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G7 Compendium of Tools to Counter Transnational Repression
Ottawa, November 23, 2025
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In 2025, on the 50th anniversary of the founding of the G7, Canada hosted the G7 Leaders' Summit in Kananaskis, Alberta, Canada, where, for the first time, Leaders committed to counter the threat of Transnational Repression (TNR) by fostering a common understanding of TNR, raising awareness, and promoting accountability to increase the costs for those who engage in acts of TNR.
As part of these efforts, the G7 and associated countries developed a TNR Resilience and Response Framework which includes the G7 Compendium of Tools to Counter Transnational Repression (the Compendium) of policy, legislative, operational, diplomatic, and community engagement mechanisms to combat TNR. This evergreen Compendium is intended to support policymakers in continuing to modernize tools and resources to address TNR.
As stated in the Statement on TNR released by Leaders during the 2025 G7 Summit, TNR is an aggressive form of foreign interference whereby states, or their proxies, attempt to harass or harm with the aim of coercing or silencing individuals outside their borders. TNR undermines national security, state sovereignty, the safety and human rights of victims, and principles of international law. It has a chilling effect in our countries. TNR often impacts dissidents, journalists, human rights defenders (HRDs), religious minorities, and those identified as part of diaspora communities. There are many vectors by which states and their proxies engage in TNR, including:
While TNR, and foreign interference more broadly, is not a new phenomenon, the scale and scope in which states and their proxies engage in this practice has risen over the past few years. The challenges to the rules-based order, mixed with heightened social and political polarization, has emboldened states to engage in more overt and aggressive forms of TNR. This represents one of several significant threats to our democracies.
We must continue to modernize our approaches to keep pace with evolving threats. This Compendium is intended to support policymakers from G7 and associated members in their efforts to counter TNR by providing a non-binding suite of tools to inform domestic responses to TNR. Note that the examples provided reflect what each government is willing to share publicly, and does not necessarily reflect a country's entire toolkit to counter TNR. Certain tools have not been made public to protect intelligence sources, methods, and vulnerabilities, which could be exploited by adversaries, leading to a compromise of national security. The mechanisms in this Compendium include:
Policy and legislative tools available in each country that reinforce accountability and deter states seeking to engage in TNR. This includes legislation to counter TNR activities, policies that shape responses to TNR incidents, and national strategies that outline future strategic objectives and commitments aimed at preventing and countering TNR.
Operational tools – (e.g., training material and the sharing of situational awareness products) – for first responders and police of jurisdiction who are often the first to receive TNR threat reporting; best practices in intelligence sharing and analysis; and law enforcement tactics used to deter and address TNR.
Diplomatic activities and capacity building tools for engaging with perpetrators of TNR to deter future acts, foster behavioural change, and support international stakeholders to strengthen their resilience to TNR.
Community engagement tools to support advocacy groups, non-government organisations (NGOs), and other groups working to conduct research and provide services (e.g., information, and referrals for resources to help affected communities or individuals) aimed at mitigating the impact that TNR can have on individuals and communities. This could include funding programs to support civil society organisations, the creation of sustained engagement programs, and information campaigns.
The G7 and associated members acknowledge the effects of TNR on those who are vulnerable, marginalised, or at risk of TNR and have in place analytical frameworks to support the development of policy with a multidimensional approach.
Considering the global nature of TNR activities, the G7 and associated members use various legislative frameworks and policies to safeguard national security, state sovereignty, and persons residing within their borders from acts of TNR. This can include, but is not limited to, invoking immigration legislation to deny entry to, or facilitate the removal of, individuals involved in TNR, and updating and/or applying criminal legislation alongside the development of counter-TNR policies.
In 2018, Australia passed the National Security Legislation Amendment (Espionage and Foreign Interference) Act which introduced new Commonwealth (Federal) Espionage and Foreign Interference (EFI) offences into the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Criminal Code) to better equip intelligence and law enforcement agencies to counter a range of national security concerns in this space. Though TNR is not comprehensively criminalised through the EFI provisions, new measures to counter foreign interference activity may capture certain instances of TNR. Specifically:
There are also a range of other Criminal Code offences that may apply to certain circumstances of TNR. This includes section 83.4 (Interference with political rights and duties) or Division 474 (Telecommunication services) of the Criminal Code. Additionally, there may be general state and territory criminal offences available.
Australia also recently passed the Criminal Code Amendment (Hate Crimes) Act 2025 that creates new criminal offences for advocating or threatening violence; and advocating, or threatening, damage to property owned or occupied by groups, or members of groups distinguished by race, religion, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, intersex status, disability, nationality, national or ethnic origin or political opinion. The offences also protect close family members of all groups. The offences capture some instances of TNR, particularly where threats of violence are used to intimidate or punish individuals in Australia because of their nationality, national or ethnic origin.
Canada uses various measures to counter TNR, including investigating and laying criminal charges in accordance with domestic laws, such as the Foreign Interference and Security of Information Act (FISIA), which criminalizes information-related conduct that may be harmful to Canada, such as spying, economic espionage and foreign-influenced threats or violence; Criminal Code offences that address various types of conduct in connection with foreign interference, such as sabotage, intimidation, computer hacking and bribery, amongst others; and the Canada Evidence Act, which creates a general scheme to deal with information related to international relations, national defence or national security in Federal Court or Federal Court of Appeal judicial reviews or statutory appeals arising from federal administrative decision-making. In June 2024, these laws, as well as the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, were modernized to address foreign interference more broadly through the introduction of the Countering Foreign Interference Act.
