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Analytical and Compliance Studies

G7/8 Governance of Migration, 1975-2016

A Research Report by Sophie Barnett, G7 Research Group
May 13, 2017

The Group of Eight (G8) — currently acting as the Group of Seven (G7) — has been addressing migration and its related issues since 1979. Whether it was operating as the G7 or G8, the group has often made a conscious effort to address refugee crises, migrant flows and humanitarian suffering in this context for almost 42 years. This study analyses the G7/8's governance of migration and related issues. It outlines the various perceptions of scholars on G7/8 migration governance and assesses the G7/8's performance in this field. It then examines the causes of the G7/8's performance on migration governance and provides various case studies, connecting more closely the causes to the effects. It argues that the G7/8 is uniquely suited to supplement the UN Security Council (UNSC), by endorsing human rights norms and stepping in to help manage migration crises when other organizations cannot.

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Significance

Despite the G7/8's governance of migration, the subject has largely been overlooked in the scholarly literature. However, as the G7/8 continues to put greater focus on migration-related issues, so too will academia. The G7/8's performance on migration has steadily increased since its first mention at the 1979 Tokyo Summit, with the most recent 2016 Ise-Shima Summit being a strong success for addressing migrant flows.

The world is currently experiencing a migrant crisis on a scale unprecedented since the Second World War. Due to the capacity of massive refugee flows to challenge the future of global economic growth and undermine political stability in war-affected regions, migration has reached critical levels of severity requiring a coordinated response from the world's most powerful countries. Furthermore, several G7/8 members are acutely affected by the crisis. Thus, understanding why and how the G7/8 has addressed migration for over three decades is important. It may also provide crucial insights for the G7/8's future performance on G7/8 migration, starting at the Italian-hosted Taormina Summit on May 26-27, 2017.

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Schools of Thought

There is no literature explicitly addressing G7/8 governance of migration. However, migration is often included under both international peace and security, and human rights issues. Within these broader categories, there are five general schools of thought on G7/8 migration governance.

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Limited

The first "inherently limited" school sees the G7/8's governance of migration as selective and small. It includes three strands as follows.

The first "UN dependent" strand argues that in terms of international peace and security, the G7/8 has continued and will continue to contribute little to migration governance. Jean-Félix Paganon (2000), former Director of the United Nations and International Organizations Department in the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, emphasizes that the exception to this is the draft of the Kosovo peace process, later known as UNSC Resolution 1244, during the 1999 G8 Summit in Köln. The case of Kosovo was circumstantial and the legitimacy it received derived not from the G8 but rather from the Security Council. Furthermore, seven G8 members were active or had interests in Kosovo, explaining why it received so much attention at the 1999 summit compared to other cases of forced displacement.

The second "U.S. human rights" strand argues that the G7/8 focuses on migration when U.S. interests coincide with human rights (Putnam and Bayne 1984). When the two are incompatible, refugees and other migrant groups are poorly addressed. During the 1979 G7 Tokyo Summit, human rights promotion did coincide with U.S. interests. President Jimmy Carter proposed that the refugee crisis in Indochina be discussed as part of the formal summit proceedings, leading to the release of a special statement on Indochinese refugees (Penttilä 2003). Yet while this was perhaps a product of U.S. perseverance and required a refugee shock, this school does not explain all inclusions of migration in all summits. Furthermore, it ignores the fact that in the current migrant crisis, the primary destination of asylum seekers is Europe rather than the U.S., and yet migration was a hot topic at the 2016 Ise-Shima Summit. Similarly, President Donald Trump has made clear his desire to keep America's borders closed to refugees (Friscolanti 2017). Meanwhile the topic is expected to make a sizeable appearance at the 2017 Taormina Summit.

The third "neoliberal strand," closely related to the second, claims that the G7/8 prioritizes a neoliberal agenda such as privatization and deregulation over human rights concerns (Gill 1999). Thus, refugees, immigration and asylum are not the G7/8's primary concern unless they interfere with economic growth. Yet while this argument rightly recognizes that migration flows can affect global economic growth, whether migration was prioritized solely due to its economic implications is difficult to determine. Humanitarian concerns or the desire to demonstrate great power status may also play a role. At the 2016 Ise-Shima Summit, most migration commitments in the communiqué referenced as a motivating factor not global economic growth but rather "common values and principles for all humanity."

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Human Rights Endorser

The second school sees the G7/8 as an endorser of human rights norms. Takumi Shibaike (2014) argues that the G7/8 acts as a crucial medium to encourage and induce state compliance with human rights. Its actions were first guided by a logic of consequences, but recently transitioned to being guided by a logic of appropriateness and spurred by international shocks. The G7/8 is thus uniquely suited to encourage host countries to respect the human rights of refugees and migrants and support their countries of origin in restoring peace and stability to ensure migrants' safe return.

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Mission Creep

The third school sees a G7/8 decline in migration governance due to an increasingly expanding G20 agenda. Kjell Engelbrekt (2015) argues that since its upgrade to the leaders' level in 2008, the G20 has "swiftly eclipsed" the G7/8 on peace and security issues and is destined to appropriate the role of the G7/8 in that realm. Therefore, a type of "mission creep" may ensue whereby the G20 takes control of the peace and security agenda of the G7/8, including the migration-related issues of refugees, forced displacement, and migrant trafficking and smuggling. However, this school ignores the fact that migration has traditionally been a G7/8 issue due to the larger scale of attention that it receives from G7/8 rather than G20 summits. It is also more closely related to the G7/8's core missions to promote human rights and democracy, and less closely related to the G7/8's core missions of financial stability and making globalization work for all. In the current migrant crisis, most G7/8 members have a stake in ensuring that the levels of displacement are adequately addressed, whereas many G20 members are less affected by and thus less concerned about them.

For the past few years, the G7/8 has continuously played a stronger role in addressing the global refugee crisis. The G7/8 has been addressing migration issues since 1979 and first recognized the scale of the current crisis in 2013. Each year, it has made more commitments on migration. This is in contrast with the G20, which made its first commitments on migration in 2015 and largely failed to deliver at the same level at the following summit in 2016. Refugees were largely absent from the 2016 G20 Hangzhou Summit, which produced three broad commitments to address migration and forced displacement in 2017, down from four made the summit prior. This is in contrast with the 2016 G7 Ise-Shima Summit, which made 10 commitments to address migration, compared to seven the year before. Thus, the 2016 G7 Ise-Shima Summit was strong on migration commitments, but the 2016 G20 Hangzhou Summit just three months later was weak. Based on current trends, it appears that a G20 takeover on migration issues is far from likely.

