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## 2024 G7 Apulia Summit Interim Compliance Report

15 June 2024 to 20 December 2024

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“We have meanwhile set up a process and there are also independent institutions monitoring which objectives of our G7 meetings we actually achieve. When it comes to these goals we have a compliance rate of about 80%, according to the University of Toronto. Germany, with its 87%, comes off pretty well. That means that next year too, under the Japanese G7 presidency, we are going to check where we stand in comparison to what we have discussed with each other now. So a lot of what we have resolved to do here together is something that we are going to have to work very hard at over the next few months. But I think that it has become apparent that we, as the G7, want to assume responsibility far beyond the prosperity in our own countries. That’s why today’s outreach meetings, that is the meetings with our guests, were also of great importance.”

Chancellor Angela Merkel, Schloss Elmau, 8 June 2015

G7 summits are a moment for people to judge whether aspirational intent is met by concrete commitments. The G7 Research Group provides a report card on the implementation of G7 and G20 commitments. It is a good moment for the public to interact with leaders and say, you took a leadership position on these issues — a year later, or three years later, what have you accomplished?

Achim Steiner, Administrator, United Nations Development Programme,  
*in G7 Canada: The 2018 Charlevoix Summit*

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## 4. Non-Proliferation: Export Controls

“We are strengthening effective export controls on materials, technology, and research that could be used for military purposes in a way that keeps pace with rapid technological developments and recognizes the central role of multilateral export control regimes as a key non-proliferation instrument and safeguard for international peace and security.”

*Apulia G7 Leaders’ Communiqué*

### Assessment

	No Compliance	Partial Compliance	Full Compliance
Canada			+1
France			+1
Germany			+1
Italy			+1
Japan			+1
United Kingdom		0	
United States			+1
European Union			+1
Average		+0.88 (84%)	

### Background

Since the invention of the atomic bomb in 1942 and its first use in Hiroshima in 1945, non-proliferation has become a significant concern for G7 members.<sup>487</sup> G7 discussions and commitments relating to non-proliferation, specifically export controls, have evolved over time. Following the 1986 Chernobyl disaster, G7 summits emphasized denuclearization of Soviet Union states and safe nuclear energy use.<sup>488</sup> Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, G7 leaders expressed the need for non-proliferation export controls that would prevent terrorists from acquiring nuclear capabilities.<sup>489</sup> North Korea’s nuclear testing in the early and mid-2000s, non-proliferation and export controls remained a topic of notable G7 attention.<sup>490</sup> Finally, the 2022 full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine renewed Russian non-proliferation compliance as a significant point in the growing agenda for non-proliferation and export controls.<sup>491</sup>

At the 1996 Moscow Summit, G7 leaders committed to prioritising nuclear safety, and international adherence to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safety standards.<sup>492</sup> They emphasised support for non-proliferation efforts and responsible management of nuclear materials.

<sup>487</sup> Atomic bomb, Encyclopedia Britannica (Edinburgh) 25 August 2024. Access Date: 7 September 2024. <https://www.britannica.com/technology/atomic-bomb/Development-and-proliferation-of-atomic-bombs>

<sup>488</sup> Nuclear Reactor Safety, G7 Information Centre (Toronto) April 1998. Access Date: 7 September 2024. <https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/evaluations/1998birmingham/issues/nuke.htm>

<sup>489</sup> Impressions Of The Kananaskis Summit, 26-27 June 2002, G7 Information Centre (Toronto) 23 July 2002. Access Date: 7 September 2024. [https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/evaluations/2002kananaskis/assess\\_baynea.html](https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/evaluations/2002kananaskis/assess_baynea.html)

<sup>490</sup> Chair's Summary, G7 Information Centre (Toronto) 8 July 2005. Access Date: 7 September 2024. <https://g7.utoronto.ca/summit/2005gleneagles/summary.html>

<sup>491</sup> G7 Leaders' Communiqué, G7 Information Centre (Toronto) 12 December 2022. Access Date: 7 September 2022. <https://g7.utoronto.ca/summit/2022elmau/220628-communication.html>

<sup>492</sup> Nuclear Safety and Security Summit Declaration, G7 Information Centre (Toronto) 20 April 1996. Access Date: 7 September 2024. <https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/summit/1996moscow/declaration.html>

At the 1997 Denver Summit, G8 leaders reaffirmed the importance of establishing an international regime of nuclear liability and renewed their commitment to the necessity of preparing an international convention on the safety of nuclear waste.<sup>493</sup>

At the 1998 Birmingham Summit, G8 leaders reaffirmed their commitment to nuclear safety, specifically to help shut down the Ukrainian Chernobyl reactor by 2000.<sup>494</sup> They also committed to strengthening cooperation on non-proliferation efforts by enhancing export controls, laws, and regulations to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems.<sup>495</sup>

At the 1999 Köln Summit, G8 leaders reaffirmed their commitment to strengthen non-proliferation mechanisms, emphasizing the role of the Nuclear Suppliers Group.<sup>496</sup> They also emphasized concerns surrounding nuclear testing following India and Pakistan's nuclear tests.

At the 2000 Okinawa Summit, G8 leaders welcomed the outcome of the 2000 Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) Review Conference and committed to implementing its conclusions, including swift entry of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty negotiations, and universal NPT adherence.<sup>497</sup> They also reaffirmed their commitments made in the 1996 Moscow Summit, emphasising the importance of the safe use of nuclear power.

At the 2002 Kananaskis Summit, G8's leaders committed to preventing nuclear weapons from falling into the hands of terrorists through the creation of the "The G8 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction."<sup>498</sup> The program was created to assist former member states of the Soviet Union in decommissioning excess nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, and its priorities were 1) destroying chemical weapons, 2) dismantling decommissioned nuclear submarines, 3) disposing of fissile materials, and 4) helping to redeploy weapons scientists.<sup>499</sup>

At the 2003 Evian Summit, G8 leaders affirmed their commitment to the IAEA advancing the Global Partnership initiative by promoting universal non-proliferation principles.<sup>500</sup> Specifically, they called on states to mobilise to improve the safety and security of the sources they produce, possess, use, import or export, and to develop a medium- and long-term approach aimed at reinforcing the security of sources and the mechanisms for interstate cooperation.<sup>501</sup>

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<sup>493</sup> Communiqué, G7 Information Centre (Toronto) 22 June 1997. Access Date: 2 February 2025.

<https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/summit/1997denver/g8final.htm>

<sup>494</sup> Communiqué, G7 Information Centre (Toronto) 17 May 1998. Access Date: 2 February 2025.

<https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/summit/1998birmingham/finalcom.htm>

<sup>495</sup> Communiqué, G7 Information Centre (Toronto) 17 May 1998. Access Date: 7 September 2024.

<https://g7.utoronto.ca/summit/1998birmingham/finalcom.htm>

<sup>496</sup> G8 Communiqué Köln 1999 Final, G7 Information Centre (Toronto) 20 June 1999. Access Date: 7 September 2024.

<https://g7.utoronto.ca/summit/1999koln/finalcom.htm>

<sup>497</sup> G8 Communiqué Okinawa 2000, G7 Information Centre (Toronto) 23 July 2000. Access Date: 7 September 2024.

<https://g7.utoronto.ca/summit/2000okinawa/finalcom.htm>

<sup>498</sup> The Kananaskis Summit Chair's Summary, G7 Information Centre (Toronto) 27 June 2002. Access Date: 2 February 2025.

<https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/summit/2002kananaskis/summary.html>

<sup>499</sup> Statement by G8 Leaders: The G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons

and Materials of Mass Destruction, G7 Information Centre (Toronto) 27 June 2002. Access Date: 7 September 2024.

<https://g7.utoronto.ca/summit/2002kananaskis/arms.html>

<sup>500</sup> Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction:

A G8 Action Plan, G7 Information Centre (Toronto) 2 June 2003. Access Date: 7 September 2024.

[https://g7.utoronto.ca/summit/2003evian/destruction\\_action\\_en.html](https://g7.utoronto.ca/summit/2003evian/destruction_action_en.html)

<sup>501</sup> Non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Securing Radioactive Sources: A G8 Action Plan, G7 Information Centre (Toronto) 2 June 2003. Access Date: 7 September 2024. [https://g7.utoronto.ca/summit/2003evian/wmd\\_action\\_en.html](https://g7.utoronto.ca/summit/2003evian/wmd_action_en.html)

At the 2004 Sea Island Summit, G8 leaders reaffirmed their commitment to the NPT, as well as the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Statement of Interdiction Principles.<sup>502</sup>

At the 2005 Gleneagles Summit, G8 leaders reaffirmed their commitment to non-proliferation and called on all states to uphold in full international norms on non-proliferation and to meet their arms control and disarmament obligations.<sup>503</sup> They also expressed particular concern about the threat of proliferation in North Korea and Iran.

At the 2006 St. Petersburg Summit, G8 leaders reaffirmed their commitment to reducing risks in the safe use of nuclear energy through a strong non-proliferation regime and reliable safety and security systems for nuclear materials and facilities.<sup>504</sup> They also recommitted to fully implementing international treaties, supporting the IAEA's efforts, and continuing to address nuclear safety and security issues through the Nuclear Safety and Security Group.

At the 2007 Heiligendamm Summit, G8 leaders reaffirmed their commitment to preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction through the multilateral treaty system and diplomatic cooperation with international partners.<sup>505</sup>

At the 2008 Hokkaido Toyako Summit, G8 leaders reaffirmed their commitment to the NPT, nuclear disarmament, and called for a global moratorium on nuclear tests and fissile material production for weapons.<sup>506</sup> They also supported North Korea's denuclearization through the Six-Party process and urged Iran to comply with United Nations resolutions and engage in diplomatic efforts regarding its nuclear program.

At the 2009 L'Aquila Summit, G8 leaders reaffirmed their commitment to the NPT, and its three pillars of non-proliferation, the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and disarmament.<sup>507</sup>

At the 2010 Muskoka Summit, G8 leaders urged all states to take decisive action against non-compliance with non-proliferation obligations, including safeguards.<sup>508</sup> They also called on states to adopt a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and an Additional Protocol with the IAEA as the new standard for verifying peaceful nuclear energy use. Furthermore, they encouraged the exchange of nuclear technology and information for peaceful purposes, particularly benefiting developing countries, in line with the NPT.

At the 2012 Camp David Summit, G8 leaders affirmed their commitment to strengthening the global non-proliferation regime by supporting key treaties and promoting international cooperation. They also emphasized the importance of diplomatic solutions for denuclearization in North Korea and Iran, robust counter-proliferation tools, and the IAEA's role in verifying compliance through the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol.<sup>509</sup>

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<sup>502</sup> G8 Action Plan on Nonproliferation, G7 Information Centre (Toronto) 9 June 2004. Access Date: 7 September 2024.

