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Potentially Productive Prospects for the Kananaskis Summit
John Kirton, G7 Research Group
March 7, 2025
For the G7’s 50th anniversary in 2025 and its 51st annual gathering, Canada will host the summit once again at Kananaskis, Alberta, in the majestic Rocky Mountains, on June 15–17. The meetings will take place on June 16 and 17, with the leaders arriving on June 15.
It will be a landmark event in several ways. It starts a new generation of the G7’s growing performance and contribution to global governance, after its first half century of work since 1975 (see Appendix A). It comes at the start of the final five years to reach the United Nations’ 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), launched 10 years ago and due to be done by 2030. Above all, it starts the return for a second term as US president Donald Trump, now waging verbal and economic war on the G7 host and other G7 partners as never before.
Kananaskis will build on the strong foundation laid by Italy’s Apulia Summit in June 2024. It will confront a full range of interconnected crises, including a world at war in Ukraine, the Middle East and elsewhere, and the need for clean energy to combat the existential threat of climate change, biodiversity loss and pollution. It simultaneously faces the revolutionary benefits and risks brought by artificial intelligence (AI), quantum computing and associated digital technologies, amidst economic, food and health insecurity, declines in development, debt sustainability and democracy, and new challenges from financial instability, migration and border security. It must complete members’ compliance with the 34 accumulated commitments made since 2015 that are due by 2025, led by those on climate change and the environment with 19, energy with four, health with three, digitalization and gender with two each, and Ukraine, food and agriculture, labour and employment, and development with one each. It must also advance action on the UN’s 2030 Agenda on Sustainable Development and its 17 SDGs, which are all far behind from being realized in five years. In Canada, a transcontinental, ecological superpower bordering the Pacific, Atlantic and Arctic oceans, G7 leaders will assemble on the frontlines of these crises, to work among themselves and with their invited guests from key countries and major multilateral and regional organizations in response.
In Kananaskis, the leaders of Canada, France, the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, Japan, Italy and the European Union will build on the results of the high-level meetings of the UN General Assembly in September 2024, the G20 summit in Rio de Janeiro on November 18–19 and the G7 foreign and finance ministers’ meetings that Canada has mounted in the first half of 2025. But G7 leaders alone have the unique responsibility to confront and control the security, climate, and other crises in ways that fulfil their shared, distinctive foundational mission of protecting at home and promoting globally their core values of open democracy, individual liberty and social advance.
The participating G7 leaders will be a mix of five veterans and four newcomers. They will be led by the new Canadian prime minister, taking office and probably after a general election held before the summit starts. French president Emmanuel Macron will be at his 10th G7 summit in a row. It will be the fourth annual one for the US president Trump, re-elected on November 5, 2024, and inaugurated on January 20, 2025. They will be joined by Italy’s prime minister Giorgia Meloni at her third, after hosting for the first time in 2024. It will be the first G7 summit for the UK prime minister Sir Keir Starmer and Japanese prime minister Shigaru Ishiba, whose coalition won the general election on October 27, 2024. The European Union will send Commission president Ursula von der Leyen to her sixth summit and Council president António Costa since December 1 to his first. Germany will send Friedrich Merz as its new chancellor whose government will be sworn in on March 25, 2025, after his party’s victory in the general election on February 23.
The prospects for the performance of the Kananaskis Summit have aroused a debate among those in several schools of thought, about how well it will do and why.
The first school, arising immediately after the US elections on November 5, sees severely reduced performance, due to Trump becoming president. Eric Reguly (2024) wrote that Trump “could pay scant attention to, or outright disdain for, G7 and G20 summits and other international events, as he did in his first presidency.”
The second school, as December ended, sees the G7 global steering committee having problems, due to most members’ domestic political difficulties driven by populism and fiscal pressures and Trump. Gideon Rachman (2024) wrote that “the majority of G7 governments are now so burdened with domestic political problems that they are incapable of steering their own countries – let alone the free world … [due to] the rise of populist parties … [and] a fiscal squeeze created by slow growth, ageing societies, the pandemic, the financial crisis of 2008 and demands for increased defence spending.” He added that Trump and Elon Musk “seem to enjoy piling on the pain … [and] particularly like baiting centre-left leaders such as Trudeau, Scholz and Starmer.” Rachman concluded that Trump “may create a situation in which the leaders of many of America’s closest allies come to regard the US president not as a friend, but as a dangerous political enemy.”
The third school, offered by former Canadian sherpa Peter Boehm (2025), sees a “‘G7 Lite’ summit and agenda as a bid to strengthen if not save the institution.” This is due to the politics, the “timing crunch” and the “known unknowns.” They include a very new Canadian prime minister as host, time for only hastily arranged pre-summit meetings for foreign and finance ministers, Trump’s aversion to multilateral meetings and uncertainty about his attendance without concessions for doing so, his poor briefing, a possible G6 meeting and even the question of whether “this venerable, informal institution falls apart.”
The fourth school sees a possible G6 without the US participating. Lisa Van Dusen (2025) said the G7 faces the choices of subjecting itself to “another G-hijacking, complete with performative scene-stealing and a working lunch upstaged by trade-war talk over elk terrine; or, the G7 suspends the United States and is portrayed in the usual propaganda circles as weakened for being reduced to the G6.” This is due to “the early, autocratic course the Trump presidency has taken both domestically and internationally.”
The fifth school sees consensus difficult due to Trump. Valerie Percival and Shawn Barber (2025) wrote that the Kananaskis Summit comes at a perilous time as Trump has replaced diplomacy with coercion and put the global order at risk. They recommend that Canada lead a G6 with an expanded agenda on multilateral trade liberalization, global health and development, gender equality, and many regional conflicts, and collaborate with South Africa’s G20 and other emerging economies to do so.
The sixth school sees mostly a mystery (Taylor-Vaisey and Sue Allan 2025). This is due to uncertainty about who Canada’s prime minister would be and about the state of Canada-US relations in June. But officials have already been planning the summit for many months, G7 foreign ministers will meet in Charlevoix on March 12–14, finance ministers and central bank governors will meet in Banff on May 20–22, the summit could focus on energy affordability, Canada’s sherpa met with the civil society engagement groups on February 4, and the G7 political directors had already met several times during the first seven weeks in 2025.
