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Promising Prospects for the Kananaskis Summit
John Kirton, G7 Research Group
April 5, 2025
For the G7’s 50th anniversary in 2025 and its 51st annual gathering, Canada will host the summit once again at Kananaskis, Alberta, in the majestic Rocky Mountains, on June 15–17.
It will be a landmark event in several ways. It starts a new generation of the G7’s growing performance and contribution to global governance, after its first half century of work since 1975 (see Appendix A). It comes at the start of the final five years to reach the United Nations’ 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), launched 10 years ago and due to be delivered by 2030. Above all, it starts the return for a second term of US president Donald Trump, now waging verbal and economic war on the G7 host and all other G7 partners as never before.
Kananaskis will build on the strong foundation laid by Italy’s Apulia Summit in June 2024. It will confront a full range of interconnected crises, including the wars in Ukraine, the Middle East and elsewhere, and the need for clean energy to combat the existential threat of climate change, biodiversity loss and environmental pollution. It simultaneously faces the revolutionary benefits and risks brought by artificial intelligence (AI), quantum computing and associated digital technologies, amidst economic, food and health insecurity, declines in development, debt sustainability and democracy, and new challenges from financial instability, migration and border security. It must complete members’ compliance with the 34 accumulated commitments made by G7 leaders since 2015 that are due by 2025. They are led by those on climate change and the environment with 19, energy with four, health with three, digitalization and gender with two each, and Ukraine, food and agriculture, labour and employment, and development with one each. It must also advance action on the UN’s 2030 Agenda on Sustainable Development and its 17 SDGs, which are all far behind from being realized in five years. In Canada, a transcontinental, ecological superpower bordering the Pacific, Atlantic and Arctic oceans, G7 leaders will assemble on the frontlines of these crises, to work among themselves and with their invited guests from key countries and major multilateral and regional organizations in response.
In Kananaskis, the leaders of Canada, France, the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, Japan, Italy and the European Union will build on the results of the high-level meetings of the UN General Assembly in September 2024, the G20 summit in Rio de Janeiro on November 18–19 and the G7 foreign and finance ministers’ meetings that Canada has mounted in the first half of 2025. But G7 leaders alone have the unique responsibility to confront and control the security, economic, environmental and other crises in ways that fulfil their shared, distinctive foundational mission of protecting at home and promoting globally their core values of open democracy, individual liberty and social advance.
The participating G7 leaders will be a mix of five veterans and four newcomers. They will be led by the new Canadian prime minister, after a general election held on April 28, just seven weeks before the summit starts. French president Emmanuel Macron will be at his 10th consecutive G7 summit. It will be the fourth in-person one for US president Trump, re-elected on November 5, 2024, and inaugurated on January 20, 2025. They will be joined by Italy’s prime minister Giorgia Meloni at her third, after hosting for the first time in 2024. It will be the first G7 summit for the UK prime minister Sir Keir Starmer, Japanese prime minister Ishiba Shigeru, whose coalition won the general election on October 27, 2024, and German chancellor Friedrich Merz, after his party’s election victory on February 23. The European Union will send Commission president Ursula von der Leyen to her sixth summit and António Costa, Council president since December 1, to his first.
The prospects for the performance of the Kananaskis Summit have aroused a debate among those in several schools of thought, about how well it will do and why.
The first school, arising immediately after the US elections on November 5, sees severely reduced performance, due to Trump becoming president. Eric Reguly (2024) wrote that Trump “could pay scant attention to, or outright disdain for, G7 and G20 summits and other international events, as he did in his first presidency.”
The second school, appearing as December ended, sees the G7 global steering committee having problems, due to most members’ domestic political difficulties driven by populism and fiscal pressures and Trump. Gideon Rachman (2024) wrote that “the majority of G7 governments are now so burdened with domestic political problems that they are incapable of steering their own countries – let alone the free world … [due to] the rise of populist parties … [and] a fiscal squeeze created by slow growth, ageing societies, the pandemic, the financial crisis of 2008 and demands for increased defence spending.” He added that Trump and Elon Musk “seem to enjoy piling on the pain … [and] particularly like baiting centre-left leaders such as Trudeau, Scholz and Starmer.” Rachman concluded that Trump “may create a situation in which the leaders of many of America’s closest allies come to regard the US president not as a friend, but as a dangerous political enemy.”
The third school, offered by former Canadian sherpa Peter Boehm (2025), sees a “‘G7 Lite’ summit and agenda as a bid to strengthen if not save the institution.” This is due to the politics, the “timing crunch” and the “known unknowns.” They include a very new Canadian prime minister as host, time for only hastily arranged pre-summit meetings for foreign and finance ministers, Trump’s aversion to multilateral meetings and uncertainty about his attendance without concessions for doing so, his poor briefing, a possible G6 meeting and even the question of whether “this venerable, informal institution falls apart.”
The fourth school sees a possible G6 without the US participating. Lisa Van Dusen (2025) said the G7 faces the choices of subjecting itself to “another G-hijacking, complete with performative scene-stealing and a working lunch upstaged by trade-war talk over elk terrine; or, the G7 suspends the United States and is portrayed in the usual propaganda circles as weakened for being reduced to the G6.” This is due to “the early, autocratic course the Trump presidency has taken both domestically and internationally.”
The fifth school sees consensus difficult due to Trump. Valerie Percival and Shawn Barber (2025) wrote that the Kananaskis Summit comes at a perilous time as Trump has replaced diplomacy with coercion and put the global order at risk. They recommend that Canada lead a G6 with an expanded agenda on multilateral trade liberalization, global health and development, gender equality, and many regional conflicts, and collaborate with South Africa’s G20 and other emerging economies to do so.
The sixth school sees mostly a mystery (Taylor-Vaisey and Sue Allan 2025). This is due to uncertainty about who Canada’s prime minister would be and about the state of Canada-US relations in June. But officials have already been planning the summit for many months, G7 foreign ministers will meet in Charlevoix on March 12–14, finance ministers and central bank governors will meet in Banff on May 20–22, the summit could focus on energy affordability, Canada’s sherpa met with the civil society engagement groups on February 4, and the G7 political directors had already met several times during the first seven weeks in 2025.
The seventh school sees an important opportunity for Canada and its G7 to improve the world on HIV/AIDS. David Morley (2025) argues that Canada’s Conservative minority government of Stephen Harper did so by raising $5 billion for maternal, newborn and child health at Muskoka in 2010 and the Liberal majority government of Justin Trudeau did so by raising $3.8 billion for girls’ education at Charlevoix in 2018. He says the shock of Trump’s severing development assistance funding for health could spur the new Canadian prime minister’s Kananaskis Summit to a similar success.
