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A Strong Start to G7 Global Security Governance at Its Munich Foreign Ministers' Meeting
John Kirton, G7 Research Group
February 15, 2025
On February 15, 2025, G7 foreign ministers met in Munich, on the margins of the Munich Security Conference. It was the first ministerial meeting of Canada’s 2025 G7 presidency, coming six weeks after its presidency began. It was attended by all G7 foreign ministers, including US secretary of state Marco Rubio, who had just announced his intention to boycott the G20 foreign ministers’ meeting on February 20 – the first in South Africa’s G20 presidency – due to the Trump administration’s displeasure with South Africa’s G20 summit thematic emphasis on what Trump saw as diversity, equity and inclusion. Although the location of the G7 foreign ministers’ meeting, outside the host country, was unusual, G7 foreign ministers began meeting at the United Nations in New York, and Canada has held at least one other ministerial meeting during its presidency in the neighbouring United States.
Importantly, the G7 ministers in Munich released a fully consensual “Joint G7 Foreign Ministers’ Statement.” Its 774 words contained nine commitments, all fully agreed. The first three were on Russia’s war against Ukraine, the next four on the Middle East, and the final two on the Indo-Pacific region.
Standing out was the commitment in which “G7 members reaffirmed their unwavering support for Ukraine in defending its freedom, sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity.” It was reinforced by “they … reaffirmed the need to develop robust security guarantees to ensure the war will not begin again,” once peace had come. At this session they were joined by Andril Sybiha, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, with whom they discussed and affirmed the many key measures G7 members had taken to provide “Ukraine with long-term security and stability as a sovereign, independent country.”
This was a badly needed display of G7 unity and full support for Ukraine, coming after the discrepant remarks by US vice president J.D. Vance and the US defence secretary Pete Hegseth at the Munich Security Conference, and the recent actions and statements of President Donald Trump itself.
The four commitments on the Middle East contained two on Gaza, with one stating “G7 members stand behind the ongoing efforts of Egypt, Qatar and the United States in continuing to work toward a permanent ceasefire.” Yet along with this shared communiqué compliment to the United States there was no hint that they were prepared to reconstruct Gaza in the way that President Trump wanted.
The passages on the Indo-Pacific singled out “China’s attempts to restrict freedom of navigation through militarization and coercive activities in the South China Sea.” And as Japan wished, “They called upon [the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea] to resolve the abductions issue immediately.
The statement also noted G7 members’ discussions of conflict and instability in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan, Haiti and Venezuela, showing that the G7 continued to be a global security governor.
The statement ended by stating “the G7 Foreign Ministers looked forward to their meeting in Canada in Charlevoix, Quebec on March 12–14.” This was the very location where Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau hosted the G7 summit in 2018, with President Trump there. It also showed that the G7 was still alive and well, functioning in a broad, unified fashion, to hold the fort and prepare the way for the leaders at their Kananaskis Summit in June, where their focus would also be on peace and security, led by Russia’s war against Ukraine.
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