 February 2007 as a first step towards full implementation of the Joint Statement of 19 September 2005 in good faith. We also urge North Korea to respond to other security and humanitarian concerns of the international community, including the early resolution of the issue of abductions.

Growth and Responsibility in the World Economy

Entire section is relevant in terms of energy.

Growth and Responsibility in Africa

Ensuring Sustainable Investment

The G8 welcome the progress made on the elaboration of the **Clean Energy Development and Investment Framework (CEDIF)** and will work with the World Bank, the African Development Bank and other donors with a view to implementing the **Energy Access Action Plan for Africa**. We reaffirm our commitment made in Gleneagles to helping Africa strengthen its adaptive capacity on climate change and work with African countries in the context of their national development strategies.

To improve **energy security** in Africa, we will give particular attention to **energy efficiency** and the use of domestic renewable **energy** sources, including **hydropower**, where appropriate, and to give priority support to the rehabilitation of existing **hydropower** plants, and the development of small **hydropower** plants. We will further promote responsible sustainable bio-**energy** production, generated from **renewable** biomass resources, with a view to contributing to climate protection without jeopardizing food security and the environment.

Annex: Summary of G8 Africa Personal Representatives' Joint Progress Report on the G8 Africa Partnership

Management of Natural Resources

The G8 stressed the importance of working with developing countries on climate change issues and the implementation of adaptation strategies. The G8 will support facilitating the access to water and sanitation as well as **energy**. The G8 also need to assist in the transition to clean **energy** through support for the African components of the **Clean Energy Investment Framework**, and explore options to increase African participation in clean **energy** investment flows. The G8 support Africa in promoting sustainable,

affordable and secure **energy** supply and **energy** use as well as cooperation towards sustainable management and biodiversity conservation.

Heiligendamm Statement on Non-Proliferation

Preventing the proliferation of **weapons of mass destruction** and their means of delivery as well as effectively combating international terrorism are critical to international peace and security. We, the Leaders of the G8, remain resolute in our shared commitment to counter the global proliferation challenge and continue to support and implement all the statements on **non-proliferation** issued on the occasion of previous summits of the G8.

The global proliferation challenge requires determined action and international cooperation on the basis of a broad and multifaceted approach. To be successful we need to work jointly with other partners and through relevant international institutions, in particular those of the United Nations system, to strengthen all instruments available for combating the proliferation of **weapons of mass destruction** and their means of delivery.

We reaffirm our commitment to the multilateral treaty system which provides the normative basis for all **non-proliferation** efforts. The strengthening and universalisation of **WMD** related treaties, in particular the **Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons**, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, are therefore a key priority. These three treaties continue to be essential instruments to maintain international peace and security and are the cornerstones of the international regime for **non-proliferation** and disarmament.

We will continue to encourage states to fulfill their obligations under the multilateral treaty regimes and to help states in effectively implementing those obligations at their national levels, inter alia by accounting for, securing and physically protecting sensitive materials. We place particular emphasis on urging the adoption of effective measures to combat illicit trafficking in **WMD** materials and their means of delivery, in particular through capacity building related to law enforcement and the establishment and enforcement of effective export controls, as well as through the Proliferation Security Initiative.

We reaffirm our commitment at Gleneagles to develop cooperative procedures to identify, track and freeze financial transactions and assets associated with **WMD** proliferation networks. We agree that the United Nations Security Council resolutions, including 1540, 1695, 1718, 1737, and 1747, require all states to take actions against **WMD** proliferation and call upon states to fulfill their obligations and responsibilities against **WMD** proliferation finance.

The Global Partnership against the Proliferation of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, launched five years ago at Kananaskis, is a unique and successful joint effort. At the midpoint of its lifespan we have reviewed the progress made so far and assessed the state of the cooperative projects undertaken. We acknowledge the progress

that has been made since the launch of the Partnership in 2002 but more has to be done to increase the efficiency of our cooperation. We remain firmly committed to completing the Kananaskis goals. We will discuss in due course whether the Partnership should be extended beyond 2012 and if so how to allocate the means for expanding its scope to address threat reduction and **nonproliferation** requirements worldwide, including those mandated by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540. We will discuss how other states, both donors and recipients, could be included in an expanded Global Partnership.

We underline the crucial importance of ensuring compliance with the multilateral treaty system. To that end we need to strengthen verification and enforcement. We are committed to continue our efforts to make the **IAEA** Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement together with an Additional Protocol the universally accepted verification standard for the peaceful use undertakings of the **NPT**. We will also work towards rendering the implementation of the CWC and BTWC more effective, in particular by promoting full and effective national implementation by all States Parties and full compliance with their obligations with regard to both Conventions. We are also committed to enhancing the effectiveness of the UNSC in meeting the challenge of proliferation and effectively fulfilling its role as the final arbiter of the consequences of non-compliance.

We acknowledge that the **nuclear non-proliferation** regime faces serious challenges. We therefore reaffirm our full commitment to the objectives and obligations of all three pillars of the **NPT** and we will continue to work for its universalisation. We call on all states party to the **NPT** to make a constructive contribution to a balanced and structured review of the Treaty, which has successfully begun with the first meeting of the Preparatory Committee of the 2010 Review Conference. We will undertake all efforts to achieve a positive outcome of the review process with a view to maintaining and strengthening the authority, credibility and integrity of the treaty regime.

We urge all states concerned to observe a moratorium on **nuclear weapon** test explosions or any other **nuclear** explosions.

We reaffirm the inalienable right of all parties to the **NPT** to the use of **nuclear energy** for peaceful purposes as enshrined in Article IV in conformity with all their Treaty obligations. To reduce the proliferation risks associated with the spread of enrichment and reprocessing goods and technology, we welcome the continued discussion by the **Nuclear Suppliers Group** on mechanisms to strengthen controls on transfers of enrichment and reprocessing equipment, facilities and technology. We regret that they did not reach consensus on this issue by 2007 as called for in St. Petersburg. We urge the **NSG** to accelerate its work and swiftly reach consensus. We agree to continue to undertake previously agreed actions on the understanding that should the **NSG** not reach consensus on appropriate criteria by 2008, we will seriously consider alternative strategies to reduce the proliferation risks associated with the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing goods and technologies. We also stress the importance of developing and implementing mechanisms of multilateral approaches to the **nuclear fuel** cycle as a

possible alternative to pursuing national enrichment and reprocessing activities. Following the **IAEA** special event in September last year we are now looking forward to the suggestions that the **IAEA** Director General will be presenting to the **IAEA** Board of Governors later this month. In considering the suggestions we will be guided by the criteria of added value to the non-proliferation regime, confidence in the reliability of supply assurances, compatibility with Article IV of the **NPT**, and the need to avoid any unnecessary interference or disturbance with the functioning of existing commercial markets. In this context, we reaffirm our commitment to ensure that the highest possible **non-proliferation**, safety and security standards for the peaceful use of **nuclear energy** are observed. We appreciate suggested initiatives in the field of multilateral approaches to the **nuclear fuel** cycle, including the Russian initiative on multinational centres to provide **nuclear fuel** cycle services, the US initiative on the **Global Nuclear Energy Partnership**, the Six-Party proposal of a standing mechanism for reliable access to **nuclear fuel**, the Japanese initiative on an **IAEA** standby arrangements system for the assurance of **nuclear fuel** supply, the UK proposal for non-revocable advanced export approval and the German initiative to establish a special territory under the exclusive control of the **IAEA** where enrichment could take place on a commercial basis. We reiterate that participation in any mechanism dealing with multilateral approaches should be carried out on a voluntary basis and should not preclude any state from purchasing **nuclear fuel** cycle services on the existing market, beyond the frameworks of multilateral mechanisms.

