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2024 G7 Apulia Summit Final Compliance Report

15 June 2024 to 15 May 2025

Prepared by

Jacob Rudolph and Angus MacKellar
and the G7 Research Group

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www.g7.utoronto.ca • g7@utoronto.ca • [@g7_rg](https://twitter.com/g7_rg)

“We have meanwhile set up a process and there are also independent institutions monitoring which objectives of our G7 meetings we actually achieve. When it comes to these goals we have a compliance rate of about 80%, according to the University of Toronto. Germany, with its 87%, comes off pretty well. That means that next year too, under the Japanese G7 presidency, we are going to check where we stand in comparison to what we have discussed with each other now. So a lot of what we have resolved to do here together is something that we are going to have to work very hard at over the next few months. But I think that it has become apparent that we, as the G7, want to assume responsibility far beyond the prosperity in our own countries. That’s why today’s outreach meetings, that is the meetings with our guests, were also of great importance.”

Chancellor Angela Merkel, Schloss Elmau, 8 June 2015

G7 summits are a moment for people to judge whether aspirational intent is met by concrete commitments. The G7 Research Group provides a report card on the implementation of G7 and G20 commitments. It is a good moment for the public to interact with leaders and say, you took a leadership position on these issues — a year later, or three years later, what have you accomplished?

Achim Steiner, Administrator, United Nations Development Programme,
in G7 Canada: The 2018 Charlevoix Summit

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4. Non-Proliferation: Export Controls

“We are strengthening effective export controls on materials, technology, and research that could be used for military purposes in a way that keeps pace with rapid technological developments and recognizes the central role of multilateral export control regimes as a key non-proliferation instrument and safeguard for international peace and security.”

Apulia G7 Leaders' Communiqué

Assessment

	No Compliance	Partial Compliance	Full Compliance
Canada			+1
France			+1
Germany			+1
Italy			+1
Japan			+1
United Kingdom		0	
United States			+1
European Union			+1
Average	+0.88 (84%)		

Background

Since the invention of the atomic bomb in 1942 and its first use in Hiroshima in 1945, non-proliferation has become a significant concern for G7 members.⁶⁹⁶ G7 discussions and commitments relating to non-proliferation, specifically export controls, have evolved over time. Following the 1986 Chernobyl disaster, G7 summits emphasized denuclearization of Soviet Union states and safe nuclear energy use.⁶⁹⁷ Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, G7 leaders expressed the need for non-proliferation export controls that would prevent terrorists from acquiring nuclear capabilities.⁶⁹⁸ North Korea's nuclear testing in the early and mid-2000s, non-proliferation and export controls remained a topic of notable G7 attention.⁶⁹⁹ Finally, the 2022 full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine renewed Russian non-proliferation compliance as a significant point in the growing agenda for non-proliferation and export controls.⁷⁰⁰

At the 1996 Moscow Summit, G7 leaders committed to prioritising nuclear safety, and international adherence to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safety standards.⁷⁰¹ They emphasised support for non-proliferation efforts and responsible management of nuclear materials.

⁶⁹⁶ Atomic bomb, Encyclopedia Britannica (Edinburgh) 25 August 2024. Access Date: 7 September 2024. <https://www.britannica.com/technology/atomic-bomb/Development-and-proliferation-of-atomic-bombs>

⁶⁹⁷ Nuclear Reactor Safety, G7 Information Centre (Toronto) April 1998. Access Date: 7 September 2024. <https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/evaluations/1998birmingham/issues/nuke.htm>

⁶⁹⁸ Impressions Of The Kananaskis Summit, 26-27 June 2002, G7 Information Centre (Toronto) 23 July 2002. Access Date: 7 September 2024. https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/evaluations/2002kananaskis/assess_baynea.html

⁶⁹⁹ Chair's Summary, G7 Information Centre (Toronto) 8 July 2005. Access Date: 7 September 2024. <https://g7.utoronto.ca/summit/2005gleneagles/summary.html>

⁷⁰⁰ G7 Leaders' Communiqué, G7 Information Centre (Toronto) 12 December 2022. Access Date: 7 September 2022. <https://g7.utoronto.ca/summit/2022elmau/220628-communique.html>

⁷⁰¹ Nuclear Safety and Security Summit Declaration, G7 Information Centre (Toronto) 20 April 1996. Access Date: 7 September 2024. <https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/summit/1996moscow/declaration.html>

At the 1997 Denver Summit, G8 leaders reaffirmed the importance of establishing an international regime of nuclear liability and renewed their commitment to the necessity of preparing an international convention on the safety of nuclear waste.⁷⁰²

At the 1998 Birmingham Summit, G8 leaders reaffirmed their commitment to nuclear safety, specifically to help shut down the Ukrainian Chornobyl reactor by 2000.⁷⁰³ They also committed to strengthening cooperation on non-proliferation efforts by enhancing export controls, laws, and regulations to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems.⁷⁰⁴

At the 1999 Köln Summit, G8 leaders reaffirmed their commitment to strengthen non-proliferation mechanisms, emphasizing the role of the Nuclear Suppliers Group.⁷⁰⁵ They also emphasized concerns surrounding nuclear testing following India and Pakistan's nuclear tests.

At the 2000 Okinawa Summit, G8 leaders welcomed the outcome of the 2000 Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) Review Conference and committed to implementing its conclusions, including swift entry of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty negotiations, and universal NPT adherence.⁷⁰⁶ They also reaffirmed their commitments made in the 1996 Moscow Summit, emphasising the importance of the safe use of nuclear power.

At the 2002 Kananaskis Summit, G8's leaders committed to preventing nuclear weapons from falling into the hands of terrorists through the creation of the "The G8 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction."⁷⁰⁷ The program was created to assist former member states of the Soviet Union in decommissioning excess nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, and its priorities were 1) destroying chemical weapons, 2) dismantling decommissioned nuclear submarines, 3) disposing of fissile materials, and 4) helping to redeploy weapons scientists.⁷⁰⁸

At the 2003 Evian Summit, G8 leaders affirmed their commitment to the IAEA advancing the Global Partnership initiative by promoting universal non-proliferation principles.⁷⁰⁹ Specifically, they called on states to mobilise to improve the safety and security of the sources they produce, possess, use, import or export, and to develop a medium- and long-term approach aimed at reinforcing the security of sources and the mechanisms for interstate cooperation.⁷¹⁰

⁷⁰² Communiqué, G7 Information Centre (Toronto) 22 June 1997. Access Date: 2 February 2025.

<https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/summit/1997denver/g8final.htm>

⁷⁰³ Communiqué, G7 Information Centre (Toronto) 17 May 1998. Access Date: 2 February 2025.

<https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/summit/1998birmingham/finalcom.htm>

⁷⁰⁴ Communiqué, G7 Information Centre (Toronto) 17 May 1998. Access Date: 7 September 2024.

<https://g7.utoronto.ca/summit/1998birmingham/finalcom.htm>

⁷⁰⁵ G8 Communiqué Köln 1999 Final, G7 Information Centre (Toronto) 20 June 1999. Access Date: 7 September 2024.

<https://g7.utoronto.ca/summit/1999koln/finalcom.htm>

⁷⁰⁶ G8 Communiqué Okinawa 2000, G7 Information Centre (Toronto) 23 July 2000. Access Date: 7 September 2024.

<https://g7.utoronto.ca/summit/2000okinawa/finalcom.htm>

⁷⁰⁷ The Kananaskis Summit Chair's Summary, G7 Information Centre (Toronto) 27 June 2002. Access Date: 2 February 2025.

<https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/summit/2002kananaskis/summary.html>

⁷⁰⁸ Statement by G8 Leaders: The G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons

and Materials of Mass Destruction, G7 Information Centre (Toronto) 27 June 2002. Access Date: 7 September 2024.

<https://g7.utoronto.ca/summit/2002kananaskis/arms.html>

⁷⁰⁹ Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction:

A G8 Action Plan, G7 Information Centre (Toronto) 2 June 2003. Access Date: 7 September 2024.

https://g7.utoronto.ca/summit/2003evian/destruction_action_en.html

⁷¹⁰ Non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Securing Radioactive Sources: A G8 Action Plan, G7 Information Centre (Toronto) 2 June 2003. Access Date: 7 September 2024. https://g7.utoronto.ca/summit/2003evian/wmd_action_en.html

At the 2004 Sea Island Summit, G8 leaders reaffirmed their commitment to the NPT, as well as the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Statement of Interdiction Principles.⁷¹¹

At the 2005 Gleneagles Summit, G8 leaders reaffirmed their commitment to non-proliferation and called on all states to uphold in full international norms on non-proliferation and to meet their arms control and disarmament obligations.⁷¹² They also expressed particular concern about the threat of proliferation in North Korea and Iran.

At the 2006 St. Petersburg Summit, G8 leaders reaffirmed their commitment to reducing risks in the safe use of nuclear energy through a strong non-proliferation regime and reliable safety and security systems for nuclear materials and facilities.⁷¹³ They also recommitted to fully implementing international treaties, supporting the IAEA's efforts, and continuing to address nuclear safety and security issues through the Nuclear Safety and Security Group.

At the 2007 Heiligendamm Summit, G8 leaders reaffirmed their commitment to preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction through the multilateral treaty system and diplomatic cooperation with international partners.⁷¹⁴

At the 2008 Hokkaido Toyako Summit, G8 leaders reaffirmed their commitment to the NPT, nuclear disarmament, and called for a global moratorium on nuclear tests and fissile material production for weapons.⁷¹⁵ They also supported North Korea's denuclearization through the Six-Party process and urged Iran to comply with United Nations resolutions and engage in diplomatic efforts regarding its nuclear program.

At the 2009 L'Aquila Summit, G8 leaders reaffirmed their commitment to the NPT, and its three pillars of non-proliferation, the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and disarmament.⁷¹⁶

At the 2010 Muskoka Summit, G8 leaders urged all states to take decisive action against non-compliance with non-proliferation obligations, including safeguards.⁷¹⁷ They also called on states to adopt a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and an Additional Protocol with the IAEA as the new standard for verifying peaceful nuclear energy use. Furthermore, they encouraged the exchange of nuclear technology and information for peaceful purposes, particularly benefiting developing countries, in line with the NPT.

At the 2012 Camp David Summit, G8 leaders affirmed their commitment to strengthening the global non-proliferation regime by supporting key treaties and promoting international cooperation. They also emphasized the importance of diplomatic solutions for denuclearization in North Korea and Iran, robust counter-proliferation tools, and the IAEA's role in verifying compliance through the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol.⁷¹⁸

⁷¹¹ G8 Action Plan on Nonproliferation, G7 Information Centre (Toronto) 9 June 2004. Access Date: 7 September 2024. <https://g7.utoronto.ca/summit/2004seaisland/nonproliferation.html>

⁷¹² Chair's Summary, G7 Information Centre (Toronto) 8 July 2005. Access Date: 7 September 2024. https://g7.utoronto.ca/summit/2003evian/wmd_action_en.html

⁷¹³ Chair's Summary, G7 Information Centre (St. Petersburg) 17 July 2006. Access Date: 2 February 2025. <https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/summit/2006stpetersburg/summary.html>

⁷¹⁴ Chair's Summary, G7 Information Centre (Toronto) 8 June 2007. Access Date: 2 February 2025. <https://g7.utoronto.ca/summit/2007heiligendamm/g8-2007-summary.pdf>

⁷¹⁵ G8 Hokkaido Toyako Summit Leaders' Declaration, G7 Information Centre (Toronto) 8 July 2008. Access Date: 2 February 2025. <https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/summit/2008hokkaido/2008-declaration.html>

⁷¹⁶ Chair's Summary, G7 Information Centre (Toronto) 10 July 2009. Access Date: 2 February 2025. <https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/summit/2009laquila/2009-summary.html>

⁷¹⁷ Muskoka Declaration: Recovery and New Beginnings, G7 Information Centre (Toronto) 26 June 2010. Access Date: 7 September 2024. <https://g7.utoronto.ca/summit/2010muskoka/communique.html>

⁷¹⁸ Group of Eight Declaration on Nonproliferation and Disarmament for 2012, G7 Information Centre (Toronto) 23 May 2012. Access Date: 7 September 2024. <https://g7.utoronto.ca/summit/2012campdavid/g8-npt.html>

At the 2016 Ise-Shima Summit, G7 leaders reaffirmed their commitment to non-proliferation and disarmament and pledged to advance the universalization of key treaties, including the NPT, to prevent and combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.⁷¹⁹

At the 2017 Taormina Summit, G7 leaders reaffirmed their commitment to non-proliferation and disarmament, emphasizing the urgent need for North Korea to comply fully with all UN Security Council Resolutions and abandon its nuclear tests and programs.⁷²⁰

At the 2021 Cornwall Summit, G7 leaders reaffirmed their commitment to upholding global non-proliferation efforts and ensuring compliance with international agreements. They also urged Iran to fully adhere to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, reverse measures reducing transparency, and cease all ballistic missile activities.⁷²¹

At the 2022 Elmau Summit, G7 leaders warned against any threat of the use of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons or related materials, particularly in Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine which began in February of 2022.⁷²² Furthermore, they urged Russia to stop its attacks, especially in the direct vicinity of Ukraine's nuclear power plants.