The eighth school sees an opportunity for Canada to create a new all-democratic “G7 plus.” David Welch (2025) says that, due to Trump, Canada should create “a new group of wealthy, high-functioning, committed liberal democracies with economies big enough to have an impact to begin mapping a collective strategy for resisting the global turn toward socially regressive authoritarianism and salvaging what can be rescued of the liberal international order.” He noted that Australia, Austria, Belgium, Britain, Canada, Czechia, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and Taiwan constitute almost a third of the global economy.
The G7’s Kananaskis Summit currently promises to produce a productive performance. It could well be a significant one, due to the severe shocks it confronts, the many multilateral organizational failures in response, and the members’ still globally predominant and internally equalizing capabilities, with the latter due to the relative decline of the US inside the G7. But its members have unprecedentedly divergent political principles, practices and policies, with Trump now waging economic war against all his fellow G7 members, threatening to annex neighbouring Canada and at times supporting authoritarian Russia in its war against a democratic Ukraine. Nonetheless its leaders’ initially low domestic political support is changing, with Trump’s now declining as the others rise, possibly leading Trump to adjust to the others’ united front at the summit itself. And the G7’s pre-summit ministerial meetings show that all members remain committed to the G7, rather than the G20, as the core of an expanding network of global summit governance.
Canada’s physical plans for hosting its seventh G7 summit were first announced at the end of the Apulia Summit on June 14, 2024, when Trudeau said the summit site would be in Kananaskis, Alberta, which had previously worked for the then G8 Summit (with Russia a member) in 2002. The choice flowed from the fact that it was western Canada’s turn to host the summit again, after Charlevoix, Quebec, in 2018 and Muskoka, Ontario, in 2010. Kananaskis had also proven to be a location totally secure from assaults by terrorists or violent protestors by air, land or sea. And using on the plans and infrastructure built in 2002 would reduce costs.
Canada’s priorities for the Kananaskis Summit were first announced at the end of the Apulia Summit on June 14, 2024 (see Appendix B). More directly, the statement from the Prime Minister’s Office ([PMO] 2024) said Trudeau “underlined Canada’s continued commitment to working together with G7 partners on common priorities,” such as:
The priorities were thus inclusive economies, climate change and digitalization with artificial intelligence at the core. Trudeau himself also suggested the priorities would be clean energy and foreign election interference.
At the G20 Rio Summit on November 18–19, Trudeau’s (2024) priorities were the similar ones of:
On February 10, 2025, the PMO (2025a) reported that Trudeau met with AI business leaders in Paris, including the heads of Anthropic, Advanced Micro Devices, OVHCloud, Hugging Face and Arm. Trudeau said that, using its G7 presidency, Canada would demonstrate leadership in advancing security, prosperity and partnerships including through AI adoption, energy and inclusion. He noted Canada’s abundance of critical minerals, clean and reliable energy, and a growing semiconductor industry. He “positioned Canada as an ideal partner for AI innovation” with a “vibrant AI ecosystem” and strong government support through initiatives such as the Pan-Canadian Artificial Intelligence Strategy and emphasized Canada’s commitment to taking an ethical and responsible approach.
On March 17, 2025, Canada’s new prime minister, Mark Carney, highlighted Ukraine’s security and sovereignty as a priority for Canada’s G7 presidency (PMO 2025c). He constantly promised during the subsequent campaign for the general election on April 28, that Canada would build the best economy in the G7.
Also likely to appear on the Kananaskis agenda are the subjects of the commitments made by past G7 summits due for delivery in 2025 (see Appendix C). The 23 commitments from 2015 to 2023 were led by those on the environment with eight, climate change with six, and energy with four, followed by health and gender with two each, and labour and employment with one. The Apulia Summit added 11, to create a new total of 34. The Apulia additions are led by climate change with three, the environment and digitalization with two each, and Ukraine, food and agriculture, development, and health with one each. Together, these 34 commitments due in 2025 are led by climate change and the environment with 19, energy with four, health with three, digitalization and gender with two each, and Ukraine, food and agriculture, labour and employment, and development with one each. Among these 34, the two (on fossil fuel subsidies and climate finance) assessed for compliance one year after they were made, had averaged compliance of 72% for all members and 75% for Canada.
The subjects of these inherited deadlines coincided well with two of the top three top priorities that Canada identified for its Kananaskis Summit in June, that Trudeau had brought to the 2024 Apulia Summit in 2024.
By March 2025, it appeared that geopolitics would be front and centre of the Kananaskis agenda. Leaders would focus on Ukraine, the Indo-Pacific, the Middle East, other regional conflicts and crises that might have arisen by then. For Canada, the priorities included Haiti, Venezuela, Sudan and the Congo. Many would be addressed by the foreign ministers’ meetings.
Kananaskis would also discuss the digital transition, in particular AI.
G7 sherpas held their first meeting in Vancouver in January.
The second sherpa meeting was held at Montebello, Quebec, in March.
The G7 leaders held their first, inter-sessional hybrid summit on February 24, the third anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Trudeau hosted from Kyiv, accompanied by von der Leyen and Costa, as well as Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy, with the other leaders participating virtually.
However, the leaders were not able to agree on a communiqué that again accused Russia of “aggression” for its full-scale invasion on Ukraine, as the US would not agree on that or any similar wording (Shakil 2025). Trudeau as host tried very hard to produce a consensus collective statement but did not succeed.
The Canadian presidency mounted ministerial meetings in Canada for only two portfolios before the Kananaskis Summit – those for foreign affairs and finance. Meetings were organized for the foreign ministers to meet in Charlevoix on March 14, although they had met earlier at the Munich Security Conference in February. They could meet again in the fall, perhaps on the margins of UNGA in September.
Similarly, the first in-person meeting for G7 finance ministers and central bankers in Canada would be in Banff, Alberta, on May 20–22. They also met in February, during the G20 ministerial meeting in Cape Town organized by South Africa’s G20 presidency. Canada’s newly appointed finance minister François-Philippe Champagne also held a video conference with his colleagues on March 17, to discuss “important global issues” in preparation for the May meeting and summit (Finance Canada 2025). G7 finance ministers and central bankers would also possibly meet on the margins of the spring and annual meetings of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank.