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Security Council Replacement

The fourth school sees the G7/8 as ultimately replacing the UNSC as the primary centre of global peace and security governance, and thus also migration governance. John Kirton (2005) argues that the G7/8 has, will and should become a more effective global security governor than the collective security-based UN system. However, four things must happen before this is to occur. The G7/8 must: 1) avoid all features of the UNSC that caused it to fail; 2) build upon the G7/8's central structural advantages of flexibility and concert-style diplomacy; 3) yield an institution capable of managing the full range of peace and security challenges on a global basis; and 4) build a system in which both the UNSC Permanent Five (P5) and non-P5 feel comfortable. Risto Pentillä (2003) also points out that there is no consensus either within the G7/8 or among non-G7/8 states that it should ever replace the UNSC.

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Security Council Supplement

The fifth school sees the G7/8 as playing a supplementary role to the UNSC. It points to that fact that the Security Council's credibility as the primary actor in international peace and security is at risk, necessitating support from other players (Brenton 2000). Pentillä (2003a) argues that the G7/8 is a "potentially powerful actor" and security forum of last resort. The G7/8 is a meta-institution that can guide the work of other organizations, including the Security Council, and step in when the other organizations are incapable of achieving the necessary results as quickly as possible. The primary roles of the G7/8 are thus policy coordination and crisis management. This is best exemplified by the G8's role in the Kosovo peace process. After "months of unsuccessful efforts to resolve the matter through the UN Security Council … the G8 emerged as the forum in which the Western powers and Russia could reach a common position" and swiftly brought the conflict to an end, thus preventing further displacement. These measures were consistent with the G8 "tradition of tackling … issues that had not been properly addressed by international institutions," with responsibility for ending conflicts and wars resting with the UNSC. Evidence of the G7/8 as a Security Council supplement can be seen in its communiqué endorsements and commitments supporting the UN and its activities.

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Puzzles

Although various schools of thought offer general insights into the G7/8's governance of migration, none of them provide a systemic, comprehensive, detailed account of the G7/8's continued performance. To acquire a direct understanding of the G7/8's performance on migration, it is essential to conduct an evidence-based examination of how the G7/8 has governed migration-related issues since its inception. This examination is done by outlining the dimensions and causes of the G7/8's performance, guided by John Kirton's Concert Equality Modelof G7/8 Governance, followed by critical cases to show more closely the causal links.

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Thesis

With few exceptions, the G7/8's governance of migration has improved since its summit start. The 2016 Ise-Shima Summit made dramatic progress and it is expected that the 2017 Taormina Summit will solidify it. While the UNSC possesses credibility as the primary centre of security governance, the legitimacy crisis it is currently facing due to bureaucratic inefficiency has made room for the G7/8 to emerge as a crisis manager, policy coordinator and Security Council supporter. In this capacity, the G7/8 also acts to endorse human rights norms in accordance with UN standards. While the G7/8 has historically addressed migrant crises in this capacity, it has not addressed every crisis. The G7/8 also struggles to institute lasting democratic change in target states. However, the G7/8 retains the capacity to continue its progress as a key player in response to migration crises worldwide.

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Dimensions of Performance

The G7/8's governance of migration can be chartered along eight dimensions of performance as developed by Kirton (2013). They are: domestic political management, deliberation, direction-setting, decision making, delivery, the development of global governance, distinctive mission done and deaths avoided (Kirton and Larionova 2016). Overall, G7/8 migration performance has progressed through six phases. These are: 1) start, from 1979 to 80; 2) revival, 1987-88; 3) sprint, 1991-93; 4) sustained substantial, 1995-2002; 5) return, 2004-09; and 6) surge, 2011-16 (see Appendix A).

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Domestic Political Management

Whether leaders met as the G7 or G8 each summit had a perfect attendance record, save for 2012 when Russian president Vladimir Putin did not attend (see Appendix A). Communique compliments related to migration remain rare but always recognized the efforts of the EU (see Appendix B). The first compliment came at the 1998 Birmingham Summit when leaders acknowledged the EU's efforts to improve international cooperation in fighting transnational organized crime. At the 1992 Munich Summit, the G8 leaders complimented the EU and Russia on their efforts to restore peace and security in Kosovo. No compliments were again given until 2016 at Ise-Shima when the leadersrecognized the EU's response to the global refugee crisis through the EU Regional Trust Fund, EU Trust Fund for Africa and EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey.

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Deliberation

On deliberation, the number of words dedicated to migration in summit documents also steadily increased (see Appendix A and Appendix C). Migration first appeared in the 1979 Tokyo Summit with 214 words when G7 leaders released the Special Statement of the Summit on Indochinese Refugees. Here they recognized the humanitarian problems that it posed to regional peace and stability, pledged to increase their contributions to refugee relief and resettlement, and requested that the UN Secretary-General convene a conference to address the crisis. Attention dipped to zero shortly thereafter but rose to 49 at the 1987 Venice Summit with a small statement expressing concern for Palestinian refugees. It steadily increased to 250 words at the 1998 Birmingham Summit, with a larger statement emphasizing the importance of tackling migrant trafficking and transnational crime, with corresponding commitments. Another rise occurred at the 2011 Deauville Summit with 397 words. At Deauville G8 leaders stood in solidarity with the displaced people of Japan due to the natural disaster of March 11, 2011, and expressed concern over the humanitarian situation in Côte d'Ivoire.

The largest treatment of migration was at the 2016 Ise-Shima Summit, when G7 leaders dedicated an unprecedented 2,581 words to the topic. In the leaders' declaration, the G7 recognized that escalated refugee flows were a global problem requiring a global response. They expressed concern for instability in Africa, Syria, Yemen and Libya, and pledged to promote the core principles of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its Protocol.