France has a criminal justice system for punishing attacks on the fundamental interests of the nation, which has been strengthened in recent years. Faced with the intensification of foreign interference (cyberattacks, false information, etc.), a new law was promulgated on July 25, 2024, aimed at preventing foreign interference in France. It implements several measures in terms of transparency (new register of foreign influence activities) and intelligence (use of algorithms, freezing of assets). This new law also provides for harsher penalties when attacks on persons or property are committed on behalf of a foreign power or entity or under foreign control, as well as the use of special investigation techniques. This aggravating circumstance will make it possible to better repress actions of foreign interference against dissidents, by explicitly naming them. Furthermore, the procedure for freezing financial assets, authorized in cases of terrorism, is extended to cases of foreign interference. Persons engaging in, inciting, or financing such acts may have their funds and resources in France frozen. An act of interference is defined under the Code monétaire et financier as "an act committed directly or indirectly at the request or on behalf of a foreign power and having the object or effect, by any means, including the communication of false or inaccurate information, of undermining the fundamental interests of the Nation, the functioning or integrity of its essential infrastructure, or the regular functioning of its democratic institutions."
In Germany, acts of TNR are prosecuted under general criminal law. When requisite conditions are met, perpetrators of TNR may be prosecuted under Section 99 of the German Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch – StGB) which deals with espionage. It criminalizes the engagement in activities of intelligence services of a foreign power that is directed towards communicating or supplying facts, objects, or knowledge.
Italy uses sections the Criminal Code (Codice Penale) to prosecute instances of TNR that fall into a category of a specific illicit behaviour under Italian criminal law, which is then investigated by law enforcement authorities.
In Japan, when acts of TNR violate existing laws or regulations, including the Criminal Code, an investigation will be carried out by police in cooperation with relevant authorities. Where any violations are confirmed, necessary and appropriate measures will be taken under the criminal justice system.
In 2025, in the Netherlands, a new criminal provision to the Dutch Criminal Code (Wetboek van Strafrecht) came into force criminalizing more forms of espionage, including digital and diaspora espionage. This includes illegally collecting (sensitive) information or objects, sabotage, intervening in (decision-making) processes or influencing people. These activities can be carried out by, or on behalf of, a foreign government and cause damage to important interests. This provides for the criminalization of a broader range of espionage activities where those who carried out the activities had (conditional) intent to endanger Dutch national security and the safety of people.
In the United Kingdom (U.K.), the National Security Act of 2023 serves as the cornerstone of the U.K.'s legislative framework for protecting its democratic integrity against foreign interference, including TNR. The Act updated existing legislative tools and contains a range of new offences and measures to protect the U.K. from various state threats activity. For example, where an act of TNR meets the requirements, and can be evidenced under the Act's Foreign Interference Offence, it can be treated as a crime punishable by up to 14 years imprisonment. Other acts of TNR may not constitute an offence under the Act itself, however, if an offence is committed for, on behalf of, or with the intention to benefit a foreign power, the state threats aggravating factor introduced by that Act may apply and result in additional custodial penalties on top of those provided for the original offence.
While the heart of the U.K.'s legislative framework for deterring and combatting TNR is the National Security Act of 2023, there is additional complementary legislation, including, but are not limited to:
In the United States (U.S.), the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act, implemented by Executive Order 13818, provides an accountability tool to target those connected to serious human rights abuses and corruption. To the extent acts of TNR also reach the threshold for serious human rights abuse or corruption, designations under E.O. 13818 work to disrupt and deter nefarious activity, and promotes accountability for those who act with impunity.
Australia has legislative powers to refuse or cancel temporary visas where foreign interference is determined to have occurred. Under the Migration Act 1958, a visa may be cancelled if the presence of the non-citizen could pose a risk to the health, safety or good order of the Australian community, and a visa may be cancelled or refused if the non-citizen fails the 'character test' due to having been assessed to be a risk to security. In addition, visa condition 8303 – namely that the holder must not become involved in activities disruptive to, or violence threatening harm to, the Australian community or a group within the Australian community – is currently imposed on several temporary visas.
Canada uses security screenings for inadmissibility under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, which includes provisions to deem an individual inadmissible to Canada should they constitute a threat to national security. Canada also conducts security screenings under the Citizenship Act to assess potential national security risks. This process grants the designated Minister the authority to request a review and potentially deny citizenship where there are reasonable grounds to believe that an individual poses a threat to Canada's security. Additionally, Canada may use denial of travel documents under the Passport Order, where an individual has been convicted of a criminal offence domestically or abroad.
In the U.S., Section 212(a)(3)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act permits the Department of State to impose visa restrictions on individuals involved in TNR against dissidents or their family members, including harassment over social media platforms or other digital means, the misuse of INTERPOL notices, forced repatriation or kidnappings abroad, kidnapping plots including of a U.S. citizen, and murder, among other actions.
In Australia, the Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme Act 2018 (FITS Act) established a public register that provides the public and government decision-makers with visibility of the nature, level and extent of foreign influence on Australia's government and political processes. It is a key supporting element of Australia's overall national approach to countering foreign interference.