On February 15, 2025, G7 foreign ministers met in Munich, on the margins of the Munich Security Conference. It was the first ministerial meeting of Canada’s 2025 G7 presidency, hosted by foreign minister Melanie Joly. Although a G7 foreign ministers’ meeting outside the host country was unusual, they had first begun meeting at the United Nations in New York, and Canada had held at least one other ministerial meeting during its previous presidencies in the neighbouring United States.
The Munich meeting was attended by all G7 foreign ministers, including US secretary of state Marco Rubio. He had just announced his intention to boycott the G20 foreign ministers’ meeting in Johannesburg on February 20 – the first ministerial meeting in 2025 G20 presidency – due to the Trump administration’s displeasure with South Africa’s G20 thematic emphasis on what Trump saw as diversity, equity and inclusion.
Before leaving Tokyo for Munich, Japanese foreign minister Takeshi Iwaya said that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was expected to be “one of the key themes … [as] the international situation remains highly turbulent. Unfortunately, division and confrontation continue to deepen. I believe these circumstances are significantly testing whether the G7, which has shared values and principles, can maintain and strengthen its cooperation, something it must do … G7 cooperation is essential” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2025).
G7 foreign ministers passed this test. Importantly, the G7 foreign ministers (2025b) in Munich released a fully consensual “Joint G7 Foreign Ministers’ Statement.” Its 774 words contained nine commitments, all fully agreed. The first three were on Russia’s war against Ukraine, the next four on the Middle East, and the final two on the Indo-Pacific region.
Standing out was the commitment in which “G7 members reaffirmed their unwavering support for Ukraine in defending its freedom, sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity” (G7 Foreign Ministers 2025b). It was reinforced by “they … reaffirmed the need to develop robust security guarantees to ensure the war will not begin again,” once peace had come. At this session they were joined by Andrii Sybiha, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, with whom they discussed and affirmed the many key measures G7 members had taken to provide “Ukraine with long-term security and stability as a sovereign, independent country.” This was a badly needed display of G7 unity and full support for Ukraine, coming after the discrepant remarks by US vice president J.D. Vance and US defence secretary Pete Hegseth at the Munich Security Conference, and the recent actions and statements of Trump.
The four commitments on the Middle East contained two on Gaza, with one stating “G7 members stand behind the ongoing efforts of Egypt, Qatar and the United States in continuing to work toward a permanent ceasefire” (G7 Foreign Ministers 2025b). Yet along with this shared communiqué compliment to the United States there was no hint that they were prepared to reconstruct Gaza in the way that Trump wanted.
The passages on the Indo-Pacific singled out “China’s attempts to restrict freedom of navigation through militarization and coercive activities in the South China Sea” (G7 Foreign Ministers 2025b). And as Japan wished, “They called upon [the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea] to resolve the abductions issue immediately.
The statement also noted G7 members’ discussions of conflict and instability in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan, Haiti and Venezuela, showing that the G7 continued to be a global security governor.
The statement ended by describing Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as an act of “aggression” and by stating the G7 foreign ministers (2025b) “looked forward to their meeting in Canada in Charlevoix, Quebec on March 12–14.” This was the place where Trudeau had hosted the G7 summit in 2018, with president Trump there. It also showed that the G7 was still alive and well, functioning in a broad, unified fashion, to hold the fort and prepare the way for the leaders at their Kananaskis Summit in June, where their focus would also be on peace and security, led by Russia’s war against Ukraine.
The G7 foreign ministers held their first meeting in Canada on March 12–14 at Charlevoix. Their performance was much better than many had expected and feared (Al Mallees 2025). All ministers participated in person, including US secretary of state Marco Rubio, direct from his meeting in Saudi Arabia on March 11 to negotiate a ceasefire in Ukraine.
At Charlevoix, G7 foreign ministers produced two documents, more than the one they had at their meeting in Munich on February 15 (Kirton 2025c). At Charlevoix there was a joint statement on a broad range of global security issues and a Declaration on Maritime Security and Prosperity covering, political, economic, crime, environmental, food and agriculture, and many other subjects.
Importantly, the joint statement, agreed by all the foreign ministers including Rubio, began by reaffirming their “unwavering support for Ukraine in defending its territorial integrity” (G7 Foreign Ministers 2025c). Moreover, it described Russia’s actions as “aggression,” by underscoring the “need for robust and credible security arrangements to ensure that Ukraine can deter and defend against and renewed acts of aggression.”
The statement’s 1,583 words contained 10 commitments, which was more than the nine commitments made in Munich. Charlevoix’s commitments had three on Ukraine, three on “regional peace and security in the Middle East,” two on “cooperation to increase security and resilience across the Indo-Pacific,” and two on “building stability and resilience in Haiti and Venezuela” (see Kirton 2025a). It was thus a broad and balanced set of commitments that still put Ukraine and the Middle East first.
The Charlevoix foreign ministers’ joint statement affirmed the G7’s democratic values four times and those of human rights twice. It developed global governance institutionally within the G7 three times, by welcoming “efforts to strengthen the Sanctions Working Group focused on listings and enforcement” and “discussions on the establishment of a Hybrid Warfare and Sabotage Working Group and of a Latin America Working Group” (G7 Foreign Ministers 2025c). It also developed global governance institutionally beyond the G7 three times.
The Declaration on Maritime Security and Prosperity contained 2,519 words and an additional seven commitments (see Kirton 2025a). These seven consisted of a general one on international security, economic prosperity and the sustainable use of marine resources, two on “emerging threats on safe seas and freedom of navigation and overflight, and four on “safe shipping and supply chain security” (G7 Foreign Ministers 2025a).
Although there were no affirmations of the value of democracy or human rights, there were extensive ones to ecological sustainability, which joined security and the economy as an equal part of the overall trilogy. Notably, the declaration noted the dangers to ports caused by “extreme weather events” in a clear reference to climate change (G7 Foreign Ministers 2025a). This could provide a way in which the G7 leaders at Kananaskis could act to combat climate change themselves.
In its institutional development of global governance, the maritime declaration made three references to bodies within the G7 and 12 to those outside.
However, what stood out were the connections the declaration made to a wide range of other G7 and global issues. Apart from security, the economy and ecology in general, these included trade, information and communications technologies, biodiversity, fishing, food, critical minerals, energy, crime, development, terrorism, migration and refugees, and health in the form of “illegal drug trafficking.”