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Direction Setting

Direction Setting also had an upward trend (see Appendix A and Appendix D). On democracy, the first mention related to migration was made at the Canadian-hosted 1988 Toronto Summit in the Chairman's Summary of Political Issueswhere G7 leaders declared their abhorrence of apartheid in South Africa and stated that the regime must be replaced by a non-racial democracy. It arose again at the 2000 Okinawa Summit, when G8 leaders requested that the Lyon Group report back at the next summit on their progress in the fight against transnational organized crime. Democracy arose again in the 2009 L'Aquila Summit Chair's Summaryon the topic of Development and Africa, when G8 leaders decided to enhance transparency and competition among intermediaries to halve transaction cost of migrants' remittances. At the 2011 Deauville Summit, in the Declaration of the G8 on the Arab Springs,G8 leaders aimed to ensure that instability did not undermine the process of political reform in the region. In the G8-Africa Joint Declaration: Shared Values, Shared Responsibilities, the leaders commended international support for the free and sovereign will of the Ivorian people. The 2016 Ise-Shima Summit had four affirmations of democracy. G7 leaders called for the international community to increase its efforts towards the promotion of peace and good governance, and pledged to strengthen democratic institutions in Africa.

Human rights, related to migration, first arose with three references at the 1988 Toronto Summit. G7 leaders stated that genuine peace could not be established solely by arms control but also required respect for human rights, and urged the Soviet Union to fully implement its commitments under the Helsinki process. Four references were made at the 1996 Lyon Summit, when G7 leaders released a separate document on Decisions Concerning Bosnia and Herzegovina,calling for parties to ensure respect for refugees and displaced persons in accordance with the rule of law. Human rights references thereafter dwindled to just one at the 2006 St. Petersburg Summit when G8 leaders made a reference to gender equality in the Chair's Summary. However, references rose again to five at the 2012 Camp David Summit, with the Camp David Declarationcalling for women's full and equal rights. The 2016 Ise-Shima Summit again made impressive progress with a striking 12 references. In their declaration, G7 leaders called for the international community to increase its efforts towards the rule of law and respect for human rights in response to the global refugee crisis, and committed to increasing the social and economic development of affected regions to support such endeavours. They also reiterated the importance of addressing human rights violations and the root causes of displacement while emphasizing the importance of empowering women and girls.

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Decision making

Decision making on migration also steadily increased (see Appendix A and Appendix E). G7 leaders first committed to address migration at the 1979 Tokyo Summit with a pledge to "significantly increase their contributions to Indochinese refugee relief and resettlement" by increasing the availability of funds and national admission capacities. At the 1992 Munich Summit, leaders again committed to contributing financial support to refugees and displaced persons. During the 1997 Denver Summit, G7 leaders stated that the authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina must respect the right of refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes in a peaceful and orderly manner and made a commitment to "support those communities that work cooperatively to support returns." At Okinawa, three commitments were made, all of which pertained to the fight against transnational organized crime. At the 2009 L'Aquila Summit, another three were made to make financial services more accessible to migrants and reduce the average costs of transferring remittances to increase migrants' income. At the 2014 Brussels Summit, G7 leaders made their first commitment in response to the Syrian refugee crisis by committing to support its neighbouring countries bearing the burden of refugee inflows. At the 2015 Elmau Summit, seven commitments were made, six of which involved the fight against the trafficking of migrants. The remaining commitment sought to tackle the causes of refugee crises. In 2016, the Ise-Shima Summit made an unprecedented 10 commitments, to increase global assistance, create education and employment opportunities, address the root causes of migrant crises, and more. For the first time, G7 leaders also made a specific commitment to support female refugees and internally displaced persons by fighting gender-based violence.

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Delivery

Delivery of G7/8 migration commitments has only tangentially been assessed. However, the limited data available suggests a somewhat upward trend, with the exception of Italy and Japan that have often only partially complied (see Appendix A and Appendix F).

Commitment 1998-55 expressing concern for migrant smuggling with G7 leaders agreeing to take joint action to combat human trafficking. This had average compliance of only +0.33. Yet six years later, commitment 2004-220, to provide emergency food and agriculture assistance to Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia and Sudan in light of ongoing political instability and displacement secured full compliance from nearly all G8 members. Only Italy partially complied, and Russia failed to comply at all. Average compliance was +0.67.

Commitment 2014-114, to support Syria's neighbouring countries bearing the burden of refugee inflows, had average compliance of +0.88. All G7 members fully complied save Japan, which only partially complied. Japan, Italy and Canada also partially complied with commitment 2015-104 to fight the trafficking of migrants (Barnett 2017). All other G7 members fully complied, with average compliance at +0.63. With commitment 2015-105, to tackle the causes of refugee crises, all G7 members fully complied. Finally, on commitment 2015-127 to combat the trafficking of migrants, average compliance was +0.75, with all but Japan and Italy fully complying.

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Development of Global Governance

On the development of global migration governance, the G7/8 leaders' 59 references to external institutions vastly exceeded the seven to internal G7/8 ones (see Appendix A, Appendix G and Appendix H). The first references to institutions within the G7/8 club were made in 1998 at Birmingham when G8 leaders welcomed the steps by the G8 Lyon Group to implement its 40 recommendations on transnational organized crime. Here the G8 also acknowledged the proposals that G8 Justice and Interior Ministers announced at their meeting in Washington in December 1997. The next two were made at Okinawa in 2000 when G8 leaders again referenced the G8 Lyon Group as well as the Moscow G8 Ministerial Conference on Combating Transnational Organized Crime. A third set of two references was made at the 2009 L'Aquila Summit when G8 leaders referenced the 2007 Berlin G8 Conference and the 2009 Global Remittances Working Group. A final internal reference to the Connex Initiative was made in 2016 at Ise-Shima.

The 59 references to external institutions were led by the 34 to the UN. This is consistent with the school seeing the G7/8 as a Security Council supporter. The first external reference to the UN was made during the 1979 Tokyo Summit. References disappeared until the 1991 London Summit when the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) was mentioned. There were another three references to the UN at the 1995 Halifax Summit and again at the 1996 Lyon Summit. At Lyon two referenced the UN and one referenced the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). At the 2007 Heiligendamm Summit, four references were made, with one each to the World Health Organization, World Bank, OECD and African Development Bank. The upward trend and spread continued in 2011 at the Deauville Summit where six references were made, including to the UN, African Union (AU), OECD and Economic Community of West African States. The 2016 Ise-Shima Summit surged to 19 references, to the UN, World Bank, AU, World Food Programme, European Investment Bank and International Syria Support Group.