At the 2023 Hiroshima Summit, G7 leaders declared their commitment to non-proliferation through the G7 Leaders' Hiroshima Vision on Nuclear Disarmament.⁷²³ The Vision reaffirmed commitment to eliminating nuclear weapons, reinforcing non-proliferation treaties, specifically the CTBT, condemning nuclear threats and promoting international cooperation for global security.⁷²⁴

At the 2024 Apulia Summit, G7 leaders committed to "[strengthen] effective export controls on materials, technology, and research that could be used for military purposes in a way that keeps pace with rapid technological developments and recognizes the central role of multilateral export control regimes as a key non-proliferation instrument and safeguard for international peace and security."

Commitment Features

Definitions and Concepts

"Strengthening" is understood to mean "To make stronger."⁷²⁵

"Effective" is understood to mean "operating in a way that produces the intended result. It does not mean any effort, especially thoughtless ones."⁷²⁶

⁷¹⁹ G7 Ise-Shima Leaders' Declaration, G7 Information Centre (Ise-Shima) 27 May 2016. Access Date: 2 February 2025. <https://g7.utoronto.ca/summit/2016shima/ise-shima-declaration-en.html>

⁷²⁰ G7 Taormina Leaders' Communiqué, G7 Information Centre (Toronto) 27 May 2017. Access Date: 7 September 2024. <https://g7.utoronto.ca/summit/2017taormina/communiqué.html>

⁷²¹ Carbis Bay G7 Summit Communiqué, G7 Information Centre (Carbis Bay, Cornwall) 13 June 2021. Access Date: 2 February 2025. <https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/summit/2021cornwall/210613-communique.html>

⁷²² Elmau Summit G7 Communiqué, G7 Information Centre (Elmau) 28 June 2022. Access Date: 2 February 2025. <https://g7.utoronto.ca/summit/2022elmau/220628-communique.html>

⁷²³ G7 Leaders' Hiroshima Vision on Nuclear Disarmament, G7 Information Centre (Toronto), 19 May 2023. Access Date: 8 September 2024. <https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/summit/2023hiroshima/230519-disarmament.html>

⁷²⁴ G7 Hiroshima Leaders' Communiqué, G7 Information Centre (Hiroshima) 20 May 2023. Access Date: 5 February 2025. <https://g7.utoronto.ca/summit/2023hiroshima/230520-communique.html>

⁷²⁵ Compliance Coding Manual for International Institutional Commitments, G7 and G20 Research Groups (Toronto) 12 November 2020. Access Date: 4 September 2024. https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/compliance/Compliance_Coding_Manual_2020.pdf

⁷²⁶ Compliance Coding Manual for International Institutional Commitments, G7 and G20 Research Groups (Toronto) 12 November 2020. Access Date: 4 September 2024. https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/compliance/Compliance_Coding_Manual_2020.pdf

“Export controls” refer to “a system that regulates the export of dual-use materials and technologies.”⁷²⁷ In this regard, “dual-use” items are “goods, software and technology that can be used for both civilian and military applications.”⁷²⁸

To “keep pace” is understood to mean “to go or make progress at the same speed as (someone or something else).”⁷²⁹

“Recognize” is understood to mean “to acknowledge formally.”⁷³⁰ In this context, recognition would mean an explicit acknowledgement.⁷³¹

“Central” is understood to mean “in, at, from, or near the centre or the most important part,” whereas “role” is understood to mean “the position or purpose that someone or something has in a situation, organization, society, etc.”⁷³² “Central role” is understood to mean someone or something that has an important position or purpose in a given context.

“Multilateral export control regimes” (MECRs) refer to “consensus-based, voluntary arrangements of supplier countries that produce technologies useful in developing weapons of mass destruction or conventional weapons.”⁷³³

“Key” is understood to mean “an instrumental or deciding factor.”⁷³⁴

“Non-proliferation” refers to “the controlling of the spread and/or amount of something, especially nuclear or chemical weapons.”⁷³⁵

General Interpretive Guidelines

This commitment is best interpreted as comprising two overarching dimensions: 1) the strengthening of effective export controls in line with technological advancements and 2) the recognition of multilateral export regimes as a key instrument in non-proliferation. The first dimension specifies three areas of export controls – a. Materials, b. Technology, and c. Research.

Full compliance, or a score of +1, will be awarded to any member that takes strong action in both dimensions by 1) effectively strengthening their export controls regime in line with technological development and 2) effectively recognizing the key role of MECRs in non-proliferation. To fully comply with the first dimension, the member must address a) materials; b) technology; and c) research. Examples of strong actions in the first

⁷²⁷ Export Controls, UNTERM (New York) n.d. Access Date: 5 September 2024. Translation provided by Compliance Director. <https://unterm.un.org/unterm2/en/view/a4cc7958-09a0-4deb-8f57-ff076c59944a>

⁷²⁸ Exporting dual-use Items, European Commission (Brussels) n.d. Access Date: 5 September 2024. https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/help-exporters-and-importers/exporting-dual-use-items_en

⁷²⁹ Keep pace with, Merriam-Webster Dictionary (Springfiel n.d. Access Date: 5 September 2024. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/keep%20pace%20with>

⁷³⁰ Compliance Coding Manual for International Institutional Commitments, G7 and G20 Research Groups (Toronto) 12 November 2020. Access Date: 4 September 2024. https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/compliance/Compliance_Coding_Manual_2020.pdf

⁷³¹ Compliance Coding Manual for International Institutional Commitments, G7 and G20 Research Groups (Toronto) 12 November 2020. Access Date: 4 September 2024. https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/compliance/Compliance_Coding_Manual_2020.pdf

⁷³² Central role, Cambridge Dictionary (Cambridge) n.d. Access Date: 5 September 2024. <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/example/english/central-role>

⁷³³ Nonproliferation: Strategy Needed to Strengthen Multilateral Export Control Regimes, U.S. Government Accountability Office (Washington D.C.) 25 October 2002. Access Date: 5 September 2024. <https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-03-43>

⁷³⁴ Key, Merriam-Webster Dictionary (Springfield) n.d. Access Date: 5 September 2024. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/key>

⁷³⁵ Non-proliferation, Cambridge Dictionary (Cambridge) n.d. Access Date: 5 September 2024. <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/non-proliferation>

dimension include expanding national control lists to include new dual-use items, further regulation against the distribution of dual-use items, harsher penalties for illicit proliferation of such items and further investment to improve or innovate upon enforcement mechanisms (e.g. economizing the permit evaluation process, hiring more security staff or improving automated sensing of controlled substances at major border crossings). Strong actions in dimension two may include normalizing existing regulations and best practices against MECR standards, formulating new agreements and strengthening regulations collaboratively at the multilateral level, and taking bilateral and multilateral coordinated action on export control strengthening alongside fellow MECR parties under the subject area of the relevant MECR.

Partial compliance, or a score of 0, will be awarded to any member that takes strong action in one of the two compliance dimensions, or takes weak action in both dimensions. Weak actions in dimension one may include verbal reaffirmations of the commitment terms without material actions to that effect. Weak actions in dimension two may include verbal reaffirmations or fielding delegations to MECR meetings without any material action.

Non-compliance, or a score of -1, will be awarded to any member that takes weak action in one but not both commitment dimensions, or to a G7 member that takes no action towards either dimension.

Scoring Guidelines

-1	The G7 member has taken weak action towards either 1) strengthening effective export controls in line with technological advancements, including materials, technology or research or 2) recognizing the central role of multilateral export control regimes as a key non-proliferation instrument, or the G7 member has not taken any action in either dimension.
0	The G7 member has taken strong action towards either 1) strengthening effective export controls in line with technological advancements, including materials, technology and research or 2) recognizing the central role of multilateral export control regimes as a key non-proliferation instrument, or the G7 member has taken weak action in both dimensions.
+1	The G7 member has taken strong action in strengthening effective export controls on materials, technology and research that could be used for military purposes in a way that keeps pace with rapid technological developments and strong action in recognizing the central role of multilateral export control regimes as a key non-proliferation instrument.

Compliance Director: Luca Rampersad

Lead Analyst: Anna Lysenko

Canada: +1

Canada has fully complied with its commitment to strengthen effective export controls on materials, technology, and research that could be used for military purposes in a way that keeps pace with rapid technological developments and recognizes the central role of multilateral export control regimes as a key non-proliferation instrument and safeguard for international peace and security.

On 19 June 2024, the Government of Canada announced the Order Amending the Export Control List (ECL).⁷³⁶ The Amendment specified that items not covered by multilateral export control regimes (MECRs) but deemed necessary by Canada to avoid use detrimental to security must be listed directly in the ECL under Group 5. Specifically, the amendment adds advanced semiconductors and quantum computing technologies to the ECL. The amendment also institutes minor editorial changes to align Canadian regulation with Wassenaar Arrangement standards.

On 10 July 2024, the Washington Summit Declaration issued at North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) summit condemned Russia's nuclear posturing and expressed concern over Russia's increasing violations of

⁷³⁶ Order Amending the Export Control List: SOR/2024-112, the Government of Canada (Ottawa) 19 June 2024. Access Date: 27 September 2024. <https://canadagazette.gc.ca/rp-pr/p2/2024/2024-06-19/html/sor-dors112-eng.html>

arms control agreements and nuclear safety standards.⁷³⁷ The declaration called on the People's Republic of China to cease all material and political support to Russia's war effort and introduce export controls on dual-use items. The declaration reaffirmed members' commitment to nuclear deterrence as essential to NATO security while encouraging arms control and non-proliferation efforts as essential to ensuring strategic stability. Canada is a NATO member.

On 20 September 2024, the Ministry of National Defence announced a research compact with the United States' Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency and the United Kingdom's Ministry of Defence.⁷³⁸ The three agencies committed to work together in researching advances to cyber-security infrastructure and in mitigating risks caused by artificial intelligence, particularly in dual-use military applications.

On 23 September 2024, the Government of Canada jointly established the Friends of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), a group of countries that advocates for a treaty ban on the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons.⁷³⁹ The FMCT includes Australia, Brazil, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Nigeria, the Philippines, the United Kingdom and the United States.

On 24 September 2024, the G7 issued joint guidance for industry on preventing the evasion of export controls and sanctions imposed on Russia.⁷⁴⁰ This document includes key risk indicators for sanctions circumvention and offers recommendations on best practices for compliance.

On 4 October 2024, Canada participated in the 19th edition of the Asia Senior-Level Talks on Non-Proliferation.⁷⁴¹ The talks, hosted by Japan for officials from various members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and interested states from outside Asia, emphasized topics such as bolstering export controls across all countries.

On 21 October 2024, the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) adopted the CBSA Assessment and Revenue Management Client Portal, a front-end portal for importers to interact with the customs process for imports into Canada.⁷⁴² This modernization endeavour is consistent with the aim of keeping up with technical changes and strengthening export restrictions, as it improves compliance and transparency by automating operations and making it easier to trace imported and exported commodities.

On 1 November 2024, Minister of Foreign Affairs Mélanie Joly and Minister of National Defence Bill Blair met with Korea's Minister of Foreign Affairs Cho Tae-yul and Minister of National Defence Kim Yong-hyun.⁷⁴³

⁷³⁷ Washington Summit Declaration, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Brussels) 10 July 2024. Access Date: 26 September 2024. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_227678.htm

⁷³⁸ UK, US and Canada to collaborate on cybersecurity and AI research, United Kingdom Ministry of Defence (London) 20 September 2024. Access Date: 11 December 2024. <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-us-and-canada-to-collaborate-on-cybersecurity-and-ai-research>

⁷³⁹ Joint Statement on the Friends of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, U.S. Department of State (Washington) 23 September 2024. Access Date: 12 November 2024. <https://www.state.gov/joint-statement-on-the-friends-of-a-fissile-material-cut-off-treaty/>

⁷⁴⁰ Preventing Russian Export Control & Sanctions Evasion Guidance, the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action (Berlin) 24 September 2024. Access Date: 1 November 2024. <https://www.bmwk.de/Redaktion/DE/Downloads/G/g7-guidance-for-industry-preventing-russian-export-control-and-sanctions-evasion.pdf>

⁷⁴¹ The 19th Asia Senior-Level Talks on Non-Proliferation (ASTOP), Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Tokyo) 4 October 2024. Access Date: 11 December 2024. https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/pressite_000001_00626.html

⁷⁴² Importers now benefitting from new accounting system for the collection of duties and taxes for commercial goods, Canada Border Services Agency (Ottawa) 21 October 2024. Access Date: 1 November 2024. <https://www.canada.ca/en/border-services-agency/news/2024/10/importers-now-benefiting-from-new-accounting-system-for-the-collection-of-duties-and-taxes-for-commercial-goods.html>

⁷⁴³ Canada-Republic of Korea Foreign and Defence (2+2) Ministerial Meeting joint statement, Global Affairs Canada (Ottawa) 1 November 2024. Access Date: 10 December 2024. <https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2024/11/canada-republic-of-korea-foreign-and-defence-22-ministerial-meeting-joint-statement.html>

In their joint statement, they condemned actions by other states to support Russia's invasion of Ukraine through the transfer dual-use items.