We are committed to resolving regional proliferation challenges by diplomatic means. We remain united in our commitment to resolve the proliferation concerns posed by Iran's **nuclear** programme. We deplore the fact that Iran has so far failed to meet its obligations under UNSC Resolutions 1696, 1737 and 1747 and will support adopting further measures, should Iran refuse to comply with its obligations. We again urge Iran to take the steps required by the international community, and made mandatory by these resolutions, to suspend all its enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, and allow negotiations to begin. International confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of the Iranian **nuclear** programme would permit a completely new chapter to be opened in our relations with Iran not only in the **nuclear** but also more broadly in the political, economic and technological fields. In this regard, we support the action of the **IAEA** and call on Iran to fully cooperate with the Agency.

Regarding the Korean Peninsula we are continuing to support the Six-Party Talks and swift implementation of the initial actions agreed on 13 February, 2007 as a first step towards full implementation of the Joint Statement of 19 September, 2005, including the resolution of the outstanding issues of concern. At the same time, we condemn the **DPRK's nuclear** test which is a clear threat to international peace and security. We urge the **DPRK** to comply with the UNSC Resolutions 1695 and 1718, strictly to refrain from any further **nuclear** test or missile launch, and to abandon all **nuclear weapons** and existing **nuclear** programmes as well as all other existing **WMD** and ballistic missile programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner. We urge the **DPRK** to return to full compliance with the **NPT** and **IAEA** safeguards. At the same time, we expect all states to fully implement the UNSC resolutions.

We look forward to reinforcing our partnership with India. We note the commitments India has made, and encourage India to take further steps towards integration into the mainstream of strengthening the **non-proliferation** regime so as to facilitate a more forthcoming approach towards **nuclear** cooperation to address its **energy** requirements, in a manner that enhances and reinforces the global **non-proliferation** regime.

The threat of **nuclear terrorism** continues to be a matter of grave concern to us. We are therefore committed to broaden participation in and further develop the **Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism** that was launched last year at St. Petersburg. We invite all EU member states to join the initiative, the EU to support our efforts and the EU-institutions to join the initiative as observer. We call on all states to endorse the Statement of Principles adopted at the Initiative's meeting in Rabat on 30 and 31 October 2006 and join in strengthening our preparedness and defenses against this threat consistent with national legal authorities and obligations under relevant international legal frameworks. We urge States that have not done so to sign and to ratify the **International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials** in its amended version.

This year marks the tenth anniversary of the entry into force of the CWC, which is the first disarmament treaty freeing the world from a whole category of **weapons of mass destruction** under international verification and within a specific timeframe. The anniversary is an opportunity to take stock of the implementation of that Convention so far and to set the stage for the Second Review Conference scheduled to take place in April 2008. We believe that at the Conference States Parties should reaffirm their commitment to full compliance with the obligations under the Convention and to further strengthen the regime established by it.

We will continue to promote efforts to address the threat posed by proliferation of means of delivery of **weapons of mass destruction**. In this regard we remain committed to implementing the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation and call upon other subscribing States to follow suit. We also intend to render it more effective and urge all states which have not done so, to subscribe to the Code without delay.

G8 Summit Statement on Counter Terrorism

Therefore, today, in Heiligendamm, we pledge to do everything in our power to counter the conditions that terrorists exploit, to keep the world's most dangerous weapons out of the hands of terrorists, to protect critical transport and **energy** infrastructures, to combat the financing of terrorism and illicit procurement networks and to remain watchful of the ways that terrorists and criminals exploit modern communication and information technologies.

Protecting Critical Energy Infrastructure

Given the trans-national nature of **energy** infrastructures, no country can insulate itself from dangerous disruptions. We resolve to continue our efforts to protect critical **energy** infrastructures from terrorist attacks. At the St. Petersburg Summit, we committed to ensure the security of the global **energy** network, and pledged to gain a better understanding of its vulnerabilities and develop ways to improve our efforts to prevent disruptions due to deliberate attacks. We instructed national experts to develop recommendations to address the challenges to secure critical **energy** infrastructure.

Today we announce the initiatives we are taking in this regard:

- Assessing the vulnerabilities of and potential risks to critical **energy** infrastructure;
- Sharing best practices of effective security responses;
- Evaluating potential threats to critical **energy** infrastructure.

Preventing Nuclear Terrorism

Weapons of mass destruction in the hands of terrorists are the pre-eminent threat to international peace and security. Preventing terrorists from acquiring **nuclear weapons** is essential to maintaining our way of life. We commit to work together in this endeavour. We therefore urge all States to ratify as soon as possible the **International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism**; and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material **and its 2005 Amendment**. In this regard, we also underscore the continuing significance of UN Security Council Resolutions 1373 and 1540 and call upon all states to ensure full compliance with their provisions. As partner nations of the **Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism**, we endorse the Initiative's continuing development and efforts to broaden participation.

Report on the Global Partnership

We reaffirm our commitment to the **Global Partnership** against the **Proliferation of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction** as set out in the 2002 Kananaskis G8 Summit documents. Since 2002, the **Global Partnership** has become a large-scale international initiative which has contributed to the enhancement of international security and stability. The past year has witnessed continuing progress in turning initial pledges into projects and activities. The destruction of chemical weapons, dismantlement of decommissioned **nuclear submarines**, the disposition of fissile materials and the employment of former weapons scientists were identified as priorities at Kananaskis. We reaffirm our commitment to support priority projects under this initiative, initially in Russia.

Dismantlement of Nuclear Submarines and Related Work

Dismantlement of **nuclear submarines** withdrawn from the Russian Navy is another priority area identified at Kananaskis. This is a complex activity, including transport of the submarines, defuelling, dismantlement and safe storage of the reactor compartments.

Substantial progress has been made since 2002, with 69 submarines dismantled, including 21 with foreign assistance from Canada, Japan, Norway, the UK and the US. The activities have mainly taken place in the North West of Russia while they have also taken place in the Russian Far East. In addition to the dismantlement of submarines, the **Global Partnership** projects also addressed the development of infrastructure to ensure **nuclear** material from the dismantlement process is made safe and secure. Key projects underway include: the German-financed construction of a land based long-term interim storage facility at Sayda Bay which became operational in July 2006. In the second phase of the **GP** this project will be extended with the construction of a **radioactive waste** management and storage facility at Sayda Bay. The rehabilitation of the temporary storage facility for spent **nuclear fuel** at Andreeva Bay funded by the Norway, Sweden and the UK; the launching of the rehabilitation of Gremikha former naval base funded by the EU, France and the EBRD; refitting of the **nuclear** waste incinerator in Zvezdochka shipyard funded by France; a multi-use naval vessel for the transport of **nuclear** (and related) materials funded by Italy; and a Spent Nuclear Fuel storage facility at the Atomflot site, Murmansk funded by the UK. Canada funded environmental improvements at Zvezdochka. The parties continue to use successfully the **Framework Agreement on a Multilateral Nuclear Environment Programme** in the Russian Federation, which provided the basis for the implementation of the Northern Dimensional Environmental Programme's (NDEP) "**Nuclear Window**", that includes a number of **nuclear** multilateral and bilateral projects, such as rehabilitation programmes at Gremikha funded by France, the NDEP and the EU.