Also noteworthy was the condemnation of China, which joined Russia as a target, while North Korea, and the Houthis were singled out too. The reference to the Houthis foreshadowed the US attack in Yemen a few days later. US concerns were also well reflected in the passages on port security, although the Panama Canal was not mentioned by name.
There were also many references to the vulnerabilities that the maritime domain posed to G7 members.
Overall, at Charlevoix the G7 foreign ministers showed a strong degree of unity across a broad range of subjects. The meeting increased hopes that Trump would reflect this new G7 consensus in the telephone call he was scheduled to hold with Putin on March 18, designed to get a serious Russian sign on to the agreement between the US and Ukraine on an immediate ceasefire in Russia’s war against Ukraine. Charlevoix also offered stronger grounds that the Kananaskis Summit itself would be more productive than many had previously thought.
G7 finance ministers and central bank governors also held their first meeting outside Canada, on February 27, during the G20 finance meeting in Cape Town. This was a hybrid meeting with complete attendance. US treasury secretary Scott Bessent participated virtually and Federal Reserve governor Jerome Powell participated in person. No outcome document was released.Soon after being sworn in, on March 17, Canadian prime minister Mark Carney invited Ukrainian president Zelenskyy to the Kananaskis Summit (Hodunova 2025; Le Monde 2025). No other decisions had been made regarding guests invited to Kananaskis by the end of March (Parashar 2025).
Kananaskis will be the first major event hosted by Canada’s newly elected prime minister, Trump’s first visit to Canada during his second term, and possibly the first time some G7 leaders meet Trump in person. Canada plans a summit with attendance by all G7 leaders.
Trump’s priorities will probably include trade and tariffs, tax cuts, border security through restricting flows of migrants and illicit drugs, countering China, raising G7 members’ defence spending, and enhancing American energy security from domestic fossil fuels.
Many expect the G7 to lay an ambitious groundwork for the other plurilateral summits coming soon after Kananaskis. These are the North Atlantic Treaty Organization summit in the Netherlands on June 24–25 (which Trump is due to attend), the International Conference on Financing for Development in Spain on June 30–July 3 and the 30th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in Brazil on November 10–21.
There are also several deadlines in 2025 set by other international institutions to which G7 members belong, starting with the G20, the IMF and World Bank, and the major bodies of the UN, especially those on issues and initiatives where Canada and Trudeau have taken an institutional lead (see Appendix D).On February 8 Trudeau flew to Europe, to give a keynote address at the AI Summit hosted by Macron in Paris on February 10–11. News reports indicated that AI would have an important place on the Kananaskis agenda. Indeed, in Paris on February 9, Trudeau said that a key G7 priority in 2025 would be generating more electricity to power AI, but not at the cost of climate change. Nuclear energy could thus be a priority, as well as lowering the energy demand of AI (Karadeglija 2025). While in Europe, Trudeau also met with the leaders of NATO and the EU in Belgium.
On February 13, after speaking by phone for 90 minutes with Vladimir Putin, Trump suggested that the G7 invite him back to reconstitute the G8, from which Russia had been suspended in the spring of 2014 after invading and annexing the Crimean region of Ukraine. CNN’s Kaitlan Collins (2025) reported that when Trump was asked if he trusted Putin, Trump replied: “Yeah, I believe he would like to see something happen. I trust him on this subject.” She also reported that Trump thought Putin “would love to be back” in the G8. Canadian Conservative Party leader Pierre Poilievre (2025) and Liberal leadership candidate Chrystia Freeland (2025) quickly responded that they would never let Putin back in. Former foreign policy advisor to Trudeau Roland Paris (2025) tweeted that “Trump will probably withdraw when the rest of the G7 refuses to readmit Putin.”
Prime Minister Carney, right after being sworn in as prime minister on March 14, travelled first to Paris to meet with Macron and then to London to meet Starmer on March 17. Only the readout of the meeting with Starmer referred to the Kananaskis Summit, specifically mentioning that the G7 agenda would include support for Ukraine (PMO 2025c). The discussions in Paris included issues that could possibly be on the Kananaskis agenda, such as responsible and safe artificial intelligence, critical minerals, clean energy, and rules-based free trade (PMO 2025b).
By the end of March 2025, the G7’s Kananaskis Summit’s prospective productive and possibly significant performance was propelled by the severe shocks it will confront, the many multilateral organizational failures in response, and G7 members’ still globally predominant and internally equalizing capabilities, the latter due to the decline in the US currency and economy. But these propellers were offset very strongly by its members’ unprecedentedly divergent political principles, practices and policies. This divergence was due to Trump now waging economic war against fellow G7 members, threatening to annex neighbouring Canada and Greenland in the EU and often supporting authoritarian Russia in its war against a democratic Ukraine. Nonetheless, G7 leaders’ initially low domestic political support was changing, with Trump’s now declining as the others now rising. This could lead Trump to adjust at Kananaskis to the others’ unified views. Already the G7 ministerial meetings and even the February 24 virtual summit suggested that all the leaders remained committed to the G7, rather than the G20, as the core of an expanding network of global summit governance to deal with the most important and difficult issues they faced.
G7 members’ shock-activated vulnerability, the strongest propellor of performance, is very high. This is especially from shocks directly related the G7 summits distinctive foundational mission of protecting within its own members and promoting globally the values of open democracy and individual liberty, along with the more broadly shared value of social advance. These are led by Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, China’s threat to Taiwan, war in the Middle East and instability in Haiti. Another unprecedented shock was the barrage of protectionist tariffs that Trump unleased on April 2 against all his G7 partners and many other countries in the world. While the vulnerabilities from Russia and the Middle East are inflicted by others, the barrage of Trump’s tariffs means that their solution lies within the G7 itself.
The physical shocks included the deadly terrorist attacks in Germany and Europe, extreme weather events fuelled by climate change led by the deadly Los Angeles wildfires and subsequent ones throughout the US, and the prospect of a new health pandemic from escalating cases and deaths from bird flu, flu and measles in the US.
Political shocks were constant, and unprecedented in their scale, scope and origin from the G7’s most powerful member. These shocks were dominated by the barrage of threats and decisions from Trump, who was inaugurated as US president on January 20, 2025. The most severe and sustained was his threat to use economic force to annex Canada as the 51st US state and to acquire EU member Greenland, without ruling out the use of military force to do so. This was followed by his threat to expel all inhabitants from Gaza forever, and to acquire it for a US-led real estate development. These shocks came with proliferating threats and then actions to impose tariffs on China, Canada and Mexico, then all countries’ steel and aluminum, and all products and services as “reciprocal” tariffs against what the US deemed as unfair. Moreover, in a bilateral call with Putin about Ukraine on February 12, Trump agreed to give Putin almost all of what Putin wanted in Ukraine.