The G7’s Kananaskis Summit is currently on track to produce a productive performance. It could well be a significant one, due to the severe shocks it confronts, the many multilateral organizational failures in response, and the members’ still globally predominant and internally equalizing capabilities, due to the relative decline of the US inside the G7. But its members have unprecedentedly divergent political principles, practices and policies, with Trump now waging economic war against all of his fellow G7 members, threatening to annex neighbouring Canada and at times supporting authoritarian Russia in its war against a democratic Ukraine. Nonetheless its leaders’ initially low domestic political support is changing, with Trump’s now declining as the others rise, possibly leading Trump to adjust to the others united front. And the signs, from the preparatory work and G7 ministerial meetings, are that all remain committed to the G7, rather than the G20, as the core of an expanding network of global summit governance.
Canada’s physical plans for hosting its seventh G7 summit were first announced at the end of the Apulia Summit on June 14, 2024, when Trudeau said the summit site would be in Kananaskis, Alberta, which had previously worked for the then G8 Summit (with Russia a member) in 2002. The choice flowed from the fact that it was western Canada’s turn to host the summit again, after Charlevoix, Quebec, in 2018 and Muskoka, Ontario, in 2010. Kananaskis had also proven to be a location totally secure from assaults by terrorists or violent protestors by air, land or sea. And by building on the plans and infrastructure build in 2002, it would reduce costs.
Canada’s priorities for the Kananaskis Summit were first announced at the end of the Apulia Summit on June 14, 2024 (see Appendix B). More directly, the statement from the Prime Minister’s Office ([PMO] 2024) said Trudeau “underlined Canada’s continued commitment to working together with G7 partners on common priorities,” such as:
The priorities were thus inclusive economies, climate change and digitalization with artificial intelligence at the core. Trudeau himself also suggested the priorities would be clean energy and foreign election interference.
At the G20 Rio Summit on November 18–19, Trudeau’s (2024) priorities were the similar ones of:
By December 6, 2024, Canada’s G7 presidency policy priorities were as follows:
Canada’s presidency process priorities then included:
Following the first sherpa meeting, on January 29–31, 2025, the agenda agreed orally and generally by all members’ sherpas was:
On February 10, 2025, the PMO (2025) reported that Trudeau meet with AI business leaders in Paris, including the heads of Anthropic, Advanced Micro Devices, OVHCloud, Hugging Face and Arm. He said that using its G7 presidency Canada would demonstrate leadership in advancing security, prosperity and partnerships including through AI adoption, energy and inclusion, and noted its abundance of critical minerals, clean and reliable energy, and a growing semiconductor industry. He “positioned Canada as an ideal partner for AI innovation” with a “vibrant AI ecosystem” and strong government support through initiatives such as the Pan-Canadian Artificial Intelligence Strategy and emphasized Canada’s commitment to taking an ethical and responsible approach.
Also likely to appear on the Kananaskis agenda are the subjects of the commitments made by past G7 summits due for delivery in 2025 (see Appendix C). The 23 commitments from 2015 to 2023 were led by those on the environment with eight, climate change with six, and energy with four, followed by health and gender with two each, and labour and employment with one. The Apulia Summit added 11, to create a new total of 34. The Apulia additions are led by climate change with three, the environment and digitalization with two each, and Ukraine, food and agriculture, development, and health with one each. Together, these 34 commitments due in 2025 are led by climate change and the environment with 19, energy with four, health with three, digitalization and gender with two each, and Ukraine, food and agriculture, labour and employment, and development with one each. Among these 34, the two (on fossil fuel subsidies and climate finance) assessed for compliance one year later, have averaged compliance of 72% for all members and 75% for Canada.
The subjects of these inherited deadlines coincided well with two of the top three top priorities Canada identified for its Kananaskis Summit in June, which that Trudeau had brought to the 2024 Apulia Summit in 2024.
By early March, the prospective summit agenda had achieved greater definition and depth.
First, geopolitics will be front and centre. Kananaskis will focus on Ukraine, the Indo-Pacific, the Middle East, other regional conflicts and crises that might have arisen by then. For Canada, the priorities include Haiti, Venezuela, Sudan and the Congo. Much will be addressed by the foreign ministers’ meetings. Ukraine will likely remain on the leaders’ agenda, given the changing situation.
Second, economic security and prosperity will remain high, with a focus on resilient critical mineral supply chains. To bring together all the work being done by various groups of officials working on aspects of economic resilience and security, such as cyber security or economic interference, and to help determine priorities to present to the G7 leaders, the Canadian presidency appointed an economic resilience and security senior official. This one-year experiment is intended to bring coherence and drive consensus.
Third is the digital transition, in particular AI and quantum computing. On AI, the Canadian presidency will continue as much as possible the G7’s work on governance and security, especially at the ministerial and official levels. The leaders’ focus will shift to AI for prosperity, in particular on three areas: AI adoption, particularly for small and medium-sized enterprises; continuing Italy’s work on the digital divide; and AI and energy, such as improving grids to sustain AI growth but also using the power of AI to improve those grids and AI.
Fourth is development and its finance. This includes following through on work by the G7’s Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment on domestic capital mobilization with a focus on infrastructure and development. In light of recent decisions by the United States to dismantle the US Agency for International Development and the United Kingdom to cut development assistance, there is much room to work in this area, especially with regard to mobilizing private capital, while still working with multilateral and regional development banks.
Fifth is fighting wildfires. This is significant both because of the summit’s location surrounded by the protected wilderness and provincial parks of Kananaskis County, but because every G7 member – with even Japan – is now experiencing wildfires. The issue also links to the G20, along with many others. Canada was working with South Africa’s G20 presidency preparing for the Johannesburg Summit on issues such as disaster resilience and development finance.
