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Analytical Studies > Analysis on the 2025 Kananaskis Summit

From Afterthought to Action:
Making the 2024 G7 Kananaskis Summit Work for Africa

John Kirton, G7 Research Group
April 24, 2025

Presentation to the Africa Study Group at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University, April 17, 2025

Introduction

How will, can and should Africa be discussed by G7 leaders at their Kananaskis Summit on June 15–17, 2025, in ways that lead to decisions that will be delivered in the following year?

At first glance, the prospects and possibilities appear to be very poor.

Africa is absent in the publicly available information about what the Kananaskis priority agenda will be. It is sure to be dominated by the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East and artificial intelligence.

Africa is also absent in the G7 foreign ministers’ many commitments at their meetings in Munich on February 15 and at Charlevoix on March 14.

The leaders of the United States and United Kingdom are drastically reducing their official development assistance (ODA), long heavily focused on Africa.

US president Donald Trump’s barrage of protectionist tariffs on April 2, 2025, assaulted almost all the countries in Africa, including its poorest ones.

Assured African advocates are largely absent among the G7 leaders at Kananaskis. This could include its Canadian host, who will only be known after Canada’s general election on April 28. Prime Minister Mark Carney could be preoccupied by a financial crisis. And a Prime Minister Poilievre has already promised to cut Canada’s ODA.

To be sure, Kananaskis would normally want to support the bigger broader G20 summit in November. It will be held in Africa for the first time and will put African priorities first. But President Trump is already assaulting the G20’s South African host, having his foreign minister boycott its meetings, and saying that he will not attend its summit.

However, a closer look points to a more promising conclusion.

In the past, Africa has survived and thrived at G7 summits, even when US Republican presidents were preoccupied with security threats such as the deadly attacks on the US itself on September 11, 2001.

Moreover, there is already a built-in, building and broadening African-related agenda for Kananaskis this year.

And many of the likely priorities at Kananaskis can adopt Africa as their solution, as they often have at the 50 G7 summits since their start in 1975.

Thus, I argue that the G7 foreign ministers this year have already publicly accepted a long list of African solutions to their leaders’ top priorities at Kananaskis.

They cover:

1. Peace and security, including Iran;
2. Economic prosperity, including trade and supply chains; and
3. Energy security, including oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG) supplies.

They have added:

4. Gender equality
5. Food security
6. Humanitarian relief
7. Youth
8. Conflict prevention
9. Human rights, and
10. Environmental hazards and extreme weather events.

And they G7 leaders have already inherited

11. Development, through replenishment of the African Development Fund.

So there is a big, broad basis on which African advocates can build.

To see how, let’s look in turn at:

• What G7 summits have done on Africa in the past?

• What they have done so far this year?

• And what they will, can and should they do at and after Kananaskis in June?

G7 Africa Performance, 1975–2024

First, G7 summits have performed well on Africa.

Commitments

From 1985 to 2024, they made 479 commitments on Africa, for 6.5% of the 7,318 commitments they produced overall (see Appendix A).

They began at Bonn in 1985 with three, followed by Tokyo in 1986 with two, London in 1991 with one, Tokyo in 1993 with two and Halifax in 1995 with two.

Then, with the end of the Cold War, they spiked, starting at Denver in 1997 with nine. Then they soared at the first Kananaskis Summit in 2002 to 87, for the all-time high.

Since Genoa in 2001, G7 leaders made commitments on Africa at every in-person summit. The number rose to 176 from 2003 to 2010, then declined to 53 from 2011 to 2018.

The current hosting cycle since 2019 has produced 124 commitments.

There were 27 at Biarritz in Germany in 2019, 12 at Cornwall in the United Kingdom in 2021, 13 at Elmau in Germany in 2022, and 16 at Hiroshima in Japan in 2023.

They soared to 56 at Apulia in Italy in June 2024.

By the summit host, Canada comes first. Its summits have produced the most[1] – 123 from four of the six summits it hosted.

In second place, with 83, comes Italy, the G7 member geographically closest to Africa.[2]

In third comes the United Kingdom, with 77 Africa commitments at five of its seven summits.

Germany produced 73 at four of its seven summits.

Japan produced 47 at six of its seven summits, even though it is the G7 member most distant from Africa in demography, language and geography.

France, well connected by language and a long, extensive imperial experience, produced 37 at four of its seven summits.