The FITS Act generally requires individuals and entities to publicly register certain activities that they undertake on behalf of a foreign principal in Australia. This includes parliamentary lobbying, general political lobbying, communications activity and disbursement activity. The FITS Act also empowers the Secretary of the Attorney-General's Department to issue a "transparency notice" declaring that a person is a foreign government related entity or individual for the purposes of the scheme.
The Australian Government is currently considering legislative reforms to improve the scheme, following a statutory review of its effectiveness and operation which was finalised in 2025.
In Canada, the Foreign Influence Transparency and Accountability Act (FITAA), which will be overseen by an independent Commissioner, will operationalize the Foreign Influence Transparency Registry (FITR). The FITR will oblige individuals and entities that enter into an arrangement with a foreign principal to publicly register their arrangements and disclose any foreign influence activities undertaken in relation to government or political processes in Canada. The FITAA will empower the Commissioner to issue a notices of violation where it is determined that a violation of the Act has occurred, or, for more egregious violations, the Commissioner may choose to refer the issue for investigation by Canada's national police service.
In France, the French government attaches great importance to the protection of human rights and respect for individual freedoms, both nationally and internationally. In this regard, French public policies take into account foreign interference targeting French citizens, regardless of their origin, and foreign nationals on French territory. TNR is understood as an integral part of foreign threats that undermine the interests of the Nation. French services have implemented communications aimed at target audiences to inform them of the manifestations of TNR and their rights. Police and intelligence services are mobilized to put an end to these actions and political and diplomatic messages are sent to offending States.
In Germany, the Federal Ministry of the Interior is in charge of addressing TNR domestically and therefore coordinates closely with relevant domestic authorities as well as other ministries involved.
In the Netherlands, to counter state-sponsored interference in diaspora communities, the Dutch Government has a national strategy. The strategy lays out three tiers, starting with law enforcement agencies, intelligence, and security services enhancing their understanding of the threat TNR poses to national security. Second is the use of diplomatic channels to express concerns about acts of TNR to those countries who attempt to interfere in Dutch society. Third, to increase the resilience of Dutch society by building networks amongst communities and raising awareness about the threat of TNR. Finally, the Dutch government also deploys a mix of administrative and judicial measures to intervene in confirmed cases of interference.
In the U.K., coordination between government departments, agencies and likeminded international partners in addressing acts of TNR is well-established. The U.K. Government's Defending Democracy Taskforce has reviewed the U.K.'s response to TNR, building an understanding of the scale, nature and impact of this threat in the U.K., and provided recommendations to continue strengthening the U.K.'s response. The Review found that the appropriate powers and system-wide safeguards are in place to robustly counter this threat. The Home Office is primarily responsible for TNR policy measures and has a wide range of operational policy tools to counter TNR. Disruptive immigration action, such as visa refusals and deportations, are available, and public order powers, particularly in relation to policing of protests, allow individuals to be stopped, questioned, searched and detained for the purpose of determining if they are involved in state threats activity.
Additionally, the National Security Act of 2023 includes the Foreign Influence Registration Scheme (FIRS), a two-tiered system to provide transparency of the nature, scale and extent of foreign influence in the U.K. The FIRS imposes registration requirements on arrangements to carry out certain influence activities in the U.K. that are directed by foreign powers or entities. The FIRS also gives the Secretary of State the power to require registration of a broader range of activities for specified countries, parts of countries or foreign government-controlled entities to protect U.K. interests under the Enhanced Tier.
The U.K. Government has also developed a range of support and security assistance mechanisms to protect individuals and communities at risk of TNR. This assistance is based on threat and varied in its scope and approach, including but not limited to cybersecurity measures, and access to broader public resources. As a result of the TNR review and its recommendations, the Home Office has recently published public TNR Guidance providing those who believe themselves to be at risk of TNR with practical advice for their safety both physically and online.
Additionally, in response to ongoing cyber threats, the U.K. National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) has developed individual cyber defence services, including account registration and personal internet protection to improve personal cyber resilience and reduce the threat from spear-phishing. The NCSC has also released new and updated guidance for high-risk individuals. Moreover, ProtectUK have produced the Blue Book: A Guide to Personal Security to provide a suite of advice to help individuals stay safe at home, at work, on-the move and online.
The G7 and associated members each employ a range of operational tools to support their intelligence and law enforcement agencies in detecting, deterring, and disrupting instances of TNR. It is vital that police engagement with individuals and communities is tailored to the specific context of each case, as well as the broader threat landscape – without inadvertently fostering a climate of fear, which is often a strategic aim of hostile actors. Efforts should remain focused on reinforcing public confidence in the freedom to live openly, while proactively identifying and addressing the diverse activities undertaken by foreign states that may constitute TNR.
In this context, local law enforcement agencies and first responders play a critical frontline role, as they are often the first to receive TNR-related reporting and have a duty to protect their communities from such threats. To strengthen these efforts, G7 and associated members can provide meaningful support to subnational entities through mechanisms such as intelligence sharing, capacity-building initiatives, and tailored training material designed to enhance situational awareness and operational readiness.