Disposition of Fissile Material

In 2000, the US and the Russian Federation agreed to each convert 34 tonnes of weapons-grade **plutonium** designated as no longer required for defence programmes into forms not useable for weapons. As a number of countries have put aside funds for this purpose, it is hoped that the outstanding issues will be resolved to enable this important activity to commence.

Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials

The G8 Gleneagles Statement and the **Sea Island G8 Action Plan on Non-Proliferation** highlighted the importance of addressing the security of **nuclear** materials, equipment and technology as well as **radioactive** sources. A number of donors have now established programmes with Russia and Ukraine to upgrade the physical protection of and account for **nuclear** materials. These include Canada, the EU, Germany, Norway, Sweden, the UK and the US. There is also increasing cooperation among those engaged in securing **radiological** sources. A number of donors, including Canada, Denmark, France, Norway, the US and the Nordic Environmental Finance Corporation (NEFCO) are supporting dismantling, storing and replacing some 700 highly **radioactive radioisotopic thermoelectric generators** (RTGs) which have been used to power Russian lighthouses. With Canadian assistance, a Russian "**RTG Master Plan**" has been developed and efforts are under way to increase co-ordination among participating countries **Global Partnership** countries are also cooperating in other spheres. The US is

cooperating with Russia and Ukraine on the dismantlement of strategic weapons systems, and enhancing the security of weapons transportation and storage. Some bio-security projects are being implemented by several **Global Partnership** members. The US and Russia, with additional financial support from several other countries, are co-operating on the construction of **fossil fuel** power plants that, when completed, will allow the permanent closure of the three remaining Russian reactors that are producing weapon-grade **plutonium**. Canada, Finland, the Netherlands, New Zealand and the UK have also contributed funds to support these projects. In Ukraine, a further step towards **nuclear safety** has been made with the replenishment of the **Chernobyl Shelter Fund** providing the necessary financial resources for completion of the new shelter. A number of donors are engaged in projects with Ukraine to enhance export control and border security systems to help prevent the illicit trafficking in **WMD** across national borders.

2007 Mid-Term Review & Assessment

To provide a clear picture of what remains to be done, the 2006 **GP** Annual Report called for a review of the **GP** and its work at this mid-point of its lifespan. The **GP** partners, non-government organizations and scientists thoroughly assessed the main achievements, lessons learned and priorities of the **GP**. The conclusions and recommendations were laid down in the Mid-Term Review and brought to the attention of the summit in Heiligendamm.

Global Partnership Review

Shortly before the **Global Partnership** against the **Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (GP)** reached the midpoint of its lifespan this year, it was recognized in St Petersburg that there was a need to undertake an impartial assessment of the initiative. As part of the evaluation process, the **Global Partnership Working Group (GPWG)** met on 27-28 February 2007 in the enlarged circle of all **GP** partners for a **GP Review**. The **GP** partners, non-government organizations and scientists thoroughly assessed the main achievements, lessons learned and priorities of the **GP**. The following conclusions and recommendations are the result of the frank and comprehensive discussions:

Five years ago at Kananaskis G8 leaders announced a bold and novel enterprise - the **Global Partnership against the Proliferation of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction**. Since then the **GP** has made a significant and practical impact by undertaking complex and technologically challenging projects, initially in Russia. **GP** nations are in a strong position to achieve their commitment to raise up to 20 billion USD by 2012. The commitments and priorities partners agreed at Kananaskis have lost none of their validity and partners reaffirm their determination to continue with this important work until 2012.

Partners also recognize that their cooperation and future security are directly linked. The **GP** must evolve to meet new, emerging threats worldwide if we are to prevent terrorists,

other non-state actors and proliferant states from acquiring chemical, biological, **radiological, nuclear** and/or missile capabilities.

Main Achievements of the Global Partnership

The **GP** is a unique and successful G8 joint effort and has already made important achievements in the first half of its life. Most programmes and projects are well on track. Progress and project implementation should speed up in the second half. This will be facilitated by multilateral and bilateral agreements and a network of contacts facilitated by the **GP**, so that the commitments made in Kananaskis can be fulfilled. With the **Global Partnership Working Group (GPWG)** an effective mechanism was created without a standing bureaucracy for unprecedented international cooperation in important and sensitive security-related areas. The **GP** has fostered trust and mutual understanding amongst partners and contributed to a cooperative atmosphere in sensitive areas at local levels as well. As a result the **GP** has been able to implement large-scale projects that make a positive difference on the ground. The **GP** has become an international model for addressing the most urgent issues of international security and stability, including the evolving threat posed by the spread of **weapons and materials of mass destruction**.

The inclusive **GP** principles have allowed fourteen other donors outside the G8 to participate in the **GP** mechanism and make their own contribution to this work. Ukraine has joined the **GP** as a new recipient country. Partners appreciate the contributions of the EU and 13 other nations who joined the **GP** as donors and who also contributed their specific experiences and know-how, underscoring the universal importance of our goals.

During the review process all partners welcomed that Russia has considerably increased its own funding for the **GP** since 2002. While this strengthens the **GP**, the immensity of the tasks identified in Kananaskis fully justifies the **GP's** continued commitments. One of the main qualities of the **GP** is its pluralistic approach. This has enabled it to implement projects in a number of areas of the Kananaskis priorities whilst permitting all partners to follow national priorities or to concentrate on areas in which they have special expertise. In accordance with tasks identified in Kananaskis significant progress has been made in

the following areas:

- Dismantling decommissioned **nuclear submarines** and securing and removing the material from them; remediation of former naval bases in order to secure and remove spent **nuclear fuels** and **radioactive waste**;
- Improving the safety and security of fissile **nuclear** materials and chemical weapon stocks;

With these achievements, the **GP** has already become an important force to enhance international security and safety. Our work has made the world safer. It has helped overcome the legacy of the Cold War by bringing people and nations together to seek the

mutual benefits of enhanced global security through cooperation, and it has created a common understanding of the global importance of the tasks agreed upon in Kananaskis.

Lessons Learned

The major political lesson learned from the **GP** implementation is that the G8 together with other partners have proved and demonstrated their ability to work successfully together to address the topical issues of international security and safety. Partners also managed to resolve problems that emerged in the process of **GP** implementation in a constructive manner and on the basis of mutual respect taking into account the legitimate security interests of partners.