The United States, despite its large Afro-American population, produced only 30, at three of its seven summits.

By subject, the G7’s 424 Africa commitments from 1985 to 2023 were distributed widely across 23 subjects (see Appendix B).

They were led by the big four subjects of development with 131 commitments, food and agriculture with 55, regional security with 53 and health with 48.

In the middle come information and communications technologies (ICT) and digitalization with 21, trade with 18, and education and democracy with 12 each.

At the bottom come crime and corruption with nine, energy and conflict prevention with seven each, peace and security and good governance with six each, human rights and gender with five each, financial regulation with four, and terrorism and climate change with three each.

Macroeconomic policy, microeconomics, labour and employment, transparency, and migration and refugees have one each.

The very low numbers for climate change and for migration and refugees stand out. So does the absence of any Africa commitments on the natural environment and biodiversity, despite the continent’s status as a natural superpower.

Compliance

Commitments produced on paper at the summit matter only if they are converted into action afterward, when G7 leaders descend from their sunny summit peak to the dark valleys of domestic politics back home, where many distractions compete for – and often consume – their attention and political capital.

Members’ compliance with their Africa commitments averages 76%, on par with the overall G7 compliance average on all subjects of 77%.[3]

Compliance started at 50% with commitments on Africa at Denver in 1997, rose to 82% for Okinawa in 2000 and 100% for those at Genoa in 2001.

After several subsequent declines, it reached or exceeded 80% again for Gleneagles in 2005, Heiligendamm in 2007 and consistently since then.

Canada’s Charlevoix Summit in 2018 had a perfect 100%.

By subject, compliance with the Africa commitments is led by human rights at 85%, followed by the environment at 84%, gender 82%, crime and corruption 82%, regional security 81%, development 80%, food and agriculture 75%, and ICT/digital 75% (see Appendix C).[4]

On development, compliance is led by the UK at 87%, followed by Germany at 80%, the EU 79%, US 77%, Canada and France 76% each, Japan 72% and Italy 62%.

Apulia 2024

At the Apulia Summit in 2024 G7 leaders made 56 commitments on Africa, for 12% of the 469 they made in all (see Appendix D).

Their Africa commitments covered 10 subjects. They were led by development with 17 commitments, followed by food and agriculture with 11, infrastructure eight, energy seven, trade and investment four, and international cooperation three. Then with one each came democracy and human rights, climate change and the environment, gender equality, and education.

Compliance with them, by December 20, 2024, was a 100%, above the all-subject average of 88%.[5]

The first one assessed, on energy, stated: “We are determined to ensure affordable, reliable, sustainable, clean and modern energy in developing countries, particularly in Africa.”

The second one, on infrastructure, stated “We reaffirm our commitment to mobilize up to USD 600 billion through the PGII [Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment] by 2027 towards sustainable, inclusive, resilient and quality infrastructure and investments with partner countries, with a particular focus on Africa, and on the Indo-Pacific.

This perfect compliance was driven by Italy’s national Mattei Plan on Africa (see Appendix E) and by the many G7 ministerial meetings Italy held (see Appendix F).

Prospects and Possibilities for Canada’s Kananaskis Summit 2025

The prospects and possibilities for Africa at Kananaskis begin with a realistic look at its leaders and their views and actions on Africa.

The six new leaders start with America’s Republican president Donald Trump. He has long been highly negative about Africa, has slashed US ODA and health spending there, and has just declared he will not attend the G20 summit in Johannesburg in December, due to what he sees as the South African government’s policy of genocide against whites.

However, Japan’s Ishiba Shigeru, Germany’s Freidrich Merz in coalition with the Social Democratic Party and Britain’s Keir Starmer with his Labour government should be African advocates to various degrees.

Canada’s Mark Carney, should he win the general election he called for April 28, and thus serve as summit host, has promised to maintain Canada’s development assistance. But half of its $12 billion in 2024 went to Ukraine, which will need more in 2025, as Trump withdraws.

The EU’s António Costa is aware that security in Europe requires security for and in Africa.

The three veteran leaders, who were at Apulia, start with France’s Emmanuel Macron, who has long been an African advocate.

Italy’s Giorgia Meloni is central. She wants to build on Apulia’s African advances, is still Trump’s best friend within the G7 and, like him, wants to stop immigration at its source in Africa and elsewhere.