Wildfires also relate to climate change, one reason Canada has chosen it as a priority, and G7 members can prepare, prevent, adapt and build resilience accordingly. This approach is similar to Canada’s approach to oceans for its 2018 presidency. Although there is a strong desire among G7 members other than the US to discuss climate change, which affects them all, it is unclear what the leaders will coalesce on. While climate change will be discussed thoroughly by the sherpas, it remains unclear if the term would even be used publicly. Canada’s new prime minister would have views on that.
Migrant smuggling and synthetic opioids will likely be addressed at the leaders’ level, especially as migrant smuggling was a major focus at Italy’s summit in 2024. Canada would like the discussions to continue, due to its regional context, as would its G7 partners. These will also likely be top issues for G7 interior ministers when they meet after Kananaskis.
Work on foreign interference will also continue at both the leaders’ and ministerial levels. The leaders’ focus will likely be directed to transnational repression, building on work started in 2024 by the US. They will discuss foreign interference in diaspora communities and human rights activists being pursued by third countries and impacts on journalists. Those discussions will take an agnostic approach, rather than identify specific actors, as each G7 member is affected differently. The G7’s Rapid Response Mechanism, first introduced at Charlevoix in 2018, will also continue to work on foreign state-sponsored disinformation.
Gender quality will continue as a cross-cutting issue, with the Gender Equality Advisory Council also established under Canada’s 2018 G7 presidency – holding its first meeting in March.
G7 sherpas held their first meeting in Vancouver on January 29–31. All the G7 sherpas attended, including a very constructive Nels Nordquist, deputy assistant to the president for economic policy and deputy director of the National Economics Council for international economics and who worked on Trump’s G7 team under his first presidency. They agreed on the need to better communicate to their citizens what the G7 had already accomplished and would do to improve their citizens’ lives.
They also agreed, in their conversations, on a broad but focused, if still somewhat tentative, summit agenda (see Appendix B).
The next sherpa meeting would be at Montebello, Quebec, on March 26–27.
The G7 leaders held their first, inter-sessional hybrid summit on February 24, the third anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Trudeau hosted from Kyiv, accompanied by the von der Leyen and Costa, as well as Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky, with the other leaders participating virtually. The discussions were very constructive although not necessarily likeminded, with Trump fully engaged. The Canadian presidency considered the fact that the conversation took place was an important outcome and a win for the G7 as a whole.
However, the leaders were not able to agree on a communiqué that again accused Russia of aggression for its full-scale invasion on Ukraine, as the US would not agree on that or any similar wording (Shakil 2025). Trudeau as host tried very hard to produce a consensus collective statement but did not succeed.
The Canadian presidency planned for pre-summit ministerials for only two portfolios – those for foreign ministers and finance ministers – given uncertainty about who would be Canada’s prime minister and government at Kananaskis. By early March, meetings for other ministerial portfolios, specifically interior ministers, development, energy and environment, and digital and industry, were being scheduled after the summit, with the energy and environment meeting possibly held in September. There could well be additional G7 ministerial meetings on the margins of other gatherings such as trade ministers and those at the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s annual meeting.
On February 15, 2025, G7 foreign ministers met in Munich, on the margins of the Munich Security Conference. It was the first ministerial meeting of Canada’s 2025 G7 presidency, hosted by foreign minister Melanie Joly and coming six weeks into its presidency. Although a G7 foreign ministers’ meeting outside the host country was unusual, they first had began meeting at the United Nations in New York, and Canada had held at least one other ministerial meeting during its previous presidencies in the neighbouring United States.
The meeting was attended by all G7 foreign ministers, including US secretary of state Marco Rubio, who had just announced his intention to boycott the G20 foreign ministers’ meeting in Johannesburg on February 20 – the first ministerial meeting in 2025 G20 presidency – due to the Trump administration’s displeasure with South Africa’s G20 thematic emphasis on what Trump saw as diversity, equity and inclusion.
Before leaving Tokyo for Munich, Japanese foreign minister Takeshi Iwaya said that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was expected to be “one of the key themes … [as] the international situation remains highly turbulent. Unfortunately, division and confrontation continue to deepen. I believe these circumstances are significantly testing whether the G7, which has shared values and principles, can maintain and strengthen its cooperation, something it must do … G7 cooperation is essential” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2025).
G7 foreign ministers passed this test. Importantly, the G7 foreign ministers (2025) in Munich released a fully consensual “Joint G7 Foreign Ministers’ Statement.” Its 774 words contained nine commitments, all fully agreed. The first three were on Russia’s war against Ukraine, the next four on the Middle East, and the final two on the Indo-Pacific region.
Standing out was the commitment in which “G7 members reaffirmed their unwavering support for Ukraine in defending its freedom, sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity” (G7 Foreign Ministers 2025). It was reinforced by “they … reaffirmed the need to develop robust security guarantees to ensure the war will not begin again,” once peace had come. At this session they were joined by Andril Sybiha, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, with whom they discussed and affirmed the many key measures G7 members had taken to provide “Ukraine with long-term security and stability as a sovereign, independent country.” This was a badly needed display of G7 unity and full support for Ukraine, coming after the discrepant remarks by US vice president J.D. Vance and the US defence secretary Pete Hegseth at the Munich Security Conference, and the recent actions and statements of Trump.
The four commitments on the Middle East contained two on Gaza, with one stating “G7 members stand behind the ongoing efforts of Egypt, Qatar and the United States in continuing to work toward a permanent ceasefire” (G7 Foreign Ministers 2025). Yet along with this shared communiqué compliment to the United States there was no hint that they were prepared to reconstruct Gaza in the way that Trump wanted.
The passages on the Indo-Pacific singled out “China’s attempts to restrict freedom of navigation through militarization and coercive activities in the South China Sea” (G7 Foreign Ministers 2025). And as Japan wished, “They called upon [the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea] to resolve the abductions issue immediately.
The statement also noted G7 members’ discussions of conflict and instability in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan, Haiti and Venezuela, showing that the G7 continued to be a global security governor.