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Distinctive Mission Done

On distinctive mission done, the key measure is whether the G7/8 actually accomplished its key missions of promoting the values of open democracy and individual liberty in areas where migrant crises have erupted (Kirton 2016). One indirect measure is whether these principles have been achieved in states included in summit documents. Here, the G7/8 has largely failed to perform. In its 2017 Freedom of the World report, Freedom House finds that democracy declined for the last 10 years, with dramatic declines occurring in every region of the world. This includes previous targets of G7/8 migration action such as Libya, Eritrea, Yemen, Ethiopia, Ukraine, Syria and Afghanistan. Furthermore, the "worst of the worst" countries for political rights and civil liberties include other previous targets such as South Sudan, Somalia, Sudan and the Central African Republic. Over a decade after the Kosovo War ended, Pristina is also still listed as "partly free" and faces challenges in ensuring citizens' rights and freedoms. Other previous targets of G7/8 support show a similar trend after the G7/8 acted on them. This suggests that while the G7/8 performs well at summits to address migrant crises, it struggles to achieve the performance outcomes that it wants.

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Deaths Avoided

On deaths avoided, there is no quantitative data to assess the extent to which migrants' lives have been saved by G7/8 action on migration. Yet G7/8 commitments to address migrant crises have likely prevented a worsening of the situation. For example, by complying with commitment 2015-105 to tackle the causes of refugee crises, the G7/8 may have contributed to a prevention of increased death tolls, such as those who die in transit by making dangerous journeys in search of asylum. In striving to end conflict causing displacement, the G7 helps make progress to ensure people are no longer forced to take desperate measures to flee their countries of origin in search of asylum abroad.

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Causes of Performance

Kirton's concert equality model offers six general causes of G7/8 performance, all of which are directly applicable to migration. They are: shock-activated vulnerability, multilateral organization failure, predominant equalizing capability, common characteristics, domestic political cohesion and club participation (Kirton and Larionova 2016).

Shock-activated Vulnerability

Shock-activated vulnerability is the first cause. The irregular migration of asylum seekers has the capacity to create or worsen political instability, thereby challenging social cohesion and global economic growth. For example, the scale of uncertainty generated by the current migrant crisis has reached critical levels unseen since the late 1940s (McKirdy 2016). With Europe as the primary asylum destination, most G7 members — especially the EU, the recent G7 host, Germany, and the current host, Italy — are particularly vulnerable to the effects of migrant inflows. Most migrants reaching Europe enter through Greece or Italy with the goal of entering the Schengen Zone and travelling north to Germany, France or the UK (Barker and Brunsden 2015). This has created a first point of entry problem, as migrants may not wish to claim asylum in the first European state they enter. These problems are in addition to the high death tolls associated with the well-publicized dangerous maritime journeys made to reach European soil, a proliferation of migrant smuggling and trafficking, and a fear that this pure non-state security threat can carry the terrorist one inside G7 countries too (UN 2017).

While some migrants are granted refugee status, many are not. This poses serious legal ambiguities and questions about whether deportation back to conflict-ridden countries is justified. Furthermore, while some states such as Germany have the economic strength to host large refugee populations, others including Greece are less economically stable and cannot offer the same quality of care (King 2016). Refugee resettlement has further fueled increased support for far-right and populist campaigns in several EU states, fostering xenophobic and anti-EU rhetoric and a desire to close borders altogether (Ward 2016). These problems have hit Europe with such force that some have even called it a "European migrant crisis" (Davis 2016). Given that the G7/8 has a European-majority, it is not a surprise that the G7/8 has been and will likely continue to be a satisfactory mechanism to address the crisis.

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Multilateral Organization Failure

Multilateral organization failure is the second cause. Throughout the years, G7/8 members have responded to various migrant crises as a forum of last resort, when other organizations were unable or unwilling to resolve the crisis alone. The G7/8 steps in when other organizations are unable to achieve the necessary results in a timely fashion, if at all. This occurred most pointedly during the Kosovo War in 1999, when G8 leaders brokered Resolution 1244 and helped to bring a swift end to the war, after months of failure to do so through the UNSC (Penttilä 2003).

The G7/8 can act where other organizations are unable to because of its flexible, informal, concert-style structure, consensus decision-making rule, and likeminded members devoted to human rights. In the case of the Kosovo War, the G8 was uniquely suited to respond to the crisis. Unlike the P5 veto and paralyzed UNSC, it was not constrained by bureaucratic inefficiency and did not require unpleasant discussions concerning the legality of the NATO's bombing campaign in Serbia and Kosovo (Penttilä 2003). In the case of disagreement, the G8 refrained from being a closed shop like the UNSC. Instead, it nominated Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari to act on behalf of the EU and G8 to mediate the disagreement between the Russians and Americans. This type of resilience is only possible with the G8 and allows for greater efficiency in effective problem-solving. As former State Secretary of the German Federal Foreign Office Gunther Pleuger (2000) said, "the way the Kosovo conflict was solved would never have been possible in the Security Council." Yet, on Rwanda in 1994 when the UN failed, the G8 did too.

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Predominant Equalizing Capability

The third cause is predominant equalizing capability. G7/8 performance on migration is continuous because of its large collective global capability and its internal capacity for all members to hold an equal voice at the table. Over the years, while some have been less inclined to address migration, others have voiced their concerns and initiated its inclusion in the summit communiqué. This is most pointedly exemplified by the fact that the Italian presidency has already included migration as a key priority of the 2017 Taormina Summit, despite the U.S.' emerging anti-migrant policy (Alfano 2017). This dissent will also likely be quashed by other notable pro-refugee participants such as German Chancellor Angela Merkel.