The European Union’s Ursula von der Leyen is the custodian of the G7 summit’s commitment on Africa last year.

Based on this analysis, the recommendations for G7 leaders to adopt as commitments at their Kananaskis Summit on June 15–17 are as follows.

1. Replenish the African Development Fund.

   At Apulia last year, leaders agreed: “we … commit to work toward a successful replenishment of the African Development Fund next year.”[6]

2. Convert into commitments their G7 foreign ministers’ concerns about Africa this year.

   On February 1, they issued the Statement on the Escalation of Violence in the Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo.

   On February 15 at Munich they stated: “The G7 members also discussed urgent situations of conflict and instability elsewhere in the world, including in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Sudan.”

   On March 14, at Charlevoix, their joint statement contained a section on “Supporting lasting peace in Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.” It said: “We unequivocally denounced the ongoing fighting and atrocities in Sudan, including sexual violence against women and girls, which have led to the world’s largest humanitarian crisis and the spread of famine. We called for the warring parties to protect civilians, cease hostilities, and ensure unhindered humanitarian access, and urged external actors to end their support fueling the conflict.” It thus linked to gender equality, food and agriculture, and humanitarian relief.

   It continued: “We condemned the Rwanda-backed M23 offensive in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and the resulting violence, displacement and grave human rights and international humanitarian law violations. This offensive constitutes a flagrant disregard of the territorial integrity of the DRC. We reiterated our call for M23 and the Rwanda Defence Force to withdraw from all controlled areas. We urged all parties to support the mediation led by the East African Community and the Southern African Development Community, to promote accountability for human rights abuses by all armed actors, including M23 and the FDLR, and to commit to a peaceful and negotiated resolution of the conflict, including the meaningful participation of women and youth.” It again linked to gender equality and now added youth. It twice affirmed the G7’s distinctive foundational mission of human rights.

   In the separate G7 Foreign Ministers’ Declaration on Maritime Security and Prosperity, they welcomed “existing initiatives, such as the G7++ Friends of the Gulf of Guinea (G7++ FoGG, that Canada chairs this year), which has been, the primary forum for dialogue among G7 members and partners on maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea.

   They also noted that the “indiscriminate Houthi attacks in the Red Sea have endangered maritime security of vessels and their crews, disturbed international trade, and exposed neighboring countries to environmental hazards. Enabled by Iran’s military, financial, and intelligence support, these illegal attacks have also contributed to increased tension in the Middle East and Yemen, with severe repercussions on the intra-Yemeni peace process… we commend the efforts of EU's maritime operation ‘Aspides’ and U.S.-led operation ‘Prosperity Guardian’.”

   In the section on “Safe Shipping and Supply Chain Security” they invited “cooperation with the African Union (pursuant to Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy 2050) and other relevant International Organizations to identify best practices for enhancing maritime supply chain resilience and for safeguarding energy and food security, including in times of geopolitical crisis.”

   Together these passages explicitly noted the initiatives of Canada, the US and EU in Africa, in western and northeastern Africa, and its relevance to security in the Middle East and Yemen, and on trade, the environment, energy, food, and geopolitical crisis. This very broadly connected Africa to many G7 members, conflicts and subjects at Kananaskis.

   On April 15, they issued a G7 Foreign Ministers’ Statement Marking Two Years Since the Beginning of the Devastating War in Sudan.” Its 11 paragraphs affirmed the G7’s foundational principles of democracy and human rights; covered Sudan, South Sudan and Chad; and dealt with the devastating war, women and children, “the world’s largest humanitarian and displacement crisis,” famine and starvation, critical infrastructure including dams and communications systems, youth and civil society. The concluding paragraphs made the G7’s first 2025 commitments on Africa. They were “we reaffirm our support for a democratic transition” and “G7 members remain committed to deepening collective diplomatic efforts to bring about an end to the world’s largest humanitarian crises and secure an end to the conflict, including through the London Sudan Conference.” The latter commitment is sufficiently leader-like that it warrants being adopted by the leaders at Kananaskis and then faithfully complied with by their governments in the following year.

Thus, the G7 this year has already publicly accepted a long list of African solutions to their leaders’ top priorities at Kananaskis.

They cover:

1. Peace and security, including Iran
2. Economic prosperity, including trade and supply chains
3. Energy security, including oil and LNG supplies.

