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Analytical Studies > Analysis on the 2025 Kananaskis Summit
G7 Summits > 2025 Kananaskis Summit > Road to the 2025 Kananaskis Summit

G7 Foreign Ministers’ Significant Performance at Charlevoix

John Kirton, G7 Research Group
March 18, 2025

The G7 foreign ministers, meeting at Charlevoix, Canada, on March 12–14, 2025, produced a significant performance, much better than many had expected and feared (Al Mallees 2025). All G7 foreign ministers participated in person, including US secretary of state Marco Rubio. He had flown in directly from his meeting in Saudi Arabia on March 11, where the United States and Ukraine agreed to propose to Russian president Vladimir Putin an “immediate ceasefire” in Russia’s war against Ukraine.

At Charlevoix, G7 foreign ministers produced two fully agreed documents, more than the one they had at their meeting in Munich on February 15 (Kirton 2025). At Charlevoix there was a joint statement on a broad range of global security issues and the Declaration on Maritime Security and Prosperity covering, political, economic, crime, environmental, food and agriculture, and many other issues.

The Joint Statement

Importantly, the joint statement, agreed by all the foreign ministers including Rubio, began by reaffirming their “unwavering support for Ukraine in defending its territorial integrity.” Moreover, it described Russia’s actions as “aggression,” by underscoring the “need for robust and credible security arrangements to ensure that Ukraine can deter and defend against and renewed acts of aggression.”

The statement’s 1,583 words contained at least 10 commitments, more than the ministers’ nine commitments at their earlier February 10 statement from Munich. Charlevoix’s 10 commitments consisted of three on Ukraine, three on “regional peace and security in the Middle East,” two on “cooperation to increase security and resilience across the Indo-Pacific,” and two on “building stability and resilience in Haiti and Venezuela” (see Appendix A). It was thus a broad and balanced set of commitments that still put Ukraine and the Middle East first.

The Charlevoix foreign ministers’ joint statement affirmed the G7’s democratic values four times and those of human rights twice. It developed global governance institutionally within the G7 three times, by welcoming “efforts to strengthen the Sanctions Working Group focused on listings and enforcement” and “discussions on the establishment of a Hybrid Warfare and Sabotage Working Group and of a Latin America Working Group.” It also developed global governance institutionally beyond the G7 three times.

Declaration on Maritime Security and Prosperity

The Declaration on Maritime Security and Prosperity, released shortly after the Joint Statement, contained 2,519 words and an additional seven commitments (see Appendix B). These seven consisted of a general one on international security, economic prosperity and the sustainable use of marine resources, two on “emerging threats on safe seas and freedom of navigation and overflight, and four of “safe shipping and supply chain security.”

Although there were affirmations of the value of democracy or human rights, there were extensive ones to ecological sustainability, which joined security and the economic as an equal part of the overall trilogy. Notably, the declaration noted the dangers to ports caused by “extreme weather events” in a clear reference to climate change that US president Donald Trump’s administration had refused to accept in those two words in the G7. This could provide a way in which the G7 leaders at Kananaskis could act to combat climate change themselves.

In its institutional development of global governance, the declaration made three references to bodies within the G7 and 12 to those outside.

What stood out were the connections the declaration made to a wide range of other G7 and global issues. Apart from security, the economy and ecology in general, these included trade, information and communications technologies, biodiversity, fishing, food, critical minerals, energy, crime, development, terrorism, migration and refugees, and health in the form of “illegal drug trafficking.”

Also noteworthy was the condemnation of China, which joined Russia as a target, while North Korea, and the Houthis were singled out too. The reference to the Houthis foreshadowed the US attack in Yemen a few days later. US concerns were also well reflected in the passages on port security, although the Panama Canal was not mentioned by name.

There were also many references to the vulnerabilities that the maritime domain posed to G7 members.

Conclusion

Overall, at Charlevoix the G7 foreign ministers showed a strong degree of unity across a broad range of subjects. The meeting increased hopes that Trump would reflect this new G7 consensus in his telephone call with Putin on March 18, designed to get a serious Russian sign on to the agreement between the US and Ukraine on an immediate ceasefire in Russia’s war against Ukraine. It also offered stronger grounds that the Kananaskis Summit itself would be more productive than many had previously thought.