During January 2025, the front page of the Financial Times on the 25 available days had stories on democracy on 92%, on climate change and the economy on 76% each, on digitalization on 44%, and on health on 32%.
The World Economic Forum’s Global Risks Report 2025 in January led with state-based armed conflict chosen by 23% of its survey respondents, followed in turn by extreme weather events from 14%, geoeconomic confrontation 8%, misinformation and disinformation 7%, societal polarization 6%, economic downturn 5% and critical change to earth systems 4%. For the next two years, the ranking was misinformation and disinformation, extreme weather events, state-base armed conflict, societal polarization, and cyber espionage and warfare. For the next 10 years it was extreme weather events, biodiversity loss and ecosystem collapse, critical change to Earth systems, natural resource shortages, and misinformation and disinformation (World Economic Forum 2025).
The failure of the world’s major multilateral organizations in responding to these severe shocks was very high, especially with Trump taking the US and its financial support out of the Paris Agreement on climate change, the World Health Organization and the UN Human Rights Council. Argentina subsequently withdrew from the World Health Organization and, along with Indonesia, was considering withdrawing from the Paris Agreement on climate change. Only 12 of the 200 UN members submitted their updated nationally determined contributions to control climate change by the deadline of February 10. Even the World Food Programme was severely short of funds needed to meet escalating food insecurity.
G7 members’ globally predominant and internally equalizing capabilities gave them the ability and incentive to fill the gap. As a group, they possessed a leading share of the relevant capabilities, especially in the military, financial and high technology fields. Within the G7, since January 1, 2025, the value of the US dollar began to decline against the currencies of other G7 members, while the euro and sterling rose. US economic growth slowed, US inflation rose, US consumer confidence declined, and US stock markets plunged when Trump began announcing tariffs against his free trade partners of Canada and Mexico, and then many more on April 2.
Yet an unprecedentedly powerful constraint on Kananaskis performance came from the plunge in G7 members’ common and converging principles and practices. This was due to Trump’s economic attack and annexationist assault on Canada and the European Union and his support for Russia on the central issue of security for Ukraine, Europe and the democratic world. Yet there was still substantial commonality among all G7 members on their security against China, Iran and fear of illegal migration, drugs and terrorism into and within their countries.
G7 leaders’ domestic political support was changing, in ways that propelled performance.
In host Canada, the governing Liberal Party’s popularity soared after its leader and prime minister, Justin Trudeau, announced his resignation on January 6, raising the prospect that his successor could win the general election expected before the Kananaskis Summit. Mark Carney won the leadership of the Liberal Party with 86% of the party’s vote on March 9 and, soon after being sworn in on March 14, called a federal election for April 28. Support for the Liberal Party remained strong into April, with most polls suggesting that the Liberals could win a majority on April 28 (Ekos 2025).
In the US, Trump took office on January 20 without a majority of the popular vote, and with his Republican Party having only a small majority in the House of Representatives and Senate. He was a lame-duck president from the start, being unable to serve again after his second term ended in January 2028. He had mid-term congressional elections looming in November 2026. By early March his approval ratings had slid into negative territory in some polls (Laws 2025; Gans 2025).
In Japan, Ishiba’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) had lost its legislative majority for the first time since 2009. It now led a precarious three-party collation government, and faced a likely election in 2025. The LDP’s approval rating was poor but its position as the government seemed secure.
In Germany and France, the leaders’ popularity and position were weak, but both would be in office for some years.
In the UK, Starmer had a secure majority and was on good terms with Trump.
In Italy, Meloni was popular and was well liked by Trump.
Thus, as April began, there were promising signs that Kananaskis would produce a productive and possibly a significant performance, of exceptional value for global governance at a uniquely critical time.
Al Mallees, Nojoud (2025). “G7 foreign ministers meet amid trade tensions,” Globe and Mail, March 13. https://www.theglobeandmail.com/world/article-g7-foreign-ministers-meet-in-charlevoix-as-trade-tensions-escalate/.
Boehm, Peter (2025). “Policy Q&A: Former G7 Sherpa Sen. Peter Boehm on Trump, Charlevoix and Bracing for Kananaskis,” Policy Magazine (January). https://www.policymagazine.ca/policy-qa-former-g7-sherpa-sen-peter-boehm-on-trump-charlevoix-and-bracing-for-kananaskis/.
Karadeglija, Anja (2025), “Trudeau Says Powering AI Without Compromising Climate Change Is a G7 Priority,” Canadian Press, February 9. https://www.thecanadianpressnews.ca/politics/trudeau-says-powering-ai-without-compromising-climate-change-is-a-g7-priority/article_1418dc53-1338-553b-a629-2425495500cf.html.
Collins, Kaitlan (@kaitlancollins) (2025). “Asked if he trusts President Putin, President Trump says, ‘Yeah, I believe he would like to see something happen. I trust him on this subject.’ He also says he wants to see Russia back in the G7, which it was kicked out of it for annexing Crimea. ‘I think Putin would love to be back.’” X, February 13. https://x.com/kaitlancollins/status/1890131296988336221?s=61.
Finance Canada (2025). “Readout.” Ottawa, March 17. https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/finance/250317-finance.html.
Ekos Politics (2025). “Rising Nationalism, Desire for Economic Sovereignty Propels Liberals to Five-Year High,” Ottawa, March 6. https://www.ekospolitics.com/index.php/2025/03/rising-nationalism-desire-for-economic-sovereignty-propels-liberals-to-five-year-high/.
Freeland, Chrystia (@chrystiafreeland) (2025). “As long as I am Prime Minister, there will be no invitation for Russia to join the G7 table in June this year. We will not turn a blind eye to war crimes and attacks on other countries’ sovereignty.” X, February 13. https://x.com/cafreeland/status/1890151873044435285.
Gans, Jared (2025). “Trump’s Approval Dips Amid Concerns over Economy: Poll,” The Hill, March 11. https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/5187064-trump-approval-rating-drops/.
G7 Foreign Ministers (2025a). “G7 Foreign Ministers’ Declaration on Maritime Security and Prosperity,” Charlevoix, Quebec, March 14. https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/foreign/250314-declaration.html.
G7 Foreign Ministers (2025b). “G7 Foreign Ministers’ Statement,” Munich, February 15. https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/foreign/250215-statement.html.