The statement ended by describing Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as an act of “aggression” and by stating the G7 foreign ministers (2025) “looked forward to their meeting in Canada in Charlevoix, Quebec on March 12–14.” This was the very location where Trudeau hosted the G7 summit in 2018, with Trump present. It also showed that the G7 was still alive and well, functioning in a broad, unified fashion, to hold the fort and prepare the way for the leaders at their Kananaskis Summit in June, where their focus would also be on peace and security, led by Russia’s war against Ukraine.
In addition to their next meeting at Charlevoix on March 12–14, foreign ministers will meet again in the fall, perhaps on the margins of UNGA in September.
G7 finance ministers and central bank governors also held their first meeting outside Canada, on February 27, during the G20 finance meeting in Cape Town. This was a hybrid meeting with complete attendance, with US treasury secretary Scott Bessent participating virtually and Federal Reserve governor Jerome Powell participating in person.
G7 finance ministers and central bank governors will meet again, this time in person in Banff, Alberta, on May 20–22, about three weeks before their leaders’ meet in neighbouring Kananaskis. They would also likely hold a session at the annual meetings of the World Bank and IMF in October in Washington DC.
Trudeau decided to defer the decision of which guests invite to his successor, on the grounds that it was important for the summit host to make that decision. One approach being considered was to invite leaders who could participate substantively on specific issues, such as critical minerals.
The Canadian presidency has received messages from many of the foreign missions based in Ottawa that their leaders wanted to be invited – showing that they believe that, despite the challenges, the G7 remains the centre of effective and legitimate global governance.
Canada is approaching the summit architecture knowing that Kananaskis will be the first major event hosted by Canada’s new prime minister, Trump’s first visit to Canada, and possibly the first time some G7 leaders meet Trump in person. It will be a very different dynamic than usual, with different considerations, such as choosing whether to focus on substance or signal whom to do business with, or to view it through the prism of hosting the US president, while keeping things productive and positive.
Canada is planning for a summit with attendance by all G7 heads of government, including Trump, plus the two EU leaders, with a strong policy foundation and surrounding support. It is thus preparing for as constructive and productive a meeting as possible.
Trump’s priorities will probably include trade and tariffs, tax cuts, border security through restricting flows of migrants and illicit drugs, countering China, raising G7 members’ defence spending, and enhancing American energy security from domestic fossil fuels.
As always, G7 leaders can be expected to have wide-ranging discussions about challenging issues such as trade behind the closed doors of the summit. However, the announcements they make, in terms of the public performance, will only reflect the issues on which the leaders agree.
Canada was very aware that soon after the Kananaskis Summit there would be the North Atlantic Treaty Organization summit in the Netherlands on June 24–25, followed by the International Conference on Financing for Development in Spain on June 30–July 3 and the 30th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in Brazil on November 10–21. Many expect the G7 to lay an ambitious groundwork for those. However, although the level of G7 ambition may be clear on issues such as defence, it is less clear regarding financing and development.
There are also several deadlines in 2025 set by other international institutions to which G7 members belong, starting with the G20, the IMF and World Bank, and the major bodies of the UN, especially those on issues and initiatives where Canada and Trudeau have taken an institutional lead (see Appendix D).
The sherpa-agreed agenda was reinforced and refined when Trudeau flew to Europe on February 8, to give a keynote address at the AI Summit hosted by Macron in Paris on February 10–11. News reports indicated that AI would have an important place on the Kananaskis agenda. Indeed, in Paris on February 9, Trudeau said that a key G7 priority in 2025 would be generating more electricity to power AI, but not at the cost of climate change. Nuclear energy could thus be a priority, as well as lowering the energy demand of AI (Karadeglija 2025). While he was in Europe, Trudeau also met with the leaders of NATO and the EU in Belgium.
On February 13, after speaking by phone for 90 minutes with Vladimir Putin, Trump suggested that the G7 invite him back to reconstitute the G8, from which Russia has been suspended in the spring of 2014 after invading and annexing the Crimean region of Ukraine. CNN’s Kaitlan Collins (2025) reported that when Trump was asked if he trusts Putin, he replied: “Yeah, I believe he would like to see something happen. I trust him on this subject.” She also reported that he thought Putin “would love to be back” in the G8. Canadian Conservative Party leader Pierre Poilievre (2025) and Liberal leadership candidate Chrystia Freeland (2025) quickly responded that they would never let Putin back in. Former foreign policy advisor to Trudeau Roland Paris (2025) tweeted that “Trump will probably withdraw when the rest of the G7 refuses to readmit Putin.”
As of early March 2025, the G7’s Kananaskis Summit’s potentially productive and even significant performance was propelled by the severe shocks it will confront, the many multilateral organizational failures in response, and G7 members’ still globally predominant and internally equalizing capabilities, due to the downturn in the US currency and economy. But these propellers are offset very strongly by its members, which have unprecedentedly divergent political principles, practices and policies, due to Trump now waging economic war against fellow G7 members, threatening to annex neighbouring Canada and Greenland in the EU and often supporting authoritarian Russia in its war against a democratic Ukraine. Nonetheless, G7 leaders’ initially low domestic political support is changing, with Trump’s now declining as the others now rise, possibly leading Trump to adjust at Kananaskis to the others unified views. Already the G7 ministerial meetings and even the February 24 virtual summit suggest that all the leaders remain committed to the G7, rather than the G20, as the core of an expanding network of global summit governance to deal with the most important and difficult issues they face.
G7 members’ shock-activated vulnerability, the strongest propellor of performance, is very high. This is especially from shocks directly related the G7 summits distinctive foundational mission of protecting within its own members and promoting globally the values of open democracy and individual liberty, along with the more broadly shared value of social advance. These are led by Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, China’s threat to Taiwan, war in the Middle East and instability in Haiti. While the vulnerabilities from Russia and the Middle East are partly self-inflicted, given the unilateral actions of Trump, this means that their solution lies within the G7 itself.