On 26 November 2024, G7 foreign ministers issued a statement that called for China to end the export of dual-use materials to Russia, and for all states to end dual-use material exports to Myanmar.⁷⁴⁴ The ministers addressed also Russia's veto on the renewal of the mandate of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1718 Committee Panel of Experts on North Korea Sanctions, as well as the dangers presented by the possible transfer of ballistic and nuclear missile technology to the North Korea by Russia.

On 15 February 2025, G7 foreign ministers issued a statement at the margins of the Munich Security Conference, condemning the provision to Russia of dual-use materials by China and the continued provision of military assistance by North Korea and Iran.⁷⁴⁵

On 7 March 2025, Canada announced additional sanctions against Iran under the Special Economic Measures (Iran) Regulations.⁷⁴⁶ These sanctions target Iranian individuals and entities involved in human rights violations and destabilizing activities in the Middle East, such as procurement networks that support weapons production, including for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. This action aligns with similar measures taken by Canada's allies, including the US, the UK, and the EU, recognizing the importance of MECRs and Canada's role in preventing the transfer of controlled materials and technologies.

On 14 March 2025, the G7 foreign ministers met in Charlevoix to reaffirm their commitments to non-proliferation.⁷⁴⁷ This included condemning China's provision of weapons and dual-use components to Russia for use in the war against Ukraine. The leaders' emphasized the importance of international rules and norms for protecting global security.

Canada has fully complied with its commitment to strengthen effective export controls on materials, technology, and research that could be used for military purposes in a way that keeps pace with rapid technological developments and recognizes the central role of multilateral export control regimes as a key non-proliferation instrument and safeguard for international peace and security. Canada has taken strong action towards strengthening its export controls by amending the ECL to include more recent technological developments and weak action in co-signing the Washington Summit Declaration. The ECL amendment also demonstrates a commitment to Canadian regulations to meet and surpass MECR standards. Canada has modernized its customs infrastructure by installing the CBSA Assessment and Revenue Management Client Portal, which streamlines import operations and improves compliance while investing in military capabilities. These actions signal Canada's dedication to robust export controls on dual-use goods. Canada's participation at the Asia Senior-Level Talks on Non-Proliferation and advancement of export controls recognizes the central role of MECRs.

Thus, Canada receives a score of +1.

Analyst: Mehek Berry

⁷⁴⁴ G7 Foreign Ministers' Meeting Statement, G7 Information Centre (Fiuggi – Anagni) 26 November 2024. Access Date: 11 December 2024. <https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/foreign/241126-statement.html>

⁷⁴⁵ Joint G7 Foreign Ministers' Statement - Meeting of G7 Foreign Ministers on the margins of the Munich Security Conference, the Federal Foreign Office (Berlin) 15 February 2025. Access Date: 7 April 2025. <https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/foreign/250215-statement.html>

⁷⁴⁶ Minister Joly announces additional sanctions against Iran (Ottawa) 3 March 2025. Access Date: 6 April 2025. <https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2025/03/minister-joly-announces-additional-sanctions-against-iran.html>

⁷⁴⁷ Joint Statement of the G7 Foreign Ministers' Meeting in Charlevoix, G7 Information Centre (Toronto) 14 March 2025. Access Date: 7 April 2025. <https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/foreign/250314-statement.html>

France: +1

France has fully complied with its commitment to strengthen effective export controls on materials, technology, and research that could be used for military purposes in a way that keeps pace with rapid technological developments and recognizes the central role of multilateral export control regimes as a key non-proliferation instrument and safeguard for international peace and security.

On 15 June 2024, France released a joint statement with the governments of Germany and the United Kingdom condemning Iran's nuclear programme expansion.⁷⁴⁸ France denounced Iran's increased uranium enrichment and advanced centrifuge use, warning of significant proliferation risks and urged Iran to fulfil its Non-Proliferation Treaty obligations.

On 24 June 2024, Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs Jean-Noël Barrot and the Council of the European Union announced its Fourteenth package of sanctions against Russia.⁷⁴⁹ The European Union added 61 entities to its export restriction list for supporting Russia's military-industrial complex, with the expanded sanctions and restrictions targeting dual-use goods and technologies, including machine tools, chemicals, and helium imports.

On 29 June 2024, Minister Barrot and the Council of the European Union adopted additional restrictive measures against Belarus to closer align them with the sanctions on Russia and address circumvention issues.⁷⁵⁰ The Council extended the export ban to include restrictions on additional dual-use goods, professional services, and transport. Furthermore, the Council will require EU exporters to contractually prohibit the re-exportation of sensitive goods to Belarus.

On 10 July 2024, the Washington Summit Declaration issued at North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) summit condemned Russia's nuclear posturing and expressed concern over Russia's increasing violations of arms control agreements and nuclear safety standards.⁷⁵¹ The declaration called on the People's Republic of China to cease all material and political support to Russia's war effort and introduce export controls on dual-use items. The declaration reaffirmed members' commitment to nuclear deterrence as essential to NATO security while encouraging arms control and non-proliferation efforts as essential to ensuring strategic stability. France is a NATO member.

On 10 September 2024, France released a joint statement with the governments of Germany and the United Kingdom condemning Iran's exports of ballistic missiles to Russia.⁷⁵² France announced it will proceed with canceling bilateral air service agreements with Iran, designating entities and individuals involved in the missile transfer, and imposing sanctions on Iran Air. France reaffirmed its commitment to working with European and international partners on the non-proliferation of weapons provided to Russia for its war against Ukraine.

⁷⁴⁸ Iran's further expansion of its nuclear programme: joint statement by France, Germany and the UK, the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (London) 15 June 2024. Access Date: 26 September 2024.

<https://www.gov.uk/government/news/iran-joint-statement-by-france-germany-and-united-kingdom>

⁷⁴⁹ Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine: comprehensive EU's 14th package of sanctions cracks down on circumvention and adopts energy measures, the Council of the European Union (Brussels), 24 June 2024. Access Date: 27 September 2024.

<https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/06/24/russia-s-war-of-aggression-against-ukraine-comprehensive-eu-s-14th-package-of-sanctions-cracks-down-on-circumvention-and-adopts-energy-measures/>

⁷⁵⁰ Belarus' involvement in Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine: new EU restrictive measures target trade, services, transport and anti-circumvention (Brussels) 29 June 2024. Access Date: 28 October 2024.

<https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/06/29/belarus-involvement-in-russia-s-war-of-aggression-against-ukraine-new-eu-restrictive-measures-target-trade-services-transport-and-anti-circumvention/>

⁷⁵¹ Washington Summit Declaration, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Brussels) 10 July 2024. Access Date: 26 September 2024. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_227678.htm

⁷⁵² Iran - Transfers of Ballistic Missiles to Russia - Statement by the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany and the United Kingdom (Paris) 10 September 2024. Access Date: 28 October 2024. <https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/iran/news/article/iran-transfers-of-ballistic-missiles-to-russia-statement-by-the-foreign>

On 23 September 2024, France jointly established the Friends of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), a group of countries that advocates for a treaty ban on the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons.⁷⁵³ The FMCT includes Australia, Brazil, Canada, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Nigeria, the Philippines, the United Kingdom and the United States.

On 24 September 2024, Minister Barrot urged all countries, particularly Iran and North Korea, to refrain from exporting weapons, dual-use goods, and military components to Russia during the UN Security Council Ministerial Meeting on Ukraine.⁷⁵⁴ Minister Barrot condemned Iran's sale of ballistic missiles to Russia, noting how it constitutes escalation and a threat to European security.

On 24 September 2024, the G7 issued joint guidance for industry on preventing the evasion of export controls and sanctions imposed on Russia.⁷⁵⁵ This document includes key risk indicators for sanctions circumvention and offers recommendations on best practices for compliance.

On 24 September 2024, France, along with 28 other countries, participated in the Exercise Pacific Protector 24 under the Proliferation Security Initiative by Australia.⁷⁵⁶ The exercise enhanced cooperation in non-proliferation export measures and security measures.

On 4 October 2024, France participated in the 19th edition of the Asia Senior-Level Talks on Non-Proliferation.⁷⁵⁷ The talks, hosted by Japan for officials from various members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and interested states from outside Asia, emphasized topics such as bolstering export controls across all countries.

On 18 November 2024, Minister Barrot and the Council of the European Union announced expanded export restrictions on Iran due to the country's military support to Russia's war against Ukraine.⁷⁵⁸ These widened measures include a prohibition on the export, transfer, supply, or sale from the EU to Iran of components used in the development and production of missiles and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles.

On 24 November 2024, the Finance Ministry's Directorate-General for Enterprise submitted to Parliament its annual report on France's dual-use goods exports during the 2023 calendar year.⁷⁵⁹ The report describes France's multi-agency export control process, and notes that France approved export licenses for up to EUR11.1 billion worth of potential dual-use goods in 2023, a 26 per cent increase from the previous year.

⁷⁵³ Joint Statement on the Friends of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, U.S. Department of State (Washington) 23 September 2024. Access Date: 12 November 2024. <https://www.state.gov/joint-statement-on-the-friends-of-a-fissile-material-cut-off-treaty/>

⁷⁵⁴ Address by Jean-Noël Barrot Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs UN Security Council Ministerial Meeting on Ukraine at the United Nations Security Council (New York) 24 September 2024. Access Date: 28 October 2024. <https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/france-and-the-united-nations/news-and-events/news/article/address-by-jean-noel-barrot-minister-for-europe-and-foreign-affairs-un-security>

⁷⁵⁵ Preventing Russian Export Control & Sanctions Evasion Guidance, the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action (Berlin) 24 September 2024. Access Date: 1 November 2024. <https://www.bmwk.de/Redaktion/DE/Downloads/G/g7-guidance-for-industry-preventing-russian-export-control-and-sanctions-evasion.pdf>

⁷⁵⁶ Exercise Specific Protector Kicks Off, Australian Government Defence (Canberra) 24 September 2024. Access Date: 12 November 2024. <https://www.defence.gov.au/news-events/releases/2024-09-24/exercise-pacific-protector-kicks>

⁷⁵⁷ The 19th Asia Senior-Level Talks on Non-Proliferation (ASTOP), Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Tokyo) 4 October 2024. Access Date: 11 December 2024. https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/pressite_000001_00626.html

⁷⁵⁸ Iran: EU widens restrictive measures in view of Iran support of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine and lists one individual and four entities, Council of the European Union (Brussels) 18 November 2024. Access Date: 11 December 2024. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/11/18/iran-eu-widens-restrictive-measures-in-view-of-iran-support-of-the-russian-war-of-aggression-against-ukraine-and-lists-one-individual-and-four-entities/>

⁷⁵⁹ Les exportations des biens à double usage de la France, Ministère de l'Économie, des finances et de l'Industrie (Paris) 24 November 2024. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 10 December 2024. <https://www.entreprises.gouv.fr/la-dge/publications/les-exportations-des-biens-double-usage-de-la-france>

On 26 November 2024, G7 foreign ministers issued a statement that called for China to end the export of dual-use materials to Russia, and for all states to end dual-use material exports to Myanmar.⁷⁶⁰ The ministers addressed also Russia's veto on the renewal of the mandate of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1718 Committee Panel of Experts on North Korea Sanctions, as well as the dangers presented by the possible transfer of ballistic and nuclear missile technology to the North Korea by Russia.

On 9 December 2024, France, Germany and the United Kingdom condemned Iran's escalation of its nuclear program particularly its actions at the Fordow facility.⁷⁶¹ They expressed concern and urged Iran to reverse its actions and its nuclear escalation.

On 17 December 2024, the French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs and Ministry of the Armed Forces and the US Department of State and Department of Defense co-chaired the third US-France Defense Trade Strategic Dialogue (DTSG) in Paris.⁷⁶² The DTSG included updates from working groups on export regulations and international export regimes. Representatives reaffirmed their commitment to close coordination on international armaments issues, including identifying measures to improve export control efficiency and effectiveness.

On 17 December 2024, the Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs issued a joint statement alongside the German Federal Foreign Office and the United Kingdom Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, pertaining to non-proliferation in Iran and the implementation Of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231(2015).⁷⁶³

On 23 December 2024, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a joint statement alongside the United Kingdom Foreign Office and the German Federal Foreign Office on the IAEA Board of Governors Resolution on Iran, underscoring the critical role played by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Safeguards Agreement in establishing the civilian nature of nuclear programs in the country.⁷⁶⁴

On 14 February 2025, Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs Director for Strategic Affairs, Security and Disarmament Guillaume Ollangier met with Indian External Affairs Ministry official Muanpuui Saiawi to discuss the state of disarmament and non-proliferation.⁷⁶⁵ The officials also affirmed India and France's respective obligations as Multilateral Export Control Regime members.