In 2020, the Australia created the Counter Foreign Interference Taskforce (CFI Taskforce) to bring together Australian intelligence agencies, law enforcement, and other relevant organisations to collaborate and use their combined authorities and capabilities to maximise the impact of these laws. The CFI Taskforce is led by Australia's national security intelligence agency, the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO), and the Australian Federal Police (AFP), to lead this operational response. The CFI Taskforce construct has successfully disrupted foreign interference activity, including TNR, using the combine powers of these agencies. This has included arrests, charges, and prosecution, as well as intelligence led disruption of specific investigations. This activity is conduced to deter foreign state targeting of Australia and Australian interests. Though predominantly an operational body, the CFI Taskforce also provides an interface for policy makers and community engagement programs with operational agencies, to align the Australian Government's approach to TNR.
In Canada, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) serves as the primary law enforcement agency responsible for investigating TNR activities involving criminal intimidation and harassment carried out at the direction or the benefit of a foreign state. These actions are considered threats to national security. The RCMP works in collaboration with other law enforcement agencies to detect, deter and where possible, mitigate TNR threats. When pursuing criminal charges, investigators may rely on key legislative tools such as the Criminal Code and the FISIA. The Criminal Code offers the broadest enforcement capabilities in response to hostile acts. However, dependent on the nature of the incident and the individuals affected, other Acts of Parliament may be applied to address the incident, prevent recurrence and impose a penalties.
Across Canada, the RCMP also engages in-person meetings with local police services to foster a coordinated response to TNR threats. Additionally, the RCMP is actively developing training programs to help law enforcement personnel recognize and respond effectively to TNR.
In France, the Direction Générale de la Sécurité Intérieure (DGSI, France's domestic intelligence service) has implemented communication initiatives aimed at both the public through its website, including a section dedicated to TNR, and security services for better detection and response to TNR activities.
In Germany, the Federal Government works closely with federal law enforcement agencies – such as the Federal Criminal Police Office (Bundeskriminalamt or BKA) – and the domestic intelligence agency – the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz or BfV) – to detect and prevent TNR, as well as to advise individuals potentially affected by such threats. Due to Germany's federal system, the responsibility for conducting individual risk assessments and implementing protective measures lies with the respective state police authorities. Nonetheless, there is ongoing cooperation between the federal level and state police authorities to coordinate effective responses.
In the U.K., law enforcement – led by Counter Terrorism Policing (CTP), the national authority on security matters – has taken action proactively steps to strengthen the policing response to TNR. The powers available, including under the National Security Act, provide police with stronger avenues to detect, disrupt and prosecute state actors who carry out acts of espionage, foreign interference, spreading disinformation, and assassinations. The legislation enhances powers of detention for suspects, and introduces new offences and investigative powers to help police gather stronger evidence to build cases for prosecution. CTP and the College of Policing have also developed guidance and awareness modules on foreign interference for the powers introduced in the Act, and security for officers and staff. These modules are available and encouraged for all police forces in the U.K. CTP. The College of Policing also provide a programme of bespoke briefings for forces across the country. While open to all, these briefings are specifically aimed towards teams and roles most likely to identify or receive reports of potential concern. This work aims to enhance the ability of front-line police officers and staff to identify state-directed crimes and the actions that can be taken to escalate and mitigate this activity. Importantly, this training will assist the police as they provide support to those affected by TNR and keep people safe.
In the U.S., the Department of Homeland Security's Office for State and Local Law Enforcement (OSLLE), the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, in partnership with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has developed a series of virtual training modules on TNR that help inform state, local, tribal, territorial, and campus law enforcement partners across the nation. Current videos, including the "TNR Overview for Law Enforcement" and "Indicators and What to do if you Suspect TNR", are linked on the OSLLE website.
In Canada, the RCMP and intelligence agencies share the same goal of ensuring the safety and security of Canadians and persons residing in Canada and protecting Canadian interests at home and abroad. Information sharing between agencies use legislative authorities and memoranda of understanding to ensure agencies can exercise their separate national security mandates. For example, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) and the RCMP use the One Vision framework – a clear and transparent means that governs information sharing between CSIS and the RCMP.
In France, there is close cooperation between law enforcement and intelligence services. The sharing of information on TNR aims to establish the most comprehensive view of this threat, and the DGSI centralizes information as part of its counter-interference activities.
In Germany, cooperation between intelligence agencies and law enforcement on cases of TNR is done most prominently done through the Joint Extremism Terrorism Counter Center for Espionage (Gemeinsames Extremismus – und Terrorismusabwehrzentrum – Spionage und Proliferation or GETZ-SP). The GETZ-SP is a platform for exchange of information and cooperation, where in particular state police agencies, the BKA, the Federal Police, and the Customs agency, as well as the federal, domestic and state intelligence agencies exchange information on their respective tasks and powers. Fundamental TNR problems and current issues can both be discussed efficiently in this context.
In Italy, issues of TNR are monitored under the umbrella of inter-agency cooperation. Should concerns arise about national security, information may be brought to weekly sessions of the Committee for Counter Terrorism Strategic Analysis (CASA).
In the U.S., Department of Homeland Security (DHS) experts engage with community partners to obtain information and develop products to distribute to state and local law enforcement as well as international partners on the TNR threat. Field staff collaborate with state, local, tribal, and territorial government partners to provide raw reporting on instances of TNR when appropriate, and provide both awareness briefings to state and local fusion center partners, as well as materials generated to support this education effort to public safety partners in each area of responsibility.