The physical shocks emerge from deadly terrorist attacks in Germany and Europe, extreme weather events fuelled by climate change led by the deadly Los Angeles wildfires and subsequent ones throughout the US, and the prospect of a new health pandemic from escalating cases and deaths from bird flu, flu and measles in the US.
Political shocks have been constant, and unprecedented in their scale, scope and origin, by those from the G7’s most powerful member. These shocks were dominated by the barrage of threats and decisions from Trump, who was inaugurated as US president on January 20, 2025. The most severe and sustained was his threat to use economic force to annex Canada as the 51st US state and to acquire EU member Greenland, without ruling out the use of military force to do so. This was followed by his threat to expel all inhabitants from the Gaze strip forever, and to acquire it for a real estate development. These shocks came with a proliferating imposition and threats to impose tariffs on China, Canada and Mexico, and then all countries’ steel and aluminum, and all products and services as “reciprocal” tariffs against what the US deemed as unfair. In a bilateral call with Putin about Ukraine on February 12, Trump agreed to give Putin almost all of what Putin wanted in Ukraine.
During January 2025, the front page of the Financial Times on the 25 available days had stories on democracy on 92%, on climate change and the economy on 76% each, on digitalization on 44%, and on health on 32%.
The World Economic Forum’s Global Risks Report 2025 in January led with state-based armed conflict chosen by 23% of its survey respondents, followed in turn by extreme weather events from 14%, geoeconomic confrontation 8%, misinformation and disinformation 7%, societal polarization 6%, economic downturn 5% and critical change to earth systems 4%. For the next two years, the ranking was misinformation and disinformation, extreme weather events, state-base armed conflict, societal polarization, and cyber espionage and warfare. For the next 10 years it was extreme weather events, biodiversity loss and ecosystem collapse, critical change to Earth systems, natural resource shortages, and misinformation and disinformation (World Economic Forum 2025).
The failure of the world’s major multilateral organizations in responding to these severe shocks was very high, especially with Trump taking the US and its financial support out of the Paris Agreement on climate change, the World Health Organization and the UN Human Rights Council. Argentina subsequently withdrew from the World Health Organization and, along with Indonesia, was considering also withdrawing from the Paris Agreement. Only 12 of the 200 UN members submitted their updated nationally determined contributions to control climate change by the deadline of February 10. Even the World Food Programme was severely short of funds needed to meet the escalating food insecurity.
G7 members’ globally predominant and internally equalizing capabilities gave them the ability and incentive to fill the gap. As a group, they possessed a leading share of the relevant capabilities, especially in the military, financial and high technology fields. Since January 1, 2025, the value of the US dollar began to decline against the currencies of other G7 members, while the euro and sterling rose. US economic growth slowed, US inflation rose to 3%, US consumer confidence declined, and US stock markets plunged when Trump began announcing tariffs against his free trade partners of Canada and Mexico.
Yet an unprecedentedly powerful constraint on Kananaskis performance came from the plunge in G7 members’ common and converging principles and practices. This was due to Trump’s economic attack and annexationist assault on Canada and the European Union and his support for Russia on the central issue of security for Ukraine’s, Europe and the democratic world security. Yet there was still substantial commonality among all G7 members on their security against China and fear of illegal migration, drugs and terrorism into and within their countries.
G7 leaders’ domestic political support was changing, in ways that propelled performance.
In host Canada, the governing Liberal Party’s popularity soared after its leader and prime minister, Justin Trudeau, announced his resignation on January 6, raising the prospect that his successor could win the general election expected before the Kananaskis Summit. By early March, on the eve of the vote to choose the next Liberal leader who would then become prime minister, some polls suggested the Liberals could win an election if one were held immediately (Ekos Politics 2025).
In the US, Trump took office on January 20 without a majority of the popular vote, and with his Republican Party having only a small majority in the House of Representatives and Senate. He would be a lame-duck president from the start, being unable to serve again after his second term ended in January 2028. He had mid-term congressional elections looming in November 2026. By early March his approval ratings had slid into negative territory in some polls (Laws 2025; Gans 2025).
In Japan, Ishiba’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) had lost its legislative majority for the first time since 2009. It now led a precarious three-party collation government, and faced a likely election in 2025. The LDP’s approval rating was poor but its position as the government seemed secure.
In Germany and France, the leaders’ popularity and position were weak, but both would be in office for some years.
In the UK, Starmer had a secure majority and was on good terms with Trump.
In Itay, Meloni was popular and was well liked by Trump.
Also promising was the evidence that all leaders, including Trump, remained committed to the G7, rather than the G20, as the core of an expanding network of global summit governance to deal with the most important and difficult issues they faced. Trump’s participation in the February 24 virtual summit and that of his foreign and finance ministers in their first G7 meetings were promising. Trump’s G7 sherpa participated constructively in the first G7 sherpa meeting. And Trump could look forward to hosting the G20 in 2026 and the G7 in 2027, the latter when his deadline to become a lame duck loomed.
Thus by early March, there were promising signs that Kananaskis would be a productive and even a significant one, of exceptional value for global governance at a uniquely critical time.
Boehm, Peter (2025). “Policy Q&A: Former G7 Sherpa Sen. Peter Boehm on Trump, Charlevoix and Bracing for Kananaskis,” Policy Magazine (January). https://www.policymagazine.ca/policy-qa-former-g7-sherpa-sen-peter-boehm-on-trump-charlevoix-and-bracing-for-kananaskis/.
Karadeglija, Anja (2025), “Trudeau Says Powering AI Without Compromising Climate Change Is a G7 Priority,” Canadian Press, February 9. https://www.thecanadianpressnews.ca/politics/trudeau-says-powering-ai-without-compromising-climate-change-is-a-g7-priority/article_1418dc53-1338-553b-a629-2425495500cf.html.
Collins, Kaitlan (@kaitlancollins) (2025). “Asked if he trusts President Putin, President Trump says, ‘Yeah, I believe he would like to see something happen. I trust him on this subject.’ He also says he wants to see Russia back in the G7, which it was kicked out of it for annexing Crimea. ‘I think Putin would love to be back.’” X, February 13. https://x.com/kaitlancollins/status/1890131296988336221?s=61.