<https://g7.utoronto.ca/summit/2004seaisland/nonproliferation.html>

<sup>503</sup> Chair's Summary, G7 Information Centre (Toronto) 8 July 2005. Access Date: 7 September 2024.

[https://g7.utoronto.ca/summit/2003evian/wmd\\_action\\_en.html](https://g7.utoronto.ca/summit/2003evian/wmd_action_en.html)

<sup>504</sup> Chair's Summary, G7 Information Centre (St. Petersburg) 17 July 2006. Access Date: 2 February 2025.

<https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/summit/2006stpetersburg/summary.html>

<sup>505</sup> Chair's Summary, G7 Information Centre (Toronto) 8 June 2007. Access Date: 2 February 2025.

<https://g7.utoronto.ca/summit/2007heilgendamm/g8-2007-summary.pdf>

<sup>506</sup> G8 Hokkaido Toyako Summit Leaders' Declaration, G7 Information Centre (Toronto) 8 July 2008. Access Date: 2 February 2025.

<https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/summit/2008hokkaido/2008-declaration.html>

<sup>507</sup> Chair's Summary, G7 Information Centre (Toronto) 10 July 2009. Access Date: 2 February 2025.

<https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/summit/2009laquila/2009-summary.html>

<sup>508</sup> Muskoka Declaration: Recovery and New Beginnings, G7 Information Centre (Toronto) 26 June 2010. Access Date: 7

September 2024. <https://g7.utoronto.ca/summit/2010muskoka/communique.html>

<sup>509</sup> Group of Eight Declaration on Nonproliferation and Disarmament for 2012, G7 Information Centre (Toronto) 23 May 2012.

Access Date: 7 September 2024. <https://g7.utoronto.ca/summit/2012campdavid/g8-npt.html>

At the 2016 Ise-Shima Summit, G7 leaders reaffirmed their commitment to non-proliferation and disarmament and pledged to advance the universalization of key treaties, including the NPT, to prevent and combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.<sup>510</sup>

At the 2017 Taormina Summit, G7 leaders reaffirmed their commitment to non-proliferation and disarmament, emphasizing the urgent need for North Korea to comply fully with all UN Security Council Resolutions and abandon its nuclear tests and programs.<sup>511</sup>

At the 2021 Cornwall Summit, G7 leaders reaffirmed their commitment to upholding global non-proliferation efforts and ensuring compliance with international agreements. They also urged Iran to fully adhere to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, reverse measures reducing transparency, and cease all ballistic missile activities.<sup>512</sup>

At the 2022 Elmau Summit, G7 leaders warned against any threat of the use of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons or related materials, particularly in Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine which began in February of 2022.<sup>513</sup> Furthermore, they urged Russia to stop its attacks, especially in the direct vicinity of Ukraine's nuclear power plants.

At the 2023 Hiroshima Summit, G7 leaders declared their commitment to non-proliferation through the G7 Leaders' Hiroshima Vision on Nuclear Disarmament.<sup>514</sup> The Vision reaffirmed commitment to eliminating nuclear weapons, reinforcing non-proliferation treaties, specifically the CTBT, condemning nuclear threats and promoting international cooperation for global security.<sup>515</sup>

At the 2024 Apulia Summit, G7 leaders committed to “[strengthen] effective export controls on materials, technology, and research that could be used for military purposes in a way that keeps pace with rapid technological developments and recognizes the central role of multilateral export control regimes as a key non-proliferation instrument and safeguard for international peace and security.”

## **Commitment Features**

### **Definitions and Concepts**

“Strengthening” is understood to mean “To make stronger.”<sup>516</sup>

“Effective” is understood to mean “operating in a way that produces the intended result. It does not mean any effort, especially thoughtless ones.”<sup>517</sup>

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<sup>510</sup> G7 Ise-Shima Leaders' Declaration, G7 Information Centre (Ise-Shima) 27 May 2016. Access Date: 2 February 2025.

<https://g7.utoronto.ca/summit/2016shima/ise-shima-declaration-en.html>

<sup>511</sup> G7 Taormina Leaders' Communiqué, G7 Information Centre (Toronto) 27 May 2017. Access Date: 7 September 2024.

<https://g7.utoronto.ca/summit/2017taormina/communique.html>

<sup>512</sup> Carbis Bay G7 Summit Communiqué, G7 Information Centre (Carbis Bay, Cornwall) 13 June 2021. Access Date: 2 February 2025. <https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/summit/2021cornwall/210613-communique.html>

<sup>513</sup> Elmau Summit G7 Communiqué, G7 Information Centre (Elmau) 28 June 2022. Access Date: 2 February 2025.

<https://g7.utoronto.ca/summit/2022elmau/220628-communique.html>

<sup>514</sup> G7 Leaders' Hiroshima Vision on Nuclear Disarmament, G7 Information Centre (Toronto), 19 May 2023. Access Date: 8 September 2024. <https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/summit/2023hiroshima/230519-disarmament.html>

<sup>515</sup> G7 Hiroshima Leaders' Communiqué, G7 Information Centre (Hiroshima) 20 May 2023. Access Date: 5 February 2025.

<https://g7.utoronto.ca/summit/2023hiroshima/230520-communique.html>

<sup>516</sup> Compliance Coding Manual for International Institutional Commitments, G7 and G20 Research Groups (Toronto) 12 November 2020. Access Date: 4 September 2024.

[https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/compliance/Compliance\\_Coding\\_Manual\\_2020.pdf](https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/compliance/Compliance_Coding_Manual_2020.pdf)

<sup>517</sup> Compliance Coding Manual for International Institutional Commitments, G7 and G20 Research Groups (Toronto) 12 November 2020. Access Date: 4 September 2024.

[https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/compliance/Compliance\\_Coding\\_Manual\\_2020.pdf](https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/compliance/Compliance_Coding_Manual_2020.pdf)

“Export controls” refer to “a system that regulates the export of dual-use materials and technologies.”<sup>518</sup> In this regard, “dual-use” items are “goods, software and technology that can be used for both civilian and military applications.”<sup>519</sup>

To “keep pace” is understood to mean “to go or make progress at the same speed as (someone or something else).”<sup>520</sup>

“Recognize” is understood to mean “to acknowledge formally.”<sup>521</sup> In this context, recognition would mean an explicit acknowledgement.<sup>522</sup>

“Central” is understood to mean “in, at, from, or near the centre or the most important part,” whereas “role” is understood to mean “the position or purpose that someone or something has in a situation, organization, society, etc.”<sup>523</sup> “Central role” is understood to mean someone or something that has an important position or purpose in a given context.

“Multilateral export control regimes” (MECRs) refer to “consensus-based, voluntary arrangements of supplier countries that produce technologies useful in developing weapons of mass destruction or conventional weapons.”<sup>524</sup>

“Key” is understood to mean “an instrumental or deciding factor.”<sup>525</sup>

“Non-proliferation” refers to “the controlling of the spread and/or amount of something, especially nuclear or chemical weapons.”<sup>526</sup>

### General Interpretive Guidelines

This commitment is best interpreted as comprising two overarching dimensions: 1) the strengthening of effective export controls in line with technological advancements and 2) the recognition of multilateral export regimes as a key instrument in non-proliferation. The first dimension specifies three areas of export controls – a. Materials, b. Technology, and c. Research.

Full compliance, or a score of +1, will be awarded to any member that takes strong action in both dimensions by 1) effectively strengthening their export controls regime in line with technological development and 2) effectively recognizing the key role of MECRs in non-proliferation. To fully comply with the first dimension, the member must address a) materials; b) technology; and c) research. Examples of strong actions in the first

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<sup>518</sup> Export Controls, UNTERM (New York) n.d. Access Date: 5 September 2024. Translation provided by Compliance Director. <https://unterm.un.org/unterm2/en/view/a4cc7958-09a0-4deb-8f57-ff076c59944a>

<sup>519</sup> Exporting dual-use Items, European Commission (Brussels) n.d. Access Date: 5 September 2024. [https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/help-exporters-and-importers/exporting-dual-use-items\\_en](https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/help-exporters-and-importers/exporting-dual-use-items_en)

<sup>520</sup> Keep pace with, Merriam-Webster Dictionary (Springfiel n.d. Access Date: 5 September 2024. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/keep%20pace%20with>

<sup>521</sup> Compliance Coding Manual for International Institutional Commitments, G7 and G20 Research Groups (Toronto) 12 November 2020. Access Date: 4 September 2024. [https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/compliance/Compliance\\_Coding\\_Manual\\_2020.pdf](https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/compliance/Compliance_Coding_Manual_2020.pdf)

<sup>522</sup> Compliance Coding Manual for International Institutional Commitments, G7 and G20 Research Groups (Toronto) 12 November 2020. Access Date: 4 September 2024. [https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/compliance/Compliance\\_Coding\\_Manual\\_2020.pdf](https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/compliance/Compliance_Coding_Manual_2020.pdf)

<sup>523</sup> Central role, Cambridge Dictionary (Cambridge) n.d. Access Date: 5 September 2024. <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/example/english/central-role>

<sup>524</sup> Nonproliferation: Strategy Needed to Strengthen Multilateral Export Control Regimes, U.S. Government Accountability Office (Washington D.C.) 25 October 2002. Access Date: 5 September 2024. <https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-03-43>

<sup>525</sup> Key, Merriam-Webster Dictionary (Springfield) n.d. Access Date: 5 September 2024. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/key>

<sup>526</sup> Non-proliferation, Cambridge Dictionary (Cambridge) n.d. Access Date: 5 September 2024. <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/non-proliferation>

dimension include expanding national control lists to include new dual-use items, further regulation against the distribution of dual-use items, harsher penalties for illicit proliferation of such items and further investment to improve or innovate upon enforcement mechanisms (e.g. economizing the permit evaluation process, hiring more security staff or improving automated sensing of controlled substances at major border crossings). Strong actions in dimension two may include normalizing existing regulations and best practices against MECR standards, formulating new agreements and strengthening regulations collaboratively at the multilateral level, and taking bilateral and multilateral coordinated action on export control strengthening alongside fellow MECR parties under the subject area of the relevant MECR.

Partial compliance, or a score of 0, will be awarded to any member that takes strong action in one of the two compliance dimensions, or takes weak action in both dimensions. Weak actions in dimension one may include verbal reaffirmations of the commitment terms without material actions to that effect. Weak actions in dimension two may include verbal reaffirmations or fielding delegations to MECR meetings without any material action.

Non-compliance, or a score of -1, will be awarded to any member that takes weak action in one but not both commitment dimensions, or to a G7 member that takes no action towards either dimension.