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Common Characteristics

The fourth cause is common and converging characteristics. Traditionally, the G7/8 has been united in their commonalities of democracy, openness and respect for the rule of law as measured by Polity 4 and Freedom House. Together, these formulate the basis of the G7/8's core mandates of promoting good governance and respect for human rights. Addressing migration-related issues therefore complies with these mandates. Root causes of forced displacement may include political instability, humanitarian suffering, and economic and social devastation by conflict. Furthermore, asylum seekers often face violations of their human rights both prior to and during their displacement. Mismanagement of migrant flows such as a lack of information may perpetuate further violations through crimes like migrant trafficking (Human Rights Watch 2015). Hence, adequately addressing migrant crises by ensuring awareness of legal support, instituting resettlement mechanisms, tackling the root causes of the conflict and ensuring sustainable mechanisms for peace in post-conflict zones aligns perfectly with the G7/8's own goals. However this complete, collective democratic commonality cannot explain the changes in the G7/8's performance on migration.

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Domestic Political Cohesion

The fifth cause, domestic political cohesion, hypothesizes that G7/8 performance depends on the degree of domestic control and support that leaders have at home (Kirton and Larionova 2016). G7/8 commitments with migration are generally met with high compliance scores, with most members fully complying. In the current migrant crisis, many G7 members have been particularly supportive and welcoming towards refugees, suggesting that this performance was at least originally met with popular support. For example, Justin Trudeau was elected Prime Minister of Canada in November 2015 on a platform to increase Canada's support for refugees. Under the Trudeau government, Canada has generally received high compliance scores on migration issues (Zillo 2016). In contrast, the recent election of President Trump in January 2017 will likely translate into lower migration compliance scores for the U.S. as the Trump administration and its supporters have already made clear their lack of support for refugee resettlement initiatives (Friscolanti 2017).

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Club Participation

The sixth cause, club participation, posits that members formulate a small elite group identity and thus have a stake in ensuring the group's success (Kirton and Larionova 2016). Being identified as a G7/8 member confers status and carries important expectations of a great power for addressing global problems such as migrant crises. States worldwide struggle to address the challenges posed by the irregular migration of asylum seekers and look for a leader in the world's response to solving the crisis. The current migrant crisis in particular demonstrates the need for a great power response. By addressing the crisis, G7/8 members reinforce the status of the group as a key player in global migration governance, as well as their individual status as a great power for being part of that group. Hence, G7/8 members have an interest in ensuring the group's leadership in responding to the challenges posed by migrant crises.

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Case Studies

Four summits stand out for their historical or present political importance among the many migrant crises the G7/8 has addressed.

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1979 Tokyo Summit

The first critical case is Tokyo 1979 and the Indochinese refugees. 1979 Tokyo Summit was convened during the height of the Indochinese refugee crisis. The refugee flows were a product of the upheavals following the 1975 communist victories in the former French colonies of Indochina: Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. For the next two decades, over three million people would flee these countries (UNHCR 2000). While the conflicts causing displacement were internal to Indochina, they were exacerbated by rivalries between the two Cold War superpowers, the U.S. and the Soviet Union, as well as China. At the summit, in accordance with the American leadership model of G7/8 governance, U.S. president Jimmy Carter spontaneously proposed that the refugee crisis in Indochina be discussed as part of the formal proceedings. Carter and the other democracy-loving G7 leaders were responding to the threats posed by the communist takeover. Ultimately, the G7 released a Special Statement of the Summit on Indochinese Refugees (1979), which declared the crisis a humanitarian problem threatening the peace and stability of Southeast Asia.

This statement was the product of a deliberation lasting only a few days, in contrast with the fact that the Cold War had produced a paralyzed UN, whose Security Council was unable to produce a similar statement over several years (Power 2013). In this light, the G7 exercised its capacity as a Security Council replacement and addressed an issue that the UN body was unable to do. The commonalities that G7 members shared made it easy for the group to endorse existing norms surrounding human rights and political stability. Given the composition of the P5, this would never have been possible in the UNSC. In a press release from the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs following the summit, the Japanese presidency stated that "Japan itself feels that [it] must make [an] utmost contribution to the solution" of the refugee question and called for the statement to be "transmitted to other various countries and various international organizations" (G7 1979). Carter's personal convictions about human rights was also a key cause.

The 1979 Tokyo Summit's focus on the Indochinese refugee crisis also established the "precedent that summits could react to sudden political or military agencies" (Penttilä, 2003). Yet political and economic issues were still discussed in separate capacities. It was not until the 1991 London Summit that the Communiqué: Economic Declaration: Building World Partnershiprecognized the social and economic effects of migratory pressures.

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1994 Naples Summit

The second critical case is Naples 1994 and the Rwandan refugees. In July 1994 — the final days of the shock of the Rwandan Genocide — G7 leaders met in Italy for the Naples Summit. However, summit documents made no mention of the mass murder or forced displacement concurrently underway in Rwanda. The 1994 Naples Summit is thus a critical case of when the G7/8 failed to perform altogether.

When G7 leaders met on July 8-10, 1994, the Rwandans had already experienced their darkest days (McKinsey 2004). By July 1994, half of Rwanda's population had either been killed or had fled the country Refugee camps in neighbouring countries had grown to the size of major cities, with 200,000 people at Kibumba and almost 500,000 in camps in western Tanzania. The U.S. and UNSC were aware of the details and magnitude of this crisis, but failed to act accordingly (Power 2013). While this would have been an opportune time for the G7 to step in and address the crisis, it too failed to mention or manage any aspect of the genocide — let alone the refugee crisis it had prolonged. The UN's massive, visible multilateral organizational failure in response to this strong shock, as a cause of performance, failed to function as the concert equality model predicts.

It is unclear why the G7 failed to address the refugee crisis in Rwanda, however, there are theories. First, due to the geographical distance between G7 members and Rwanda, direct shock-activated vulnerability was largely absent within the group. No G7 country was being invaded by or acting as a host country for Rwandan refugees. Nor had any been the imperial power of this Belgian colony. Consequently, none experienced first-hand the severe consequences of the crisis. This may have undermined the importance of addressing the crisis at the summit table. This highlights a second possible factor: that the G7's predominant equalizing capability also failed to operate as predicted. It is possible that either leaders collectively concluded it was better to remain uninvolved or that U.S. opposition to stopping the genocide, after its recent failure in Somalia, overwhelmed the summit table. It is therefore likely that the G7 failed to act in the case of Rwanda for similar reasons as the UNSC. That is, leaders concluded that stopping the genocide or taking care of the resulting refugees was not worth the political, financial and/or human cost.