Adequate information submission, site access and tax exemption in accordance with the existing legal requirements of donors and recipients were found to be essential for the implementation of projects. While there remains room for improving project implementation also within the GP framework, our evaluations have shown that it is possible to overcome the many bureaucratic obstacles to progress by sustaining good working-level relationships and a strong commitment to mutual cooperation and understanding, without compromising requirements for financial probity, safety standards or national security. There are many examples for cooperative work on which to draw. It is therefore important to make this broad set of solutions known to all partners, since the options available mean that all donors can find a way of making a contribution, no matter how large or small. Possible solutions include co-financing by donors under the project leadership of one large donor, decentralized cooperation with local representatives or direct contracting with implementing agencies. It is essential to have the proper legal arrangements in place before embarking on project implementation. Although all partners envisage making the fastest possible progress on their projects, it is acknowledged that it takes time to make the legal arrangements needed to maintain high quality standards. Having appropriate legal arrangements in place, every effort should be made to shorten the time required to conclude specific contracts to start project implementation. Reliable long-term planning is essential and predictable disbursement of funds are essential for successful completion of projects. Thus, making a difference on the ground locally requires the continued commitment of donors and recipients at all levels of government.

Future Priorities

Within the **GP**, significant progress has been made since 2002. At the same time, partners recognize that more needs to be done to enhance effectiveness of cooperation to achieve the **Partnership's** goals. Some partners will also undertake work in areas not fully addressed so far, including fissile material/plutonium disposition and other areas such as biosecurity and biosafety. The Russian Federation considers of primary importance for the implementation of the **GP** projects in Russia the dismantlement of decommissioned **nuclear submarines** and chemical weapons destruction. In addition to the work in Russia, the implementation and universalization of the CPPNM, Full Scope Safeguards, the Additional Protocol, UNSCR 1540, the **Convention on the Suppression of Nuclear Terrorism** as well as the **Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism** are, without

being exhaustive, areas where partners may seek to engage through the **GP**. Partners agreed that maintaining a high level of global security will only be possible by strengthening the weakest links. At Sea Island, partners reaffirmed that they will address proliferation challenges worldwide. Some **GP** nations have already begun to make progress in this area. The **GP** is open to further geographical expansion in accordance with the Kananaskis documents. Taking into account the ongoing focus on projects in Russia, we continue to review the eligibility of other countries, including those from the CIS, to join the **GP**. Formal confirmation of their readiness to meet the conditions established in the Kananaskis documents, as well as detailed information on the projects they would request to be addressed under the **GP** are required.

In the areas where the **GP** initially started its implementation such as chemical weapons destruction and **nuclear submarines** dismantlement in the Russian Federation, it is recognized that further efforts are needed in the coming years to construct additional chemical weapons destruction facilities and to expand cooperation in the field of submarine dismantlement in the Far East. During our assessment, we found that the **GP** is well positioned with a view to the second half of the **GP**. Against the background of evolving risks, we will evaluate the **GP** in due course before the end of its life span in 2012 with a special emphasis on the experience and the structure of the **GP**. Stock can be taken from this unique cooperation of 22 partners united in a common vision to make the world safer.

Report on the Nuclear Safety and Security Group

At the Kananaskis Summit, the G8 Leaders agreed to establish a **G8 Nuclear Safety and Security Group (NSSG)**. The NSSG, responsible to Leaders, will, according to its mandate, provide technically informed, strategic policy advice on issues that could impact safety and security in the peaceful use of **nuclear energy**, in close cooperation with multilateral organizations and avoiding duplication of tasks or responsibilities that are being addressed adequately by existing organizations or entities.

We are committed to continue to consider **nuclear safety** and security issues in the **Nuclear Safety and Security Group**. We will continue to develop a common approach to selected **nuclear safety** and **radiation** protection issues and their regulation, by

- Developing a common understanding of internationally acceptable safety and security levels in the fields of **nuclear** installations, **radioactive** sources, decommissioning, **radioactive waste** and spent **fuel** management facilities in order to benchmark our national practices.

Importance of Nuclear Safety and Security

The G8 are committed to the "**nuclear safety** first" principle, to recognised international accepted principles and best practices and to the highest level of standards in **nuclear safety** and security. We recognise the international conventions and **IAEA** standards form a good basis for the continuous improvement of national **nuclear** regulatory

systems and **nuclear safety** as necessary. It is our common interest to maintain and if necessary to improve **nuclear safety**, **radiation** safety, waste management, **nuclear security** and **nuclear liability** in our respective countries, and we call upon all other States to do the same.

Nuclear Regulatory Infrastructure

In view of the continuous safety and security challenges, we will continue to support measures to promote **nuclear (safety and security)** regulatory best practices.

The G8 have made use or intend to make use of the **IAEA "Integrated Regulatory Review Services"** to review and further improve their national regulatory bodies.

National Nuclear Safety and Security Infrastructure and Partnerships

We will promote strong and competent national **nuclear safety and security** infrastructure. We recall that the nations forming the G8 have initiated and monitored major national and international programs to address **nuclear safety and security** needs and to establish partnership relations on these issues. We welcome continued cooperation with relevant international organizations active in this area. Priority actions are:

- Use of the **Convention on Nuclear Safety and the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management** and on the **Safety of Radioactive Waste Management** for open and critical peer review and a source for learning about the best safety practices of others;
- Promote utilization of **IAEA Safety Standards** for the modernisation of national safety regulations, to the extent feasible;
- Multinational cooperation in the safety review of **nuclear power plant** designs.

The full implementation of international conventions on **nuclear safety and security**, the commitment to promote **nuclear safety standards and security guidelines** as well as the increased use of integrated review services are important prerequisites for the world's community to establish a global **nuclear safety** and security partnership. We call upon all states to join, as appropriate, and implement the respective international instruments.

Chernobyl Commitments

We reaffirm our commitments under former G7 / G8 summit declarations and memoranda of understanding - to undertake joint efforts with Ukraine to convert the damaged reactor unit site into safe conditions and to make available safe and reliable facilities at **Chernobyl NPP** site necessary for a safe decommissioning of the shut down **reactor units**. We urge the Government of Ukraine in collaboration with EBRD, to take all necessary measures to assist in timely and efficient implementation of these programmes and projects within the agreed frameworks.

Nuclear Safety of NPP Medzamor, Armenia

We urge Armenia to undertake further upgrades necessary to ensure that **NPP Medzamor** can operate in a safe manner until it can be shut down and decommissioned.

Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources

We will continue to support international efforts to enhance controls on **radioactive** sources. We welcome the fact that more than 88 countries have committed to implement the **IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources** and urge all other states to adopt the code. We further note that to date 38 countries have committed to act in a harmonized manner in accordance with the **IAEA Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources**, and we encourage all states to support international activities aimed to harmonizing the implementation of provisions of the guidance.

Global Nuclear Safety Network

We will continue to strengthen the **Global Nuclear Safety and Security Partnership**. We will support the further enhancement of the evolving web-based systems and networks for information exchange and co-operation in **nuclear safety** matters, as implementation of **nuclear conventions**, co-operation on safety standards, and harmonization of safety approaches, exchange of operational experience and resolution of generic **nuclear safety** issues. This evolving global **nuclear safety** network is based on considerable work of international organizations in particular the **IAEA** and **OECD-NEA**. It will substantially contribute to maintain competence and to continuously develop effective protection against **nuclear hazards**. We note the efforts for the collection and dissemination of regulatory information, actions, initiatives and lessons learned as an appropriate means to strengthen the effectiveness of national **nuclear safety and security** regulators.