In Canada, the RCMP provide awareness sessions to the public to report TNR via in-person, online, or telephonic reporting to local police and the RCMP. The RCMP has also conducted public awareness campaigns regarding foreign interference activities in relation to threats, intimidation or harassment by foreign states. As a deterrent, the RCMP has, for example, used marked vehicles in front of locations believed to be used for monitoring diaspora communities and for taking part in coercing individuals to leave Canada to face criminal proceedings in their country of origin. These marked RCMP vehicles have had the intended deterrent effect.
In France, government agencies are implementing a range of measures to inform the public about TNR, reassure victims that they have the support of the French authorities, and deter perpetrators from acting. The subject of TNR is communicated through press articles, the publication of a website, and the conduct of disruptive interviews. Political or "service-to-service" messages are also sent to foreign states involved in these activities.
In Germany, the state police authorities are generally in charge of taking protective measures where there are indications of a danger to individuals with links to foreign states. Appropriate protective measures are implemented when there is evidence of TNR. For example, where there is warning of a threat, local police may increase overt protective measures (e.g., uniformed police officer in high visibility locations) to such an extent that, due to the deterrent effect created, a perpetrator may abandon their plan of action.
In the U.K., policing use a range of deterrent activities. This may include visible protective security measures at a location or with a specific community, including increased patrols; and use of behavioural detection measures, including Project SERVATOR and deployment of increased physical security measures. Police may also integrate communications and community outreach into wider engagement. Security minded communications are at the heart of policing's approach, seeking to deter those with hostile intent while reassuring the public as they go about their daily life. This is delivered across press, public and community engagement and includes publicising the arrest, charge and conviction of those committing crimes on behalf of foreign states to encourage others to report concerns, and to send a clear message to adversaries and their proxies. Where possible, messaging and advice on state threats is coordinated and integrated into wider security engagement between police, the National Physical Security Authority, and the National Cyber Security Centre, across threat methodologies including terrorism, espionage, physical threats and TNR which are addressed from the shared foundation of good security practice. Business engagement and community engagement forums can also be used. Increasing awareness of the threat and encouraging the public and private sectors to increase their security and vigilance supports law enforcement and increases societal resilience. The U.K. also publishes online guidance, advice, news and updates through the National Protective Security Authority, the National Cyber Security Centre, and ProtectUK. Bespoke engagement with sectors or groups at specific risk will be built from these foundations.
In the U.S., the Department of Justice (DOJ), including the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and its law enforcement partners, investigates and prosecutes instances of TNR using existing federal law. Along with the FBI and other law enforcement partners, the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) can also share findings with government partners who make determinations on admissibility and visa eligibility. The DHS's Office of Intelligence and Analysis and the U.S. Coast Guard work with Customs and Border Protection and other DHS components, as appropriate, to identify potential instances of TNR in the maritime domain (including actors targeting people in the homeland). Through engagement with faith-based, law enforcement, and academic stakeholders, DHS's Office of Partnership and Engagement has demonstrated that proactive law enforcement engagement helps to build trust with affected communities and encourages individuals to report instances of TNR to law enforcement.
Domestically, the G7 and associated members are taking proactive steps to counter TNR at the foundational level. These efforts include the sharing of best practices and the expansion of opportunities for subnational partners, such as local law enforcement and community groups, to collaborate and support one another.
As the G7 and associated members continue enhancing operational components of their toolkits, emphasizing information-sharing initiatives is key to strengthening these relationships. This approach not only reinforces support for subnational partners but also enables the collection of lessons-learned and trends analysis that can help inform and modernize legislation, ultimately improving law enforcement's ability to respond to evolving threats.
Diplomatic measures remain a significant method of holding perpetrators of TNR accountable. There are a range of diplomatic tools from more overt (like exposure and attribution) to more subtle approaches (like demarches and bilateral engagements). As shown by the various diplomatic and capacity building measures noted below, accountability and transparency on the international stage are valuable measures to mitigate TNR.
The G7 and associated members respectively draw from a range of diplomatic mechanisms and capacity building tools to address cases of TNR, including:
Australia has participated in multilateral responses to TNR, including at the Human Rights Council and the Third Committee of the General Assembly. Subject to meeting legislative thresholds and Australia's foreign policy approach, Australia's human rights sanctions framework may support diplomatic efforts to counter TNR. Under Australia's human rights sanctions framework, the Foreign Minister may sanction a person or entity if the Foreign Minister is satisfied the person or entity has engaged in, has been responsible for, or has been complicit in an act that constitutes a serious violation or a serious abuse of a person's right to life; or right not to be subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; or right not to be held in slavery or servitude, or right not to be required to perform forced or compulsory labour.
France uses diplomatic tools such as denunciation against foreign interference, declarations with European Union (EU) countries on hybrid actions, and sanctions. France has strongly advocated for the establishment of a new EU sanction regime on destabilizing actors to more effectively counter malign activities aimed at the EU and its member States, as well as third states and international organizations.