They have added:

4. Gender equality
5. Food security
6. Humanitarian relief
7. Youth
8. Conflict prevention
9. Human rights
10. Environmental hazards.

And they have inherited:

11. Development, through replenishment of the African Development Fund.

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Notes

[1] Canada is the only bilingual English- and French-language G7 country, matching the African continent in this respect. ↩

[2] Before 2024, it has produced only 27 commitments on Africa at three of its six summits: two at Genoa in 2001, 20 at L’Aquila in 2009 and five at Taormina in 2017. But it made 56 at Apulia last year. ↩

[3] Africa’s 76% is on 55 commitments assessed and the all-subject 77% is with the 705 commitments assessed across all subjects. ↩

[4] By member, compliance on all 708 assessed commitments was led by the European Union at 87%, followed in turn by the United Kingdom at 85%, Canada 83%, and the United States and Germany 80% each. Then came France at 76%, Japan 72% and Italy 56%. ↩

[5] Of Apulia’s 456 commitments, 20 priority ones were selected by the G7 Research Group for compliance assessments. Two were on Africa. ↩

[6] It is one of the 34 still unfulfilled commitments due for delivery in 2025 that G7 summits have made since 2015. ↩

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Appendix A: G7 Commitments on Africa, 1975–2024 ↩

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Appendix B: G7/8 Africa Commitments by Subject 1975–2023 ↩

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Appendix C: G7 Leaders’ Compliance on Africa by Subject ↩

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Appendix D: 2024 Apulia Summit Commitments on Africa, N=56 ↩

G7-2024-10.  [Engaging with African countries, in a spirit of equitable and strategic partnership.] As they work to deliver sustainable development and industrial growth for their people, we are advancing our respective efforts to invest in sustainable infrastructure, including through the PGII (development)

Fostering partnerships with African countries (N=19 development – Africa)

G7-2024-78.  G8 G7-2024-78 We are committed to stepping up our support to African countries in their efforts to achieve sustainable development (development) (Africa)

G7-2024-79.  [We are committed to stepping up our support to African countries in their efforts to achieve]… local value creation (development) (Africa)

G7-2024-80.  [We are committed to stepping up our support to African countries in their efforts to]…strengthen democratic governance (development) (Africa)

G7-2024-81.  [We are committed to stepping up our support to African countries in their efforts to]…contribute to global stability and prosperity (development) (Africa)

G7-2024-82.  [We are committed to stepping up our support to African countries in their efforts to]…protect the rule-based international order. (development) (Africa)

G7-2024-83.  We will align our efforts with the African Union Agenda 2063 and African countries’ needs and priorities, including the integrated African continental plans for improved local and regional food security (development) (Africa)

G7-2024-84.  [We will align our efforts with the African Union Agenda 2063 and African countries’ needs and priorities, including …] infrastructure

G7-2024-85.  [We will align our efforts with the African Union Agenda 2063 and African countries’ needs and priorities, including …] trade (Africa)

G7-2024-86.  [We will align our efforts with the African Union Agenda 2063 and African countries’ needs and priorities, including …] agricultural productivity. (Africa)

G7-2024-87.  We will also support the operationalization of the African Continental Free Trade Area which will be an essential parameter of African growth in the coming decade. (Africa)

G7-2024-88.  We will reinforce mutually beneficial and equitable cooperation with African countries and regional organizations. (Africa)

G7-2024-89.  While assuring African countries our continued financial support, we will enhance the coordination and effectiveness of G7 cooperation resources; (Africa)

G7-2024-90.  [While assuring African countries our continued financial support, we will]…support better mobilization and management of local domestic resources; (Africa)

G7-2024-91.  [While assuring African countries our continued financial support, we will]…promote increased private investment. (Africa)

G7-2024-92.  We reiterate our support for the G20 Compact with Africa, as a tool to increase private sector investments, promote structural reforms, and local entrepreneurship support, and enhance cooperation, including in the energy sector. (trade-investment)

G7-2024-93.  Acknowledging that sustainable development and democracy are mutually reinforcing, we reiterate our commitment to supporting African governments in advancing democratic governance and human rights, as we address conditions conducive to terrorism, violent extremism, and instability. (democracy-human rights)

G7-2024-95.  We support the ambition of partnerships such as the G20 Compact with Africa and the Paris Pact for People and Planet (4P), which work to foster collaboration between key global stakeholders to deliver additional financing for development, climate, and nature and fostering private sector investment.