Nuclear and Radiological Emergency Response

At previous summits, we agreed to enhance global controls on **nuclear** and **radioactive** materials and facilities in order to minimize the risk of the malicious use of these materials and facilities. We are implementing those decisions. However, we recognize that we must also enhance as necessary our ability to effectively respond to nuclear and **radiological** accidents and incidents if they do occur. We welcome the establishment of the **IAEA** Incident and Emergency Centre and will support the **IAEA** in this work.

Joint Statement by the German G8 Presidency and the Heads of State and/or Government of Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Africa on the Occasion of the G8 Summit in Heiligendamm

Fighting Climate Change: We face serious challenges in tackling climate change and achieving sustainable development globally. We reaffirm our commitment to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and to its objective through both mitigation and adaptation in accordance with our common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. On this basis and taking into account the scientific knowledge as represented in the recent IPCC reports, we remain committed to contribute our fair share to tackle climate change in order to stabilize green house **gas** concentrations at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. To this end we need a flexible, fair and effective global framework and concerted international action. We underline the crucial role of economic incentives, in particular by carbon markets, for the necessary investments in climate friendly technologies at large scale. The adaptation to climate change will be a major challenge for all countries, in particular for developing countries, and means for adaptation need to be included in a future agreement along with enhanced technology cooperation and financing. We call on all parties to actively and constructively participate in the negotiations on a comprehensive agreement at the UNFCCC Conference in Indonesia in December 2007.

Energy: We recognise the need for closer, more practical and result-oriented regional and international cooperation in the **energy** sector, especially in ensuring secure and affordable supplies of **energy** as well as in improving **energy efficiency** and the access to advanced and affordable **energy** technologies. We confirm our commitment to promote **energy efficiency**, through cost-effective solutions, to advance the effective use of **fossil fuels**, such as the clean **coal** technology, and to increase the use of cleaner and **renewable energy** sources, such as biofuels and biomass, as an important step towards secure, stable and competitive **energy** supplies for achieving sustainable development.

Development, particularly in Africa: We reiterate our commitment to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the eradication of poverty and sustainable global development. In view of our responsibility regarding the challenges of development we shall strengthen cooperation and coordination between us to achieve these goals. We commit to embark on a high-level dialogue on specific challenges as proposed by the G8 (Heiligendamm Process) as a follow up to continue our discussion in a more structured manner for a period of two years until the G8 Summit in 2009 where we will review the progress made on the following issues: Promoting cross border investment to our mutual benefit, Promoting Research and Innovation, Development, particularly Africa, and Sharing Knowledge for improving **Energy** Efficiency.

**Appendix A:
Moscow Nuclear Safety and Security Summit Declaration**

April 20, 1996

1. The end of the cold war and the political and economic reforms in Russia have opened a new era in our relationship and have provided the international community with real possibilities for cooperation in the fields of nuclear safety and security. The Moscow meeting is an important step in the realization of these objectives. We are determined, at this summit and beyond, to work together to ensure the safety of nuclear power and to promote greater security for nuclear materials.

2. We are committed to give an absolute priority to safety in the use of nuclear energy. As we approach the tenth anniversary of the Chernobyl accident, it is our shared objective that such a catastrophe cannot reoccur.

We are ready to cooperate among ourselves so that the use of nuclear energy is conducted all over the world consistently with fundamental principles of nuclear safety. Further, we are committed to measures which will enable nuclear power, already a significant contributor to electricity supply in those countries choosing to exploit it, to continue in the next century to play an important role in meeting future world energy demand consistent with the goal of sustainable development agreed at the Rio Conference in 1992.

We recognize the importance of openness and transparency to obtain public trust which is a key factor for the use of nuclear energy.

3. The security of all nuclear material is an essential part of the responsible and peaceful use of nuclear energy. In particular, the safe management of fissile material, including material resulting from the dismantling of nuclear weapons, is imperative, not least as a safeguard against any risk of illicit trafficking in nuclear materials.

4. In the spirit of the decisions adopted during the New York Conference of May 1995 on review and extension of the Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT), including the Decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, we will increase our cooperation in the field of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament by promoting universal adherence to the NPT, working vigorously to strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards system and through effective and responsible export control measures. We are issuing a separate statement on CTBT. We renew our commitment to the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on a non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

Nuclear Safety

5. Recognizing that the prime responsibility for nuclear safety rests with national governments, it is of the first importance to continue to enhance international collaborative efforts to promote a high level of nuclear safety worldwide.

Safety of Civilian Nuclear Reactors

6. Nuclear safety has to prevail over all other considerations. We reaffirm our commitment to the highest internationally recognized safety level for the siting, design, construction, operation and regulation of nuclear power installations.

7. The promotion of an effective nuclear safety culture in each country with nuclear installations is essential to that end.

8. Sustainable nuclear safety also requires a supportive economic and legal environment whereby both operators and national regulatory bodies can fully assume their independent responsibilities.

9. Nuclear safety can also be enhanced by greater international transparency in nuclear power activities, in particular by means of peer reviews, and this should lead to existing reactors which do not meet current safety requirements being brought to an acceptable level of safety or ceasing operation.

10. The adoption of the Convention on Nuclear Safety, which reaffirms these fundamental safety principles, is a major accomplishment in this field. We urge all countries to sign this Convention and to complete internal procedures to join so that the Convention can be brought into force expeditiously certainly before the end of 1996.

11. National efforts have been made in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the Newly Independent States to improve nuclear safety levels, often in cooperation with multilateral and bilateral programmes. In this regard, we acknowledge these important efforts to upgrade reactor safety and improve safety culture, but note that further substantial progress is still required. We reaffirm our commitment to cooperate fully for this purpose.

Nuclear Liability

12. An effective nuclear liability regime must assure adequate compensation to victims of, and for damage caused by, nuclear accidents. In addition, to secure the degree of private sector involvement needed to undertake vital safety improvements, the regime should at the same time protect industrial suppliers from unwarranted legal action.

13. The essential principles in this area are the exclusive and strict liability of the operator of the nuclear installations and ensuring needed financial security for adequate compensation.

14. It is essential that countries with nuclear installations that have not yet done so establish an effective regime for liability for nuclear damage corresponding to these principles.

15. It is important to work together on enhancing the international regime of liability for nuclear damage with a view to ensuring that it will attract wide adherence and accommodate any state which may wish to become a party. We encourage the experts to make further progress to this end. In this connection, the reinforcement of regional cooperation is welcomed.

Energy Sector Strategies in Transition Countries

16. Efficient market-oriented strategies for energy sector reform are essential to promote nuclear safety. This will generate adequate resources for investment in safety upgrades and maintenance, and encourage energy conservation. All countries in transition should pursue such market-oriented reforms and investment strategies based upon least cost planning, giving due regard to nuclear safety and environmental criteria, and to energy efficiency and conservation.

17. The International Financial Institutions have played a leading role in developing market-oriented energy sector reforms and investment plans. Their continued involvement and support is critical to ensure further progress.

Nuclear Waste Management

International Convention

18. National authorities must ensure radioactive waste is managed safely and that provisions are made for its proper handling, storage and ultimate disposal. These are essential elements for any nuclear energy programme.