**Scoring Guidelines**

-1	The G7 member has taken weak action towards either 1) strengthening effective export controls in line with technological advancements, including materials, technology or research or 2) recognizing the central role of multilateral export control regimes as a key non-proliferation instrument, or the G7 member has not taken any action in either dimension.
0	The G7 member has taken strong action towards either 1) strengthening effective export controls in line with technological advancements, including materials, technology and research or 2) recognizing the central role of multilateral export control regimes as a key non-proliferation instrument, or the G7 member has taken weak action in both dimensions.
+1	The G7 member has taken strong action in strengthening effective export controls on materials, technology and research that could be used for military purposes in a way that keeps pace with rapid technological developments and strong action in recognizing the central role of multilateral export control regimes as a key non-proliferation instrument.

*Compliance Director: Luca Rampersad  
Lead Analyst: Anna Lysenko*

**Canada: +1**

Canada has fully complied with its commitment to strengthen effective export controls on materials, technology, and research that could be used for military purposes in a way that keeps pace with rapid technological developments and recognizes the central role of multilateral export control regimes as a key non-proliferation instrument and safeguard for international peace and security.

On 19 June 2024, the Government of Canada announced the Order Amending the Export Control List (ECL).<sup>527</sup> The Amendment specified that items not covered by multilateral export control regimes (MECRs) but deemed necessary by Canada to avoid use detrimental to security must be listed directly in the ECL under Group 5. Specifically, the amendment adds advanced semiconductors and quantum computing technologies to the ECL. The amendment also institutes minor editorial changes to align Canadian regulation with Wassenaar Arrangement standards.

On 10 July 2024, the Washington Summit Declaration issued at North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) summit condemned Russia’s nuclear posturing and expressed concern over Russia’s increasing violations of

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<sup>527</sup> Order Amending the Export Control List: SOR/2024-112, the Government of Canada (Ottawa) 19 June 2024. Access Date: 27 September 2024. <https://canadagazette.gc.ca/rp-pr/p2/2024/2024-06-19/html/sor-dors112-eng.html>



arms control agreements and nuclear safety standards.<sup>528</sup> The declaration called on the People's Republic of China to cease all material and political support to Russia's war effort and introduce export controls on dual-use items. The declaration reaffirmed members' commitment to nuclear deterrence as essential to NATO security while encouraging arms control and non-proliferation efforts as essential to ensuring strategic stability. Canada is a NATO member.

On 20 September 2024, the Ministry of National Defence announced a research compact with the United States' Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency and the United Kingdom's Ministry of Defence.<sup>529</sup> The three agencies committed to work together in researching advances to cyber-security infrastructure and in mitigating risks caused by artificial intelligence, particularly in dual-use military applications.

On 23 September 2024, the Government of Canada jointly established the Friends of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), a group of countries that advocates for a treaty ban on the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons.<sup>530</sup> The FMCT includes Australia, Brazil, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Nigeria, the Philippines, the United Kingdom and the United States.

On 24 September 2024, the G7 issued joint guidance for industry on preventing the evasion of export controls and sanctions imposed on Russia.<sup>531</sup> This document includes key risk indicators for sanctions circumvention and offers recommendations on best practices for compliance.

On 4 October 2024, Canada participated in the 19th edition of the Asia Senior-Level Talks on Non-Proliferation.<sup>532</sup> The talks, hosted by Japan for officials from various members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and interested states from outside Asia, emphasized topics such as bolstering export controls across all countries.

On 21 October 2024, the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) adopted the CBSA Assessment and Revenue Management Client Portal, a front-end portal for importers to interact with the customs process for imports into Canada.<sup>533</sup> This modernization endeavour is consistent with the aim of keeping up with technical changes and strengthening export restrictions, as it improves compliance and transparency by automating operations and making it easier to trace imported and exported commodities.

On 1 November 2024, Minister of Foreign Affairs Mélanie Joly and Minister of National Defence Bill Blair met with Korea's Minister of Foreign Affairs Cho Tae-yul and Minister of National Defence Kim Yong-hyun.<sup>534</sup>

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<sup>528</sup> Washington Summit Declaration, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Brussels) 10 July 2024. Access Date: 26 September 2024. [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_227678.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_227678.htm)

<sup>529</sup> UK, US and Canada to collaborate on cybersecurity and AI research, United Kingdom Ministry of Defence (London) 20 September 2024. Access Date: 11 December 2024. <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-us-and-canada-to-collaborate-on-cybersecurity-and-ai-research>

<sup>530</sup> Joint Statement on the Friends of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, U.S. Department of State (Washington) 23 September 2024. Access Date: 12 November 2024. <https://www.state.gov/joint-statement-on-the-friends-of-a-fissile-material-cut-off-treaty/>

<sup>531</sup> Preventing Russian Export Control & Sanctions Evasion Guidance, the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action (Berlin) 24 September 2024. Access Date: 1 November 2024. <https://www.bmwk.de/Redaktion/DE/Downloads/G/g7-guidance-for-industry-preventing-russian-export-control-and-sanctions-evasion.pdf>

<sup>532</sup> The 19th Asia Senior-Level Talks on Non-Proliferation (ASTOP), Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Tokyo) 4 October 2024. Access Date: 11 December 2024. [https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/pressite\\_000001\\_00626.html](https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/pressite_000001_00626.html)

<sup>533</sup> Importers now benefitting from new accounting system for the collection of duties and taxes for commercial goods, Canada Border Services Agency (Ottawa) 21 October 2024. Access Date: 1 November 2024. <https://www.canada.ca/en/border-services-agency/news/2024/10/importers-now-benefiting-from-new-accounting-system-for-the-collection-of-duties-and-taxes-for-commercial-goods.html>

<sup>534</sup> Canada-Republic of Korea Foreign and Defence (2+2) Ministerial Meeting joint statement, Global Affairs Canada (Ottawa) 1 November 2024. Access Date: 10 December 2024. <https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2024/11/canada-republic-of-korea-foreign-and-defence-22-ministerial-meeting-joint-statement.html>

In their joint statement, they condemned actions by other states to support Russia's invasion of Ukraine through the transfer dual-use items.

On 26 November 2024, G7 foreign minister issued a statement that called for China to end the export of dual-use materials to Russia, and for all states to end dual-use material exports to Myanmar.<sup>535</sup>

Canada has fully complied with its commitment to strengthen effective export controls on materials, technology, and research that could be used for military purposes in a way that keeps pace with rapid technological developments and recognizes the central role of multilateral export control regimes as a key non-proliferation instrument and safeguard for international peace and security. Canada has taken strong action towards strengthening its export controls by amending the ECL to include more recent technological developments and weak action in co-signing the Washington Summit Declaration. The ECL amendment also demonstrates a commitment to Canadian regulations to meet and surpass MECR standards. Canada has modernized its customs infrastructure by installing the CBSA Assessment and Revenue Management Client Portal, which streamlines import operations and improves compliance while investing in military capabilities. These actions signal Canada's dedication to robust export controls on dual-use goods. Canada's participation at the Asia Senior-Level Talks on Non-Proliferation and advancement of export controls recognizes the central role of MECRs.

Thus, Canada receives a score of +1.

*Analyst: Mehek Berry*

#### **France: +1**

France has fully complied with its commitment to strengthen effective export controls on materials, technology, and research that could be used for military purposes in a way that keeps pace with rapid technological developments and recognizes the central role of multilateral export control regimes as a key non-proliferation instrument and safeguard for international peace and security.

On 15 June 2024, France released a joint statement with the governments of Germany and the United Kingdom condemning Iran's nuclear programme expansion.<sup>536</sup> France denounced Iran's increased uranium enrichment and advanced centrifuge use, warning of significant proliferation risks and urged Iran to fulfil its Non-Proliferation Treaty obligations.

On 24 June 2024, Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs Jean-Noël Barrot and the Council of the European Union announced its Fourteenth package of sanctions against Russia.<sup>537</sup> The European Union added 61 entities to its export restriction list for supporting Russia's military-industrial complex, with the expanded sanctions and restrictions targeting dual-use goods and technologies, including machine tools, chemicals, and helium imports.

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<sup>535</sup> G7 Foreign Ministers' Meeting Statement G7 Information Centre (Fiuggi – Anagni) 26 November 2024. Access Date: 11 December 2024. <https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/foreign/241126-statement.html>

<sup>536</sup> Iran's further expansion of its nuclear programme: joint statement by France, Germany and the UK, the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (London) 15 June 2024. Access Date: 26 September 2024. <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/iran-joint-statement-by-france-germany-and-united-kingdom>

<sup>537</sup> Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine: comprehensive EU's 14th package of sanctions cracks down on circumvention and adopts energy measures, the Council of the European Union (Brussels), 24 June 2024. Access Date: 27 September 2024. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/06/24/russia-s-war-of-aggression-against-ukraine-comprehensive-eu-s-14th-package-of-sanctions-cracks-down-on-circumvention-and-adopts-energy-measures/>

On 29 June 2024, Minister Barrot and the Council of the European Union adopted additional restrictive measures against Belarus to closer align them with the sanctions on Russia and address circumvention issues.<sup>538</sup> The Council extended the export ban to include restrictions on additional dual-use goods, professional services, and transport. Furthermore, the Council will require EU exporters to contractually prohibit the re-exportation of sensitive goods to Belarus.

On 10 July 2024, the Washington Summit Declaration issued at North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) summit condemned Russia's nuclear posturing and expressed concern over Russia's increasing violations of arms control agreements and nuclear safety standards.<sup>539</sup> The declaration called on the People's Republic of China to cease all material and political support to Russia's war effort and introduce export controls on dual-use items. The declaration reaffirmed members' commitment to nuclear deterrence as essential to NATO security while encouraging arms control and non-proliferation efforts as essential to ensuring strategic stability. France is a NATO member.

On 10 September 2024, France released a joint statement with the governments of Germany and the United Kingdom condemning Iran's exports of ballistic missiles to Russia.<sup>540</sup> France announced it will proceed with canceling bilateral air service agreements with Iran, designating entities and individuals involved in the missile transfer, and imposing sanctions on Iran Air. France reaffirmed its commitment to working with European and international partners on the non-proliferation of weapons provided to Russia for its war against Ukraine.

On 23 September 2024, France jointly established the Friends of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), a group of countries that advocates for a treaty ban on the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons.<sup>541</sup> The FMCT includes Australia, Brazil, Canada, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Nigeria, the Philippines, the United Kingdom and the United States.

On 24 September 2024, Minister Barrot urged all countries, particularly Iran and North Korea, to refrain from exporting weapons, dual-use goods, and military components to Russia during the UN Security Council Ministerial Meeting on Ukraine.<sup>542</sup> Minister Barrot condemned Iran's sale of ballistic missiles to Russia, noting how it constitutes escalation and a threat to European security.