G7 Foreign Ministers (2025c). “Joint Statement of the G7 Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Charlevoix,” Charlevoix, Quebec, March 14. https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/foreign/250314-statement.html.
Hodunova, Kateryna (2025). “New Canadian Prime Minister Invites Zelensky to Attend G7 Summit in June,” Kyiv Independent, March 17. https://kyivindependent.com/new-canadian-pm-invites-zelensky-to-attend-g7-summit-in-june/.
Kirton, John (2025a). “G7 Foreign Ministers’ Significant Performance at Charlevoix,” G7 Research Group, March 18. https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/evaluations/2025kananaskis/kirton-foreign-ministers-charlevoix.html
Kirton, John (2025b). “A Strong Start to G7 Global Security Governance at Its Munich Foreign Ministers’ Meeting,” G7 Research Group, February 15. https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/evaluations/2025kananaskis/kirton-foreign-ministers-munich.html.
Laws, Jasmine (2025). “Donald Trump Approval Rating Goes Negative for First Time in Presidency,” Newsweek, March 6. https://www.newsweek.com/donald-trump-approval-rating-negative-first-time-presidency-2039743.
Le Monde (2025). “Canadian PM Carney Says His Country Must Bolster Ties with ‘Reliable Allies’.” March 17. https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2025/03/17/canadian-pm-carney-says-his-country-must-bolster-ties-with-reliable-allies_6739243_4.html.
Morley, David (2025). “Canada-Hosted G7 and G8 Summits Have Mattered Before. They Can Matter Again,” Globe and Mail, March 31. https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-canada-hosted-g7-and-g8-summits-have-mattered-before-they-can-matter/.
National Defence (2024). “Minister Blair Concludes Successful Visit to Europe for North Atlantic Treaty Organization and G7 Defence Ministers’ Meetings,” Naples, October 20. https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/news/2024/10/minister-blair-concludes-successful-visit-to-europe-for-north-atlantic-treaty-organization-and-g7-defence-ministers-meetings.html.
Parashar, Sachin (2025). “Modi’s Presence at G7 Uncertain as Canada Says No Decision on Summit Invitations,” Times of India, March 23. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/pm-modi-presence-at-g7-uncertain-as-canada-is-yet-to-finalise-invites/articleshow/119356690.cms.
Paris, Roland (@rolandparis) (2025). “Unnecessary because Trump will probably withdraw when the rest of the G7 refuses to readmit Putin.” X, February 13. https://x.com/rolandparis/status/1890202796156416503.
Percival, Valerie and Shawn Barber (2025). “Canada Needs to Reset Its Priorities for the G7 Presidency,” Globe and Mail, February 25. https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-canada-needs-to-reset-its-priorities-for-the-g7-presidency/.
Poilievre, Pierre (@pierrepoilievre) (2025). “Russia should not be welcomed back into the G7. It was a Conservative government that led the charge to kick Russia out of the then G8 because of their illegal invasion of Crimea in 2014. Russia’s exclusion from the G7 is every bit as justifiable today.” X, February 13. https://x.com/PierrePoilievre/status/1890185595038888173.
Prime Minister’s Office (2024). “Prime Minister Advances Shared Progress and Prosperity at the G7 Summit,” Apulia, Italy, June 14. https://www.pm.gc.ca/en/news/news-releases/2024/06/14/prime-minister-trudeau-advances-shared-progress-and-prosperity-g7-summit.
Prime Minister’s Office (2025a). “Prime Minister Justin Trudeau Speaks with Artificial Intelligence Business Leaders,” Paris, France, February 10. https://www.pm.gc.ca/en/news/readouts/2025/02/10/prime-minister-justin-trudeau-speaks-artificial-intelligence-business.
Prime Minister’s Office (2025b). “Prime Minister Carney Meets with President of France Emmanuel Macron,” Paris, March 17. https://www.pm.gc.ca/en/news/readouts/2025/03/17/prime-minister-carney-meets-president-france-emmanuel-macron.
Prime Minister’s Office (2025c). “Prime Minister Carney Meets with Prime Minister of the United Kingdom Sir Keir Starmer,” London, March 17. https://www.pm.gc.ca/en/news/readouts/2025/03/17/prime-minister-carney-meets-prime-minister-united-kingdom-sir-keir-starmer.
Rachman, Gideon (2024). “Leading Democracies Are Struggling to Govern,” Financial Times, December 23. https://www.ft.com/content/ea15bed8-bb4d-4e55-880f-a0ed4f2ef8b6.
Reguly, Eric (2024). “Donald Trump’s Election Victory is a Nightmare Scenario for European, Especially German, Industry,” Globe and Mail, November 6. https://www.theglobeandmail.com/business/commentary/article-donald-trumps-election-victory-is-a-nightmare-scenario-for-european/.
Shakil, Ismail (2025). “G7 Nations Still Discussing Joint Statement on Ukraine, Canadian Minister Says,” Reuters, February 25. https://www.reuters.com/world/g7-nations-still-discussing-joint-statement-ukraine-canadian-minister-says-2025-02-24/.
Taylor-Vaisey, Nick and Sue Allan (2025). “Canada’s G7 Preppers,” Politico, February 18. https://www.politico.com/newsletters/ottawa-playbook/2025/02/18/canadas-g7-preppers-00204632.
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Van Dusan, Lisa (2025). “The Road to Kananaskis: Making the G6 Great Again?,” January 29. Policy Magazine (January). https://www.policymagazine.ca/the-road-to-kananaskis-making-the-g6-great-again/.
Welch, David (2025). “To Help Tame Donald Trump, Canada Needs to Target Him Directly,” Globe and Mail, March 12. https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-canada-can-help-tame-trump/.
World Economic Forum (2025). The Global Risks Report 2025: 20th Edition – Insight Report (Geneva, Switzerland). https://reports.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Global_Risks_Report_2025.pdf.