France and the U.K. launched the Pall Mall Process in February 2024 bringing together a multistakeholder community to address the threat posed by the proliferation and irresponsible use of commercial cyber intrusion tools and services. In April 2025, 26 participating governments supported a Code of Practice for States – setting forth political commitments and practical recommendations to address this issue. The Code of Practice serves notably as an important contribution to joint efforts to boost international cooperation to counter the acts of TNR involving the misuse of commercial spyware and cyber tools to engage in arbitrary and unlawful surveillance, including physical targeting and tracking, hacking, or cyber harassment. Within the Pall Mall process, France and the U.K. will continue to work with the global multistakeholder community to implement policy options and new practices, track progress, and develop a shared picture for responsible practice across the commercial cyber intrusion market.
Germany has created a TNR coordination unit in the Federal Foreign Office (Auswärtiges Amt) to address TNR through foreign policy measures. Working closely with the Federal Ministry of the Interior (Bundesministerium des Innern) and domestic authorities, the unit can propose bilateral measures ranging from messaging to visa restrictions and sanctions to respond to individual cases. Multilaterally, Germany raises TNR in statements and resolutions, for example, at the UN Human Rights Council. Germany, has also taken a direct approach of embedding TNR into its foreign policy strategies issued by the Foreign Office.
Japan has been actively involved in efforts to raise awareness of TNR at multilateral settings such as in the Human Rights Council and the Third Committee of the United Nations in collaboration with like-minded partners.
The European Union (EU) and its Member States, remain committed to fighting TNR and its impacts on human rights as highlighted in the EU Council Conclusions on EU priorities in the UN human rights fora 2025. The EU is increasingly raising concerns about TNR perpetrated by specific countries in statements at the Human Rights Council. Furthermore, the EU regularly condemns TNR acts during human rights dialogues and EU diplomats observe trials of individuals facing forced returns. In addition, the EU has included TNR-related listings under the EU Human Rights Sanctions Regime, which targets individuals and entities responsible for serious human rights violations and abuses of serious concern worldwide through sanctions. Finally, through its human rights defenders (HRDs) protection mechanism, ProtectDefenders.eu, the EU provides emergency support (including grants up to €10,000) to HRDs at-risk, including TNR victims (for temporary relocation, legal support, and other protection measures).
In September 2025, G7 partners and associated members issued a Statement on Iranian Transnational Repression and Other Malign Activities, to condemn their TNR activities and to demonstrate unwavering solidarity with international partners whose citizens and residents have also been targeted by Iran.
Additionally, TNR could also be considered as an item in the context of countering hybrid threats – coordinated and harmful activities carried out by state actors or non-state actors and posing a threat to democracy and security in the EU – and addressed through coordinated action via the activation the Hybrid, Cyber or Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) toolboxes ensuring a targeted response to the threat. In April 2025, G7 partners and associated states including the U.K., US, Australia, Canada, Germany, and New Zealand issued a public technical advisory on malicious cyber actors using spyware known as BADBAZAAR and MOONSHINE to target data on mobile devices including smartphones.
Australia is investing heavily in engagements with countries, particularly of its region, to help curb the effects of foreign interference, including TNR activities. This includes engaging with countries transparently to share experiences, including on whole of government resilience mechanisms. In 2025, the Department of Home Affairs' Counter Foreign Interference Coordination Centre will work with civil society, with a focus on the community support sector, to increase community resilience to foreign interference. Australia is committed to deepening partnerships with civil society and countries in the region to enhance awareness and harden resilience to TNR practices.
France has been developing closer cooperation with like-minded partners for several years in order to better understand the methods used in TNR, share findings, and take remedial actions. These exchanges occur predominantly through intelligence services and are now an integral part of cooperation agendas. The French government also maintains regular dialogue on TNR with civil society actors.
In 2025, the U.K. and Canada will partner to jointly launch the Common Good Cyber Fund – the first-of-its-kind – to fortify cybersecurity defences where they are needed most. Developed by the Global Cyber Alliance, the fund will support implementing innovative models for sustaining groups, organizations, and individuals involved in critical cyber security functions to counter digital TNR.
In the U.K., the Foreign Commonwealth Development Office (FCDO) delivers programmatic capacity building interventions to counter TNR via its Integrated Security Fund (ISF) International Cyber Portfolio. In 2025, the FCDO launched CyberCivil Southern Africa, a programme of capacity building interventions to strengthen the resilience of civil society organisations at high risk of malicious state-sponsored cyber activity. Across the U.K.'s priority regions, it is working with Shadowserver to enhance existing and establish new trusted information sharing partnerships with regional Computer Security Incident Response Teams (CSIRTs) and other system defenders specialising in incident response capabilities and cybersecurity posture of high-risk civil society actors and NGOs in order to provide actionable cyber threat information and support enhanced cybersecurity awareness, detection and response capabilities.
The U.S. has engaged countries globally to call attention to its heightened concern and condemnation of TNR targeting individuals around the world and regularly issues demarches to perpetrating and facilitating governments. The U.S. also supports several initiatives designed to build capacity of both international and local civil society organizations, as well as other partners working with groups at high risk of TNR. These programs have resulted in valuable TNR datasets, case studies, best practices for policymakers and responders, and mechanisms to engage directly with impacted communities and stakeholders. Government partners have produced authoritative reports on acts of TNR in various sectors, from academia to the targeting of political activists and their families. These partners have established important relationships and networks with civil society experts who help to educate and engage impacted communities, improving overall efforts to counter TNR.