Ekos Politics (2025). “Rising Nationalism, Desire for Economic Sovereignty Propels Liberals to Five-Year High,” Ottawa, March 6. https://www.ekospolitics.com/index.php/2025/03/rising-nationalism-desire-for-economic-sovereignty-propels-liberals-to-five-year-high/.
Freeland, Chrystia (@chrystiafreeland) (2025). “As long as I am Prime Minister, there will be no invitation for Russia to join the G7 table in June this year. We will not turn a blind eye to war crimes and attacks on other countries’ sovereignty.” X, February 13. https://x.com/cafreeland/status/1890151873044435285.
Gans, Jared (2025). “Trump’s Approval Dips Amid Concerns over Economy: Poll,” The Hill, March 11. https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/5187064-trump-approval-rating-drops/.
G7 Foreign Ministers (2025). “G7 Foreign Ministers’ Statement,” Munich, February 15. https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/foreign/250215-statement.html.
Laws, Jasmine (2025). “Donald Trump Approval Rating Goes Negative for First Time in Presidency,” Newsweek, March 6. https://www.newsweek.com/donald-trump-approval-rating-negative-first-time-presidency-2039743.
National Defence (2024). “Minister Blair Concludes Successful Visit to Europe for North Atlantic Treaty Organization and G7 Defence Ministers’ Meetings,” Naples, October 20. https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/news/2024/10/minister-blair-concludes-successful-visit-to-europe-for-north-atlantic-treaty-organization-and-g7-defence-ministers-meetings.html.
Paris, Roland (@rolandparis) (2025). “Unnecessary because Trump will probably withdraw when the rest of the G7 refuses to readmit Putin.” X, February 13. https://x.com/rolandparis/status/1890202796156416503.
Percival, Valerie and Shawn Barber (2025). “Canada Needs to Reset Its Priorities for the G7 Presidency,” Globe and Mail, February 25. https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-canada-needs-to-reset-its-priorities-for-the-g7-presidency/.
Poilievre, Pierre (@pierrepoilievre) (2025). “Russia should not be welcomed back into the G7. It was a Conservative government that led the charge to kick Russia out of the then G8 because of their illegal invasion of Crimea in 2014. Russia’s exclusion from the G7 is every bit as justifiable today.” X, February 13. https://x.com/PierrePoilievre/status/1890185595038888173.
Prime Minister’s Office (2024). “Prime Minister Advances Shared Progress and Prosperity at the G7 Summit,” Apulia, Italy, June 14. https://www.pm.gc.ca/en/news/news-releases/2024/06/14/prime-minister-trudeau-advances-shared-progress-and-prosperity-g7-summit.
Prime Minister’s Office (2025). “Prime Minister Justin Trudeau Speaks with Artificial Intelligence Business Leaders,” Paris, France, February 10. https://www.pm.gc.ca/en/news/readouts/2025/02/10/prime-minister-justin-trudeau-speaks-artificial-intelligence-business.
Rachman, Gideon (2024). “Leading Democracies Are Struggling to Govern,” Financial Times, December 23. https://www.ft.com/content/ea15bed8-bb4d-4e55-880f-a0ed4f2ef8b6.
Reguly, Eric (2024). “Donald Trump’s Election Victory is a Nightmare Scenario for European, Especially German, Industry,” Globe and Mail, November 6. https://www.theglobeandmail.com/business/commentary/article-donald-trumps-election-victory-is-a-nightmare-scenario-for-european/.
Shakil, Ismail (2025). “G7 Nations Still Discussing Joint Statement on Ukraine, Canadian Minister Says,” Reuters, February 25. https://www.reuters.com/world/g7-nations-still-discussing-joint-statement-ukraine-canadian-minister-says-2025-02-24/.
Taylor-Vaisey, Nick and Sue Allan (2025). “Canada’s G7 Preppers,” Politico, February 18. https://www.politico.com/newsletters/ottawa-playbook/2025/02/18/canadas-g7-preppers-00204632.
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Van Dusan, Lisa (2025). “The Road to Kananaskis: Making the G6 Great Again?,” January 29. Policy Magazine (January). https://www.policymagazine.ca/the-road-to-kananaskis-making-the-g6-great-again/.
World Economic Forum (2025). The Global Risks Report 2025: 20th Edition – Insight Report (Geneva, Switzerland). https://reports.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Global_Risks_Report_2025.pdf.