Year |
Grade |
Domestic political management |
Deliberation |
Direction setting |
Decision making |
Delivery |
Development of global governance |
Participation |
|||||||
# communiqué compliments |
Spread |
# days |
# statements |
# |
# references to core values |
# commitments |
Compliance |
# assessed |
# ministerials created |
# official-level groups created |
# members |
# participating countries |
# participating international organizations |
||
1975 |
A− |
2 |
29% |
3 |
1 |
1,129 |
5 |
15 |
54% |
2 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
0 |
0 |
1976 |
D |
0 |
0% |
2 |
1 |
1,624 |
0 |
10 |
n/a |
n/a |
0 |
0 |
7 |
0 |
0 |
1977 |
B− |
1 |
13% |
2 |
6 |
2,669 |
0 |
55 |
n/a |
n/a |
0 |
1 |
8 |
0 |
0 |
1978 |
A |
1 |
13% |
2 |
2 |
2,999 |
0 |
50 |
57% |
3 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
0 |
1979 |
B+ |
0 |
0% |
2 |
2 |
2,102 |
0 |
55 |
n/a |
n/a |
1 |
2 |
8 |
0 |
0 |
1980 |
C+ |
0 |
0% |
2 |
5 |
3,996 |
3 |
54 |
n/a |
n/a |
0 |
1 |
8 |
0 |
0 |
1981 |
C |
1 |
13% |
2 |
3 |
3,165 |
0 |
48 |
50% |
2 |
1 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
0 |
1982 |
C |
0 |
0% |
3 |
2 |
1,796 |
0 |
39 |
15% |
1 |
0 |
3 |
9 |
0 |
0 |
1983 |
B |
0 |
0% |
3 |
2 |
2,156 |
7 |
39 |
22% |
2 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
0 |
1984 |
C− |
1 |
13% |
3 |
5 |
3,261 |
0 |
31 |
27% |
2 |
1 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
0 |
1985 |
E |
4 |
50% |
3 |
2 |
3,127 |
1 |
24 |
64% |
2 |
0 |
2 |
8 |
0 |
0 |
1986 |
B+ |
3 |
25% |
3 |
4 |
3,582 |
1 |
39 |
29% |
1 |
1 |
1 |
9 |
0 |
0 |
1987 |
D |
2 |
13% |
3 |
7 |
5,064 |
0 |
53 |
65% |
1 |
0 |
2 |
9 |
0 |
0 |
1988 |
C− |
3 |
25% |
3 |
3 |
4,872 |
0 |
27 |
n/a |
n/a |
0 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
0 |
1989 |
B+ |
3 |
38% |
3 |
11 |
7,125 |
1 |
61 |
47% |
4 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
0 |
0 |
2014 |
B |
6 |
44% |
2 |
1 |
5,106 |
42 |
141 |
85% |
24 |
1 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
0 |
2015 |
B+ |
2 |
25% |
2 |
2 |
12,674 |
20 |
376 |
79% |
35 |
1 |
4 |
9 |
6 |
6 |
2016 |
B− |
22 |
63% |
2 |
7 |
23,052 |
95 |
342 |
69% |
28 |
1 |
1 |
9 |
7 |
5 |
2017 |
B |
2 |
25% |
2 |
4 |
8,614 |
158 |
180 |
79% |
22 |
1 |
2 |
9 |
5 |
6 |
2018 |
B+ |
0 |
0% |
2 |
8 |
11,224 |
56 |
315 |
78% |
42 |
1 |
|
9 |
12 |
4 |
2019 |
B− |
6 |
57% |
3 |
10 |
7,202 |
|
71 |
76% |
27 |
1 |
0 |
9 |
8 |
8 |
2020 |
B+ |
0 |
0% |
1 |
1 |
795 |
0 |
25 |
94% |
20 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
4 |
n/a |
2021 |
A− |
4 |
50% |
3 |
3 |
20,677 |
130 |
429 |
89% |
29 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
4 |
3 |
2022 |
A− |
1 |
13% |
3 |
8 |
19,179 |
118 |
545 |
92% |
21 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
6 |
9 |
2023 |
A |
17 |
75% |
3 |
6 |
30,046 |
57 |
698 |
- |
- |
0 |
0 |
9 |
9 |
7 |
Average/ |
|
60/ |
|
23 |
50/ |
138,587/ |
676/ |
3,122/ |
82% |
248/ |
6 |
7 |
9 |
61/ |
48/ |
Total |
204 |
27.57 |
129 |
268 |
527,017 |
1,575 |
7,093 |
15.98 |
696 |
21 |
102 |
429 |
189 |
106 |
|
Average |
4.2 |
0.6 |
2.6 |
5.5 |
10,755.4 |
32.8 |
147.8 |
0.4 |
16.5 |
0.4 |
2.1 |
8.8 |
3.9 |
2.2 |
|
2024 Apulia |
A− |
14 |
75% |
3 |
1 |
19,795 |
81 |
469 |
|
|
|
|
9 |
|
|
Updated: Brittaney Warren, October 14, 2023, John Kirton, June 17, 2024.
June 2024 (Prime Minister’s Office, 2024):
Subsequently, the list was presented as:
For the G20 Rio Summit on November 18–19, Trudeau’s priorities were (Trudeau 2024):
1 |
Environment |
10 |
2 |
Climate change |
9 |
3 |
Energy |
4 |
4 |
Health |
3 |
5 |
Digital |
2 |
6 |
Gender equality |
2 |
Summit |
Total |
Gender |
Energy |
Health |
Climate |
Environment |
Labour |
Ukraine |
Food and Agriculture |
Digital |
Development |
1975–2014 |
0 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2015 Elmau |
1 |
1 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2016 Ise-Shima |
2 |
|
1 |
1 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2017 Taormina |
1 |
1 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2018 Charlevoix |
0 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2019 Biarritz |
0 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2020 Virtual |
0 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2021 Cornwall |
5 |
|
1 |
|
2 |
2 |
|
|
|
|
|
2022 Elmau |
6 |
|
1 |
|
2 |
2 |
1 |
|
|
|
|
2023 Hiroshima |
8 |
|
1 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
|
|
|
|
|
2024 Apulia |
11 |
|
|
1 |
3 |
2 |
|
1 |
1 |
2 |
1 |
Total |
34 |
2 |
4 |
3 |
9 |
10 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
1 |
2015-283: [We will continue to take steps] to reduce the gender gap in workforce participation within our own countries by 25% by 2025, taking into account national circumstances including by improving the framework conditions to enable women and men to balance family life and employment, including access to parental leave and childcare. (core gender) (labour-employment related)
2016-166: We remain committed to the elimination of inefficient fossil fuel subsidies and encourage all countries to do so by 2025. (core energy finance) Compliance 50%, Canada 50%
2016-226: Galvanize international efforts to combat malnutrition and to hold the rise of obesity and over-weight targeting most vulnerable populations - mothers, children and adolescent girls - and consistent with the WHO [World Health Organization] Comprehensive Implementation Plan on Maternal, Infant and Young Child Nutrition, including: (i) the activities within the Decade of Action on Nutrition 2016-2025 and by various initiatives such as Scaling Up Nutrition (core health) (food-agriculture-related)
2017-152: Consider adopting measures that support an increased uptake by fathers of parental leave, by 2025. (core gender)
None
None
None
2021-14: [We commit to]…increasing and improving climate finance to 2025 (core climate change finance)
2021-189: More broadly, we reaffirm our existing commitment to eliminating inefficient fossil fuel subsidies by 2025, [and call on all countries to join us, recognising the substantial financial resource this could unlock globally to support the transition and the need to commit to a clear timeline]. (core energy - finance)
2021-204: We reaffirm the collective developed country goal to jointly mobilise $100 billion per year from public and private sources, through to 2025 in the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency on implementation. (core climate change - finance)
2021-224: Third, we will work intensively towards increasing investment in the protection, conservation and restoration of nature, including committing to increase finance for nature-based solutions through to 2025. (core environment - finance)
2021-326: Working intensively towards increasing finance for nature from all sources throughout the next five years: in particular, we commit to increase our finance contributions for nature-based solutions through to 2025. (core environment - finance)