The G7 thus failed to address the Rwandan genocide and consequent refugee crisis. The most that the G7 did was endorse human rights norms and call for new approaches "in the UN and elsewhere to deal with emerging global challenges" including "mass displacement of victims of conflict and involuntary migration across borders" in the Chairman's Statementat the Canadian-hosted 1995 Halifax Summit one year later. Yet while it also condemned extremists in Burundi and Rwanda, the Chairman's Statement made no mention of Rwandan refugees or refugee camps in neighbouring countries. Furthermore, while several Rwandan refugees have yet to return to their homes, no G7 document to date has explicitly mentioned them (McKinsey 2004). The case of Rwanda thus demonstrates a failure of the G7 to address a key migrant crisis. It suggests that perhaps G7 members only act to address migration-related issues when they directly affect them at home.

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1999 Köln Summit

The third critical case is Cologne 1999 and the refugees from Kosovo. On March 24, 1999, NATO began its controversial bombing campaign in Kosovo to force Slobodan Milosevic, Serb nationalist and President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, to agree to a political settlement on Kosovo's future and stop his incipient genocide there (Penttilä 2003). The campaign was met with criticism from both NATO members and those outside the Alliance because NATO had failed to consult the UNSC beforehand, producing legal ambiguity about whether its bombing campaign was justified. In response, an angry Russia refused to participate in the G8 Contact Group. Progress on implementing a solution stalled thereafter, as Serbia pursued its ethnic cleansing campaign.

The German Presidency of the 1999 Köln Summit was thus an opportune time to attempt to end the Kosovo War. The German Presidency developed the Fischer Plan, comprised of five principles on which lasting peace could be built, and took it to the EU and NATO. Risto Penttilä (2003) argues that the use of the G8 to settle the crisis worked for three reasons. First, Russia appreciated that G8 membership implied great-power status. Second, it contained all of the major powers, minus China, whose agreement was necessary. And third, the G8 was not constrained by the strict rules and procedures that other international institutions were constrained by. Furthermore, unlike in Rwanda, most G8 members had a stake in ending the Kosovo conflict in their own regional European home.

In April 1999, G8 members met in Dresden, where they successfully created a solution to the conflict, based on the Fischer Plan. After agreeing on the specific text of the solution, G8 foreign ministers met in June to produce a means of ending the war in Kosovo. They had drafted a resolution for the UNSC. After finalizing the details with their permanent representatives in New York, UNSC Resolution 1244 was quickly adopted. It authorized an international presence in Kosovo and established the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo. While G8 action and Resolution 1244 did not focus on forced displacement issues, the goal of ending the Kosovo War effectively addressed the root causes of refugee flows within the region. Within three weeks of the war's end, 500,000 people had returned to Kosovo (UNHCR 2000a). By the end of 1999, more than 820,000 Kosovo Albanians had returned.

In addition to brokering Resolution 1244 and successfully resolving the conflict in Kosovo, G8 leaders did not take over the spotlight from a weakened Security Council. Instead, in their Statement on Regional Issues, they welcomed steps already taken to provide for the safe and free return of all displaced persons to their homes, and welcome the adoption of Resolution 1244. This demonstrates a consensus that in June 1999 G8 leaders did not intend to replace the UNSC as the centre of governance on international peace and security issues. Instead, they simply acted as a security forum of last resort and worked hard to address the serious humanitarian concerns in the region, thereby restoring its respect for human rights.

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2016 Ise-Shima Summit

The fourth case is the 2016 Ise-Shima Summit, which was an unprecedented success on migration. When G7 leaders met in Japan in May 2016, there was consensus that addressing the current migrant crisis was crucial. In 2015 alone, 65.3 million people were displaced, marking the first time that the threshold of 60 million had been crossed since the Second World War (UNHCR 2016). Of the 65.3 million, 3.2 million people were awaiting decisions on asylum, 21.3 million people were refugees and 40.8 million people had been internally displaced. The massive influx of migrants was and largely continues to be the product of forced displacement by conflict in Afghanistan, Libya, Somalia, Syria and beyond.

Most asylum seekers are currently headed to Europe with the primary goal of entering the Schengen zone (Barker and Brunsden 2015). Thus due to their geographic location and possession of EU membership, many G7 members are particularly affected by the crisis. At the Ise-Shima Summit, leaders therefore placed greater emphasis on addressing root causes of displacement by promoting peace and stability in migrants' countries of origin. They also put a regional focus on certain commitments, by pledging to work towards a stabilized Syria and offering to support the Libyan Government of National Accord in its national restoration of peace and security. Instead of making migration an isolated issue, the leaders' declaration also recognized the implications of irregular migration patterns for other economic and political issues. For the first time, leaders weaved migration-related commitments through other topics including gender equality, employment and the Sustainable Development Goals. This was a departure from how previous passages were drafted, where migration always appeared as a stand-alone issue. In effect, it emphasized how migrants' rights are often violated during their journeys.

While G7 leaders recognized that the large scale of displaced persons is a global problem requiring a global response, leaders again refrained from overstepping the legitimacy of the UN and its Security Council as the primary centre of governance on international peace and security issues. The G7 made commitments in line with existing human rights norms to tackle the migrant crisis through aid, resettlement, assistance and crisis management. They also called for international assistance in responding to cases of protracted displacement. However, G7 leaders specifically stated their support for "UN-led efforts to strengthen the long-term capacity and effectiveness of the international system to respond to humanitarian crises." This includes: 1) increasing resources for humanitarian assistance; 2) reducing reliance on humanitarian aid by investing in resilience and disaster risk reduction, and seeking durable solutions to displacement; 3) broadening the resource base; and 4) enhancing access, efficiency and effectiveness of humanitarian aid delivery systems. They also endorsed UN emergency relief organizations leading the world's response to humanitarian suffering, such as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and UN Children's Rights and Emergency Relief Organization, and welcomed the upcoming UN Summit on Refugees and Migrants in September.