⁷⁶⁰ G7 Foreign Ministers' Meeting Statement, G7 Information Centre (Fiuggi – Anagni) 26 November 2024. Access Date: 11 December 2024. <https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/foreign/241126-statement.html>

⁷⁶¹ Iran's Further Escalation of Its Nuclear Programme: Joint Statement by France, Germany and the UK, Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (London) 9 December 2024. Access Date: 24 January 2025. <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/irans-further-escalation-of-its-nuclear-programme-joint-statement-by-france-germany-and-the-uk>

⁷⁶² Third Defense Trade Strategic Dialogue (DTSG) Between the United States and France, Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs (Paris) 17 December 2024. Access Date: 15 February 2025. <https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/security-disarmament-and-non-proliferation/news/2024/article/third-defense-trade-strategic-dialogue-dtsg-between-the-united-states-and>

⁷⁶³ Joint Statement by France, Germany, United Kingdom on Non-Proliferation, Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs (Paris) 10 September 2024. Access Date: 28 October 2024. <https://onu.delegfrance.org/iran-joint-statement-by-france-germany-united-kingdom-on-non-proliferation>

⁷⁶⁴ Joint Statement by France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States on the IAEA Board of Governors Resolution on Iran, Federal Foreign Office (Berlin) 23 November 2024. Access Date: 17 February 2025. <https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/newsroom/news/2686318-2686318>

⁷⁶⁵ India-France Bilateral Dialogue on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, Paris (February 14, 2025), Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India (New Delhi) 14 February 2025. Access Date: 6 March 2025. https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/39073/IndiaFrance_Bilateral_Dialogue_on_Disarmament_and_NonProliferation_Paris_February_14_2025

On 15 February 2025, G7 foreign ministers issued a statement at the margins of the Munich Security Conference, condemning the provision to Russia of dual-use materials by China and the continued provision of military assistance by North Korea and Iran.⁷⁶⁶

On 24 February 2025, the sixteenth Sanctions Package against Russia took effect in France, following the agreement upon the extensions of sanctions by the Council of the European Union, thereby imposing stricter export restrictions with regard to dual-use items and with a specific focus on chemical precursors and industrial machinery.⁷⁶⁷

On 24 February 2025, France took part in the Conference on Disarmament, issuing a joint statement with other EU member states regarding a variety of proliferation related topics, including the escalatory role that material deliveries to Russia in the form of dual-use goods have played in the war in Ukraine.⁷⁶⁸

On 14 March 2025, the G7 foreign ministers met in Charlevoix to reaffirm their commitments to non-proliferation.⁷⁶⁹ This included condemning China's provision of weapons and dual-use components to Russia for use in the war against Ukraine. The leaders' emphasized the importance of international rules and norms for protecting global security.

France has fully complied with its commitment to strengthen effective export controls on materials, technology, and research that could be used for military purposes in a way that keeps pace with rapid technological developments and recognizes the central role of multilateral export control regimes as a key non-proliferation instrument and safeguard for international peace and security. France has signed multiple statements that demonstrate a commitment to non-proliferation and effective export controls on dual-use goods. France's participation at the Asia Senior-Level Talks on Non-Proliferation and the Exercise Pacific Protector 24, their co-chairing of the DTSG as well as their advancement of export controls at those forums recognizes the central role of MECRs.

Thus, France receives a score of +1.

Analyst: Jeanne Brownnewell

Germany: +1

Germany has fully complied with its commitment to strengthen effective export controls on materials, technology, and research that could be used for military purposes in a way that keeps pace with rapid technological developments and recognizes the central role of multilateral export control regimes as a key non-proliferation instrument and safeguard for international peace and security.

On 15 June 2024, Germany released a joint statement with the governments of France and the United Kingdom condemning Iran's nuclear programme expansion.⁷⁷⁰ Germany denounced Iran's increased uranium enrichment and advanced centrifuge use, warning of significant proliferation risks and urged Iran to fulfil its Non-Proliferation Treaty obligations.

⁷⁶⁶ Joint G7 Foreign Ministers' Statement - Meeting of G7 Foreign Ministers on the margins of the Munich Security Conference, G7 Information Centre (Toronto) 15 February 2025. Access Date: 7 April 2025. <https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/foreign/250215-statement.html>

⁷⁶⁷ New package of sanctions against Russia, the Federal Foreign Office (Berlin) 24 February 2025. Access Date: 7 April 2025. <https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-en/federal-government/eu-sanctions-2336106>

⁷⁶⁸ Conference on Disarmament - 2025 HLS - Joint Statement, EU Delegation to the UN (Geneva) 24 February 2025. Access Date: 7 April 2025. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/un-geneva/conference-disarmament-2025-hls-joint-statement_en

⁷⁶⁹ Joint Statement of the G7 Foreign Ministers' Meeting in Charlevoix, G7 Information Centre (Toronto) 14 March 2025. Access Date: 7 April 2025. <https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/foreign/250314-statement.html>

⁷⁷⁰ Iran's further expansion of its nuclear programme: joint statement by France, Germany and the UK, the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (London) 15 June 2024. Access Date: 26 September 2024. <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/iran-joint-statement-by-france-germany-and-united-kingdom>

On 24 June 2024, Minister of Foreign Affairs Annalena Baerbock and the Council of the European Union announced its fourteenth package of sanctions against Russia.⁷⁷¹ The European Union added 61 entities to its export restriction list for supporting Russia's military-industrial complex, with the expanded sanctions and restrictions targeting dual-use goods and technologies, including machine tools, chemicals, and helium imports.

On 29 June 2024, Minister Baerbock and the Council of the European Union adopted additional restrictive measures against Belarus to closer align them with the sanctions on Russia and address circumvention issues.⁷⁷² The Council extended the export ban to include restrictions on additional dual-use goods, professional services, and transport. Furthermore, the Council will require EU exporters to contractually prohibit the re-exportation of sensitive goods to Belarus.

On 10 July 2024, the Washington Summit Declaration issued at North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) summit condemned Russia's nuclear posturing and expressed concern over Russia's increasing violations of arms control agreements and nuclear safety standards.⁷⁷³ The declaration called on the People's Republic of China to cease all material and political support to Russia's war effort and introduce export controls on dual-use items. The declaration reaffirmed members' commitment to nuclear deterrence as essential to NATO security while encouraging arms control and non-proliferation efforts as essential to ensuring strategic stability. Germany is a NATO member.

On 23 July 2024, the Bundestag passed the 21st amendment to the German Foreign Trade and Payments Ordinance.⁷⁷⁴ The amendment establishes additions to Germany's National Controls List (NCL) for dual-use goods, extending beyond existing European Union export control policies to include limits on the export of research and materials relating to emerging technologies.

On 10 September 2024, Germany released a joint statement with the governments of France and the United Kingdom condemning Iran's exports of ballistic missiles to Russia.⁷⁷⁵ Germany announced it will proceed with canceling bilateral air service agreements with Iran, designating entities and individuals involved in the missile transfer, and imposing sanctions on Iran Air. Germany reaffirmed its commitment to working with European and international partners on the non-proliferation of weapons provided to Russia for its war against Ukraine.

On 23 September 2024, Germany jointly established the Friends of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), a group of countries that advocates for a treaty ban on the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons.⁷⁷⁶ The FMCT includes Australia, Brazil, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Nigeria, the Philippines, the United Kingdom and the United States.

On 24 September 2024, the German Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action, alongside other G7 members, issued joint guidance for industry on preventing the evasion of export controls and sanctions

⁷⁷¹ Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine: comprehensive EU's 14th package of sanctions cracks down on circumvention and adopts energy measures, the Council of the European Union (Brussels), 24 June 2024. Access Date: 27 September 2024.

<https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/06/24/russia-s-war-of-aggression-against-ukraine-comprehensive-eu-s-14th-package-of-sanctions-cracks-down-on-circumvention-and-adopts-energy-measures/>

⁷⁷² Belarus' involvement in Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine: new EU restrictive measures target trade, services, transport and anti-circumvention (Brussels) 29 June 2024. Access Date: 28 October 2024.

<https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/06/29/belarus-involvement-in-russia-s-war-of-aggression-against-ukraine-new-eu-restrictive-measures-target-trade-services-transport-and-anti-circumvention/>

⁷⁷³ Washington Summit Declaration, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Brussels) 10 July 2024. Access Date: 26 September 2024. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_227678.htm

⁷⁷⁴ Twenty-first Ordinance amending the Foreign Trade and Payments Ordinance, the German Bundestag (Berlin) 23 July 2024. Access Date: 1 November 2024. <https://dservet.bundestag.de/btd/20/126/2012685.pdf>

⁷⁷⁵ Iran - Transfers of Ballistic Missiles to Russia - Statement by the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany and the United Kingdom (Paris) 10 September 2024. Access Date: 28 October 2024. <https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/iran/news/article/iran-transfers-of-ballistic-missiles-to-russia-statement-by-the-foreign>

⁷⁷⁶ Joint Statement on the Friends of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, U.S. Department of State (Washington) 23 September 2024. Access Date: 12 November 2024. <https://www.state.gov/joint-statement-on-the-friends-of-a-fissile-material-cut-off-treaty/>

imposed on Russia.⁷⁷⁷ This document includes key risk indicators for sanctions circumvention and offers recommendations on best practices for compliance.

On 24 September 2024, Germany, along with 28 other countries participated in the Exercise Pacific Protector 24 under the Proliferation Security Initiative by Australia.⁷⁷⁸ The exercise enhanced cooperation in non-proliferation export measures and security measures.

On 4 October 2024, Germany participated in the 19th edition of the Asia Senior-Level Talks on Non-Proliferation.⁷⁷⁹ The talks, hosted by Japan for officials from various members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and interested states from outside Asia, emphasized topics such as bolstering export controls across all countries.

On 9 October 2024, Deputy Permanent Representative of Germany at the United Nations Thomas Zahneisen delivered a statement during the 1540 Committee Open Briefing, underscoring the Federal Office for Economic Affairs and Export Controls (BAFA) role in Multilateral Export Control Regimes (MECR).⁷⁸⁰ Deputy Representative Zahneisen highlighted BAFA's efforts as the convener of the Wiesbaden Process and the Erlangen Initiative, established to enhance cooperation in research-related export controls.

On 30 October 2024, the Federal Office for Economic Affairs and Export Control co-chaired the first regional conference of the Erlangen Initiative, held in Singapore.⁷⁸¹ The conference aimed to bolster regional cooperation on research and academia's role in supporting United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540.

On 18 November 2024, Minister Baerbock and the Council of the European Union announced expanded export restrictions on Iran due to the country's military support to Russia's war against Ukraine.⁷⁸² These widened measures include a prohibition on the export, transfer, supply, or sale from the EU to Iran of components used in the development and production of missiles and uncrewed aerial vehicles.

On 26 November 2024, G7 foreign ministers called for China to end the export of dual-use materials to Russia, and for all states to end dual-use material exports to Myanmar.⁷⁸³

On 29 November 2024, G7 foreign ministers released a joint declaration that addressed Russia's veto on the renewal of the mandate of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1718 Committee Panel of Experts

⁷⁷⁷ Preventing Russian Export Control & Sanctions Evasion Guidance, the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action (Berlin) 24 September 2024. Access Date: 1 November 2024. <https://www.bmwk.de/Redaktion/DE/Downloads/G/g7-guidance-for-industry-preventing-russian-export-control-and-sanctions-evasion.pdf>

⁷⁷⁸ Exercise Specific Protector Kicks Off, Australian Government Defence (Canberra) 24 September 2024. Access Date: 12 November 2024. <https://www.defence.gov.au/news-events/releases/2024-09-24/exercise-pacific-protector-kicks>

⁷⁷⁹ The 19th Asia Senior-Level Talks on Non-Proliferation (ASTOP), Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Tokyo) 4 October 2024. Access Date: 11 December 2024. https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/pressite_000001_00626.html

⁷⁸⁰ Statement by Germany During the 1540 Committee Open Briefing, the Federal Foreign Office (Berlin) 9 October 2024. Access Date: 1 November 2024. <https://new-york-un.diplo.de/un-en/-/2679358>

⁷⁸¹ Regional Industry Outreach Conference in Singapore, the Federal Foreign Office (Berlin) 30 October 2024. Access Date: 1 November 2024. <https://disarmament.unoda.org/update/regional-industry-outreach-conference-for-central-asia-and-neighbouring-states/>

⁷⁸² Iran: EU widens restrictive measures in view of Iran support of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine and lists one individual and four entities, Council of the European Union (Brussels) 18 November 2024. Access Date: 11 December 2024. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/11/18/iran-eu-widens-restrictive-measures-in-view-of-iran-support-of-the-russian-war-of-aggression-against-ukraine-and-lists-one-individual-and-four-entities/>

⁷⁸³ G7 Foreign Ministers' Meeting Statement G7 Information Centre (Fiuggi – Anagni) 26 November 2024. Access Date: 11 December 2024. <https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/foreign/241126-statement.html>

on North Korea Sanctions, as well as the dangers presented by the possible transfer of ballistic and nuclear missile technology to the North Korea by Russia.⁷⁸⁴

On 6 December 2024, the Ministry of Defence of Germany partook in the Combined Space Operations Initiative hosted by the Italian ministry of Defence in Florence, with Germany and other participating partners addressing their continued commitment to non-proliferation in space.⁷⁸⁵

On 9 December 2024, Germany, France and the UK condemned Iran's escalation of its nuclear program particularly its actions at the Fordow facility.⁷⁸⁶ They expressed concern and urged Iran to reverse its actions and its nuclear escalation.