On 24 September 2024, the G7 issued joint guidance for industry on preventing the evasion of export controls and sanctions imposed on Russia.<sup>543</sup> This document includes key risk indicators for sanctions circumvention and offers recommendations on best practices for compliance.

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<sup>538</sup> Belarus' involvement in Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine: new EU restrictive measures target trade, services, transport and anti-circumvention (Brussels) 29 June 2024. Access Date: 28 October 2024. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/06/29/belarus-involvement-in-russia-s-war-of-aggression-against-ukraine-new-eu-restrictive-measures-target-trade-services-transport-and-anti-circumvention/>

<sup>539</sup> Washington Summit Declaration, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Brussels) 10 July 2024. Access Date: 26 September 2024. [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_227678.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_227678.htm)

<sup>540</sup> Iran - Transfers of Ballistic Missiles to Russia - Statement by the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany and the United Kingdom (Paris) 10 September 2024. Access Date: 28 October 2024. <https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/iran/news/article/iran-transfers-of-ballistic-missiles-to-russia-statement-by-the-foreign>

<sup>541</sup> Joint Statement on the Friends of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, U.S. Department of State (Washington) 23 September 2024. Access Date: 12 November 2024. <https://www.state.gov/joint-statement-on-the-friends-of-a-fissile-material-cut-off-treaty/>

<sup>542</sup> Address by Jean-Noël Barrot Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs UN Security Council Ministerial Meeting on Ukraine at the United Nations Security Council (New York) 24 September 2024. Access Date: 28 October 2024. <https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/france-and-the-united-nations/news-and-events/news/article/address-by-jean-noel-barrot-minister-for-europe-and-foreign-affairs-un-security>

<sup>543</sup> Preventing Russian Export Control & Sanctions Evasion Guidance, the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action (Berlin) 24 September 2024. Access Date: 1 November 2024. <https://www.bmwk.de/Redaktion/DE/Downloads/G/g7-guidance-for-industry-preventing-russian-export-control-and-sanctions-evasion.pdf>

On 24 September 2024, France, along with 28 other countries participated in the Exercise Pacific Protector 24 under the Proliferation Security Initiative by Australia.<sup>544</sup> The exercise enhanced cooperation in non-proliferation export measures and security measures.

On 4 October 2024, France participated in the 19th edition of the Asia Senior-Level Talks on Non-Proliferation.<sup>545</sup> The talks, hosted by Japan for officials from various members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and interested states from outside Asia, emphasized topics such as bolstering export controls across all countries.

On 18 November 2024, Minister Barrot and the Council of the European Union announced expanded export restrictions on Iran due to the country's military support to Russia's war against Ukraine.<sup>546</sup> These widened measures include a prohibition on the export, transfer, supply, or sale from the EU to Iran of components used in the development and production of missiles and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles.

On 24 November 2024, the Finance Ministry's Directorate-General for Enterprise submitted to Parliament its annual report on France's dual-use goods exports during the 2023 calendar year.<sup>547</sup> The report describes France's multi-agency export control process, and notes that France approved export licenses for up to EUR11.1 billion worth of potential dual-use goods in 2023, a 26 per cent increase from the previous year.

On 26 November 2024, G7 foreign ministers issued a declaration that called for China to end the export of dual-use materials to Russia, and for all states to end dual-use material exports to Myanmar.<sup>548</sup>

France has fully complied with its commitment to strengthen effective export controls on materials, technology, and research that could be used for military purposes in a way that keeps pace with rapid technological developments and recognizes the central role of multilateral export control regimes as a key non-proliferation instrument and safeguard for international peace and security. France has signed multiple statements that demonstrate a commitment to non-proliferation and effective export controls on dual-use goods. France's participation at the Asia Senior-Level Talks on Non-Proliferation and the Exercise Pacific Protector 24 as well as their advancement of export controls at those forums recognizes the central role of MECRs.

Thus, France receives a score of +1.

*Analyst: Jeanne Brownnewell*

### **Germany: +1**

Germany has fully complied with its commitment to strengthen effective export controls on materials, technology, and research that could be used for military purposes in a way that keeps pace with rapid technological developments and recognizes the central role of multilateral export control regimes as a key non-proliferation instrument and safeguard for international peace and security.

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<sup>544</sup> Exercise Specific Protector Kicks Off, Australian Government Defence (Canberra) 24 September 2024. Access Date: 12 November 2024. <https://www.defence.gov.au/news-events/releases/2024-09-24/exercise-pacific-protector-kicks>

<sup>545</sup> The 19th Asia Senior-Level Talks on Non-Proliferation (ASTOP), Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Tokyo) 4 October 2024. Access Date: 11 December 2024. [https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/pressite\\_000001\\_00626.html](https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/pressite_000001_00626.html)

<sup>546</sup> Iran: EU widens restrictive measures in view of Iran support of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine and lists one individual and four entities, Council of the European Union (Brussels) 18 November 2024. Access Date: 11 December 2024. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/11/18/iran-eu-widens-restrictive-measures-in-view-of-iran-support-of-the-russian-war-of-aggression-against-ukraine-and-lists-one-individual-and-four-entities/>

<sup>547</sup> Les exportations des biens à double usage de la France, Ministère de l'Économie, des finances et de l'Industrie (Paris) 24 November 2024. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 10 December 2024. <https://www.entreprises.gouv.fr/la-dge/publications/les-exportations-des-biens-double-usage-de-la-france>

<sup>548</sup> G7 Foreign Ministers' Meeting Statement G7 Information Centre (Fiuggi – Anagni) 26 November 2024. Access Date: 11 December 2024. <https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/foreign/241126-statement.html>

On 15 June 2024, Germany released a joint statement with the governments of France and the United Kingdom condemning Iran's nuclear programme expansion.<sup>549</sup> Germany denounced Iran's increased uranium enrichment and advanced centrifuge use, warning of significant proliferation risks and urged Iran to fulfil its Non-Proliferation Treaty obligations.

On 24 June 2024, Minister of Foreign Affairs Annalena Baerbock and the Council of the European Union announced its fourteenth package of sanctions against Russia.<sup>550</sup> The European Union added 61 entities to its export restriction list for supporting Russia's military-industrial complex, with the expanded sanctions and restrictions targeting dual-use goods and technologies, including machine tools, chemicals, and helium imports.

On 29 June 2024, Minister Baerbock and the Council of the European Union adopted additional restrictive measures against Belarus to closer align them with the sanctions on Russia and address circumvention issues.<sup>551</sup> The Council extended the export ban to include restrictions on additional dual-use goods, professional services, and transport. Furthermore, the Council will require EU exporters to contractually prohibit the re-exportation of sensitive goods to Belarus.

On 10 July 2024, the Washington Summit Declaration issued at North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) summit condemned Russia's nuclear posturing and expressed concern over Russia's increasing violations of arms control agreements and nuclear safety standards.<sup>552</sup> The declaration called on the People's Republic of China to cease all material and political support to Russia's war effort and introduce export controls on dual-use items. The declaration reaffirmed members' commitment to nuclear deterrence as essential to NATO security while encouraging arms control and non-proliferation efforts as essential to ensuring strategic stability. Germany is a NATO member.

On 23 July 2024, the Bundestag passed the 21st amendment to the German Foreign Trade and Payments Ordinance.<sup>553</sup> The amendment establishes additions to Germany's National Controls List (NCL) for dual-use goods, extending beyond existing European Union export control policies to include limits on the export of research and materials relating to emerging technologies.

On 10 September 2024, Germany released a joint statement with the governments of France and the United Kingdom condemning Iran's exports of ballistic missiles to Russia.<sup>554</sup> Germany announced it will proceed with canceling bilateral air service agreements with Iran, designating entities and individuals involved in the missile transfer, and imposing sanctions on Iran Air. Germany reaffirmed its commitment to working with European and international partners on the non-proliferation of weapons provided to Russia for its war against Ukraine.

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<sup>549</sup> Iran's further expansion of its nuclear programme: joint statement by France, Germany and the UK, the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (London) 15 June 2024. Access Date: 26 September 2024.

<https://www.gov.uk/government/news/iran-joint-statement-by-france-germany-and-united-kingdom>

<sup>550</sup> Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine: comprehensive EU's 14th package of sanctions cracks down on circumvention and adopts energy measures, the Council of the European Union (Brussels), 24 June 2024. Access Date: 27 September 2024.

<https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/06/24/russia-s-war-of-aggression-against-ukraine-comprehensive-eu-s-14th-package-of-sanctions-cracks-down-on-circumvention-and-adopts-energy-measures/>

<sup>551</sup> Belarus' involvement in Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine: new EU restrictive measures target trade, services, transport and anti-circumvention (Brussels) 29 June 2024. Access Date: 28 October 2024.

<https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/06/29/belarus-involvement-in-russia-s-war-of-aggression-against-ukraine-new-eu-restrictive-measures-target-trade-services-transport-and-anti-circumvention/>

<sup>552</sup> Washington Summit Declaration, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Brussels) 10 July 2024. Access Date: 26 September 2024. [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_227678.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_227678.htm)

<sup>553</sup> Twenty-first Ordinance amending the Foreign Trade and Payments Ordinance, the German Bundestag (Berlin) 23 July 2024. Access Date: 1 November 2024. <https://dserver.bundestag.de/btd/20/126/2012685.pdf>

<sup>554</sup> Iran - Transfers of Ballistic Missiles to Russia - Statement by the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany and the United Kingdom (Paris) 10 September 2024. Access Date: 28 October 2024. <https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/iran/news/article/iran-transfers-of-ballistic-missiles-to-russia-statement-by-the-foreign>

On 23 September 2024, Germany jointly established the Friends of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), a group of countries that advocates for a treaty ban on the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons.<sup>555</sup> The FMCT includes Australia, Brazil, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Nigeria, the Philippines, the United Kingdom and the United States.

On 24 September 2024, the German Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action, alongside other G7 members, issued joint guidance for industry on preventing the evasion of export controls and sanctions imposed on Russia.<sup>556</sup> This document includes key risk indicators for sanctions circumvention and offers recommendations on best practices for compliance.

On 24 September 2024, Germany, along with 28 other countries participated in the Exercise Pacific Protector 24 under the Proliferation Security Initiative by Australia.<sup>557</sup> The exercise enhanced cooperation in non-proliferation export measures and security measures.

On 4 October 2024, Germany participated in the 19th edition of the Asia Senior-Level Talks on Non-Proliferation.<sup>558</sup> The talks, hosted by Japan for officials from various members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and interested states from outside Asia, emphasized topics such as bolstering export controls across all countries.

On 9 October 2024, Deputy Permanent Representative of Germany at the United Nations Thomas Zahneisen delivered a statement during the 1540 Committee Open Briefing, underscoring the Federal Office for Economic Affairs and Export Controls (BAFA) role in Multilateral Export Control Regimes (MECR).<sup>559</sup> Deputy Representative Zahneisen highlighted BAFA's efforts as the convener of the Wiesbaden Process and the Erlangen Initiative, established to enhance cooperation in research-related export controls.

