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G7 Performance on China, 1975–2021
Alissa Wang, with Duja Muhanna, G7 Research Group
June 27, 2021
China attracted far more attention and action at the G7's Cornwall Summit on June 11–13, 2021, than at any G7 summit since the first in 1975. This produced the central question: just how much bigger, bolder and broader was the G7's treatment of China this year and how well will the G7 leaders' paper proclamations turn into real action as their governments comply with the summit commitments on China in the coming year? To start the search for an answer, this analysis reviews the conclusions and commitments on the China that G7 summits made in the past, compares those with their Cornwall performance, and suggests how that performance can be improved.
China has been a minor but increasingly significant subject for G7 summit public deliberations, as recorded in the conclusions of the communiqués issued at summits in the leaders' name. From 1975 to 2021, the G7 produced 6,565 words on the subject of China. It did so in four distinct phases, separated by periods during which China received no attention.
In the first phase, from 1987 to 1992, the G7 first mentioned China. It devoted 73 words to China in 1987, then 208 in 1989, 345 in 1990, 73 in 1991, and 95 in 1992. In the second phase, from 1995 to 1997 it devoted 112 words China in 1995, 337 in 1996 and 247 in 1997. The third, short phase from 2000 to 2003 produced 41 words in 2000, 62 in 2001, and 106 in 2003.
The fourth phase, from 2005 to 2018, was the longest and strongest until 2021. There was continued and sustained deliberation on China at every G7 summit. It began with 105 words in 2005, increased dramatically to 530 in 2006, peaked at 665 words in 2009, and ended with 200 words in 2018.
The fifth phase, in 2021, followed an absence of attention in 2019 and 2020. At the Cornwall Summit, the G7 dedicated 566 words to China, the second highest ever. This could be the launch of a new multi-year phase.
G7 decision making on China, through the production on collective, public, precise, future-oriented politically binding commitments made at summits, has followed a similar cadence in general terms (see Appendix A). G7 commitments on China have been rare, with only 18 commitments made since the summit's start in 1975. There were two in 1990 and one in 1995. After a long gap there were five in 2007, one each in 2008, 2009, 2014, 2015, 2016 and 2017, and, most recently, a spike to four commitments in 2021. The highest number of commitments was made in 2007, when the summit made five commitments with regards to the Heiligendamm Process, in which China was a participant. (China was invited to the summit from 2005 to 2009.) The second highest was the four in 2021, when China was now clearly on the outside.
Commitments on China spanned several important component subjects. They included human rights and democracy, investment, climate, energy, development, and regional security (specifically the South and East China Seas).
Overall, performance trends in G7 deliberation and decision making produce four major phases of G7 performance on China.
In the first phase, G7 deliberation on China was solid. An average 132 words were dedicated to China at each summit from 1987 to 1992. Yet decision making was very small. Only two commitments were made, both at the 1990 Houston Summit. Both focused on the G7's measures in response to the Tiananmen Square incident of 1989.
The G7 first mentioned China by name at the 1987 Venice Summit in the Chairman's Statement on Political Issues. From 1987 to 1992, it discussed China in regards to a wide range of subjects, including economic reforms, climate change, regional security, and non-proliferation, but with a focus on human rights and democracy.
The G7's attitude toward China was a mix of being critical and conciliatory. The G7 expressed optimism about China's economic reforms, while also repeatedly condemning the Tiananmen Square incident.
In the second phase, from 1995 to 1997, G7 performance was again strong on deliberation but weak on decision making. An average 232 words were dedicated to China during this phase, which was an improvement from the first phase. Decision making was almost non-existent. Only one commitment was made, in 1995, as a general commitment to pursue G7 dialogue with China.
Deliberation focused mainly on the handover of Hong Kong. The G7 also addressed the territorial dispute in the South China Sea, and China's role in the treaty establishing a nuclear weapon free zone in Southeast Asia.
In the third phase, from 2000 to 2004, the G7 had its weakest performance on China. Average deliberation was the lowest among all phases, at only 70 words. No commitments were made.
The focus was on trade. At both the 2000 Okinawa Summit and the 2001 Genoa Summit, the G8 (now with Russia added) welcomed the progress made on China's accession to the World Trade Organization. At the 2003 Evian Summit, G8 leaders briefly stated that they held discussions with leaders of emerging and developing countries, including China, to exchange views on growth and international cooperation.
The fourth phase, from 2005 to 2018, was by far the strongest phase of G7/8 performance on China. There was sustained attention to China in all of the summits, with an average 293 words, the highest average among all the phases. In addition, the G7/8 began making an increasing number of binding political commitments on China.
From 2005 to 2013, G7/8 leaders discussed a wide range of issues on China, including climate change, the Iranian nuclear issue, energy, investment and development. From 2014 to 2018, G7 deliberation on China focused mainly on the South and East China Seas crisis.