On 13 December 2024, the Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action and the Office for Economic Affairs and Export Controls issued the 4th package of measures as part to streamline enforcement of export controls.⁷⁸⁷

On 17 December 2024, the Federal Foreign Office issued a joint statement alongside the United Kingdom Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office and the Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs of France, pertaining to non-proliferation in Iran and the implementation Of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231(2015).⁷⁸⁸

On 17 December 2024, the fifteenth Sanctions Package against Russia took effect in Germany, following the measures of the Council of the European Union Regulation (EU) 2024/3192.⁷⁸⁹ The new package imposes stricter export restrictions upon dual-use items listed in Annex I of the EU Dual-Use Regulation.

On 23 December 2024, the Federal Foreign Office released a joint statement alongside the United Kingdom Foreign Office and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of France on the International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors Resolution on Iran, underscoring the critical role played by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Safeguards Agreement in establishing the civilian nature of nuclear programs in the country.⁷⁹⁰

⁷⁸⁴ G7 Foreign Ministers' Meeting Statement, G7 Information Centre (Toronto) 29 November 2024. Access Date: 17 February 2025. <https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/foreign/241126-statement.html>

⁷⁸⁵ Space: Florence hosts the meeting of the Combined Space Operations Initiative, Ministry of Defence (Rome) 6 December 2024. Access Date: 24 March 2025, .<https://www.difesa.it/eng/primo-piano/space-florence-hosts-the-meeting-of-the-combined-space-operations-initiative/59641.html>

⁷⁸⁶ Iran's Further Escalation of Its Nuclear Programme: Joint Statement by France, Germany and the UK, Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (London) 9 December 2024. Access Date: 24 January 2025. <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/irans-further-escalation-of-its-nuclear-programme-joint-statement-by-france-germany-and-the-uk>

⁷⁸⁷ Export Control: 4th Package of Measures from BMWK and BAFA as Part of the Growth Initiative Makes Export Control Procedures More Digital, Faster and More Efficient, Federal Office for Economic Affairs and Export Control (Berlin) 13 December 2024. Access Date: 17 February 2025.

https://www.bafa.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/DE/Aussenwirtschaft/2024_14_massnahmenpaket4_bmwk_bafa.html

⁷⁸⁸ Joint Statement by France, Germany, United Kingdom on Non-Proliferation, Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs (Paris) 10 September 2024. Access Date: 28 October 2024. <https://onu.delegfrance.org/iran-joint-statement-by-france-germany-united-kingdom-on-non-proliferation>

⁷⁸⁹ Export control: 4th package of measures from BMWK and BAFA as part of the growth initiative makes export control procedures more digital, faster and more efficient, Federal Office for Economic Affairs and Export Control (Berlin) 13 December 2024. Access Date: 17 February 2025.

https://www.bafa.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/DE/Aussenwirtschaft/2024_14_massnahmenpaket4_bmwk_bafa.html

⁷⁹⁰ Joint Statement by France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States on the IAEA Board of Governors Resolution on Iran, Federal Foreign Office (Berlin) 23 November 2024. Access Date: 17 February 2025. <https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/newsroom/news/2686318-2686318>

On 15 February 2025, G7 foreign ministers issued a statement at the margins of the Munich Security Conference, condemning the provision to Russia of dual-use materials by China and the continued provision of military assistance by North Korea and Iran.⁷⁹¹

On 24 February 2025, the sixteenth Sanctions Package against Russia took effect in Germany, following the agreement upon the extensions of sanctions by the Council of the European Union, thereby imposing stricter export restrictions with regard to dual-use items with a specific focus on chemical precursors and industrial machinery.⁷⁹²

On 24 February 2025, Germany took part in the Conference on Disarmament, issuing a joint statement with other EU member states regarding a variety of proliferation related topics, including the escalatory role that material deliveries to Russia in the form of dual-use goods have played in the war in Ukraine.⁷⁹³

On 14 March 2025, the G7 foreign ministers met in Charlevoix to reaffirm their commitments to non-proliferation.⁷⁹⁴ This included condemning China's provision of weapons and dual-use components to Russia for use in the war against Ukraine. The leaders' emphasized the importance of international rules and norms for protecting global security.

Germany has fully complied with its commitment to strengthen effective export controls on materials, technology, and research that could be used for military purposes in a way that keeps pace with rapid technological developments and recognizes the central role of multilateral export control regimes as a key non-proliferation instrument and safeguard for international peace and security. Germany demonstrated strong action towards strengthening its export controls by amending its NCL to include emerging technologies. Furthermore, Germany demonstrated additional action in co-signing the G7 joint guidance for industry and issuing multiple guidance papers and statements. Germany's participation at the Asia Senior-Level Talks on Non-Proliferation and the Exercise Pacific Protector 24 as well as their advancement of export controls at those forums recognizes the central role of MECRs.

Thus, Germany receives a score of +1.

Analyst: Lorenzo Songsare Shevy

Italy: +1

Italy has fully complied with its commitment to strengthen effective export controls on materials, technology, and research that could be used for military purposes in a way that keeps pace with rapid technological developments and recognizes the central role of multilateral export control regimes as a key non-proliferation instrument and safeguard for international peace and security.

On 24 June 2024, Minister of Foreign Affairs Antonio Tajani and the Council of the European Union announced its Fourteenth package of sanctions against Russia.⁷⁹⁵ The European Union added 61 entities to its

⁷⁹¹ Joint G7 Foreign Ministers' Statement - Meeting of G7 Foreign Ministers on the margins of the Munich Security Conference, G7 Information Centre (Toronto) 15 February 2025. Access Date: 7 April 2025. <https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/foreign/250215-statement.html>

⁷⁹² New package of sanctions against Russia, the Federal Foreign Office (Berlin) 24 February 2025. Access Date: 7 April 2025. <https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-en/federal-government/eu-sanctions-2336106>

⁷⁹³ Conference on Disarmament - 2025 HLS - Joint Statement, EU Delegation to the UN (Geneva) 24 February 2025. Access Date: 7 April 2025. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/un-geneva/conference-disarmament-2025-hls-joint-statement_en

⁷⁹⁴ Joint Statement of the G7 Foreign Ministers' Meeting in Charlevoix, G7 Information Centre (Toronto) 14 March 2025. Access Date: 7 April 2025. <https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/foreign/250314-statement.html>

⁷⁹⁵ Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine: comprehensive EU's 14th package of sanctions cracks down on circumvention and adopts energy measures, the Council of the European Union (Brussels), 24 June 2024. Access Date: 27 September 2024. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/06/24/russia-s-war-of-aggression-against-ukraine-comprehensive-eu-s-14th-package-of-sanctions-cracks-down-on-circumvention-and-adopts-energy-measures/>

export restriction list for supporting Russia's military-industrial complex, with the expanded sanctions and restrictions targeting dual-use goods and technologies, including machine tools, chemicals, and helium imports.

On 29 June 2024, Minister Tajani the Council of the European Union adopted additional restrictive measures against Belarus to closer align them with the sanctions on Russia and address circumvention issues.⁷⁹⁶ The Council extended the export ban to include restrictions on additional dual-use goods, professional services, and transport. Furthermore, the Council will require EU exporters to contractually prohibit the re-exportation of sensitive goods to Belarus.

On 1 July 2024, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation published a decree establishing a National Controls List for dual-use goods, extending beyond existing European Union dual-use export controls policies.⁷⁹⁷ The National Controls List includes restrictions on various dual-use technologies, including quantum computing technologies and semiconductors.⁷⁹⁸

On 24 July 2024, the Chamber of Deputies and Senate of the Republic of Italy, under the Nineteenth Legislature, published the policy guidelines for the European Commission for 2024-2029.⁷⁹⁹ Within these guidelines the legislature emphasized economic security as a key priority and highlighted the need for a coordinated approach to export controls.

On 23 September 2024, Minister Tajani delivered a statement on dual-use restrictions during the G7 ministerial meeting on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly's High-Level Week.⁸⁰⁰ At this ministerial meeting, Minister Tajani called on China to cease the transfer of dual-use materials to Russia, particularly those acting as inputs for Russia's defense sector.

On 23 September 2024, Italy jointly established the Friends of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), a group of countries that advocates for a treaty ban on the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons.⁸⁰¹ The FMCT includes Australia, Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Nigeria, the Philippines, the United Kingdom and the United States.

On 24 September 2024, the G7 issued joint guidance for industry on preventing the evasion of export controls and sanctions imposed on Russia.⁸⁰² This document includes key risk indicators for sanctions circumvention and offers recommendations on best practices for compliance.

⁷⁹⁶ Belarus' involvement in Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine: new EU restrictive measures target trade, services, transport and anti-circumvention (Brussels) 29 June 2024. Access Date: 28 October 2024.

<https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/06/29/belarus-involvement-in-russia-s-war-of-aggression-against-ukraine-new-eu-restrictive-measures-target-trade-services-transport-and-anti-circumvention/>

⁷⁹⁷ Decreta, Istituzione dell'Elenco nazionale di controllo, Ministero degli Affari Esteri e della Cooperazione Internazionale (Rome) 1 July 2024. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 29 September 2024. <https://www.esteri.it/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/Istituzione-dellelenco-nazionale-di-controllo.pdf>

⁷⁹⁸ Allegato A, Decreta, Istituzione dell'Elenco nazionale di controllo, Ministero degli Affari Esteri e della Cooperazione Internazionale (Rome) 1 July 2024. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 29 September 2024. <https://www.esteri.it/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/allegato-A.pdf>

⁷⁹⁹ Policy Guidelines for the European Commission 2024-2029, the Chamber of Deputies and Senate of the Republic (Rome) 24 July 2024. Access Date: 1 November 2024. <https://documenti.camera.it/leg19/dossier/pdf/AT030.pdf>

⁸⁰⁰ Statement on Dual-Use Restrictions at G7 Ministerial, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation (Rome) 23 September 2024. Access Date: 1 November 2024. https://www.esteri.it/it/sala_stamp/archivionotizie/comunicati/2024/09/statement-by-antonio-tajani-minister-for-foreign-affairs-and-international-cooperation-of-italy-in-his-capacity-as-chair-of-the-g7-foreign-ministers-meeting-at-the-high-level-week-of-the-un/

⁸⁰¹ Joint Statement on the Friends of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, U.S. Department of State (Washington) 23 September 2024. Access Date: 12 November 2024. <https://www.state.gov/joint-statement-on-the-friends-of-a-fissile-material-cut-off-treaty>

⁸⁰² Preventing Russian Export Control & Sanctions Evasion Guidance, the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action (Berlin) 24 September 2024. Access Date: 1 November 2024. <https://www.bmwk.de/Redaktion/DE/Downloads/G/g7-guidance-for-industry-preventing-russian-export-control-and-sanctions-evasion.pdf>

On 24 September 2024, Italy, along with 28 other countries participated in the Exercise Pacific Protector 24 under the Proliferation Security Initiative by Australia.⁸⁰³ The exercise enhanced cooperation in non-proliferation export measures and security measures.

On 9 October 2024, Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni issued Legislative Decree No. 103 of 12 June 2024, to simplify controls on economic activities.⁸⁰⁴ The decree, which entered into law on 2 August 2024 also pertains to the simplification of export related controls of economic activities.

On 20 October 2024, the Ministry of Economy and Finance issued the draft state budget for the fiscal period 2025-2027, which increases the budget for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation's National Authority for Export Control of Armament and Dual-Use Materials (UAMA) from fiscal period 2025 to 2026.⁸⁰⁵

On 18 November 2024, Minister Tajani and the Council of the European Union announced expanded export restrictions on Iran due to the country's military support to Russia's war against Ukraine.⁸⁰⁶ These widened measures include a prohibition on the export, transfer, supply, or sale from the EU to Iran of components used in the development and production of missiles and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles.

On 26 November 2024, G7 foreign ministers called for China to end the export of dual-use materials to Russia, and for all states to end dual-use material exports to Myanmar.⁸⁰⁷ Their declaration also addressed Russia's veto on the renewal of the mandate of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1718 Committee Panel of Experts on North Korea Sanctions, as well as the proliferatory dangers presented by the possible transfer of ballistic and nuclear missile technology to the North Korea by Russia.

On 29 November 2024, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defense opened the second Italian Forum on Export Controls.⁸⁰⁸ This forum, focused on the defense industry, was a conference of key stakeholders focused on improving public-private dialogue on the development, maintenance and enforcement of export controls.