On 30 October 2024, the Federal Office for Economic Affairs and Export Control co-chaired the first regional conference of the Erlangen Initiative, held in Singapore.<sup>560</sup> The conference aimed to bolster regional cooperation on research and academia's role in supporting United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540.

On 18 November 2024, Minister Baerbock and the Council of the European Union announced expanded export restrictions on Iran due to the country's military support to Russia's war against Ukraine.<sup>561</sup> These widened measures include a prohibition on the export, transfer, supply, or sale from the EU to Iran of components used in the development and production of missiles and uncrewed aerial vehicles.

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<sup>555</sup> Joint Statement on the Friends of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, U.S. Department of State (Washington) 23 September 2024. Access Date: 12 November 2024. <https://www.state.gov/joint-statement-on-the-friends-of-a-fissile-material-cut-off-treaty/>

<sup>556</sup> Preventing Russian Export Control & Sanctions Evasion Guidance, the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action (Berlin) 24 September 2024. Access Date: 1 November 2024. <https://www.bmwk.de/Redaktion/DE/Downloads/G/g7-guidance-for-industry-preventing-russian-export-control-and-sanctions-evasion.pdf>

<sup>557</sup> Exercise Specific Protector Kicks Off, Australian Government Defence (Canberra) 24 September 2024. Access Date: 12 November 2024. <https://www.defence.gov.au/news-events/releases/2024-09-24/exercise-pacific-protector-kicks>

<sup>558</sup> The 19th Asia Senior-Level Talks on Non-Proliferation (ASTOP), Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Tokyo) 4 October 2024. Access Date: 11 December 2024. [https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/pressite\\_000001\\_00626.html](https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/pressite_000001_00626.html)

<sup>559</sup> Statement by Germany During the 1540 Committee Open Briefing, the Federal Foreign Office (Berlin) 9 October 2024. Access Date: 1 November 2024. <https://new-york-un.diplo.de/un-en/-/2679358>

<sup>560</sup> Regional Industry Outreach Conference in Singapore, the Federal Foreign Office (Berlin) 30 October 2024. Access Date: 1 November 2024. <https://disarmament.unoda.org/update/regional-industry-outreach-conference-for-central-asia-and-neighbouring-states/>

<sup>561</sup> Iran: EU widens restrictive measures in view of Iran support of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine and lists one individual and four entities, Council of the European Union (Brussels) 18 November 2024. Access Date: 11 December 2024. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/11/18/iran-eu-widens-restrictive-measures-in-view-of-iran-support-of-the-russian-war-of-aggression-against-ukraine-and-lists-one-individual-and-four-entities/>

On 26 November 2024, G7 Foreign Ministers called for China to end the export of dual-use materials to Russia, and for all states to end dual-use material exports to Myanmar.<sup>562</sup>

Germany has fully complied with its commitment to strengthen effective export controls on materials, technology, and research that could be used for military purposes in a way that keeps pace with rapid technological developments and recognizes the central role of multilateral export control regimes as a key non-proliferation instrument and safeguard for international peace and security. Germany demonstrated strong action towards strengthening its export controls by amending its NCL to include emerging technologies. Furthermore, Germany demonstrated additional action in co-signing the G7 joint guidance for industry and issuing multiple guidance papers and statements. Germany's participation at the Asia Senior-Level Talks on Non-Proliferation and the Exercise Pacific Protector 24 as well as their advancement of export controls at those forums recognizes the central role of MECRs.

Thus, Germany receives a score of +1.

*Analyst: Lorenzo Songsare Shevy*

### **Italy: +1**

Italy has fully complied with its commitment to strengthen effective export controls on materials, technology, and research that could be used for military purposes in a way that keeps pace with rapid technological developments and recognizes the central role of multilateral export control regimes as a key non-proliferation instrument and safeguard for international peace and security.

On 24 June 2024, Minister of Foreign Affairs Antonio Tajani and the Council of the European Union announced its Fourteenth package of sanctions against Russia.<sup>563</sup> The European Union added 61 entities to its export restriction list for supporting Russia's military-industrial complex, with the expanded sanctions and restrictions targeting dual-use goods and technologies, including machine tools, chemicals, and helium imports.

On 29 June 2024, Minister Tajani the Council of the European Union adopted additional restrictive measures against Belarus to closer align them with the sanctions on Russia and address circumvention issues.<sup>564</sup> The Council extended the export ban to include restrictions on additional dual-use goods, professional services, and transport. Furthermore, the Council will require EU exporters to contractually prohibit the re-exportation of sensitive goods to Belarus.

On 1 July 2024, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation published a decree establishing a National Controls List for dual-use goods, extending beyond existing European Union dual-use export

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<sup>562</sup> G7 Foreign Ministers' Meeting Statement G7 Information Centre (Fiuggi – Anagni) 26 November 2024. Access Date: 11 December 2024. <https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/foreign/241126-statement.html>

<sup>563</sup> Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine: comprehensive EU's 14th package of sanctions cracks down on circumvention and adopts energy measures, the Council of the European Union (Brussels), 24 June 2024. Access Date: 27 September 2024. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/06/24/russia-s-war-of-aggression-against-ukraine-comprehensive-eu-s-14th-package-of-sanctions-cracks-down-on-circumvention-and-adopts-energy-measures/>

<sup>564</sup> Belarus' involvement in Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine: new EU restrictive measures target trade, services, transport and anti-circumvention (Brussels) 29 June 2024. Access Date: 28 October 2024. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/06/29/belarus-involvement-in-russia-s-war-of-aggression-against-ukraine-new-eu-restrictive-measures-target-trade-services-transport-and-anti-circumvention/>

controls policies.<sup>565</sup> The National Controls List includes restrictions on various dual-use technologies, including quantum computing technologies and semiconductors.<sup>566</sup>

On 24 July 2024, the Chamber of Deputies and Senate of the Republic of Italy, under the Nineteenth Legislature, published the policy guidelines for the European Commission for 2024-2029.<sup>567</sup> Within these guidelines the legislature emphasized economic security as a key priority and highlighted the need for a coordinated approach to export controls.

On 23 September 2024, Minister Tajani delivered a statement on dual-use restrictions during the G7 ministerial meeting on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly's High-Level Week.<sup>568</sup> At this ministerial meeting, Minister Tajani called on China to cease the transfer of dual-use materials to Russia, particularly those acting as inputs for Russia's defense sector.

On 23 September 2024, Italy jointly established the Friends of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), a group of countries that advocates for a treaty ban on the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons.<sup>569</sup> The FMCT includes Australia, Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Nigeria, the Philippines, the United Kingdom and the United States.

On 24 September 2024, the G7 issued joint guidance for industry on preventing the evasion of export controls and sanctions imposed on Russia.<sup>570</sup> This document includes key risk indicators for sanctions circumvention and offers recommendations on best practices for compliance.

On 24 September 2024, Italy, along with 28 other countries participated in the Exercise Pacific Protector 24 under the Proliferation Security Initiative by Australia.<sup>571</sup> The exercise enhanced cooperation in non-proliferation export measures and security measures.

On 9 October 2024, Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni issued Legislative Decree No. 103 of 12 June 2024, to simplify controls on economic activities.<sup>572</sup> The decree, which entered into law on 2 August 2024 also pertains to the simplification of export related controls of economic activities.

On 20 October 2024, the Ministry of Economy and Finance issued the draft state budget for the fiscal period 2025-2027, which increases the budget for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation's

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<sup>565</sup> Decreta, Istituzione dell'Elenco nazionale di controllo, Ministero degli Affari Esteri e della Cooperazione Internazionale (Rome) 1 July 2024. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 29 September 2024. <https://www.esteri.it/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/Istituzione-dellelenco-nazionale-di-controllo.pdf>

<sup>566</sup> Allegato A, Decreta, Istituzione dell'Elenco nazionale di controllo, Ministero degli Affari Esteri e della Cooperazione Internazionale (Rome) 1 July 2024. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 29 September 2024. <https://www.esteri.it/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/allegato-A.pdf>

<sup>567</sup> Policy Guidelines for the European Commission 2024-2029, the Chamber of Deputies and Senate of the Republic (Rome) 24 July 2024. Access Date: 1 November 2024. <https://documenti.camera.it/leg19/dossier/pdf/AT030.pdf>

<sup>568</sup> Statement on Dual-Use Restrictions at G7 Ministerial, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation (Rome) 23 September 2024. Access Date: 1 November 2024. [https://www.esteri.it/it/sala\\_stamp/archivionotizie/comunicati/2024/09/statement-by-antonio-tajani-minister-for-foreign-affairs-and-international-cooperation-of-italy-in-his-capacity-as-chair-of-the-g7-foreign-ministers-meeting-at-the-high-level-week-of-the-un/](https://www.esteri.it/it/sala_stamp/archivionotizie/comunicati/2024/09/statement-by-antonio-tajani-minister-for-foreign-affairs-and-international-cooperation-of-italy-in-his-capacity-as-chair-of-the-g7-foreign-ministers-meeting-at-the-high-level-week-of-the-un/)

<sup>569</sup> Joint Statement on the Friends of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, U.S. Department of State (Washington) 23 September 2024. Access Date: 12 November 2024. <https://www.state.gov/joint-statement-on-the-friends-of-a-fissile-material-cut-off-treaty>

<sup>570</sup> Preventing Russian Export Control & Sanctions Evasion Guidance, the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action (Berlin) 24 September 2024. Access Date: 1 November 2024. <https://www.bmwk.de/Redaktion/DE/Downloads/G/g7-guidance-for-industry-preventing-russian-export-control-and-sanctions-evasion.pdf>

<sup>571</sup> Exercise Specific Protector Kicks Off, Australian Government Defence (Canberra) 24 September 2024. Access Date: 12 November 2024. <https://www.defence.gov.au/news-events/releases/2024-09-24/exercise-pacific-protector-kicks>

<sup>572</sup> Legislative Decree No. 103 Simplifying Controls on Economic Activities, the President of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Italy (Rome) 12 July 2024. Access Date: 1 November 2024. <https://www.normattiva.it/uri-res/N2Ls?urn:nir:stato:decreto.legislativo:2024-07-12;103!vig=>



National Authority for Export Control of Armament and Dual-Use Materials (UAMA) from fiscal period 2025 to 2026.<sup>573</sup>

On 18 November 2024, Minister Tajani and the Council of the European Union announced expanded export restrictions on Iran due to the country's military support to Russia's war against Ukraine.<sup>574</sup> These widened measures include a prohibition on the export, transfer, supply, or sale from the EU to Iran of components used in the development and production of missiles and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles.