Year |
Grade |
Domestic political management |
Deliberation |
Direction setting |
Decision making |
Delivery |
Development of global governance |
Participation |
|||||||
# communiqué compliments |
Spread |
# days |
# statements |
# |
# references to core values |
# commitments |
Compliance |
# assessed |
# ministerials created |
# official-level groups created |
# members |
# participating countries |
# participating international organizations |
||
1975 |
A− |
2 |
29% |
3 |
1 |
1,129 |
5 |
15 |
54% |
2 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
0 |
0 |
1976 |
D |
0 |
0% |
2 |
1 |
1,624 |
0 |
10 |
n/a |
n/a |
0 |
0 |
7 |
0 |
0 |
1977 |
B− |
1 |
13% |
2 |
6 |
2,669 |
0 |
55 |
n/a |
n/a |
0 |
1 |
8 |
0 |
0 |
1978 |
A |
1 |
13% |
2 |
2 |
2,999 |
0 |
50 |
57% |
3 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
0 |
1979 |
B+ |
0 |
0% |
2 |
2 |
2,102 |
0 |
55 |
n/a |
n/a |
1 |
2 |
8 |
0 |
0 |
1980 |
C+ |
0 |
0% |
2 |
5 |
3,996 |
3 |
54 |
n/a |
n/a |
0 |
1 |
8 |
0 |
0 |
1981 |
C |
1 |
13% |
2 |
3 |
3,165 |
0 |
48 |
50% |
2 |
1 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
0 |
1982 |
C |
0 |
0% |
3 |
2 |
1,796 |
0 |
39 |
15% |
1 |
0 |
3 |
9 |
0 |
0 |
1983 |
B |
0 |
0% |
3 |
2 |
2,156 |
7 |
39 |
22% |
2 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
0 |
1984 |
C− |
1 |
13% |
3 |
5 |
3,261 |
0 |
31 |
27% |
2 |
1 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
0 |
1985 |
E |
4 |
50% |
3 |
2 |
3,127 |
1 |
24 |
64% |
2 |
0 |
2 |
8 |
0 |
0 |
1986 |
B+ |
3 |
25% |
3 |
4 |
3,582 |
1 |
39 |
29% |
1 |
1 |
1 |
9 |
0 |
0 |
1987 |
D |
2 |
13% |
3 |
7 |
5,064 |
0 |
53 |
65% |
1 |
0 |
2 |
9 |
0 |
0 |
1988 |
C− |
3 |
25% |
3 |
3 |
4,872 |
0 |
27 |
n/a |
n/a |
0 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
0 |
1989 |
B+ |
3 |
38% |
3 |
11 |
7,125 |
1 |
61 |
47% |
4 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
0 |
0 |
2014 |
B |
6 |
44% |
2 |
1 |
5,106 |
42 |
141 |
85% |
24 |
1 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
0 |
2015 |
B+ |
2 |
25% |
2 |
2 |
12,674 |
20 |
376 |
79% |
35 |
1 |
4 |
9 |
6 |
6 |
2016 |
B− |
22 |
63% |
2 |
7 |
23,052 |
95 |
342 |
69% |
28 |
1 |
1 |
9 |
7 |
5 |
2017 |
B |
2 |
25% |
2 |
4 |
8,614 |
158 |
180 |
79% |
22 |
1 |
2 |
9 |
5 |
6 |
2018 |
B+ |
0 |
0% |
2 |
8 |
11,224 |
56 |
315 |
78% |
42 |
1 |
|
9 |
12 |
4 |
2019 |
B− |
6 |
57% |
3 |
10 |
7,202 |
|
71 |
76% |
27 |
1 |
0 |
9 |
8 |
8 |
2020 |
B+ |
0 |
0% |
1 |
1 |
795 |
0 |
25 |
94% |
20 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
4 |
n/a |
2021 |
A− |
4 |
50% |
3 |
3 |
20,677 |
130 |
429 |
89% |
29 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
4 |
3 |
2022 |
A− |
1 |
13% |
3 |
8 |
19,179 |
118 |
545 |
92% |
21 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
6 |
9 |
2023 |
A |
17 |
75% |
3 |
6 |
30,046 |
57 |
698 |
- |
- |
0 |
0 |
9 |
9 |
7 |
Average/ |
|
60/ |
|
23 |
50/ |
138,587/ |
676/ |
3,122/ |
82% |
248/ |
6 |
7 |
9 |
61/ |
48/ |
Total |
204 |
27.57 |
129 |
268 |
527,017 |
1,575 |
7,093 |
15.98 |
696 |
21 |
102 |
429 |
189 |
106 |
|
Average |
4.2 |
0.6 |
2.6 |
5.5 |
10,755.4 |
32.8 |
147.8 |
0.4 |
16.5 |
0.4 |
2.1 |
8.8 |
3.9 |
2.2 |
|
2024 Apulia |
A− |
14 |
75% |
3 |
1 |
19,795 |
81 |
469 |
|
|
|
|
9 |
|
|
Updated: Brittaney Warren, October 14, 2023, John Kirton, June 17, 2024.
June 2024 (Prime Minister’s Office, 2024):
Subsequently, the list was presented as:
For the G20 Rio Summit on November 18–19, Trudeau’s priorities were (Trudeau 2024):
By December 6, 2024, Canada’s presidency policy priorities were:
Canada’s presidency process priorities were:
1 |
Environment |
10 |
2 |
Climate change |
9 |
3 |
Energy |
4 |
4 |
Health |
3 |
5 |
Digital |
2 |
6 |
Gender equality |
2 |
Summit |
Total |
Gender |
Energy |
Health |
Climate |
Environment |
Labour |
Ukraine |
Food and Agriculture |
Digital |
Development |
1975–2014 |
0 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2015 Elmau |
1 |
1 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2016 Ise-Shima |
2 |
|
1 |
1 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2017 Taormina |
1 |
1 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2018 Charlevoix |
0 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2019 Biarritz |
0 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2020 Virtual |
0 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2021 Cornwall |
5 |
|
1 |
|
2 |
2 |
|
|
|
|
|
2022 Elmau |
6 |
|
1 |
|
2 |
2 |
1 |
|
|
|
|
2023 Hiroshima |
8 |
|
1 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
|
|
|
|
|
2024 Apulia |
11 |
|
|
1 |
3 |
2 |
|
1 |
1 |
2 |
1 |
Total |
34 |
2 |
4 |
3 |
9 |
10 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
1 |
2015-283: [We will continue to take steps] to reduce the gender gap in workforce participation within our own countries by 25% by 2025, taking into account national circumstances including by improving the framework conditions to enable women and men to balance family life and employment, including access to parental leave and childcare. (core gender) (labour-employment related)
2016-166: We remain committed to the elimination of inefficient fossil fuel subsidies and encourage all countries to do so by 2025. (core energy finance) Compliance 50%, Canada 50%
2016-226: Galvanize international efforts to combat malnutrition and to hold the rise of obesity and over-weight targeting most vulnerable populations - mothers, children and adolescent girls - and consistent with the WHO [World Health Organization] Comprehensive Implementation Plan on Maternal, Infant and Young Child Nutrition, including: (i) the activities within the Decade of Action on Nutrition 2016-2025 and by various initiatives such as Scaling Up Nutrition (core health) (food-agriculture-related)
2017-152: Consider adopting measures that support an increased uptake by fathers of parental leave, by 2025. (core gender)
None
None
None
2021-14: [We commit to]…increasing and improving climate finance to 2025 (core climate change finance)
2021-189: More broadly, we reaffirm our existing commitment to eliminating inefficient fossil fuel subsidies by 2025, [and call on all countries to join us, recognising the substantial financial resource this could unlock globally to support the transition and the need to commit to a clear timeline]. (core energy - finance)
2021-204: We reaffirm the collective developed country goal to jointly mobilise $100 billion per year from public and private sources, through to 2025 in the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency on implementation. (core climate change - finance)
2021-224: Third, we will work intensively towards increasing investment in the protection, conservation and restoration of nature, including committing to increase finance for nature-based solutions through to 2025. (core environment - finance)