On 29 November 2024, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defense opened the second Italian Forum on Export Controls.⁸⁰⁹ This forum, focused on the defence industry, was a conference of key

⁸⁰³ Exercise Specific Protector Kicks Off, Australian Government Defence (Canberra) 24 September 2024. Access Date: 12 November 2024. <https://www.defence.gov.au/news-events/releases/2024-09-24/exercise-pacific-protector-kicks>

⁸⁰⁴ Legislative Decree No. 103 Simplifying Controls on Economic Activities, the President of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Italy (Rome) 12 July 2024. Access Date: 1 November 2024. <https://www.normattiva.it/uri-res/N2Ls?urn:nir:stato:decreto.legislativo:2024-07-12;103%lgv>

⁸⁰⁵ Integrative Note to the Budget Draft for 2025-2027, the Ministry of Economy and Finance (Rome) 20 October 2024. Access Date: 1 November 2024. https://www.rgs.mef.gov.it/_Documenti/VERSIONE-I/attivita_istituzionali/formazione_e_gestione_del_bilancio/bilancio_di_previsione/bilancio_finanziario/2025-2027/DLB/DLB_2025_DLB-04-AT-060-Esteri.pdf

⁸⁰⁶ Iran: EU widens restrictive measures in view of Iran support of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine and lists one individual and four entities, Council of the European Union (Brussels) 18 November 2024. Access Date: 11 December 2024. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/11/18/iran-eu-widens-restrictive-measures-in-view-of-iran-support-of-the-russian-war-of-aggression-against-ukraine-and-lists-one-individual-and-four-entities/>

⁸⁰⁷ G7 Foreign Ministers' Meeting Statement, G7 Information Centre (Fiuggi – Anagni) 26 November 2024. Access Date: 11 December 2024. <https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/foreign/241126-statement.html>

⁸⁰⁸ Tajani e Crosetto aprono alla Farnesina il secondo "Forum italiano sul Controllo delle Esportazioni", Ministero degli Affari Esteri e della Cooperazione Internazionale (Rome) 29 November 2024. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 10 December 2024. https://www.esteri.it/it/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/comunicati/2024/11/tajani-e-crosetto-aprono-alla-farnesina-il-secondo-forum-italiano-sul-controllo-delle-esportazioni/

⁸⁰⁹ Tajani e Crosetto aprono alla Farnesina il secondo "Forum italiano sul Controllo delle Esportazioni", Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation (Rome) 29 November 2024. Translation provided by Google Translate. Access Date: 10 December 2024. https://www.esteri.it/it/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/comunicati/2024/11/tajani-e-crosetto-aprono-alla-farnesina-il-secondo-forum-italiano-sul-controllo-delle-esportazioni/

stakeholders focused on improving public-private dialogue on the development, maintenance and enforcement of export controls.

On 21 January 2025, Ambassador Leonardo Bencini assumed the Presidency of the Conference on Disarmament, whilst setting the focus of the Italian presidency on the topic areas of nuclear disarmament, the continued commitment of states to the non-militarisation of outer space, efforts towards a Fissile Materials Treaty and security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon states.⁸¹⁰

On 5 December 2024, Ambassador Debora Lepre chaired the 28th Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) Plenary meeting in Vienna.⁸¹¹ The Wassenaar Arrangement Plenary serves as the decision-making body for export controls on dual use goods.⁸¹²

On 6 December 2024, the Ministry of Defence of Italy hosted the Combined Space Operations Initiative in Florence, with Italy and other participating partners addressing their continued commitment to non-proliferation in space.⁸¹³

On 15 February 2025, G7 foreign ministers issued a statement at the margins of the Munich Security Conference, condemning the provision to Russia of dual-use materials by China and the continued provision of military assistance by North Korea and Iran.⁸¹⁴

On 24 February 2025, the sixteenth Sanctions Package against Russia took effect in Italy, following the agreement upon the extensions of sanctions by the Council of the European Union, thereby imposing stricter export restrictions with regard to dual-use items with a specific focus on chemical precursors and industrial machinery.⁸¹⁵

On 24 February 2025, Italy took part in the Conference on Disarmament, issuing a joint statement with other EU member states regarding a variety of proliferation related topics, including the escalatory role that material deliveries to Russia in the form of dual-use goods have played in the war in Ukraine.⁸¹⁶

On 14 March 2025, the G7 Foreign Ministers and the EU High Representative met in Charlevoix to reaffirm their commitments to non-proliferation.⁸¹⁷ This included condemning China's provision of weapons and dual-use components to Russia for use in the war against Ukraine. The leaders' emphasized the importance of international rules and norms for protecting global security.

⁸¹⁰ Italy assuming the Presidency of the Conference on Disarmament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation (Rome) 21 January 2025. Access Date: 17 February 2025. https://italiarappdisarmo.esteri.it/en/news/dalla_rappresentanza/2025/01/italy-assuming-the-presidency-of-the-conference-on-disarmament/

⁸¹¹ Statement Issued By The Plenary Chair On 2024 Outcomes Of The Wassenaar Arrangement On Export Controls For Conventional Arms And Dual-use Goods And Technologies, Wassenaar Arrangement (Vienna) 5 December 2024. Access Date: 17 February 2025. <https://www.wassenaar.org/app/uploads/2024/12/Chair-Statement-2024-Outcomes.pdf>

⁸¹² About us, The Wassenaar Arrangement (Vienna) n.d. Access Date: 10 May 2025. <https://www.wassenaar.org/about-us/>

⁸¹³ Space: Florence hosts the meeting of the Combined Space Operations Initiative, Ministry of Defence (Rome) 6 December 2024. Access Date: 24 March 2025. <https://www.difesa.it/eng/primo-piano/space-florence-hosts-the-meeting-of-the-combined-space-operations-initiative/59641.html>

⁸¹⁴ Joint G7 Foreign Ministers' Statement - Meeting of G7 Foreign Ministers on the margins of the Munich Security Conference, G7 Information Centre (Toronto) 15 February 2025. Access Date: 7 April 2025. <https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/foreign/250215-statement.html>

⁸¹⁵ New package of sanctions against Russia, the Federal Foreign Office (Berlin) 24 February 2025. Access Date: 7 April 2025. <https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-en/federal-government/eu-sanctions-2336106>

⁸¹⁶ Conference on Disarmament - 2025 HLS - Joint Statement, EU Delegation to the UN (Geneva) 24 February 2025. Access Date: 7 April 2025. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/un-geneva/conference-disarmament-2025-hls-joint-statement_en

⁸¹⁷ Joint Statement of the G7 Foreign Ministers' Meeting in Charlevoix, G7 Information Centre (Toronto) 14 March 2025. Access Date: 7 April 2025. <https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/foreign/250314-statement.html>

On 28 March 2025, Ambassador Bencini took part in the Global Conference on AI, Security and Ethics organised by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research Institute (UNIDIR) in Geneva.⁸¹⁸ In his discussions during the Conference, Ambassador Bencini underscored the importance non-proliferation in the emerging field of AI, which presents itself as a possible force multiplier for conventional methods of proliferation such as biological weapons.

Italy has fully complied with its commitment to strengthen effective export controls on materials, technology, and research that could be used for military purposes in a way that keeps pace with rapid technological developments and recognizes the central role of multilateral export control regimes as a key non-proliferation instrument and safeguard for international peace and security. Italy has taken strong action towards strengthening its export controls by increasing the funding of the UAMA, whilst also simplifying the implementation of economic restrictions through Legislative Decree No. 103 of 12 June 2024. Furthermore, The legislative changes and increases in UAMA funding demonstrates a commitment by Italian regulations to meet and surpass Multilateral Export Control Regime standards. Italy's participation at the Exercise Pacific Protector 24 as well as their advancement of export controls recognizes the central role of MECRs.

Thus, Italy receives a score of +1.

Analyst: Lorenzo Songsare Shery

Japan: +1

Japan has fully complied with its commitment to strengthen effective export controls on materials, technology, and research that could be used for military purposes in a way that keeps pace with rapid technological developments and recognizes the central role of multilateral export control regimes as a key non-proliferation instrument and safeguard for international peace and security.

On 17 June 2024, Japan and the United States held an Extended Deterrence Dialogue addressing nuclear development.⁸¹⁹ Both countries emphasized joint deterrence capabilities, and alliance preparedness.

On 26 June 2024, Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry Ken Saito met with United States Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo.⁸²⁰ At this meeting, in furtherance of the Japan-United States Commercial and Industrial Partnership, Minister Saito and Secretary Raimondo discussed further bilateral cooperation on export controls.

On 23 September 2024, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida stressed Japan's commitment to a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) as a feasible step toward a world without nuclear weapons.⁸²¹ In his remarks at the Friends of an FMCT High-Level Launch Meeting, he emphasized the importance of beginning treaty discussions to limit continued manufacturing of fissile material for nuclear weapons. The FMCT includes Australia, Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Nigeria, the Philippines, the United Kingdom and the United States.

⁸¹⁸ Unidir Global Conference: Reaffirming Multilateralism And Trust In The Age Of Artificial Intelligence, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation (Rome) 2 April 2025. Access Date: 8 April 2025. https://italiarappdisarmo.esteri.it/en/news/dalla_rappresentanza/2025/04/unidir-global-conference-reaffirming-multilateralism-and-trust-in-the-age-of-artificial-intelligence/

⁸¹⁹ US-Japan Extended Deterrence Dialogue, U.S. Department of State (Washington) 17 June 2024. Access Date: 12 November 2024. <https://www.state.gov/u-s-japan-extended-deterrence-dialogue-3/>

⁸²⁰ Minister Saito Holds the Fourth Japan-U.S. Commercial and Industrial Partnership (JUCIP) Ministerial Meeting with Ms. Gina M. Raimondo, United States Secretary of Commerce, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (Tokyo) 27 June 2024. Access Date: 29 September 2024. https://www.meti.go.jp/english/press/2024/0627_001.html

⁸²¹ Prime Minister Kishida attends the High-Level Launch Meeting of the Friends of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Tokyo) 23 September 2024. Access Date: 3 October 2024. https://www.mofa.go.jp/dns/ac_d/page4e_001472_00001.html

On 24 September 2024, Minister for Foreign Affairs Yoko Kamikawa emphasized Japan's commitment to advancing realistic and practical efforts toward a world free of nuclear weapons, particularly in light of the challenging international security climate.⁸²² Minister Kamikawa pushed for strengthening efforts to universalize the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and expedite its early entry into force.

On 24 September 2024, the G7 issued joint guidance for industry on preventing the evasion of export controls and sanctions imposed on Russia.⁸²³ This document includes key risk indicators for sanctions circumvention and offers recommendations on best practices for compliance.

On 24 September 2024, Japan, along with 28 other countries, participated in the Exercise Pacific Protector 24 under the Proliferation Security Initiative by Australia.⁸²⁴ The exercise enhanced cooperation in non-proliferation export measures and security measures.

On 4 October 2024, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs hosted the 19th edition of the Asia Senior-Level Talks on Non-Proliferation.⁸²⁵ Japanese officials engaged with participants, who were officials from various members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and interested states from outside Asia, on topics such as bolstering export controls across all countries.

On 28 October 2024, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry held a joint dialogue event with counterparts from China's Ministry of Commerce, on the topic of export controls.⁸²⁶ During this event, Japanese and Chinese officials discussed export control issues, promoting transparency and mutual understanding between governments and private-sector stakeholders.

On 30 October 2024, the Ministry of Economy, Technology and Industry issued a ministry ordinance outlining amendments to the regulations under the Foreign Exchange Order including seventeen and eighteen, focusing on transactions related to technology transfer and export controls.⁸²⁷ The amendments contain new rules specifying conditions for providing technical information related to the development, manufacture, or use of sensitive goods listed in Appendix I of the Export Trade Control Order. This includes manufacturing technologies that, if misused, could be adapted for nuclear or military applications.

On 26 November 2024, Foreign Minister Takeshi Iwaya released a joint Declaration alongside all other G7 Foreign Ministers.⁸²⁸ As part of the declaration, the ministers called for China to end the export of dual-use materials to Russia, and for all states to end dual-use material exports to Myanmar. The declaration also addressed Russia's veto on the renewal of the mandate of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1718 Committee Panel of Experts on North Korea Sanctions, as well as the proliferatory dangers presented by the possible transfer of ballistic and nuclear missile technology to the North Korea by Russia.

⁸²² Eleventh Ministerial Meeting of the Friends of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Tokyo) 25 September 2024. Access Date: 3 October 2024. https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/pressite_000001_00603.html

⁸²³ Preventing Russian Export Control & Sanctions Evasion Guidance, the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action (Berlin) 24 September 2024. Access Date: 1 November 2024. <https://www.bmwk.de/Redaktion/DE/Downloads/G/g7-guidance-for-industry-preventing-russian-export-control-and-sanctions-evasion.pdf>

⁸²⁴ Exercise Specific Protector Kicks Off, Australian Government Defence (Canberra) 24 September 2024. Access Date: 12 November 2024. <https://www.defence.gov.au/news-events/releases/2024-09-24/exercise-pacific-protector-kicks>

⁸²⁵ The 19th Asia Senior-Level Talks on Non-Proliferation (ASTOP), Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Tokyo) 4 October 2024. Access Date: 11 December 2024. https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/pressite_000001_00626.html

⁸²⁶ Third Meeting of the Japan-China Export Control Dialogue and Japan-China Joint Outreach Event Held, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (Tokyo) 30 October 2024. Access Date: 11 October 2024. https://www.meti.go.jp/english/press/2024/1030_001.html

⁸²⁷ Regarding amendments to the "Ministry Ordinance Partially Revising the Ministerial Ordinance on Trade-Related Non-Trade Transactions, etc.", Center for Information on Security Trade Control (Tokyo) 30 October 2024. Access Date: 27 December 2024. <https://www.cistec.or.jp/export/express/241030/241030.html>

⁸²⁸ G7 Foreign Ministers' Meeting Statement G7 Information Centre (Fiuggi – Anagni) 26 November 2024. Access Date: 11 December 2024. <https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/foreign/241126-statement.html>

On 3 December 2024, the Japanese Government called for the adoption of tangible measures based on the “Hiroshima Action Plan.”⁸²⁹ These measures include the enhancement of transparency measures, negotiations on the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, continuation of the non-use of nuclear weapons and disarmament and non-proliferation education to improve understanding of the realities of the atomic bombings. It considers maintaining and strengthening the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

On 14 January 2025, Japan and the European Union held a Dialogue on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, reinforcing their shared commitment to global peace and stability, with a focus on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, underscoring the importance of the NPT.⁸³⁰ The dialogue emphasized Japan’s shared commitment with the EU to promote global peace and stability through collaborative efforts in arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation.