2022-32: We renew our strong commitment and will intensify our efforts to delivering on the collective USD 100 billion climate finance mobilisation goal as soon as possible and through to 2025. (core climate change - finance) Compliance 94%, Canada 100%
2022-34: We commit to working alongside others towards the implementation of the Glasgow Climate Pact's call to collectively at least double the provision of climate finance for adaptation to developing countries from 2019 levels by 2025. (core climate change - finance)
2022-39: We are committed to mobilising resources from all sources and to substantially increasing our national and international funding for nature by 2025 to support the implementation of an ambitious global framework. (core environment - finance)
2022-41: We commit to ensure our international development assistance does no harm to nature by 2025, and delivers positive outcomes overall for people, climate, and nature. (core environment) (development-related)
2022-48: We [stress that fossil fuel subsidies are inconsistent with the goals of the Paris Agreement and] reaffirm our commitment to the elimination of inefficient fossil fuel subsidies by 2025. (core energy - finance)
2022-161: By 2025, we will increase the share of our ODA [official development assistance] employment and skills promotion programmes that is directed specifically towards green sectors and greening traditional sectors in alignment with our emerging and developing partner countries' strategies, and subject to our budgetary processes. (core labour and employment) (development-related)
2023-116: We reaffirm our commitments to the developed country Parties’ [to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change] goal of jointly mobilizing $100 billion annually in climate finance by 2020 through to 2025 in the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency on implementation. (core climate change - finance)
2023-123: We continue to accelerate efforts to respond to the Glasgow Climate Pact that urges developed countries to at least double their collective provision of climate finance for adaptation to developing countries from the 2019 level by 2025, in the context of achieving a balance between mitigation and adaptation in the provision of scaled-up financial resources. (core climate change - finance) (development related)
2023-143: We will make as much progress as possible on these issues…by the UN Ocean Conference in 2025. (core environment)
2023-144: [We will make as much progress as possible]…on the broader agenda of ocean protection by the UN Ocean Conference in 2025. (core environment)
2023-147: We will identify incentives, including subsidies, harmful to biodiversity by 2025, and redirect or eliminate them while scaling up positive incentives for the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity by 2030 at the latest, taking initial steps without delay. (core environment - finance)
2023-148: We reiterate our commitment to substantially increase our national and international funding for nature by 2025. (core environment - finance)
2023-178: We reaffirm our commitment to the elimination of inefficient fossil fuel subsidies by 2025 or sooner (core energy - finance)
2023-248: We recommit to working alongside global partners to assist countries to achieve UHC [universal health coverage] by supporting primary health care (PHC) and developing and restoring essential health services, to achieve better than pre-pandemic levels by the end of 2025, as part of our effort to strengthen health systems in ordinary times. (core health)
We will build on the Japan-Ukraine Conference for Promotion of Economic Growth and Reconstruction held in Tokyo on 19 February and the Ukraine Recovery Conference held on 11-12 June in Berlin and we look forward to the next Ukraine Recovery Conference in Rome in 2025. (Ukraine)
We will foster multi-stakeholder engagement and innovation, including with multilaterals, the private sector and philanthropies, and welcome in particular the 2025 Paris Nutrition for Growth Summit. (Food-agriculture)
We underline that this is a collective effort and further actions from all countries, especially major economies, are required in order to peak global GHG by 2025 at the latest and achieve net-zero by 2050. (Climate change)
We reaffirm our commitment to eliminate inefficient fossil fuel subsidies by 2025 or sooner and will report in 2025 on progress made. We call on others to do the same. (climate change)
We recall our previous commitment to increase our national and international funding for nature by 2025, and to substantially and progressively increase the level of financial resources from all sources including by providing support to the Global Environment Facility. (Climate change)
We note that Target 19 aims at mobilizing at least USD 200 billion per year by 2030 for biodiversity from all sources, including USD 20 billion per year by 2025 and USD 30 billion per year by 2030, through international financial resources. We are all still concerned about incentives, including subsidies, harmful to biodiversity, and call upon all relevant organizations to continue collaborating with us, including by assisting in identifying such incentives, and we are all working to fulfil our respective applicable commitments, including, inter alia, to identify these incentives by 2025, and redirect or eliminate them, while scaling-up positive incentives for the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity by 2030 at the latest, taking initial steps without delay. (Environment-biodiversity)
We will work towards a successful UNOC3 in 2025 in this regard. (Environment)
We will build on the outcomes of the AI Seoul Summit and upcoming milestones, including this year’s UN Summit of the Future and the AI Action Summit in 2025. (Digital-AI)
We reaffirm our support for the Program of Action to Advance Responsible State’ Behaviour in the Use of ICTs in the context of international security, as the permanent and action-oriented mechanism to hold discussions on cybersecurity at the UN from 2025 onwards. (digital)
In this regard, we welcome the successful replenishment of the Asian Development Fund (AsDF14) support a successful International Development Association (IDA21) replenishment and commit to work toward a successful replenishment of the African Development Fund next year (AfDF17). (Development)
We look forward to the Global Disability Summit to be held in Berlin in 2025. (Health)
As of October 27, 2024
Security
Climate Change
Environment
Health
Development
Gender
Artificial Intelligence
Reform of International Financial Institutions
Global Governance
 — 
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