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Conclusion

With certain notable exceptions, led by Rwanda in 1994, the G7/8 has repeatedly responded to various migrant crises worldwide since the emergence of the Indochinese refugee crisis in 1979. Since then, G7/8 migration performance has steadily increased. It is likely that the G7/8's governance of migration will continue to progress in the future in a fashion that endorses human rights norms and reinforces UNSC activities. The G7/8 is expected to continue addressing the current migrant crisis, and such advances will likely be a result of shock-activated vulnerability to G7 countries, multilateral organizational failure, predominant equalizing capability and club participation. This is due above all to the close connection between most G7 members and the effects of the crisis on them at home. G7/8 leaders have a stake in ensuring that current displacement ends and migrants can safely return home. This is likely why the Italy — governing a key EU entry point on the Mediterranean Route — stated at an early stage its intention to prioritize migration and forced displacement at the 2017 Taormina Summit.

If the 2017 Taormina Summit is to make progress on migration, it must address the root causes of displacement, rather than just the symptoms. Leaders must also work harder to promote democracy and the rule of law. The G7/8 struggles with instituting these principles in target states, which is highly problematic for the political stability of post-conflict zones and the achievement of the G7/8's core goals. The maintenance of commonalities among G7/8 members in addressing migration is also under increased pressure, as evidenced by the election of President Trump, Britain's decision to leave the EU, and increased support for far right and anti-EU parties in France and the Netherlands. Thus with a weary Europe, a closing America and a demographically autocratic Japan, 2017 will be a challenging year to ensure effective progress on G7/8 migration performance. Yet the G7/8 has previously succeeded in advancing its aims under suboptimal conditions. It thus remains capable of making 2017 a positive year for migrants, their countries of origin, host countries and the G7/8.

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Appendix A: Overall G7/8 Migration Performance, 1975-2016

Notes:
Domestic Political Management: participation by G7/8 members and at least one representative from the European Union and excludes invited countries; compliments are references to full members in summit documents.
Deliberation: duration of summit and the documents collectively released in the leaders' name at the summit.
Direction Setting: number of statements of fact, causation and rectitude relating directly to open democracy and individual liberty.
Decision Making: number of commitments as identified by the G7/8 Research Group.
Delivery: scores are measured on a scale from -1 (no compliance) to +1 (full compliance). Figures are cumulative scores based on compliance reports.
Development of Global Governance: internal are references to G7/8 institutions in summit documents; external are references to institutions outside the G7/8.
N/A = not applicable; as no commitments have been measured, an average compliance score is not available.

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Appendix B: G7/8 Communiqué Compliments, 1975-2016

1998 Birmingham (N=1)

20. To fight this threat, international cooperation is indispensable. We ourselves, particularly since the Lyon summit in 1996, have sought ways to improve that cooperation. Much has already been achieved. We acknowledge the work being done in the UN, the EU and by other regional groupings. We welcome the steps undertaken by the G8 Lyon Group to implement its 40 Recommendations on transnational organised crime and the proposals G8 Justice and Interior Ministers announced at their meeting in Washington last December. By working together, our countries are helping each other catch criminals and break up cartels. But more needs to be done. There must be no safe havens either for criminals or for their money.

1999 Koln (N=2)

We welcome the decisive steps already taken and now underway to end violence and repression in Kosovo, to establish peace and to provide for the safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes. In this regard, we particularly welcome the adoption on June 10 of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1244, and commend the intensive efforts of our Foreign Ministers and others, including the Special Envoys of the European Union and the Russian Federation, to restore peace and security.

2016 Ise-Shima (N=1)

The G7 encourages international financial institutions and bilateral donors to bolster their financial and technical assistance for refugees and other displaced persons as well as their host communities and welcomes, in particular, the launch of New Financing Initiative to Support the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Region. We also call for close coordination with existing facilities and funding mechanisms, such as the EU Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis ('Madad Fund'), the EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey, and the EU Trust Fund for Africa. We stress the importance of increasing support to the most affected host countries, such as Jordan, Lebanon and Kenya, and continue close cooperation with Turkey, which will help deliver the outcomes of the London Conference on Supporting Syria and the Region. The Syrian crisis has underlined the need for the international community to be better equipped to assist developing countries of all income levels and across all regions in addressing cases of protracted displacements. Increasing global support for relevant international humanitarian and emergency relief organizations, such as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the World Food Programme, and UN Children's Rights and Emergency Relief Organization (UNICEF), is vital.

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Appendix C: G7/8 Conclusions on Migration, 1975-2016

Notes:
Data are drawn from all official English-language documents released by the G8 leaders as a group. Charts are excluded.
# words: number of migration-related subjects for the year specified, excluding document titles and references. Words are calculated by paragraph because the paragraph is the unit of analysis.
% total words: total number of words in all documents for the year specified.
# paragraphs: number of paragraphs containing references to migration for the year specified. Each point is recorded as a separate paragraph.
% total paragraphs: total number of paragraphs in all documents for the year specified.
# documents: number of documents that contain migration subjects and excludes dedicated documents.
% total documents: total number of documents for the year specified.
# dedicated documents: number of documents for the year that contain a migration-related subject in the title.

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Appendix D: G7/8 Direction-Setting Performance, 1975-2016

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Appendix E: G7/8 Commitments on Migration, 1975-2016

1979-32: "The Governments represented will, as part of an international effort, significantly increase their contributions to Indochinese refugee relief and resettlement — by making more funds available and by admitting more people, while taking into account the existing social and economic circumstances in each of their countries." (development)

1992-41: "The needs of hundreds of thousands of refugees and displaced persons require further significant financial support. We are willing to contribute and ask others also to make fair contributions."

1995-68: "We reiterate our firm belief in the necessity for the international community to promote efficient means to respond promptly to humanitarian emergencies, and support the work of the WEU in this area."

1997-144: "The authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina must uphold fully the right of refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes in a peaceful and orderly manner. We will support those communities that work cooperatively to support returns. Those who fail to do so will lose access to economic assistance."

1998-55: "We are deeply concerned by all forms of trafficking of human beings including the smuggling of migrants. We agreed to joint action to combat trafficking in women and children, including efforts to prevent such crimes, protect victims and prosecute the traffickers."

2000-55: "We reaffirm our support for the adoption by the end of 2000 of the UN Transnational Organized Crime Convention and three related Protocols on firearms, smuggling of migrants and trafficking in persons for the establishment of an effective legal framework against transnational organized crime (TOC)."