On 4 February 2025, Japan highlighted its commitment to the IAEA by stressing the importance of enhancing cooperation on nuclear non-proliferation efforts in anticipation of Director General of the IAEA Rafael Mariano Grossi to the Ministry of Affairs.⁸³¹ Japan further emphasized its support for multilateral frameworks, such as the IAEA, to foster international peace and security through strengthened export controls and non-proliferation measures.

On 14 March 2025, the G7 foreign ministers met in Charlevoix to reaffirm their commitments to non-proliferation.⁸³² This included condemning China’s provision of weapons and dual-use components to Russia for use in the war against Ukraine. The leaders’ emphasized the importance of international rules and norms for protecting global security.

Japan has fully complied with its commitment to strengthen effective export controls on materials, technology, and research that could be used for military purposes in a way that keeps pace with rapid technological developments and recognizes the central role of multilateral export control regimes as a key non-proliferation instrument and safeguard for international peace and security. Japan demonstrated strong action to strengthen its export controls policies by amending the Foreign Exchange Order, and to corroborate these controls with Multilateral Export Control Regime standards by proxy through bilateral cooperation with the United States. Germany’s participation at the Asia Senior-Level Talks on Non-Proliferation and the Exercise Pacific Protector 24 as well as their advancement of export controls at those forums recognizes the central role of MECRs.

Thus, Japan receives a score of +1.

Analyst: Mehek Berry

United Kingdom: 0

The United Kingdom has partially complied with its commitment to strengthen effective export controls on materials, technology, and research that could be used for military purposes in a way that keeps pace with rapid technological developments and recognizes the central role of multilateral export control regimes as a key non-proliferation instrument and safeguard for international peace and security.

⁸²⁹ The Adoption of the Draft Resolution on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons submitted by Japan in the Plenary Meeting of the United Nations General Assembly, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Tokyo) 3 December 2024. Access Date: 3 December 2024. https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/pressite_000001_00769.html

⁸³⁰ Japan-EU Dialogue on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Tokyo) 16 January 2025. Access Date: 8 February 2025. https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/pressite_000001_00920.html

⁸³¹ Visit of H.E. Mr. Rafael Mariano Grossi, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Tokyo) 4 February 2025. Access Date: 8 February 2025. https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/pressite_000001_00971.html

⁸³² Joint Statement of the G7 Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Charlevoix, G7 Information Centre (Toronto) 14 March 2025. Access Date: 7 April 2025. <https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/foreign/250314-statement.html>

On 15 June 2024, the United Kingdom released a joint statement with the governments of France and Germany condemning Iran's nuclear programme expansion.⁸³³ The United Kingdom denounced Iran's increased uranium enrichment and advanced centrifuge use, warning of significant proliferation risks and urged Iran to fulfil its Non-Proliferation Treaty obligations.

On 10 July 2024, the Washington Summit Declaration issued at North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) summit condemned Russia's nuclear posturing and expressed concern over Russia's increasing violations of arms control agreements and nuclear safety standards.⁸³⁴ The declaration called on the People's Republic of China to cease all material and political support to Russia's war effort and introduce export controls on dual-use items. The declaration reaffirmed members' commitment to nuclear deterrence as essential to NATO security while encouraging arms control and non-proliferation efforts as essential to ensuring strategic stability. The UK is a NATO member.

On 2 September 2024, Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs David Lammy announced the introduction of further regulation on exports that support Iran's production of military weapons to the House of Commons, supporting efforts to maintain international security and tackle threats to peace.⁸³⁵

On 10 September 2024, the United Kingdom released a joint statement with the governments of France and Germany condemning Iran's exports of ballistic missiles to Russia.⁸³⁶ Germany announced it will proceed with canceling bilateral air service agreements with Iran, designating entities and individuals involved in the missile transfer, and imposing sanctions on Iran Air. Germany reaffirmed its commitment to working with European and international partners on the non-proliferation of weapons provided to Russia for its war against Ukraine.

On 20 September 2024, the Ministry of Defence announced a research compact with the United States' Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency and Canada's Department of National Defence.⁸³⁷ The three agencies committed to work together in researching advances to cyber-security infrastructure and in mitigating risks caused by artificial intelligence, particularly in dual-use military applications.

On 23 September 2024, the United Kingdom jointly established the Friends of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), a group of countries that advocates for a treaty ban on the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons.⁸³⁸ The FMCT includes Australia, Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Nigeria, the Philippines, and the United States.

⁸³³ Iran's further expansion of its nuclear programme: joint statement by France, Germany and the UK, the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (London) 15 June 2024. Access Date: 26 September 2024.

<https://www.gov.uk/government/news/iran-joint-statement-by-france-germany-and-united-kingdom>

⁸³⁴ Washington Summit Declaration, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Brussels) 10 July 2024. Access Date: 26 September 2024. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_227678.htm

⁸³⁵ UK policy on arms export licences to Israel: Foreign Secretary's statement, Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (London) 2 September 2024. Access Date: 15 October 2024.

<https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/foreign-secretary-statement-on-uk-policy-on-arms-export-licenses-to-israel>

⁸³⁶ Iran - Transfers of Ballistic Missiles to Russia - Statement by the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany and the United Kingdom (Paris) 10 September 2024. Access Date: 28 October 2024. <https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/iran/news/article/iran-transfers-of-ballistic-missiles-to-russia-statement-by-the-foreign>

⁸³⁷ UK, US and Canada to collaborate on cybersecurity and AI research, United Kingdom Ministry of Defence (London) 20 September 2024. Access Date: 11 December 2024. <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-us-and-canada-to-collaborate-on-cybersecurity-and-ai-research>

⁸³⁸ Joint Statement on the Friends of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, U.S. Department of State (Washington) 23 September 2024. Access Date: 12 November 2024. <https://www.state.gov/joint-statement-on-the-friends-of-a-fissile-material-cut-off-treaty/>

On 24 September 2024, the G7 issued joint guidance for industry on preventing the evasion of export controls and sanctions imposed on Russia.⁸³⁹ This document includes key risk indicators for sanctions circumvention and offers recommendations on best practices for compliance.

On 24 September 2024, the UK, along with 28 other countries participated in the Exercise Pacific Protector 24 under the Proliferation Security Initiative by Australia.⁸⁴⁰ The exercise enhanced cooperation in non-proliferation export measures and security measures.

On 26 November 2024, G7 foreign ministers called for China to end the export of dual-use materials to Russia, and for all states to end dual-use material exports to Myanmar.⁸⁴¹ The declaration also addressed Russia's veto on the renewal of the mandate of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1718 Committee Panel of Experts on North Korea Sanctions, as well as the dangers presented by the possible transfer of ballistic and nuclear missile technology to the North Korea by Russia.

On 9 December 2024, the UK, France and Germany condemned Iran's escalation of its nuclear program particularly its actions at the Fordow facility.⁸⁴² They expressed concern and urged Iran to reverse its actions and its nuclear escalation.

On 17 December 2024, the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) issued a joint statement alongside the German Federal Foreign Office and the Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs of France, pertaining to non-proliferation in Iran and the implementation Of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231(2015).⁸⁴³

On 17 December 2024, UK Deputy Permanent Representative James Kariuki condemned Iran's nuclear escalation.⁸⁴⁴ The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported a significant increase in Iran's uranium production. Kariuki stated there was no civilian justification for Iran's actions and warned that its growing capabilities raised concerns for global non-proliferation.

On 18 December 2024, Deputy Permanent Representative Kariuki condemned North Korea's support for Russia's war in Ukraine, and its supplying of weapons.⁸⁴⁵ Kariuki called for the withdrawal of North Korean Forces and support for Russia, warning that it undermined international law and stability. He also called for

⁸³⁹ Preventing Russian Export Control & Sanctions Evasion Guidance, the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action (Berlin) 24 September 2024. Access Date: 1 November 2024. <https://www.bmwk.de/Redaktion/DE/Downloads/G/g7-guidance-for-industry-preventing-russian-export-control-and-sanctions-evasion.pdf>

⁸⁴⁰ Exercise Specific Protector Kicks Off, Australian Government Defence (Canberra) 24 September 2024. Access Date: 12 November 2024. <https://www.defence.gov.au/news-events/releases/2024-09-24/exercise-pacific-protector-kicks>

⁸⁴¹ G7 Foreign Ministers' Meeting Statement G7 Information Centre (Fiuggi – Anagni) 26 November 2024. Access Date: 11 December 2024. <https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/foreign/241126-statement.html>

⁸⁴² Iran's Further Escalation of Its Nuclear Programme: Joint Statement by France, Germany and the UK, Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (London) 9 December 2024. Access Date: 24 January 2025. <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/irans-further-escalation-of-its-nuclear-programme-joint-statement-by-france-germany-and-the-uk>

⁸⁴³ Joint Statement by France, Germany, United Kingdom on Non-Proliferation, Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs (Paris) 10 September 2024. Access Date: 28 October 2024. <https://onu.delegfrance.org/iran-joint-statement-by-france-germany-united-kingdom-on-non-proliferation>

⁸⁴⁴ There Is No Justification for Iran's Stockpiling of High Enriched Uranium: UK Statement at the UN Security Council, Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (New York) 17 December 2024. Access Date: 24 January 2025. <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/there-is-no-justification-for-irans-stockpiling-of-high-enriched-uranium-uk-statement-at-the-un-security-council>

⁸⁴⁵ North Korea Must Cease Its Support for Russia's Illegal War in Ukraine: UK Statement at the UN Security Council, Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (New York) 18 December 2024. Access Date: 24 January 2025. <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/dprk-must-cease-its-support-for-russias-illegal-war-in-ukraine-uk-statement-at-the-un-security-council>

alignment with global nuclear non-proliferation principles, urging Russia to honour the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

On 20 December 2024, the FCDO published the Counter Proliferation Programme guidance for the financial year 2025 to 2026.⁸⁴⁶ This guidance outlines the UK's commitment to non-proliferation efforts and supports global actions to address proliferation threats.

On 23 December 2024, the FCDO released a joint statement alongside the Federal Foreign Office and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of France on the IAEA Board of Governors Resolution on Iran, underscoring the critical role played by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Safeguards Agreement in establishing the civilian nature of nuclear programs in the country.⁸⁴⁷

On 11 March 2025, the Export Control Joint Unit in the Department for Business and Trade announced upcoming changes to the Strategic Export Controls list in line with the Wassenaar Arrangement.⁸⁴⁸ The updated list will be made public in the spring.

On 14 March 2025, the G7 foreign ministers met in Charlevoix to reaffirm their commitments to non-proliferation.⁸⁴⁹ This included condemning China's provision of weapons and dual-use components to Russia for use in the war against Ukraine. The leaders' emphasized the importance of international rules and norms for protecting global security.

The United Kingdom has partially complied with its commitment to strengthen effective export controls on materials, technology, and research that could be used for military purposes in a way that keeps pace with rapid technological developments and recognizes the central role of multilateral export control regimes as a key non-proliferation instrument and safeguard for international peace and security. The UK has participated in multiple statements and groups with fellow G7 and NATO members that call for stronger export controls regarding business with geopolitical rivals. Through collaboration with the United States and Canada, the UK has also committed to defence research conducive to making its export controls regime more applicable to modern technologies. However, the UK has not updated its control list or taken any action to strengthen its export controls on dual-use materials, technology or research during this cycle. The UK indicated that its export control list would be published in the spring. Publication of this list and its implementation in line with the Wassenaar Arrangement will result in full compliance.

Thus, the United Kingdom receives a score of 0.

Analyst: Layan Mhaish

United States: +1

The United States has fully complied with its commitment to strengthen effective export controls on materials, technology, and research that could be used for military purposes in a way that keeps pace with rapid technological developments and recognizes the central role of multilateral export control regimes as a key non-proliferation instrument and safeguard for international peace and security.

⁸⁴⁶ Counter Proliferation Programme Guidance: Financial Year 2025 to 2026, Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (London) 20 December 2024. Access Date: 24 January 2025. <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/counter-proliferation-programme>

⁸⁴⁷ Joint Statement by France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States on the IAEA Board of Governors Resolution on Iran, Federal Foreign Office (Berlin) 23 November 2024. Access Date: 17 February 2025. <https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/newsroom/news/2686318-2686318>

⁸⁴⁸ NTE 2025/06: upcoming updates to the UK strategic export control list, Department for Business and Trade (London) 11 March 2025. Access Date: 10 May 2025. <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/notice-to-exporters-202506-upcoming-updates-to-the-uk-strategic-export-control-list/nte-202506-upcoming-updates-to-the-uk-strategic-export-control-list>

⁸⁴⁹ Joint Statement of the G7 Foreign Ministers' Meeting in Charlevoix, G7 Information Centre (Toronto) 14 March 2025. Access Date: 7 April 2025. <https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/foreign/250314-statement.html>

On 17 June 2024, the United States and Japan held an Extended Deterrence Dialogue addressing nuclear development.⁸⁵⁰ Both countries emphasized joint deterrence capabilities, and alliance preparedness.