On 26 November 2024, G7 Foreign Ministers called for China to end the export of dual-use materials to Russia, and for all states to end dual-use material exports to Myanmar.<sup>575</sup>

On 29 November 2024, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defense opened the second Italian Forum on Export Controls.<sup>576</sup> This forum, focused on the defense industry, was a conference of key stakeholders focused on improving public-private dialogue on the development, maintenance and enforcement of export controls.

Italy has fully complied with its commitment to strengthen effective export controls on materials, technology, and research that could be used for military purposes in a way that keeps pace with rapid technological developments and recognizes the central role of multilateral export control regimes as a key non-proliferation instrument and safeguard for international peace and security. Italy has taken strong action towards strengthening its export controls by increasing the funding of the UAMA, whilst also simplifying the implementation of economic restrictions through Legislative Decree No. 103 of 12 June 2024. Furthermore, The legislative changes and increases in UAMA funding demonstrates a commitment by Italian regulations to meet and surpass Multilateral Export Control Regime standards. Italy's participation at the Exercise Pacific Protector 24 as well as their advancement of export controls recognizes the central role of MECRs.

Thus, Italy receives a score of +1.

*Analyst: Lorenzo Songsare Shevy*

### **Japan: +1**

Japan has fully complied with its commitment to strengthen effective export controls on materials, technology, and research that could be used for military purposes in a way that keeps pace with rapid technological developments and recognizes the central role of multilateral export control regimes as a key non-proliferation instrument and safeguard for international peace and security.

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<sup>573</sup> Integrative Note to the Budget Draft for 2025-2027, the Ministry of Economy and Finance (Rome) 20 October 2024. Access Date: 1 November 2024. [https://www.rgs.mef.gov.it/\\_Documenti/VERSIONE-I/attivita\\_istituzionali/formazione\\_e\\_gestione\\_del\\_bilancio/bilancio\\_di\\_previsione/bilancio\\_finanziario/2025-2027/DLB/DLB\\_2025\\_DLB-04-AT-060-Esteri.pdf](https://www.rgs.mef.gov.it/_Documenti/VERSIONE-I/attivita_istituzionali/formazione_e_gestione_del_bilancio/bilancio_di_previsione/bilancio_finanziario/2025-2027/DLB/DLB_2025_DLB-04-AT-060-Esteri.pdf)

<sup>574</sup> Iran: EU widens restrictive measures in view of Iran support of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine and lists one individual and four entities, Council of the European Union (Brussels) 18 November 2024. Access Date: 11 December 2024. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/11/18/iran-eu-widens-restrictive-measures-in-view-of-iran-support-of-the-russian-war-of-aggression-against-ukraine-and-lists-one-individual-and-four-entities/>

<sup>575</sup> G7 Foreign Ministers' Meeting Statement G7 Information Centre (Fiuggi – Anagni) 26 November 2024. Access Date: 11 December 2024. <https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/foreign/241126-statement.html>

<sup>576</sup> Tajani e Crosetto aprono alla Farnesina il secondo "Forum italiano sul Controllo delle Esportazioni", Ministero degli Affari Esteri e della Cooperazione Internazionale (Rome) 29 November 2024. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 10 December 2024. [https://www.esteri.it/it/sala\\_stampa/archivionotizie/comunicati/2024/11/tajani-e-crosetto-aprono-alla-farnesina-il-secondo-forum-italiano-sul-controllo-delle-esportazioni/](https://www.esteri.it/it/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/comunicati/2024/11/tajani-e-crosetto-aprono-alla-farnesina-il-secondo-forum-italiano-sul-controllo-delle-esportazioni/)

On 17 June 2024, Japan and the United States held an Extended Deterrence Dialogue addressing nuclear development.<sup>577</sup> Both countries emphasized joint deterrence capabilities, and alliance preparedness.

On 26 June 2024, Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry Ken Saito met with United States Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo.<sup>578</sup> At this meeting, in furtherance of the Japan-United States Commercial and Industrial Partnership, Minister Saito and Secretary Raimondo discussed further bilateral cooperation on export controls.

On 23 September 2024, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida stressed Japan's commitment to a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) as a feasible step toward a world without nuclear weapons.<sup>579</sup> In his remarks at the Friends of an FMCT High-Level Launch Meeting, he emphasized the importance of beginning treaty discussions to limit continued manufacturing of fissile material for nuclear weapons. The FMCT includes Australia, Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Nigeria, the Philippines, the United Kingdom and the United States.

On 24 September 2024, Minister for Foreign Affairs Yoko Kamikawa emphasized Japan's commitment to advancing realistic and practical efforts toward a world free of nuclear weapons, particularly in light of the challenging international security climate.<sup>580</sup> Minister Kamikawa pushed for strengthening efforts to universalize the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and expedite its early entry into force.

On 24 September 2024, the G7 issued joint guidance for industry on preventing the evasion of export controls and sanctions imposed on Russia.<sup>581</sup> This document includes key risk indicators for sanctions circumvention and offers recommendations on best practices for compliance.

On 24 September 2024, Japan, along with 28 other countries participated in the Exercise Pacific Protector 24 under the Proliferation Security Initiative by Australia.<sup>582</sup> The exercise enhanced cooperation in non-proliferation export measures and security measures.

On 4 October 2024, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs hosted the 19th edition of the Asia Senior-Level Talks on Non-Proliferation.<sup>583</sup> Japanese officials engaged with participants, who were officials from various members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and interested states from outside Asia, on topics such as bolstering export controls across all countries.

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<sup>577</sup> US-Japan Extended Deterrence Dialogue, U.S. Department of State (Washington) 17 June 2024. Access Date: 12 November 2024. <https://www.state.gov/u-s-japan-extended-deterrence-dialogue-3/>

<sup>578</sup> Minister Saito Holds the Fourth Japan-U.S. Commercial and Industrial Partnership (JUCIP) Ministerial Meeting with Ms. Gina M. Raimondo, United States Secretary of Commerce, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (Tokyo) 27 June 2024. Access Date: 29 September 2024. [https://www.meti.go.jp/english/press/2024/0627\\_001.html](https://www.meti.go.jp/english/press/2024/0627_001.html)

<sup>579</sup> Prime Minister Kishida attends the High-Level Launch Meeting of the Friends of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Tokyo) 23 September 2024. Access Date: 3 October 2024. [https://www.mofa.go.jp/dns/ac\\_d/page4e\\_001472\\_00001.html](https://www.mofa.go.jp/dns/ac_d/page4e_001472_00001.html)

<sup>580</sup> Eleventh Ministerial Meeting of the Friends of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Tokyo) 25 September 2024. Access Date: 3 October 2024. [https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/pressite\\_000001\\_00603.html](https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/pressite_000001_00603.html)

<sup>581</sup> Preventing Russian Export Control & Sanctions Evasion Guidance, the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action (Berlin) 24 September 2024. Access Date: 1 November 2024. <https://www.bmwk.de/Redaktion/DE/Downloads/G/g7-guidance-for-industry-preventing-russian-export-control-and-sanctions-evasion.pdf>

<sup>582</sup> Exercise Specific Protector Kicks Off, Australian Government Defence (Canberra) 24 September 2024. Access Date: 12 November 2024. <https://www.defence.gov.au/news-events/releases/2024-09-24/exercise-pacific-protector-kicks>

<sup>583</sup> The 19th Asia Senior-Level Talks on Non-Proliferation (ASTOP), Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Tokyo) 4 October 2024. Access Date: 11 December 2024. [https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/pressite\\_000001\\_00626.html](https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/pressite_000001_00626.html)

On 28 October 2024, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry held a joint dialogue event with counterparts from China's Ministry of Commerce, on the topic of export controls.<sup>584</sup> During this event, Japanese and Chinese officials discussed export control issues, promoting transparency and mutual understanding between governments and private-sector stakeholders.

On 30 October 2024, the Ministry of Economy, Technology and Industry issued a ministry ordinance outlining amendments to the regulations under the Foreign Exchange Order including seventeen and eighteen, focusing on transactions related to technology transfer and export controls.<sup>585</sup> The amendments contain new rules specifying conditions for providing technical information related to the development, manufacture, or use of sensitive goods listed in Appendix I of the Export Trade Control Order. This includes manufacturing technologies that, if misused, could be adapted for nuclear or military applications.

On 26 November 2024, Foreign Minister Takeshi Iwaya released a joint Declaration alongside all other G7 Foreign Ministers.<sup>586</sup> As part of the declaration, the ministers called for China to end the export of dual-use materials to Russia, and for all states to end dual-use material exports to Myanmar.

Japan has fully complied with its commitment to strengthen effective export controls on materials, technology, and research that could be used for military purposes in a way that keeps pace with rapid technological developments and recognizes the central role of multilateral export control regimes as a key non-proliferation instrument and safeguard for international peace and security. Japan demonstrated strong action to strengthen its export controls policies by amending the Foreign Exchange Order, and to corroborate these controls with Multilateral Export Control Regime standards by proxy through bilateral cooperation with the United States. Germany's participation at the Asia Senior-Level Talks on Non-Proliferation and the Exercise Pacific Protector 24 as well as their advancement of export controls at those forums recognizes the central role of MECRs.

Thus, Japan receives a score of +1.

*Analyst: Mehek Berry*

### **United Kingdom: 0**

The United Kingdom has partially complied with its commitment to strengthen effective export controls on materials, technology, and research that could be used for military purposes in a way that keeps pace with rapid technological developments and recognizes the central role of multilateral export control regimes as a key non-proliferation instrument and safeguard for international peace and security.

On 15 June 2024, the United Kingdom released a joint statement with the governments of France and Germany condemning Iran's nuclear programme expansion.<sup>587</sup> The United Kingdom denounced Iran's increased uranium enrichment and advanced centrifuge use, warning of significant proliferation risks and urged Iran to fulfil its Non-Proliferation Treaty obligations.

On 10 July 2024, the Washington Summit Declaration issued at North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) summit condemned Russia's nuclear posturing and expressed concern over Russia's increasing violations of

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<sup>584</sup> Third Meeting of the Japan-China Export Control Dialogue and Japan-China Joint Outreach Event Held, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (Tokyo) 30 October 2024. Access Date: 11 October 2024.

[https://www.meti.go.jp/english/press/2024/1030\\_001.html](https://www.meti.go.jp/english/press/2024/1030_001.html)

<sup>585</sup> Regarding amendments to the "Ministry Ordinance Partially Revising the Ministerial Ordinance on Trade-Related Non-Trade Transactions, etc.", Center for Information on Security Trade Control (Tokyo) 30 October 2024. Access Date: 27 December 2024.