References

Al Mallees, Nojoud (2025). “G7 foreign ministers meet amid trade tensions,” Globe and Mail, March 13. https://www.theglobeandmail.com/world/article-g7-foreign-ministers-meet-in-charlevoix-as-trade-tensions-escalate/.

Kirton, John (2025). “A Strong Start to G7 Global Security Governance at Its Munich Foreign Ministers’ Meeting,” G7 Research Group, February 15. https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/evaluations/2025kananaskis/kirton-foreign-ministers-munich.html.

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Appendix A: G7 Foreign Ministers’ Charlevoix Commitments ↩

1. We reaffirmed our unwavering support for Ukraine in defending its territorial integrity and right to exist, and its freedom, sovereignty and independence.
2. We stated that we will continue to coordinate economic and humanitarian support to promote the early recovery and reconstruction of Ukraine, including at the Ukraine Recovery Conference which will take place in Rome on July 10-11, 2025.
3. We reiterated our intention to continue to take action against such third countries.

Regional peace and stability in the Middle East

4. We reaffirmed our support for the resumption of unhindered humanitarian aid into Gaza and for a permanent ceasefire.
5. We affirmed our readiness to engage with Arab partners on their proposals to chart a way forward on reconstruction in Gaza and build a lasting Israeli-Palestinian peace.
6. We expressed our support for the people of Syria and Lebanon, as both countries work towards peaceful and stable political futures.

Cooperation to increase security and resilience across the Indo-Pacific

7. We reiterated our commitment to upholding a free, open, prosperous and secure Indo-Pacific, based on sovereignty, territorial integrity, peaceful resolution of disputes, fundamental freedoms and human rights.
8. We also expressed support for Taiwan’s meaningful participation in appropriate international organizations.

Building stability and resilience in Haiti and Venezuela

10. We reaffirmed our commitment to helping the Haitian people restore democracy, security and stability, including through support to the Haitian National Police and Kenya-led Multinational Security Support Mission and an increased role for the UN.
11. We expressed support for Haitian authorities’ efforts to create a specialized anti-corruption jurisdiction that complies with the highest international standards.

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Appendix B: Commitments on Maritime Security and Prosperity ↩

1. We, the Foreign Ministers of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America, and the High Representative of the European Union, reaffirm the G7’s steadfast commitment to contribute towards a free, open, and secure maritime domain based on the rule of law that strengthens international security, fosters economic prosperity, and ensures the sustainable use of marine resources.

Emerging Threat on Safe Seas and Freedom of Navigation and Overflight

2. We undertake to implement means through which to track systematically and report on attempts to change the status quo by force and by the establishment of new geographical facts, including through coercive and dangerous actions on the oceans and seas that might threaten regional and international peace and security.
3. We will enhance our cooperation with industry mitigate risks, reduce bottlenecks to operational tasks while strengthening repair capacities in order to improve the overall resilience of critical undersea and maritime infrastructure.

Safe Shipping and Supply Chain Security

4. We commit to strengthen our coordination, amongst the G7 and with other partners, to prevent the use of unregistered or fraudulently registered, uninsured and substandard vessels engaged in sanctions evasion, arms transfers, illegal fishing and illicit trade.
5. We are also committed to capacity building of the countries in the region in law enforcement and Maritime Domain Awareness.
6. We will work with partners and with relevant International Organizations to encourage robust cybersecurity standards for port ICT [information and communications technologies] infrastructure, to increase resilience against malicious cyber incidents on maritime logistical networks, to reduce monopolistic power over key supply chain nodes, to promote secure and transparent port ownership, to limit unsolicited or undue foreign influence over critical infrastructures and strategic waterways, and to otherwise encourage greater focus on such potential vulnerabilities.
7. We commit to enhancing diplomatic efforts and to exchanging best practices among national authorities, relevant international and regional organizations, and relevant industry sectors to accelerate the clean-up of UXO [unexploded ordnance] from the seas and ocean.

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