Countering TNR requires a whole of society effort. The G7 and associated members have taken steps to support civil society through funding mechanisms and services to build the resiliency of affected individuals and communities. This includes working alongside NGOs that conduct research and reporting on instances of TNR, while maintaining important relationships with affected individuals and wider communities.
Another aspect of engagement involves raising public awareness of TNR. The G7 Leaders' Statement on TNR aimed to build an international understanding of TNR, while the G7 and associated members have held sustained information sharing programs through in-person workshops and social media campaigns to inform their domestic societies. This type of engagement remains important for the G7 and its associated members to reinforce trust between civil society and the institutions that protect them from TNR.
In Australia, the Australian Federal Police (AFP) has developed a Community Interference Factsheet, available in over 40 languages, to assist in educating Australian communities on foreign interference, and how to recognise and report it. AFP Community Liaison Teams work with partners to engage communities and community leaders around Australia to identify security concerns.
The Department of Home Affairs' Countering Foreign Interference Coordination Centre (CFICC) delivers a Community Interference Cross Agency Engagement Program which coordinates engagement with 11 identified communities across Australia. The Program aims to support communities to identify and report foreign interference and to build community resilience against malicious foreign actors. The second tranche of the Program aims to help the community support sector recognize foreign interference in the course of their work with communities, and also help the sector to support community members to report foreign interference and refer them to appropriate support services. To support the second tranche of the Program, CFICC has commissioned research to assess the level of foreign interference awareness in the community support sector, identify best practice trauma-informed approaches for engaging communities experiencing, or at risk of foreign interference and co-design practical, adaptable resources for front line support services.
The CFICC also published "CFI in Australia: Working towards a more secure Australia". Translated into 23 languages, this publicly available document outlines who is most at risk from foreign interference, what the Australian Government is doing to address the threat, and how individuals and organisations can better protect themselves.
CFICC is also developing an online CFI Community Support Hub to support community members impacted by foreign interference. The Hub will include in-language resources to support community members to identify and report foreign interference and will provide guidance on how individuals and communities can protect themselves. This includes navigating online safety, identifying disinformation, overseas travel and engagement with diplomatic or consular officials in Australia. The Hub will include a webform for community members to seek additional resources or advice.
In Canada, the National Counter Foreign Interference Coordinator (NCFIC) engages with victims of TNR. This includes information workshops that bring together at-risk communities with officials from Public Safety Canada, the RCMP, CSIS, Justice Canada, and local police of jurisdictions to learn from the experiences of those communities and to equip them with the tools to identify, protect against, and report threats of TNR. The workshops are intentionally designed to be low-profile, invite-only events that are narrow in scope to ensure meaningful engagement with key community members, and to limit the potential for external interference. Participants are carefully selected to maximize impact and facilitate candid discussions.
CSIS, through its Academic Outreach & Stakeholder Engagement program, engages with advocacy and community associations to help sensitize persons in Canada most at risk to TNR to the evolving the threat and to how to defend themselves. This work is conducted in cooperation with the NCFIC as it supports the Government's response to TNR and helps facilitate CSIS investigations into TNR activities conducted by hostile states.
The Digital Citizen Contribution Program at the Department of Canadian Heritage seeks to bolster citizen resilience to disinformation and other online harms. The program provides funding for third-party research and citizen-focused activities, including projects aimed at boosting digital media literacy skills among Canada's diverse communities. While not exclusively aimed at TNR, the program's focus on building citizen resilience and digital media literacy through supporting civil society organizations is a key component of a whole of society approach to countering TNR.
In Germany, the Federal Government engages with individuals at risk of TNR and civil society organisations at various levels, to hear about their experiences and to note changes or trends in the actions of foreign state actors.
In the Netherlands, the Dutch Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment houses the Social Stability Expertise Unit. This unit assists stakeholders – from professionals and communities to policymakers and leaders at local and national levels – contend with polarization, social tensions, and in preventing radicalization. The same applies when TNR leads to social tensions and polarization between and within groups in the Netherlands. The Social Stability Expertise Unit develops and provides practical knowledge; builds networks by connecting parties; and provides early insights into societal tensions. Furthermore, the Dutch Government aims to increase societal resilience by increasing awareness about the threat posed by state-sponsored interference. In 2024, the General Intelligence and Safety Security Service (Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst or AIVD) and National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism (Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid or NCTV) published an analysis of state-sponsored interference in diaspora communities. This analysis provides insight into the objectives, targets (actual and potential), and modus operandi deployed by state actors who attempt to interfere in the Netherlands. This analysis may also be used to raise awareness among diaspora communities. To increase community engagement, a communication toolkit has been developed for municipalities and other public partners. The toolkit consists of various anonymous animated videos, leaflets, and posters of frequently reported acts of foreign interference.
In the U.K., the Government meets regularly, and maintains good relationships, with civil society groups, including those advocating on TNR. Furthermore, the U.K.'s collaboration with academia is extensive and provides expertise on a wide range of contemporary and scholarly thinking on a range of issues including TNR. The general aims of engagement are to allow individuals to feel part of U.K. society; be able to mix confidently with people of all backgrounds; and provide a positive contribution to the U.K. in the communities where they settle. Although engagement specific to TNR or national security is inherently challenging, the U.K. adopts a 'do no harm' principle regarding community engagement and remains aware of the risks of inadvertently spreading fear among communities by framing engagement along the lines of TNR or state threats. Therefore, community engagement initiatives, run out of local authorities or central government departments, focus on integration and community resilience.