19. The development of the Convention on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, based on these principles, is of paramount importance. We call on all countries generating nuclear waste with nuclear installations to participate actively in the preparation of this Convention under the auspices of the IAEA and to encourage its effective finalization and prompt adoption.

Ocean Dumping

20. We commit ourselves to ban dumping at sea of radioactive waste and encourage all states to adhere at the earliest possible date to the 1993 amendment of the London Convention.

Nuclear Material Security

Programme on Preventing and Combatting Illicit Trafficking in Nuclear Material

21. Illicit trafficking of nuclear material is a public safety and nonproliferation concern. We recognized the importance of this issue at our meetings in Naples and Halifax. As risks continue to exist, we have agreed on, and released, a programme on preventing and combatting illicit trafficking in nuclear material to ensure increased cooperation among our governments in all aspects of prevention, detection, exchange of information, investigation and prosecution in cases of illicit nuclear trafficking.

We call on other governments to join us in implementing this programme.

Nuclear Material Control, Accountancy and Physical Protection

22. We reaffirm the fundamental responsibility of nations to ensure the security of all nuclear materials in their possession and the need to ensure that they are subject to effective systems of nuclear material accounting and control and physical protection. These systems should include regulations, licensing and inspections. We express our support for the IAEA safeguards regime, which plays a critical role in providing assurance against the diversion of nuclear material going undetected. We underline the need for the urgent strengthening of IAEA capabilities to detect undeclared nuclear activities. We note that these measures are also conducive to preventing illicit trafficking of nuclear material.

23. We recognize the importance of continually improving systems and technologies for controlling and protecting nuclear materials. We urge nations to cooperate bilaterally, multilaterally and through the IAEA to ensure that the national systems for controlling nuclear materials remain effective. We are encouraged by the wide array of cooperative projects underway in this field under bilateral and multilateral auspices and pledge to sustain and increase these efforts.

24. We urge ratification by all states of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and encourage the application of the IAEA recommendations on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.

25. We pledge our support for efforts to ensure that all sensitive nuclear material (separated plutonium and highly enriched uranium) designated as not intended for use for meeting defence requirements is safely stored, protected and placed under IAEA safeguards (in the Nuclear Weapon

States, under the relevant voluntary offer IAEA-safeguards agreements) as soon as it is practicable to do so.

Safe and Effective Management of Weapons Fissile Material Designated as No Longer Required for Defence Purposes

26. Major steps have been taken in recent years towards nuclear disarmament. This has created substantial stocks of fissile material designated as no longer required for defence purposes. It is vital, as mentioned above, that these stockpiles are safely managed and eventually transformed into spent fuel or other forms equally unusable for nuclear weapons and disposed of safely and permanently.

27. The primary responsibility for the safe management of weapons fissile material rests with the nuclear weapons states themselves, but other states and international organizations are welcome to assist where desired.

28. We welcome the steps that the United States and the Russian Federation have taken to blend highly-enriched uranium (HEU) from dismantled nuclear weapons to low-enriched uranium (LEU) for peaceful non-explosive purposes, and the cooperation programs of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States of America and other states with the Russian Federation for the safe storage, the peaceful uses of fissile material released by the dismantlement of nuclear weapons, and their safe and secure transportation for that purpose; we encourage other efforts along these lines.

29. We are determined to identify appropriate strategies for the management of fissile material designated as no longer required for defence purposes. Options include safe and secure long-term storage, vitrification or other methods of permanent disposal, and conversion into mixed-oxide fuel (MOX) for use in nuclear reactors. We have agreed to share relevant experience and expertise to elaborate and implement these strategies. We welcome plans to conduct small-scale technology demonstrations related to these options, including the possibility of establishing pilot projects and plants. We shall convene an international meeting of experts in order to examine available options and identify possible development of international cooperation in the implementation of these national strategies, bearing in mind technical economic, non-proliferation, environmental and other relevant considerations. The meeting will take place in France by the end of 1996.

30. We recognize the importance of ensuring transparency in the management of highly enriched uranium and plutonium designated as no longer required for defence purposes.

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A background document on "Nuclear Safety", "Nuclear Material Control, Accountancy and Physical Protection" and "Safe and effective management of weapons fissile material designated as no longer required for defence purposes" is being released separately.

Appendix B: Inclusions and Exclusions

List of Subjects Included:

1975

“resource endowments” (1975) OPEC oil embargo
“energy problems” (1975)
“raw materials including energy” (1975)
“energy sources” (1975)
“conservation” (1975)
“alternative sources” (1975)
“world energy market” (1975)

1976

“energy resources” (1976)
“energy development” (1976)

1977

“oil” (1977 Communiqué)
“nuclear energy” (1977 Communiqué)
“energy requirements” (1977 Communiqué)
“energy production” (1977 Communiqué)
“nuclear proliferation” (1977 Communiqué)
“1974 oil price rise” (1977 World Economic Prospects Appendix)
“oil importing nations” (1977 Balance-of-Payments Financing Appendix)
“OPEC” (1977 Balance-of-Payments Financing Appendix)
“imported oil” (1977 Balance-of-Payments Financing Appendix)
“oil consuming nations” (1977 Balance-of-Payments Financing Appendix)
“quotas” (1977 Balance-of-Payments Financing Appendix)
“hydrocarbon resources” (1977 Energy Appendix)
“dissemination of [nuclear] material” (1977 Energy Appendix)
“nuclear weapons” (1977 Energy Appendix)
“nonproliferation policies” (1977 Energy Appendix)
“diversify supplies” (1977 Energy Appendix)
“coal” (1977 Energy Appendix)
“conventional sources” (1977 Energy Appendix)
“new sources” (1977 Energy Appendix)
“international fuel cycle evaluation” (1977 Energy Appendix)

1978

“imported energy” (1978 Communiqué)
“safeguards” (1978 Communiqué)
“energy consumption” (1978 Communiqué)
“oil reserve” (1978 Communiqué)
“oil consumption” (1978 Communiqué)

“national energy programs” (1978 Communiqué)
“energy targets” (1978 Communiqué)
“nuclear power programs” (1978 Communiqué)
“enriched uranium supply” (1978 Communiqué)
“renewable energy” (1978 Communiqué)

1979

“non-oil developing countries” (1979 Communiqué)
“barrels” (1979 Communiqué)
“International Energy Agency (IEA)” (1979 Communiqué)
“rationalization of use” (1979 Communiqué)
“high-level group of representatives [to review results in energy conservation and development of alternative sources]” (1979 Communiqué)
“similar objectives [urged developing countries to conserve]” (1979 Communiqué)
“oil markets” (1979 Communiqué)
“international oil transactions” (1979 Communiqué)
“oil companies” (1979 Communiqué)
“crude oil cargoes” (1979 Communiqué)
“purchase price” (1979 Communiqué)
“profit situation of oil companies” (1979 Communiqué)
“keeping domestic oil prices at world market prices” (1979 Communiqué)
“domestic underpricing of oil” (1979 Communiqué)
“governmental stockpiles” (1979 Communiqué)
“International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA]” (1979 Communiqué)
“fuel crises” (1979 Communiqué)
“International Energy Technology Group” (1979 Communiqué)
“energy technology” (1979 Communiqué)
“energy shortages” (1979 Communiqué)
“energy potential” (1979 Communiqué)