<https://www.cistec.or.jp/export/express/241030/241030.html>

<sup>586</sup> G7 Foreign Ministers' Meeting Statement G7 Information Centre (Fiuggi – Anagni) 26 November 2024. Access Date: 11 December 2024. <https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/foreign/241126-statement.html>

<sup>587</sup> Iran's further expansion of its nuclear programme: joint statement by France, Germany and the UK, the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (London) 15 June 2024. Access Date: 26 September 2024.

<https://www.gov.uk/government/news/iran-joint-statement-by-france-germany-and-united-kingdom>

arms control agreements and nuclear safety standards.<sup>588</sup> The declaration called on the People's Republic of China to cease all material and political support to Russia's war effort and introduce export controls on dual-use items. The declaration reaffirmed members' commitment to nuclear deterrence as essential to NATO security while encouraging arms control and non-proliferation efforts as essential to ensuring strategic stability. The UK is a NATO member.

On 2 September 2024, Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs David Lammy announced the introduction of further regulation on exports that support Iran's production of military weapons to the House of Commons, supporting efforts to maintain international security and tackle threats to peace.<sup>589</sup>

On 10 September 2024, the United Kingdom released a joint statement with the governments of France and Germany condemning Iran's exports of ballistic missiles to Russia.<sup>590</sup> Germany announced it will proceed with canceling bilateral air service agreements with Iran, designating entities and individuals involved in the missile transfer, and imposing sanctions on Iran Air. Germany reaffirmed its commitment to working with European and international partners on the non-proliferation of weapons provided to Russia for its war against Ukraine.

On 20 September 2024, the Ministry of Defence announced a research compact with the United States' Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency and Canada's Department of National Defence.<sup>591</sup> The three agencies committed to work together in researching advances to cyber-security infrastructure and in mitigating risks caused by artificial intelligence, particularly in dual-use military applications.

On 23 September 2024, the United Kingdom jointly established the Friends of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), a group of countries that advocates for a treaty ban on the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons.<sup>592</sup> The FMCT includes Australia, Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Nigeria, the Philippines, and the United States.

On 24 September 2024, the G7 issued joint guidance for industry on preventing the evasion of export controls and sanctions imposed on Russia.<sup>593</sup> This document includes key risk indicators for sanctions circumvention and offers recommendations on best practices for compliance.

On 24 September 2024, the UK, along with 28 other countries participated in the Exercise Pacific Protector 24 under the Proliferation Security Initiative by Australia.<sup>594</sup> The exercise enhanced cooperation in non-proliferation export measures and security measures.

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<sup>588</sup> Washington Summit Declaration, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Brussels) 10 July 2024. Access Date: 26 September 2024. [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_227678.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_227678.htm)

<sup>589</sup> UK policy on arms export licences to Israel: Foreign Secretary's statement, Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (London) 2 September 2024. Access Date: 15 October 2024.

<https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/foreign-secretary-statement-on-uk-policy-on-arms-export-licenses-to-israel>

<sup>590</sup> Iran - Transfers of Ballistic Missiles to Russia - Statement by the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany and the United Kingdom (Paris) 10 September 2024. Access Date: 28 October 2024. <https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/iran/news/article/iran-transfers-of-ballistic-missiles-to-russia-statement-by-the-foreign>

<sup>591</sup> UK, US and Canada to collaborate on cybersecurity and AI research, United Kingdom Ministry of Defence (London) 20 September 2024. Access Date: 11 December 2024. <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-us-and-canada-to-collaborate-on-cybersecurity-and-ai-research>

<sup>592</sup> Joint Statement on the Friends of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, U.S. Department of State (Washington) 23 September 2024. Access Date: 12 November 2024. <https://www.state.gov/joint-statement-on-the-friends-of-a-fissile-material-cut-off-treaty/>

<sup>593</sup> Preventing Russian Export Control & Sanctions Evasion Guidance, the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action (Berlin) 24 September 2024. Access Date: 1 November 2024. <https://www.bmwk.de/Redaktion/DE/Downloads/G/g7-guidance-for-industry-preventing-russian-export-control-and-sanctions-evasion.pdf>

<sup>594</sup> Exercise Specific Protector Kicks Off, Australian Government Defence (Canberra) 24 September 2024. Access Date: 12 November 2024. <https://www.defence.gov.au/news-events/releases/2024-09-24/exercise-pacific-protector-kicks>

On 26 November 2024, G7 Foreign Ministers called for China to end the export of dual-use materials to Russia, and for all states to end dual-use material exports to Myanmar.<sup>595</sup>

The United Kingdom has partially complied with its commitment to strengthen effective export controls on materials, technology, and research that could be used for military purposes in a way that keeps pace with rapid technological developments and recognizes the central role of multilateral export control regimes as a key non-proliferation instrument and safeguard for international peace and security. The UK has participated in multiple statements and groups with fellow G7 and NATO members that call for stronger export controls regarding business with geopolitical rivals. Through collaboration with the United States and Canada, the UK has also committed to defence research conducive to making its export controls regime more applicable to modern technologies. However, the UK has not updated its control list or taken any action to strengthen its export controls on dual-use materials, technology or research during this cycle.

Thus, the United Kingdom receives a score of 0.

*Analyst: Layan Mbaish*

### **United States: +1**

The United States has fully complied with its commitment to strengthen effective export controls on materials, technology, and research that could be used for military purposes in a way that keeps pace with rapid technological developments and recognizes the central role of multilateral export control regimes as a key non-proliferation instrument and safeguard for international peace and security.

On 17 June 2024, the United States and Japan held an Extended Deterrence Dialogue addressing nuclear development.<sup>596</sup> Both countries emphasized joint deterrence capabilities, and alliance preparedness.

On 21 June 2024, representatives from the European Union and the United States, including EU Commissioner for Home Affairs Ylva Johansson and US Deputy Attorney General Lisa Monaco, met for the EU-US Ministerial Meeting on Justice and Home Affairs in Brussels.<sup>597</sup> The representatives reaffirmed their commitment to the enforcement of sanctions and export controls in light of Russia's war effort in Ukraine.

On 26 June 2024, Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo met with Japanese Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry Ken Saito.<sup>598</sup> At this meeting, in furtherance of the Japan-United States Commercial and Industrial Partnership, Secretary Raimondo and Minister Saito discussed further bilateral cooperation on export controls.

On 27 June 2024, Secretary Raimondo met with Korean Minister of Trade, Industry and Energy Ahn Duk-geun.<sup>599</sup> Secretary Raimondo and Minister Ahn discussed further cooperation on dual-use export controls, specifically commenting upon ongoing negotiations at the United States-Korea Supply Chain and Commercial Dialogue initiative's Dual-Use Export Controls working group.

On 10 July 2024, the Washington Summit Declaration issued at North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) summit condemned Russia's nuclear posturing and expressed concern over Russia's increasing violations of

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<sup>595</sup> G7 Foreign Ministers' Meeting Statement G7 Information Centre (Fiuggi – Anagni) 26 November 2024. Access Date: 11 December 2024. <https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/foreign/241126-statement.html>

<sup>596</sup> US-Japan Extended Deterrence Dialogue, U.S. Department of State (Washington) 17 June 2024. Access Date: 12 November 2024. <https://www.state.gov/u-s-japan-extended-deterrence-dialogue-3/>

<sup>597</sup> EU-US joint press release following the EU-US Ministerial on Justice and Home Affairs (Brussels) 20 June 2024. Access Date: 28 October 2024. [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip\\_24\\_3428](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_3428)

<sup>598</sup> Minister Saito Holds the Fourth Japan-U.S. Commercial and Industrial Partnership (JUCIP) Ministerial Meeting with Ms. Gina M. Raimondo, United States Secretary of Commerce, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (Tokyo) 27 June 2024. Access Date: 29 September 2024. [https://www.meti.go.jp/english/press/2024/0627\\_001.html](https://www.meti.go.jp/english/press/2024/0627_001.html)

<sup>599</sup> Joint Readout: United States-Korea Supply Chain and Commercial Dialogue Ministerial Meeting, U.S. Department of Commerce (Washington D.C.) 27 June 2024. Access Date: 29 September 2024. <https://www.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2024/06/joint-readout-united-states-korea-supply-chain-and-commercial-dialogue>

arms control agreements and nuclear safety standards.<sup>600</sup> The declaration called on the People's Republic of China to cease all material and political support to Russia's war effort and introduce export controls on dual-use items. The declaration reaffirmed members' commitment to nuclear deterrence as essential to NATO security while encouraging arms control and non-proliferation efforts as essential to ensuring strategic stability. The US is a NATO member.

On 20 September 2024, the Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency announced a research compact with the United Kingdom's Ministry of Defence and Canada's Department of National Defence.<sup>601</sup> The three agencies committed to work together in researching advances to cyber-security infrastructure and in mitigating risks caused by artificial intelligence, particularly in dual-use military applications.

On 23 September 2024, the United States jointly established the Friends of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), a group of countries that advocates for a treaty ban on the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons.<sup>602</sup> The FMCT includes Australia, Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Nigeria, the Philippines, and the United Kingdom.

On 24 September 2024, the G7 issued joint guidance for industry on preventing the evasion of export controls and sanctions imposed on Russia.<sup>603</sup> This document includes key risk indicators for sanctions circumvention and offers recommendations on best practices for compliance.

On 24 September 2024, the United States, along with 28 other countries participated in the Exercise Pacific Protector 24 under the Proliferation Security Initiative by Australia.<sup>604</sup> The exercise enhanced cooperation in non-proliferation export measures and security measures.

On 2 October 2024, the Department of State introduced new sanctions targeting four entities that have transferred dual-use goods to the Houthi rebel group in Yemen.<sup>605</sup>

On 3 October 2024, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Bonnie Jenkins addressed international security, highlighting Russia's violations of international obligations at the NATO Weapons of Mass Destruction Conference.<sup>606</sup> She called for strengthened commitments to arms control and the nuclear proliferation regime, and the necessity for the engagement of Russia and China on these issues.