G7-2024-96.  We will work with the IMF, the World Bank, and other key parties to bring this plan forward, with a view to realizing it for pilot countries by the end of 2024.

We will contribute to these efforts globally, with a special attention to implementing and aligning with the African continental plans by supporting the following multi-stakeholder programs developed with the African Union and other global partners:

G7-2024-109.  the Technical Cooperation Collaborative to implement the “COP28 UAE Declaration on sustainable agriculture, resilient food systems, and climate action” and enhance access to quality technical cooperation for the integration of food systems and climate plans in low-income and climate vulnerable countries; (food and agriculture)

G7-2024-110.  the Vision for Adapted Crops and Soils for the restoration and maintenance of healthy soils and the further development and climate resilience of traditional and indigenous crops in Africa, recalling the importance of Africa Fertilizer and Soil Health Summit 2024; (food and agriculture)

G7-2024-111.  a G7 private-public initiative on coffee aimed to further advance policy, sustained investments, research and innovation, partnerships, blended finance to boost the resilience, environmental sustainability, value addition and circularity of the coffee value chains worldwide and to support smallholders and family farmers in producing countries, including examining the feasibility of the establishment of a global private-public fund on coffee. (food and agriculture)

G7-2024-112.  Given childhood stunting and wasting caused by malnutrition can have lifelong physical, psychological and social effects that threaten sustainable development, we commit to support treatment and prevention to address this challenge. (food and agriculture)

G7-2024-113.  We will foster multi-stakeholder engagement and innovation, including with multilaterals, the private sector and philanthropies (food and agriculture)

G7-2024-114.  We will also promote innovative solutions to increase the quantity and quality of public and private funding for food security and food systems in low-income countries. (food and agriculture)
G7-2024-115.  We will: work together to improve the fiscal space for food security in line with continued efforts to improve the international financial architecture, including further analysis of the potential of debt swaps (food and agriculture)

G7-2024-116.  [We will:]…building on existing cooperation, initiate a collaborative of G7 public development banks and DFIs to enhance co-investment and risk-mitigation for sustainable agriculture and food systems transformation (food and agriculture)

G7-2024-117.  [We will:] support the design and development of a Financing for Shock-Driven Food Crisis Facility to provide rapid-response financing in anticipation of severe food crises, also involving private capital from global insurance markets. (food and agriculture)

G7-2024-118.  We also highlight synergies between AFSI, the Global Alliance for Food Security, and the Global Alliance against Hunger and Poverty under development within the G20, which the ambitions of we fully support. (food and agriculture)

G7-2024-119.  We also continue to support coordinated action with and among the UN Rome-based agencies and the wider UN system, MDBs and other relevant organizations, including the African Union. (international cooperation)

G7-2024-120.  We reaffirm our commitment to mobilize up to USD 600 billion through the PGII by 2027 towards sustainable, inclusive, resilient, and quality infrastructure and investments with partner countries, with a particular focus on Africa and on the Indo-Pacific. (infrastructure)

G7-2024-121.  We reaffirm the Carbis Bay commitment for our DFIs and multilateral partners to invest at least USD 80 billion into the private sector in Africa (development)

We will enhance this Partnership by:

G7-2024-122.  raising the profile of the PGII initiative throughout the G7 platform with the strong coordination and involvement of all its G7 tracks (infrastructure)

G7-2024-123.  establishing a secretariat for effective implementation and investment coordination with partners (infrastructure)

G7-2024-124.  supporting the launch of the African Virtual Investment Platform, in collaboration with the African Union and OECD, to enhance information sharing, transparency, and public policies on investment in Africa; (development)

G7-2024-125.  working together with our DFIs, MDBs, and private sector to improve green investments in Africa as part of our PGII commitment. (infrastructure)

G7-2024-126.  In this respect, we will progressively enhance country-based investment coordination, including through platforms such as the Alliance for Green Infrastructure in Africa. (infrastructure)

G7-2024-127.  We commit to implement these key pillars, as we are stepping up our efforts to attract private investments at scale (development)

G7-2024-128.  [We commit to implement these key pillars, as we are stepping up our efforts to]… improving the enabling environments (development)

G7-2024-129.  [We commit to implement these key pillars, as we are stepping up our efforts to]… maximizing the role of MDBs and DFIs (development)

G7-2024-130.  [We commit to implement these key pillars, as we are stepping up our efforts to]… enhancing co-financing (development)

G7-2024-131.  [We commit to implement these key pillars, as we are stepping up our efforts to]… advancing high standards for quality infrastructure, including through certification schemes such as the Blue Dot Network and the FAST-INFRA Initiative and further developing a pipeline of bankable projects. (infrastructure).