1980

“price mechanism” (1980 Communiqué)
“oil ceilings” (1980 Communiqué)
“stock policies” (1980 Communiqué)
“energy policies” (1980 Communiqué)
“reduction” (1980 Communiqué)
“monitoring” (1980 Communiqué)
“baseload, oilfired generating capacity” (1980 Communiqué)
“fuel efficient vehicles” (1980 Communiqué)
“fuel efficiency” (1980 Communiqué)
“gasoline pricing and taxation” (1980 Communiqué)
“synthetic fuels” (1980 Communiqué)
“solar energy” (1980 Communiqué)
“International Coal Industry Advisory Board” (1980 Communiqué)
“fossil fuels” (1980 Communiqué)
“spent fuels” (1980 Communiqué)

“nuclear waste” (1980 Communiqué)
“commercial scale plants” (1980 Communiqué)
“comprehensive energy strategy” (1980 Communiqué)
“energy assistance” (1980 Communiqué)
“oil generated payments imbalances” (1980 Communiqué)
“oil surplus funds” (1980 Communiqué)

1981

“1979-80 oil price increase” (1981 Communiqué)
“nuclear waste management” (1981 Communiqué)
“two oil price shocks” (1981 Communiqué)
“energy economies” (1981 Communiqué)
“energy savings” (1981 Communiqué)
“market mechanisms” (1981 Communiqué)
“geothermal and biomass energy” (1981 Communiqué)
“UN Conference on New and Renewable Sources of Energy” (1981 Communiqué)

1982

“reduce our vulnerability” (1982 Communiqué)
“interruptions” (1982 Communiqué)
“disruptions” (1982 Communiqué)
“energy security” (1982 Communiqué)

1983

“indigenous energy production” (1983 Communiqué)

1986

“imbalances and other distortions” (1986 Communiqué)
“cooperative energy policies” (1986 Communiqué)
“Chernobyl” (1986 Communiqué)
“nuclear emergencies and accidents” (1986 Communiqué)
“[nuclear] safety” (1986 Communiqué)
“standards” (1986 Communiqué)

1987

“free flow of oil” (1987 Communiqué)

1988

“INF [Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces] Treaty” (1988 Political Declaration)
“arms control agreement” (1988 Political Declaration)

1989

“oil spills” (1989 Communiqué)
“oil pollution” (1989 Communiqué)

1990

- “international oil spills convention” (1990 Communiqué)
- “Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines” (1990 Statement on Transnational Issues)
- “nuclear export control measures” (1990 Statement on Transnational Issues)
- “IAEA safeguards” (1990 Statement on Transnational Issues)
- “NPT” (1990 Communiqué)

1991

- “Gulf Crisis” or “Gulf War” (1991 Communiqué)
- “political shocks” (1991 Communiqué)
- “energy trade and investment” (1991 Communiqué)
- “environmental costs” (1991 Communiqué)
- “economic energy source” (1991 Communiqué)
- “general energy systems” (1991 Communiqué)
- “European Energy Charter” (1991 Communiqué)
- “Gulf Crisis Financial Coordination Group” (1991 Communiqué)
- “Gulf Development Fund” (1991 Communiqué)
- “burning oil wells” (1991 Communiqué)
- “Security Council Resolution 687” (1991 Declaration on Conventional Arms Transfers and NBC Non-proliferation)
- “United Nations Special Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)” (1991 Declaration on Conventional Arms Transfers and NBC Non-proliferation)
- “Treaty of Tlatelolco” (1991 Declaration on Conventional Arms Transfers and NBC Non-proliferation)
- “dual-use items” (1991 Declaration on Conventional Arms Transfers and NBC Non-proliferation)
- “Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)” (1991 Declaration on Conventional Arms Transfers and NBC Non-proliferation)
- “UN Arms Register” (1991 Declaration on Conventional Arms Transfers and NBC Non-proliferation)
- “START” (1991 Declaration on Conventional Arms Transfers and NBC Non-proliferation)

1992

- “safety authorities and plant operators” (1992 Communiqué)
- “market-oriented reform of energy policies” (1992 Communiqué)
- “energy sector” (1992 Communiqué)
- “technical improvements” (1992 Communiqué)
- “regulatory regimes” (1992 Communiqué)
- “convention on nuclear safety” (1992 Communiqué)
- “energy studies” (1992 Communiqué)
- “cost implications” (1992 Communiqué)
- “action program” (1992 Communiqué)
- “transfer or the illicit or clandestine production of nuclear weapons” (1992 Political Declaration: Shaping the New Partnership)

1993

“nuclear safety program” (1993 Communiqué)
“radioactive wastes” (1993 Communiqué)
“Joint Declaration on Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” (1993 Political Declaration)

1994

“high risk reactors” (1994 Communiqué)
“Nuclear Safety Account” or “Action Plan” (1994 Communiqué)

1995

“G7 Action Plan for Ukraine’s Energy Sector” (1995 Communiqué)
“energy sector reform and investment” (1995 Communiqué)
“non-nuclear energy” (1995 Communiqué)
“fissile material” (1995 Chairman’s Statement)
“weapons-grade plutonium” (1995 Chairman’s Statement)
“START II” (1995 Chairman’s Statement)
“illicit trafficking of nuclear materials” (1995 Chairman’s Statement)
“systems of control, accounting and physical security for nuclear materials” (1995 Chairman’s Statement)
“INTERPOL” (1995 Chairman’s Statement)
“nuclear theft and smuggling” (1995 Chairman’s Statement)
“Agreed Framework between the United States and North Korea” (1995 Chairman’s Statement)
“Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO)” (1995 Chairman’s Statement)

1996

“nuclear weapon free zone” (1996 Chairman’s Statement)
“Treaty of Rarotonga” (1996 Chairman’s Statement)
“Treaty of Pelindaba” (1996 Chairman’s Statement)
“1996 Moscow Summit on Nuclear Safety and Security” (1996 Chairman’s Statement)
“nuclear safety” (1996 Chairman’s Statement)
“Convention on Nuclear Safety” (1996 Chairman’s Statement)
“peer review mechanisms”
“nuclear liability”
“international convention on the safety of radioactive waste management”
“Programme for preventing and combatting illicit trafficking in nuclear material”
“Program 93+2”

1997

“Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management” (1997 Communiqué)
“Protocol to amend the Vienna Convention [regarding nuclear damage]” (1997 Communiqué)

“ministerial on energy issues” (1997 Communiqué)
“Programme for Preventing and Combating Illicit Trafficking in Nuclear Materials.” (1997 Communiqué)
“fissile material” (1997 Communiqué)
“Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty” (1997 Communiqué)
“convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices” (1997 Communiqué)
“international export control regimes” (1997 Communiqué)
“Australia Group export control regime” (1997 Communiqué)
“export control norms” (1997 Communiqué)
“weapons plutonium” (1997 Communiqué)
“START II and START III” (1997 Communiqué)
“Non-Proliferation Experts Group (NPEG)” (1997 Foreign Ministers’ Progress Report)
“nuclear forensics capabilities” (1997 Foreign Ministers’ Progress Report)
“MOX-fuel” (1997 Foreign Ministers’ Progress Report)
“Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium”