This phase was propelled by the Heiligendamm Process. In 2007, the G8 made a historic high of five commitments on China in the context of the Heiligendamm Process, including commitments to cooperate with China on investment, research and innovation, climate change, energy, and development. In 2008 and 2009, the G8 reaffirmed its commitment to the Heiligendamm process. From 2014 to 2017, one commitment was made at each annual summits, all focused on the South and East China Seas.
This phase also saw a turning point in the attitude of the G7/8 toward China. The first part of this phase saw a positive and cooperative attitude. Since 2014, the G7, now again without Russia as a member, turned toward a more critical attitude.
G7 performance on China has been weak but slowly increasing, as China has become an increasingly important area of G7/8 deliberation and decision making. There was a great spike at Cornwall in 2021.
Overall, G7/8 performance was stronger on deliberation and weaker in decision making. China has been discussed in the context of a wide range of issues, few concrete decisions were made in the form of politically binding commitments. In contrast to the broad treatment under deliberation, there were only three main subjects on which the G7/8 made binding commitments related to China: human rights and democracy (in response to Tiananmen), economic cooperation (in the context of the Heiligendamm Process) and regional security (in response to the South China Sea crisis).
The 2021 summit at Cornwall saw a peak in performance. Deliberation and decision making were both high. The G7 made commitments on human rights (with respect to Xinjiang and Hong Kong), economic reforms (especially on China's allegedly non-market policies) and on investigating the origins of COVID-19 in China.
To further engage with China and to truly open up opportunities for dialogue and cooperation, the G7 should aim to back up its wide-ranging deliberations on China with concrete commitments. So far, commitments have mostly related to sensitive and contentious political issues such as Tiananmen, the South and East China Seas, Xinjiang, Hong Kong, and non-market practices. There are deliberations on cooperating with China in a wide range of areas of potential global cooperation such as climate change, investment, research and innovation, development and energy, but very little concrete and binding commitments have been made in these areas. Unfortunately, the cooperative spirit of the Heiligendamm Process has largely been lost and replaced by a spirit of antagonism. The G7, in the near future, should fix this imbalance to pave the way toward a more mutually beneficial and globally beneficial, engagement with China.
Two areas for further research stand out. The first is to assess G7 compliance with the leaders' 18 commitments on China, to see how much those commitments matter in the subsequent practical political world and beyond. The second is to conduct detailed process tracing of how the summit commitments were negotiated, shaped and agreed. This could start with those made at the Cornwall Summit, where US president Joe Biden, often backed by the leaders of the United Kingdom, Canada and France, preferred commitments that more directly and explicitly challenged China's behaviour than the leaders of Germany and Italy did.
Year |
# commitments |
% total commitments |
Component subjects |
1975 |
0 |
0 |
|
1976 |
0 |
0 |
|
1977 |
0 |
0 |
|
1978 |
0 |
0 |
|
1979 |
0 |
0 |
|
1980 |
0 |
0 |
|
1981 |
0 |
0 |
|
1982 |
0 |
0 |
|
1983 |
0 |
0 |
|
1984 |
0 |
0 |
|
1985 |
0 |
0 |
|
1986 |
0 |
0 |
|
1987 |
0 |
0 |
|
1988 |
0 |
0 |
|
1989 |
0 |
0 |
|
1990 |
2 |
2/78 (0.026) |
Human rights (Tiananmen) |
1991 |
0 |
0 |
|
1992 |
0 |
0 |
|
1993 |
0 |
0 |
|
1994 |
0 |
0 |
|
1995 |
1 |
1/78 (0.013) |
Dialogue with China |
1996 |
0 |
0 |
|
1997 |
0 |
0 |
|
1998 |
0 |
0 |
|
1999 |
0 |
0 |
|
2000 |
0 |
0 |
|
2001 |
0 |
0 |
|
2002 |
0 |
0 |
|
2003 |
0 |
0 |
|
2004 |
0 |
0 |
|
2005 |
0 |
0 |
|
2006 |
0 |
0 |
|
2007 |
5 |
5/330 (0.015) |
Heiligendamm Process (investment, research and innovation, climate change, energy, development) |
2008 |
1 |
1/296 (0.003) |
Heiligendamm Process |
2009 |
1 |
1/254 (0.004) |
Heiligendamm Process |
2010 |
0 |
0 |
|
2011 |
0 |
0 |
|
2012 |
0 |
0 |
|
2013 |
0 |
0 |
|
2014 |
1 |
1/141 (0.0071) |
South and East China Seas |
2015 |
1 |
1/376 (0.003) |
South and East China Seas |
2016 |
1 |
1/342 (0.003) |
South and East China Seas |
2017 |
1 |
1/180 (0.006) |
South and East China Seas |
2018 |
0 |
0 |
|
2019 |
0 |
0 |
|
2020 |
0 |
0 |
|
2021 |
4 |
NA |
COVID-19 origins, non-market policies, Human Rights (Xinjiang, Hong Kong) |
Total |
18 |
17/5987 (0.003) |
|
Average |
0.38 |
|
Data compiled by Duja Muhanna, G7 Research Group, June 15, 2021.
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