G7-2024-132.  We will further promote concrete G7 PGII initiatives, flagship projects, and complementary initiatives to develop transformative economic corridors for quality infrastructure and investment, such as the deepening of our coordination and financing for the Lobito Corridor, the Luzon Corridor, the Middle Corridor, and the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor, also building on the EU Global Gateway, the Great Green Wall Initiative, and the Mattei Plan for Africa launched by Italy. (infrastructure).

G7-2024-202.  We are determined to ensure affordable, reliable, sustainable, clean, and modern energy in developing countries, particularly in Africa, [recognizing the opportunity that the clean energy transition presents to spur a new era of productivity, industrial growth, and economic development, and to advance the priority of clean cooking in the continent.] (energy)

G7-2024-203.  We stand ready to play a pivotal role in supporting Africa’s ambitions and efforts to develop adequate clean energy infrastructure and supply chains. (energy)

G7-2024-204.  For this reason, we are launching the Energy for Growth in Africa initiative, alongside Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria, Republic of Congo, and South Africa...Our efforts will be geared towards ensuring Africa can fulfil its potential to become a global sustainable energy hub using relevant platforms, such as the UNDP Center for Climate, Energy and Environment established by the Italian Presidency. (energy)

G7-2024-205.  Furthermore, we strongly support the creation of new sustainable energy generation capacity in Africa and the Mediterranean to contribute to global decarbonization goals, in our common fight against climate change (energy)

G7-2024-206.  [we strongly support the]… development of greater interconnectivity to help reduce the cost of the energy transition. (energy)

G7-2024-207.  We encourage and actively support the acceleration of private investment, including through public-private partnerships, increasing Africa’s integration with the global energy market, in particular through the Mediterranean region. (energy)

G7-2024-208.  We continue exploring innovative financing sources for climate and biodiversity action and clean energy, innovative schemes such as payment for ecosystem services, green bonds and high-integrity biodiversity credits with environmental and social safeguards. (energy)

G7-2024-209.  In particular, we support the issuance of green bonds in low- and middle-income countries, particularly on the African continent, to encourage private financial flows for sustainable investments and the growth of capital markets, in line with existing initiatives such as the Global Green Bonds Initiative. (energy)

G7-2024-341.  In this regard, we [welcome the successful replenishment of the Asian Development Fund (AsDF14) support a successful International Development Association (IDA21) replenishment and] commit to work toward a successful replenishment of the African Development Fund next year (AfDF17). (development)

G7-2024-344.  We support the Alliance for Green Infrastructure in Africa (AGIA), as an innovative financial mechanism of the AfDB in partnership with the African Union, Africa50 and other development partners, aimed at mobilizing blended capital to design and develop a USD 10 billion bankable portfolio of transformative green infrastructure projects in Africa to accelerate the energy transition, bridge the long-standing infrastructure gap and promote climate resilience. (development)

G7-2024-345.  As G7, we will collectively contribute up to USD 150 million in grants, concessional and commercial capital to AGIA [and we expect to help leverage around up to USD 3 billion of private sector investment in green infrastructure in Africa.] (development)

G7-2024-364.  We will champion initiatives to increase participation of a broader range of low- and middle-income countries in Africa and elsewhere in global supply chains, while promoting high standards and creating benefits for local workers and communities everywhere. (trade)

G7-2024-436.  We reiterate our commitment to collectively increase G7 ODA for gender equality and we will explore ways to do this at the nexus of climate change and gender, particularly in Africa.

G7-2024-438.  Noting that 2024 is the African Union’s Year of Education, we will enhance our partnership with African countries on girls’ education, including through redoubling our efforts to meet the G7 Girls Education targets by 2026.

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Appendix E: Subject Match of G7 Commitments and Mattei Plan Pillars ↩

Macroeconomics, microeconomics, labour and employment, transparency, and migration and refugees have one each.

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Appendix F: G7 Ministers’ Africa Commitments from 2024 ↩

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