1998

“Energy Ministers’ Meeting” (1998 Communiqué)
“reliable, economic, safe and environmentally-sound energy supplies” (1998 Communiqué)
“economically viable international energy transmission networks” (1998 Communiqué)
“Energy Charter Treaty” (1998 Communiqué)
“electric power sectors” (1998 Communiqué)
“the Nuclear Safety Working Group (NSWG)” (1998 Communiqué)
“International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER)” (1998 Communiqué)
“civil nuclear fusion development” (1998 Communiqué)

1999

“protect and manage weapons-grade fissile material, especially plutonium” (1999 Communiqué)
“nuclear / missile tests” (1999 Communiqué)
“Nuclear Safety Convention peer review meeting” (1999 Communiqué)
“International Atomic Energy Agency Conference on Strengthening Nuclear Safety in Eastern Europe” (1999 Communiqué)
“Chernobyl Shelter Fund” or “Shelter Implementation Plan” (1999 G7 Statement)

2000

“sustainable energy” (2000 Communiqué)
“Task Force [on renewables]” (2000 Communiqué)
“1992 Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage” (2000 Communiqué)
“1992 International Oil Pollution Compensation (IOPC) Convention” (2000 Communiqué)
“Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty” (2000 Communiqué)
“Global Monitoring System” (2000 Communiqué)
“plutonium disposition” (2000 Communiqué)

2002

“G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction” or “Action Plan” (2002 Chair’s Summary)

“dismantlement of decommissioned nuclear submarines” (Statement by the G8 Leaders: G8 Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction)

“six principles to prevent terrorists or those that harbour them from acquiring or developing nuclear, chemical, radiological and biological weapons; missiles; and related materials, equipment and technology” (Statement by the G8 Leaders: G8 Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction)

2003

“Multilateral Nuclear Environment Programme” (2003 Global Partnership: A G8 Action Plan)

2004

“Proliferation Security Initiative” (2004 Chair’s Summary)

“G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction” (2004 Chair’s Summary)

“enrichment and reprocessing equipment and technologies” (2004 Chair’s Summary)

2005

“markets for clean energy technologies” (2005 Chair’s Summary)

“International Energy Forum (IEF)” (2005 Global Economy and Oil)

“refinery capacity”

“universally agreed reporting system for oil supply and demand”

“Joint Oil Data Initiative (JODI)”

2006

“energy” (2006 Chair’s Summary)

“energy efficiency” (2006 Chair’s Summary)

“energy saving” (2006 Chair’s Summary)

“energy poverty” (2006 Chair’s Summary)

“energy prices” (2006 Chair’s Summary)

“nuclear” (2006 Chair’s Summary)

“Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons” (2006 Chair’s Summary)

“Global Nuclear Energy Partnership” (2006 Chair’s Summary)

“Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism” (2006 Chair’s Summary)

“Energy Community Treaty” (2006 Keynote Address)

“gas” (2006 Keynote Address)

“hydroelectric power” (2006 Keynote Address)

“Global Nuclear Energy Partnership” (2006 Joint Statement by Bush and Putin)

“nuclear trade” (2006 Joint Statement by Bush and Putin)

“Additional Protocol” (2006 Joint Statement by Bush and Putin)

“UN General Assembly of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism” (2006 Joint Statement by Bush and Putin)
“Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material” (2006 Joint Statement by Bush and Putin)
“Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction” (2006 Joint Statement between Harper and Putin)
“General Assembly of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism” (2006 G8 Statement on Strengthening the UN Counter-Terrorism Program)
“Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons” (2006 Statement on Non-Proliferation)
“Global Nuclear Energy Partnership” (2006 Statement on Non-Proliferation)
“nuclear submarines” (2006 Report on G8 Global Partnership)
“Multilateral Nuclear Environment Programme” (2006 Report on G8 Global Partnership)
“radioactive” (2006 Report on G8 Global Partnership)

2007

“nuclear terrorism” (2007 Chair’s summary)
“Nuclear Safety and Security Group (NSSG)” (2007 Chair’s summary)
“Clean Energy Development and Investment Framework (CEDIF)” (2007 Growth and Responsibility in Africa)
“Energy Access Action Plan for Africa” (2007 Growth and Responsibility in Africa)
“Hydropower” (2007 Growth and Responsibility in Africa)
“Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons” (2007 Heiligendamm Statement on Non-Proliferation)
“The Global Partnership against the Proliferation of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction” (2007 Heiligendamm Statement on Non-Proliferation)
“Global Nuclear Energy Partnership” (2007 Heiligendamm Statement on Non-Proliferation)
“International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials” (2007 Heiligendamm Statement on Non-Proliferation)
“Framework Agreement on a Multilateral Nuclear Environment Programme” (2007 Report on the G8 Global Partnership)
“radiological” (2007 Report on the G8 Global Partnership)
“radioisotopic thermoelectric generators (RTGs)” (2007 Report on the G8 Global Partnership)
“RTG Master Plan” (2007 Report on the G8 Global Partnership)
“Global Partnership Working Group (GPWG)” (2007 Global Partnership Review)
“Convention on the Suppression of Nuclear Terrorism” (2007 Global Partnership Review)
“Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism” (2007 Global Partnership Review)
“Safety of Radioactive Waste Management” (2007 Report on the Nuclear Safety and Security Group)

“Convention on Nuclear Safety and the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management” (2007 Report on the Nuclear Safety and Security Group)
“nuclear power plant” (2007 Report on the Nuclear Safety and Security Group)
“reactor units” (2007 Report on the Nuclear Safety and Security Group)
“IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources” (2007 Report on the Nuclear Safety and Security Group)
“IAEA Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources” (2007 Report on the Nuclear Safety and Security Group)
“Global Nuclear Safety and Security Partnership” (2007 Report on the Nuclear Safety and Security Group)
“nuclear conventions” (2007 Report on the Nuclear Safety and Security Group)
“nuclear hazards” (2007 Report on the Nuclear Safety and Security Group)

List of Subjects Excluded:

1989

“greenhouse gases” (1989 Communiqué): because all references are already included in the “References to Kyoto Appendix,” which will be attached.

1991

“conventional arms transfers” (1991 Declaration on Conventional Arms Transfers and NBC (Nuclear, Biological and Chemical) Non-proliferation)
“biological weapons” (1991 Declaration on Conventional Arms Transfers and NBC (Nuclear, Biological and Chemical) Non-proliferation)
“chemical weapons” (1991 Declaration on Conventional Arms Transfers and NBC (Nuclear, Biological and Chemical) Non-proliferation)
“CFE [Conventional Armed Forces in Europe] treaties” (1991 Political Declaration: Shaping the New Partnership)

1996

“somatic cell nuclear transfer” (1996 Communiqué)
“Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty” (1996 Chairman’s Statement)
“Arms Control Agreement” (1996 Decisions Regarding Bosnia Herzegovina)

1997

“Chemical Weapons Convention” (1997 Communiqué)
“Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention” (1997 Communiqué)
“weapons of mass destruction” (1997 Communiqué)

1999

“[missile] proliferation” (1999 Communiqué)