In the U.S., the FBI provides information – including a Threat Intimidation Guide in multiple languages – on its public website. In addition, FBI hotline operators are trained to identify indicators of TNR to ensure that TNR-linked cases are directed to appropriate field offices and the TNR cell for action.
The Department of State also does regular outreach with diaspora groups, HRDs, and others to better understand the threat of TNR, how it is evolving both in the U.S. and globally, and to provide information on possible resources for these groups.
DHS community stakeholder engagements have focused on raising awareness of available DHS resources and identifying how DHS can address community needs. The DHS Office of Partnership and Engagement (OPE) unifies the Department's outreach with critical stakeholders nationwide, including state, local, tribal, and territorial governments, the private sector, faith-based organizations, academia, nonprofit, and community organizations. Within OPE, the Office of Strategic Partnerships and National Campaigns (SPNC) fosters community engagement across the Department's mission space. SPNC coordinates outreach with community, faith-based, and mission driven/nonprofit organizations to build trust and establish a routine process for collaboration with community leaders. Additionally, the office serves as a conduit to share external stakeholder input and feedback with DHS leadership to inform homeland security policies. The SPNC Partnerships team engages on community safety and security issues, including specific engagement on TNR and related issues of foreign influence as they intersect with the Department's work. For example, engagements include listening sessions with affected communities and roundtables with leaders of organizations to discuss strategies for enhancing community safety and opportunities for mutual support. Further, the OPE Private Sector Office maintains regular engagement with key private sector partners to gather insights into risk mitigation practices and innovation to further the Department's mission. This includes awareness of artificial intelligence-enabled tools that may be maliciously used by bad actors to further TNR goals, such as deepfakes of individuals or rapidly-developed, online content against individuals seeking entrance into the U.S.
Additionally, the OPE administers the Homeland Security Advisory Council (HSAC) and Faith-Based Security Advisory Council (FBSAC), which serve as external advisory bodies to the DHS Secretary in response to direct taskings that may relate to a variety of security issues. The FBSAC is an important vehicle at the Secretary's disposal to engage directly with, and receive recommendations from, the faith-based community on matters related to protecting houses of worship and preparedness and enhanced coordination with the faith community. OPE then drives Department-wide implementation of Council recommendations and identification of strategic partnerships to advance DHS's work.
As a result of extensive and meaningful stakeholder engagements with targeted communities, DHS has developed resources to advance the physical, personal, and cyber security of civil society and to support the cyber resilience of high-risk communities. Examples of these resources include: Law Enforcement Resource Library that brings together resources (e.g., training, information sharing initiatives, grant funding opportunities, etc.) for state, local, tribal, territorial, and campus law enforcement from across the DHS, including resources and information on TNR, and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency's (CISA) Resources Applicable to Counter Transnational Repression, which provide links to DHS resources on personal security considerations and doxing, information on physical and cybersecurity resources, and related training information. CISA's High-Risk Community Protection Initiative is dedicated to strengthening the cybersecurity of communities in the U.S. that are at high risk of being targeted with cyber threats and TNR. The Cyber Hygiene Services by CISA offers free cybersecurity services to help organizations reduce those communities' exposure to threats by taking a proactive approach to monitoring and mitigating attack vectors.
In Germany, the Federal Foreign Office (FFO) (Auswärtiges Amt) operates a funding program to support human rights projects through which TNR can also be addressed. In addition, the FFO offers protection programs for HRDs at risk (e.g., temporary relocation/local emergency measures with a focus on third countries), which include capacity-building on risk management and security measures, including digital threats.
In the U.K., multiple funding streams within the system support those affected by TNR. Although not directly created for victims of TNR, the Integrated Security Fund (ISF) is a government-wide fund that addresses the highest-priority threats to U.K. national security, and can be used to reduce the risk of TNR.
Mitigation of TNR involves community resilience, to bolster governments' resources and acknowledges a national response may not always be feasible. It is therefore important that authorities at the community level are properly trained with the knowledge to recognize and report instances of TNR to inform the level of response needed. Raising public awareness and supporting community service organisations who address the threat of TNR are among the many ways in which governments can better protect their communities. As highlighted by these tools, the G7 and associated members value working with civil society, through a reciprocal relationship that ensures the views and experiences of affected communities are reflected in national approaches to countering TNR.
Countering TNR requires a whole-of-society approach. Governments seeking to modernize their toolkits by referring to this Compendium must keep in mind the importance of engaging meaningfully with communities throughout the process. This means working closely with civil society organisations, local law enforcement, and members of communities affected by TNR. This Compendium highlights that TNR-specific legislation is not a requirement for addressing TNR and that governments can use pre-existing laws and mechanisms to counter TNR such as criminal codes, immigration measures, and diplomatic strategies. This Compendium is a changing blueprint of the types of tools that can be leveraged to address a constantly evolving threat. The G7 and associated members will continue to strive to be leaders in countering TNR to achieve the strategic goals of raising awareness, responding collectively, and building resilience to the threat of TNR.
Source: Public Safety Canada
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