2021-326: Working intensively towards increasing finance for nature from all sources throughout the next five years: in particular, we commit to increase our finance contributions for nature-based solutions through to 2025. (core environment - finance)
2022-32: We renew our strong commitment and will intensify our efforts to delivering on the collective USD 100 billion climate finance mobilisation goal as soon as possible and through to 2025. (core climate change - finance) Compliance 94%, Canada 100%
2022-34: We commit to working alongside others towards the implementation of the Glasgow Climate Pact's call to collectively at least double the provision of climate finance for adaptation to developing countries from 2019 levels by 2025. (core climate change - finance)
2022-39: We are committed to mobilising resources from all sources and to substantially increasing our national and international funding for nature by 2025 to support the implementation of an ambitious global framework. (core environment - finance)
2022-41: We commit to ensure our international development assistance does no harm to nature by 2025, and delivers positive outcomes overall for people, climate, and nature. (core environment) (development-related)
2022-48: We [stress that fossil fuel subsidies are inconsistent with the goals of the Paris Agreement and] reaffirm our commitment to the elimination of inefficient fossil fuel subsidies by 2025. (core energy - finance)
2022-161: By 2025, we will increase the share of our ODA [official development assistance] employment and skills promotion programmes that is directed specifically towards green sectors and greening traditional sectors in alignment with our emerging and developing partner countries' strategies, and subject to our budgetary processes. (core labour and employment) (development-related)
2023-116: We reaffirm our commitments to the developed country Parties’ [to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change] goal of jointly mobilizing $100 billion annually in climate finance by 2020 through to 2025 in the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency on implementation. (core climate change - finance)
2023-123: We continue to accelerate efforts to respond to the Glasgow Climate Pact that urges developed countries to at least double their collective provision of climate finance for adaptation to developing countries from the 2019 level by 2025, in the context of achieving a balance between mitigation and adaptation in the provision of scaled-up financial resources. (core climate change - finance) (development related)
2023-143: We will make as much progress as possible on these issues…by the UN Ocean Conference in 2025. (core environment)
2023-144: [We will make as much progress as possible]…on the broader agenda of ocean protection by the UN Ocean Conference in 2025. (core environment)
2023-147: We will identify incentives, including subsidies, harmful to biodiversity by 2025, and redirect or eliminate them while scaling up positive incentives for the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity by 2030 at the latest, taking initial steps without delay. (core environment - finance)
2023-148: We reiterate our commitment to substantially increase our national and international funding for nature by 2025. (core environment - finance)
2023-178: We reaffirm our commitment to the elimination of inefficient fossil fuel subsidies by 2025 or sooner (core energy - finance)
2023-248: We recommit to working alongside global partners to assist countries to achieve UHC [universal health coverage] by supporting primary health care (PHC) and developing and restoring essential health services, to achieve better than pre-pandemic levels by the end of 2025, as part of our effort to strengthen health systems in ordinary times. (core health)
We will build on the Japan-Ukraine Conference for Promotion of Economic Growth and Reconstruction held in Tokyo on 19 February and the Ukraine Recovery Conference held on 11-12 June in Berlin and we look forward to the next Ukraine Recovery Conference in Rome in 2025. (Ukraine)
We will foster multi-stakeholder engagement and innovation, including with multilaterals, the private sector and philanthropies, and welcome in particular the 2025 Paris Nutrition for Growth Summit. (Food-agriculture)
We underline that this is a collective effort and further actions from all countries, especially major economies, are required in order to peak global GHG by 2025 at the latest and achieve net-zero by 2050. (Climate change)
We reaffirm our commitment to eliminate inefficient fossil fuel subsidies by 2025 or sooner and will report in 2025 on progress made. We call on others to do the same. (climate change)
We recall our previous commitment to increase our national and international funding for nature by 2025, and to substantially and progressively increase the level of financial resources from all sources including by providing support to the Global Environment Facility. (Climate change)
We note that Target 19 aims at mobilizing at least USD 200 billion per year by 2030 for biodiversity from all sources, including USD 20 billion per year by 2025 and USD 30 billion per year by 2030, through international financial resources. We are all still concerned about incentives, including subsidies, harmful to biodiversity, and call upon all relevant organizations to continue collaborating with us, including by assisting in identifying such incentives, and we are all working to fulfil our respective applicable commitments, including, inter alia, to identify these incentives by 2025, and redirect or eliminate them, while scaling-up positive incentives for the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity by 2030 at the latest, taking initial steps without delay. (Environment-biodiversity)
We will work towards a successful UNOC3 in 2025 in this regard. (Environment)
We will build on the outcomes of the AI Seoul Summit and upcoming milestones, including this year’s UN Summit of the Future and the AI Action Summit in 2025. (Digital-AI)
We reaffirm our support for the Program of Action to Advance Responsible State’ Behaviour in the Use of ICTs in the context of international security, as the permanent and action-oriented mechanism to hold discussions on cybersecurity at the UN from 2025 onwards. (digital)
In this regard, we welcome the successful replenishment of the Asian Development Fund (AsDF14) support a successful International Development Association (IDA21) replenishment and commit to work toward a successful replenishment of the African Development Fund next year (AfDF17). (Development)
We look forward to the Global Disability Summit to be held in Berlin in 2025. (Health)
As of October 27, 2024
Security
Climate Change
Environment
Health
Development
Gender
Artificial Intelligence
Reform of International Financial Institutions
Global Governance
 — 
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