On 4 October 2024, the United States participated in the 19th edition of the Asia Senior-Level Talks on Non-Proliferation.<sup>607</sup> The talks, hosted by Japan for officials from various members of the Association of Southeast

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<sup>600</sup> Washington Summit Declaration, The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Brussels) 10 July 2024. Access Date: 26 September 2024. [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_227678.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_227678.htm)

<sup>601</sup> UK, US and Canada to collaborate on cybersecurity and AI research, United Kingdom Ministry of Defence (London) 20 September 2024. Access Date: 11 December 2024. <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-us-and-canada-to-collaborate-on-cybersecurity-and-ai-research>

<sup>602</sup> Joint Statement on the Friends of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, U.S. Department of State (Washington) 23 September 2024. Access Date: 12 November 2024. <https://www.state.gov/joint-statement-on-the-friends-of-a-fissile-material-cut-off-treaty/>

<sup>603</sup> Preventing Russian Export Control & Sanctions Evasion Guidance, the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action (Berlin) 24 September 2024. Access Date: 1 November 2024. <https://www.bmwk.de/Redaktion/DE/Downloads/G/g7-guidance-for-industry-preventing-russian-export-control-and-sanctions-evasion.pdf>

<sup>604</sup> Exercise Specific Protector Kicks Off, Australian Government Defence (Canberra) 24 September 2024. Access Date: 12 November 2024. <https://www.defence.gov.au/news-events/releases/2024-09-24/exercise-pacific-protector-kicks>

<sup>605</sup> Targeting Houthi Weapons Smuggling and Procurement Networks, Department of State (Washington D.C.) 2 October 2024. Access Date: 11 December 2024. <https://www.state.gov/targeting-houthi-weapons-smuggling-and-procurement-networks/>

<sup>606</sup> Under Secretary Jenkin's Remarks at the NATO WMD Conference, U.S. Department of State (Washington) 3 October 2024. Access Date: 12 November 2024. <https://www.state.gov/under-secretary-jenkins-remarks-at-the-nato-wmd-conference/>

<sup>607</sup> The 19th Asia Senior-Level Talks on Non-Proliferation (ASTOP), Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Tokyo) 4 October 2024. Access Date: 11 December 2024. [https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/pressite\\_000001\\_00626.html](https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/pressite_000001_00626.html)

Asian Nations and interested states from outside Asia, emphasized topics such as bolstering export controls across all countries.

On 28 October 2024, the Department of the Treasury issued a Final Rule restricting US export of semiconductors, artificial intelligence and quantum computing and information technologies to China.<sup>608</sup> The rule stipulates that individuals residing in the United States cannot transfer certain of these items to China, and that certain other transfers cannot be made without the consent of the Department of the Treasury.

On 30 October 2024, the Department of State introduced new sanctions targeting entities transferring dual-use goods to Russia in third countries including China, India, Malaysia, Thailand, Türkiye and the United Arab Emirates.<sup>609</sup>

On 13 November 2024, Assistant Secretary Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation C.S. Eliot Kang emphasized the importance of maintaining national security by ensuring the peaceful use of nuclear energy.<sup>610</sup> He highlighted challenges to non-proliferation and strategies to manage nuclear exports to maintain global security.

On 21 November 2024, the US and Thailand hosted the Southeast Asia Proliferation Security Initiative to discuss non-proliferation efforts.<sup>611</sup> The workshop discussed methods to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction including export controls.

On 26 November 2024, G7 Foreign Ministers called for China to end the export of dual-use materials to Russia, and for all states to end dual-use material exports to Myanmar.<sup>612</sup>

The United States has fully complied with its commitment to strengthen effective export controls on materials, technology, and research that could be used for military purposes in a way that keeps pace with rapid technological developments and recognizes the central role of multilateral export control regimes as a key non-proliferation instrument and safeguard for international peace and security. The United States demonstrated taken strong action to restrict the export of materials and technologies with potential military uses, including through the Treasury Department's final rule limiting semiconductor, quantum information and artificial intelligence to China. The United States' participation at the Asia Senior-Level Talks on Non-Proliferation, the Exercise Pacific Protector 24 and the Proliferation Security Initiative as well as their advancement of export controls at those forums recognizes the central role of MECRs.

Thus, the United States receives a score of +1.

*Analyst: Layan Mhaish*

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<sup>608</sup> FACT SHEET: Addressing U.S. Investments in Certain National Security Technologies and Products in Countries of Concern, The White House (Washington D.C.) 28 October 2024. Access Date: 11 December 2024. <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/10/28/fact-sheet-addressing-u-s-investments-in-certain-national-security-technologies-and-products-in-countries-of-concern/>

<sup>609</sup> New Measures Targeting Third-Country Enablers Supporting Russia's Military-Industrial Base, U.S. Department of State (Washington D.C.) 30 October 2024. Access Date: 11 December 2024. <https://www.state.gov/new-measures-targeting-third-country-enablers-supporting-russias-military-industrial-base/>

<sup>610</sup> Understanding the Past and Navigating the Future of Civil Nuclear Energy, U.S. Department of State (Colorado) 13 November 2024. Access Date: 11 December 2024. <https://www.state.gov/understanding-the-past-and-navigating-the-future-of-civil-nuclear-energy/>

<sup>611</sup> U.S. and Thailand Co-Host Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Southeast Asia Workshop in Bangkok to Strengthen Regional Counterproliferation Cooperation, U.S. Department of State (Washington D.C.) 21 November 2024. Access Date: 11 December 2024. <https://www.state.gov/u-s-and-thailand-co-host-proliferation-security-initiative-psi-southeast-asia-workshop-in-bangkok-to-strengthen-regional-counterproliferation-cooperation/>

<sup>612</sup> G7 Foreign Ministers' Meeting Statement G7 Information Centre (Fiuggi – Anagni) 26 November 2024. Access Date: 11 December 2024. <https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/foreign/241126-statement.html>

### European Union: +1

The European Union has fully complied with its commitment to strengthen effective export controls on materials, technology, and research that could be used for military purposes in a way that keeps pace with rapid technological developments and recognizes the central role of multilateral export control regimes as a key non-proliferation instrument and safeguard for international peace and security.

On 21 June 2024, representatives from the European Union and the United States, including EU Commissioner for Home Affairs Ylva Johansson and US Deputy Attorney General Lisa Monaco, met for the EU-US Ministerial Meeting on Justice and Home Affairs in Brussels.<sup>613</sup> The representatives reaffirmed their commitment to the enforcement of sanctions and export controls in light of Russia's war effort in Ukraine.

On 24 June 2024, the Council of the European Union announced its Fourteenth package of sanctions against Russia.<sup>614</sup> The European Union added 61 entities to its export restriction list for supporting Russia's military-industrial complex, with the expanded sanctions and restrictions targeting dual-use goods and technologies, including machine tools, chemicals, and helium imports.

On 29 June 2024, the Council of the European Union adopted additional restrictive measures against Belarus to closer align them with the sanctions on Russia and address circumvention issues.<sup>615</sup> The Council extended the export ban to include restrictions on additional dual-use goods, professional services, and transport. Furthermore, the Council will require EU exporters to contractually prohibit the re-exportation of sensitive goods to Belarus.

On 5 September 2024, the European Commission adopted a Delegated Regulation updating the list of dual-use items contained in Annex I of Regulation (EU) 2021/821.<sup>616</sup> This list is updated annually to remain aligned with the Multilateral Export Control Regimes (MECRs). This update adds new dual-use goods to the list, such as nuclear equipment, toxins, and noise reduction equipment, provides for the modification of control parameters, and updates technical definitions.

On 13 September 2024, the European Union condemned Iran's recent exports of ballistic missiles to Russia.<sup>617</sup> The European Union is responding by announcing new restrictive measures against Iran, including the designation of involved entities in the missile, drone, and aviation sectors.

On 24 September 2024, the G7 issued joint guidance for industry on preventing the evasion of export controls and sanctions imposed on Russia.<sup>618</sup> This document includes key risk indicators for sanctions circumvention and offers recommendations on best practices for compliance.

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<sup>613</sup> EU-US joint press release following the EU-US Ministerial on Justice and Home Affairs (Brussels) 20 June 2024. Access Date: 28 October 2024. [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip\\_24\\_3428](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_3428)

<sup>614</sup> Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine: comprehensive EU's 14th package of sanctions cracks down on circumvention and adopts energy measures, Council of the European Union (Brussels), 24 June 2024. Access Date: 27 September 2024. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/06/24/russia-s-war-of-aggression-against-ukraine-comprehensive-eu-s-14th-package-of-sanctions-cracks-down-on-circumvention-and-adopts-energy-measures/>

<sup>615</sup> Belarus' involvement in Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine: new EU restrictive measures target trade, services, transport and anti-circumvention (Brussels) 29 June 2024. Access Date: 28 October 2024. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/06/29/belarus-involvement-in-russia-s-war-of-aggression-against-ukraine-new-eu-restrictive-measures-target-trade-services-transport-and-anti-circumvention/>

<sup>616</sup> 2024 Update of the EU Control List of Dual-Use Items (Brussels) 1 October 2024. Access Date: 11 November 2024. [https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/news/2024-update-eu-control-list-dual-use-items-2024-10-01\\_en](https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/news/2024-update-eu-control-list-dual-use-items-2024-10-01_en)

<sup>617</sup> Iran: Statement by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union (Brussels) 13 September 2024. Access Date: 11 November 2024. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/09/13/iran-statement-by-the-high-representative-on-behalf-of-the-european-union/>

<sup>618</sup> Preventing Russian Export Control & Sanctions Evasion Guidance, the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action (Berlin) 24 September 2024. Access Date: 1 November 2024. <https://www.bmwk.de/Redaktion/DE/Downloads/G/g7-guidance-for-industry-preventing-russian-export-control-and-sanctions-evasion.pdf>



On 4 October 2024, the European Union participated in the 19th edition of the Asia Senior-Level Talks on Non-Proliferation.<sup>619</sup> The talks, hosted by Japan for officials from various members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and interested states from outside Asia, emphasized topics such as bolstering export controls across all countries.

On 18 November 2024, the Council of the European Union announced expanded export restrictions on Iran due to the country's military support to Russia's war against Ukraine.<sup>620</sup> These widened measures include a prohibition on the export, transfer, supply, or sale from the EU to Iran of components used in the development and production of missiles and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles.

The European Union has fully complied with its commitment to strengthen effective export controls on materials, technology, and research that could be used for military purposes in a way that keeps pace with rapid technological developments and recognizes the central role of multilateral export control regimes as a key non-proliferation instrument and safeguard for international peace and security. The European Union has taken strong action towards strengthening its export controls by aligning restrictions on Belarus and updating the dual-use export control list, and weak action by offering verbal support during the EU-US Ministerial Meeting. The updates to the dual-use export control list also demonstrates a commitment for European Union regulations to meet and surpass MECR standards. The European Union's participation at the Asia Senior-Level Talks on Non-Proliferation and their advancement of export controls at those forums recognizes the central role of MECRs.

Thus, the European Union receives a score of +1.

*Analyst: Jeanne Brownell*

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<sup>619</sup> The 19th Asia Senior-Level Talks on Non-Proliferation (ASTOP), Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Tokyo) 4 October 2024. Access Date: 11 December 2024. [https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/pressite\\_000001\\_00626.html](https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/pressite_000001_00626.html)

<sup>620</sup> Iran: EU widens restrictive measures in view of Iran support of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine and lists one individual and four entities, Council of the European Union (Brussels) 18 November 2024. Access Date: 11 December 2024. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/11/18/iran-eu-widens-restrictive-measures-in-view-of-iran-support-of-the-russian-war-of-aggression-against-ukraine-and-lists-one-individual-and-four-entities/>