2000-56: "We appreciate the work undertaken by the Lyon Group in the fight against TOC, and request them to report back to our next meeting".

2000-57: "We also endorse the results of the Moscow G8 Ministerial Conference on Combating Transnational Organized Crime".

2002-43: "Working to enhance African capacities to protect and assist war-affected populations and facilitate the effective implementation in Africa of United Nations Security Council resolutions relating to civilians, women and children in armed conflict — including by supporting African countries hosting, assisting and protecting large refugee populations"

2004-220: "Although harvests improved in 2003-04, substantial emergency assistance will still be required for Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia, and Sudan, in part because of political instability and displacement of populations due to conflicts…Working with other donors, we will do our part to ensure that emergency needs, including food, are met." (food and agriculture)

2005-139: "We, the leaders of the G8 and of Africa, renew our resolve today to see an end to the crisis in Darfur — a crisis that has seen thousands killed, some two million displaced and fearful to return home, and that threatens to undermine a hard-won peace agreement for Southern Sudan, itself the scene of over twenty years of brutal civil war. To this end we have already provided diverse and significant assistance, and we commit here to continuing that support." (regional security)

2007-188: "encouraging African states to promote higher allocations toward domestic investment by sharing best practices about market-oriented financing schemes to open-up more options for a productive use of remittances, for example granting incentives for migrants channeling parts of their savings towards economic development in their country of origin;" (development)

2008-191: "We reaffirm our commitment to preventing and combating transnational organized crime using all means at our disposal, while ensuring the rule of law and respect for human rights." (crime and corruption)

2008-192: "We will strengthen our cooperation, including experience-sharing, to fight against transnational organized crime, including trafficking in persons, smuggling of migrants, illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, cybercrime and money laundering." (crime)

2009-171: "Given the development impact of remittance flows, we will facilitate a more efficient transfer and improved use of remittances and enhance cooperation between national and international organizations, in order to implement the recommendations of the 2007 Berlin G8 Conference and of the Global Remittances Working Group established in 2009 and coordinated by the World Bank." (finance)

2009-172: "We will aim to make financial services more accessible to migrants and to those who receive remittances in the developing world." (finance)

2009-173: "We will work to achieve in particular the objective of a reduction of the global average costs of transferring remittances from the present 10% to 5% in 5 years through enhanced information, transparency, competition and cooperation with partners, generating a significant net increase in income for migrants and their families in the developing world." (finance)

2013-180: "[We will offer political and practical support to those regional and international organisations leading efforts to] tackle facilitating factors such as corruption, transnational organised crime and illicit trafficking of drugs and people, which undermine governance and the rule of law and in some cases provide an important source of funding for terrorists." (crime and corruption)

2014-114: "We are committed to supporting the neighbouring countries bearing the burden of Syrian refugee inflows" (regional security)

2015-104: "[Based on our common values and principles we are committed to:] Fighting Trafficking of Migrants" (human rights)

2015-105: "[Based on our common values and principles we are committed to:] Tackling Causes for Refugee Crises" (development)

2015-126: "We reaffirm our commitment to prevent [the trafficking of migrants]" (human rights)

2015-127: "[We reaffirm our commitment to] combat the trafficking of migrants]" (human rights)

2015-128: "[We reaffirm our commitment] to detect [human trafficking in and beyond our borders.]" (human rights)

2015-129: "[We reaffirm our commitment to] deter [human trafficking in and beyond our borders.]" (human rights)

2015-130: "[We reaffirm our commitment to] disrupt human trafficking in and beyond our borders." (human rights)

2016-9: "We commit to increase global assistance to meet immediate and long-term needs of refugees and other displaced persons as well as their host communities." (development)

2016-114: "We commit to increase global assistance to meet immediate and longer-term needs of refugees and other displaced persons as well as their host communities, via humanitarian, financial, and development assistance, cooperation, as well as other measures to support trade and investment consistent with our international obligations, recognizing the necessity of closer collaboration between humanitarian, development and other actors." (development)

2016-117: "We commit to assist the front-line states in creating education and employment opportunities for refugees in order to empower them as future assets contributing to the stability and prosperity of host communities and the reconstruction of home countries after their return." (development)

2016-118: "The G7 supports the strengthening of the international protection approaches through promoting the core principles of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its Protocol, and by providing safe haven for those fleeing persecution. It is also clear, however, that protection frameworks should not be used to bypass legitimate immigration assessment." (human rights)

2016-119: "We are determined to continue to fight migrant smuggling and modern slavery, and protect victims of trafficking together with countries of origin, transit and destination." (human rights)

2016-120: "Further, we support UN-led efforts to strengthen the long-term capacity and effectiveness of the international system to respond to humanitarian crises, which includes: (i) increasing resources for humanitarian assistance, (ii) reducing reliance on humanitarian aid by investing in resilience and disaster risk reduction, and by seeking durable solutions to displacement; (iii) broadening the resource base; as well as (iv) enhancing access, efficiency and effectiveness of humanitarian aid delivery systems." (development)

2016-125: "We are committed to supporting displaced persons and their host communities and to working towards a long-term, sustainable post-conflict stabilization and rehabilitation of Syria and to eradicating conditions conducive to violent extremism." (development)

2016-134: "We stand ready to offer support to the GNA to help restore peace, security and prosperity, and address the dire humanitarian suffering." (peace and security)

2016-144: "We thus continue to support African and regional organizations' efforts to address these issues, including to prevent and resolve conflicts, strengthen democratic institutions, fight against trafficking in persons, manage irregular migration, combat the illicit transfer of conventional arms, create jobs for the youth, expose and tackle corruption, and promote sustainable development and resilience, emphasizing the importance of African ownership of these efforts." (peace and security)

2016-280: "We are committed to support refugee and internally displaced women and girls as well as for those affected by conflicts and disasters, by providing assistance to empower them and develop their resilience, and to prevent and respond to sexual and gender-based violence." (gender)

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Appendix F: G7/8 Compliance with Commitments on Migration, 1975-2016

Notes:
+1 = full compliance.
0 = partial compliance.
−1 = no compliance.

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Appendix G: G7/8 Development of Global Governance — External References, 1975-2016

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Appendix H: G7/8 Development of Global Governance — Internal References, 1975-2016

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