On 21 June 2024, representatives from the European Union and the United States, including EU Commissioner for Home Affairs Ylva Johansson and US Deputy Attorney General Lisa Monaco, met for the EU-US Ministerial Meeting on Justice and Home Affairs in Brussels.⁸⁵¹ The representatives reaffirmed their commitment to the enforcement of sanctions and export controls in light of Russia's war effort in Ukraine.

On 26 June 2024, Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo met with Japanese Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry Ken Saito.⁸⁵² At this meeting, in furtherance of the Japan-United States Commercial and Industrial Partnership, Secretary Raimondo and Minister Saito discussed further bilateral cooperation on export controls.

On 27 June 2024, Secretary Raimondo met with Korean Minister of Trade, Industry and Energy Ahn Duk-geun.⁸⁵³ Secretary Raimondo and Minister Ahn discussed further cooperation on dual-use export controls, specifically commenting upon ongoing negotiations at the United States-Korea Supply Chain and Commercial Dialogue initiative's Dual-Use Export Controls working group.

On 10 July 2024, the Washington Summit Declaration issued at North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) summit condemned Russia's nuclear posturing and expressed concern over Russia's increasing violations of arms control agreements and nuclear safety standards.⁸⁵⁴ The declaration called on the People's Republic of China to cease all material and political support to Russia's war effort and introduce export controls on dual-use items. The declaration reaffirmed members' commitment to nuclear deterrence as essential to NATO security while encouraging arms control and non-proliferation efforts as essential to ensuring strategic stability. The US is a NATO member.

On 20 September 2024, the Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency announced a research compact with the United Kingdom's Ministry of Defence and Canada's Department of National Defence.⁸⁵⁵ The three agencies committed to work together in researching advances to cyber-security infrastructure and in mitigating risks caused by artificial intelligence, particularly in dual-use military applications.

On 23 September 2024, the United States jointly established the Friends of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), a group of countries that advocates for a treaty ban on the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons.⁸⁵⁶ The FMCT includes Australia, Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Nigeria, the Philippines, and the United Kingdom.

⁸⁵⁰ US-Japan Extended Deterrence Dialogue, U.S. Department of State (Washington) 17 June 2024. Access Date: 12 November 2024. <https://www.state.gov/u-s-japan-extended-deterrence-dialogue-3/>

⁸⁵¹ EU-US joint press release following the EU-US Ministerial on Justice and Home Affairs (Brussels) 20 June 2024. Access Date: 28 October 2024. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_3428

⁸⁵² Minister Saito Holds the Fourth Japan-U.S. Commercial and Industrial Partnership (JUCIP) Ministerial Meeting with Ms. Gina M. Raimondo, United States Secretary of Commerce, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (Tokyo) 27 June 2024. Access Date: 29 September 2024. https://www.meti.go.jp/english/press/2024/0627_001.html

⁸⁵³ Joint Readout: United States-Korea Supply Chain and Commercial Dialogue Ministerial Meeting, U.S. Department of Commerce (Washington D.C.) 27 June 2024. Access Date: 29 September 2024. <https://www.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2024/06/joint-readout-united-states-korea-supply-chain-and-commercial-dialogue>

⁸⁵⁴ Washington Summit Declaration, The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Brussels) 10 July 2024. Access Date: 26 September 2024. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_227678.htm

⁸⁵⁵ UK, US and Canada to collaborate on cybersecurity and AI research, United Kingdom Ministry of Defence (London) 20 September 2024. Access Date: 11 December 2024. <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-us-and-canada-to-collaborate-on-cybersecurity-and-ai-research>

⁸⁵⁶ Joint Statement on the Friends of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, U.S. Department of State (Washington) 23 September 2024. Access Date: 12 November 2024. <https://www.state.gov/joint-statement-on-the-friends-of-a-fissile-material-cut-off-treaty/>

On 24 September 2024, the G7 issued joint guidance for industry on preventing the evasion of export controls and sanctions imposed on Russia.⁸⁵⁷ This document includes key risk indicators for sanctions circumvention and offers recommendations on best practices for compliance.

On 24 September 2024, the United States, along with 28 other countries participated in the Exercise Pacific Protector 24 under the Proliferation Security Initiative by Australia.⁸⁵⁸ The exercise enhanced cooperation in non-proliferation export measures and security measures.

On 2 October 2024, the Department of State introduced new sanctions targeting four entities that have transferred dual-use goods to the Houthi rebel group in Yemen.⁸⁵⁹

On 3 October 2024, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Bonnie Jenkins addressed international security, highlighting Russia's violations of international obligations at the NATO Weapons of Mass Destruction Conference.⁸⁶⁰ She called for strengthened commitments to arms control and the nuclear proliferation regime, and the necessity for the engagement of Russia and China on these issues.

On 4 October 2024, the United States participated in the 19th edition of the Asia Senior-Level Talks on Non-Proliferation.⁸⁶¹ The talks, hosted by Japan for officials from various members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and interested states from outside Asia, emphasized topics such as bolstering export controls across all countries.

On 28 October 2024, the Department of the Treasury issued a Final Rule restricting US export of semiconductors, artificial intelligence and quantum computing and information technologies to China.⁸⁶² The rule stipulates that individuals residing in the United States cannot transfer certain of these items to China, and that certain other transfers cannot be made without the consent of the Department of the Treasury.

On 30 October 2024, the Department of State introduced new sanctions targeting entities transferring dual-use goods to Russia in third countries including China, India, Malaysia, Thailand, Türkiye and the United Arab Emirates.⁸⁶³

On 13 November 2024, Assistant Secretary Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation C.S. Eliot Kang emphasized the importance of maintaining national security by ensuring the peaceful use of nuclear

⁸⁵⁷ Preventing Russian Export Control & Sanctions Evasion Guidance, the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action (Berlin) 24 September 2024. Access Date: 1 November 2024. <https://www.bmwk.de/Redaktion/DE/Downloads/G/g7-guidance-for-industry-preventing-russian-export-control-and-sanctions-evasion.pdf>

⁸⁵⁸ Exercise Specific Protector Kicks Off, Australian Government Defence (Canberra) 24 September 2024. Access Date: 12 November 2024. <https://www.defence.gov.au/news-events/releases/2024-09-24/exercise-pacific-protector-kicks>

⁸⁵⁹ Targeting Houthi Weapons Smuggling and Procurement Networks, Department of State (Washington D.C.) 2 October 2024. Access Date: 11 December 2024. <https://www.state.gov/targeting-houthi-weapons-smuggling-and-procurement-networks/>

⁸⁶⁰ Under Secretary Jenkin's Remarks at the NATO WMD Conference, U.S. Department of State (Washington) 3 October 2024. Access Date: 12 November 2024. <https://www.state.gov/under-secretary-jenkins-remarks-at-the-nato-wmd-conference/>

⁸⁶¹ The 19th Asia Senior-Level Talks on Non-Proliferation (ASTOP), Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Tokyo) 4 October 2024. Access Date: 11 December 2024. https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/pressite_000001_00626.html

⁸⁶² FACT SHEET: Addressing U.S. Investments in Certain National Security Technologies and Products in Countries of Concern, The White House (Washington D.C.) 28 October 2024. Access Date: 11 December 2024. <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/10/28/fact-sheet-addressing-u-s-investments-in-certain-national-security-technologies-and-products-in-countries-of-concern/>

⁸⁶³ New Measures Targeting Third-Country Enablers Supporting Russia's Military-Industrial Base, U.S. Department of State (Washington D.C.) 30 October 2024. Access Date: 11 December 2024. <https://www.state.gov/new-measures-targeting-third-country-enablers-supporting-russias-military-industrial-base/>

energy.⁸⁶⁴ He highlighted challenges to non-proliferation and strategies to manage nuclear exports to maintain global security.

On 21 November 2024, the US and Thailand hosted the Southeast Asia Proliferation Security Initiative to discuss non-proliferation efforts.⁸⁶⁵ The workshop discussed methods to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction including export controls.

On 26 November 2024, G7 foreign ministers called for China to end the export of dual-use materials to Russia, and for all states to end dual-use material exports to Myanmar.⁸⁶⁶ The declaration also addressed Russia's veto on the renewal of the mandate of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1718 Committee Panel of Experts on North Korea Sanctions, as well as the dangers presented by the possible transfer of ballistic and nuclear missile technology to the North Korea by Russia.

On 17 December 2024, the Department of State and Department of Defense and the French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs and Ministry of the Armed Forces co-chaired the third US-France Defense Trade Strategic Dialogue (DTSG) in Paris.⁸⁶⁷ The DTSG included updates from working groups on export regulations and international export regimes. Representatives reaffirmed their commitment to close coordination on international armaments issues, including identifying measures to improve export control efficiency and effectiveness.

On 5 February 2025, President Donald Trump signed a directive reinstating his first term "maximum pressure" policy on Iran, aiming to force the state into a nuclear deal.⁸⁶⁸ President Trump emphasized the consequences of acquiring nuclear weapons, showcasing non-proliferation goals.

On 13 February 2025, President Trump proposed restarting nuclear arms control talks with Russia and China.⁸⁶⁹ He criticized current spending on nuclear weapons and aimed for a future agreement to halve Russian and Chinese defence budgets.

On 26 February 2025, the United States sanctioned six entities based in China and Hong Kong for aiding Iran's missile programs.⁸⁷⁰

⁸⁶⁴ Understanding the Past and Navigating the Future of Civil Nuclear Energy, U.S. Department of State (Colorado) 13 November 2024. Access Date: 11 December 2024. <https://www.state.gov/understanding-the-past-and-navigating-the-future-of-civil-nuclear-energy/>

⁸⁶⁵ U.S. and Thailand Co-Host Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Southeast Asia Workshop in Bangkok to Strengthen Regional Counterproliferation Cooperation, U.S. Department of State (Washington D.C.) 21 November 2024. Access Date: 11 December 2024. <https://www.state.gov/u-s-and-thailand-co-host-proliferation-security-initiative-psi-southeast-asia-workshop-in-bangkok-to-strengthen-regional-counterproliferation-cooperation/>

⁸⁶⁶ G7 Foreign Ministers' Meeting Statement G7 Information Centre (Fiuggi – Anagni) 26 November 2024. Access Date: 11 December 2024. <https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/foreign/241126-statement.html>

⁸⁶⁷ Third Defense Trade Strategic Dialogue (DTSG) Between the United States and France, Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs (Paris) 17 December 2024. Access Date: 15 February 2025. <https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/security-disarmament-and-non-proliferation/news/2024/article/third-defense-trade-strategic-dialogue-dtsg-between-the-united-states-and>

⁸⁶⁸ Trump Restores 'Maximum Pressure' Policy on Iran, Hopes for Nuclear Deal, The White House (Washington D.C.) 5 February 2025. Access Date: 17 February 2025. <https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2025/02/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-restores-maximum-pressure-on-iran/>

⁸⁶⁹ Trump proposes nuclear deal with Russia and China to halve defense budgets, The Guardian (Washington D.C.) 13 February 2025. Access Date: 17 February 2025. <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/feb/13/trump-nuclear-russia-china>

⁸⁷⁰ New Sanctions Increase Pressure on Iran's UAV and Ballistic Missile Programs, Department of State (Washington D.C.) 26 February 2025. Access Date: 7 April 2025. <https://www.state.gov/new-sanctions-increase-pressure-on-irans-uav-and-ballistic-missile-programs/>

On 14 March 2025, the G7 foreign ministers met in Charlevoix to reaffirm their commitments to non-proliferation.⁸⁷¹ This included condemning China's provision of weapons and dual-use components to Russia for use in the war against Ukraine. The leaders' emphasized the importance of international rules and norms for protecting global security.

On 1 April 2025, the United States sanctioned six entities and two Individuals in China, the United Arab Emirates and Iran for aiding Iran's ballistic missile procurement networks.⁸⁷² This action aims to disrupt Iran's proliferation efforts.

The United States has fully complied with its commitment to strengthen effective export controls on materials, technology, and research that could be used for military purposes in a way that keeps pace with rapid technological developments and recognizes the central role of multilateral export control regimes as a key non-proliferation instrument and safeguard for international peace and security. The United States demonstrated taken strong action to restrict the export of materials and technologies with potential military uses, including through the Treasury Department's final rule limiting semiconductor, quantum information and artificial intelligence to China. The United States' participation at the Asia Senior-Level Talks on Non-Proliferation, the Exercise Pacific Protector 24 and the Proliferation Security Initiative, their co-chairing of the DTSG as well as their advancement of export controls at those forums recognizes the central role of MECRs.

Thus, the United States receives a score of +1.

Analyst: Layan Mbaish

European Union: +1

The European Union has fully complied with its commitment to strengthen effective export controls on materials, technology, and research that could be used for military purposes in a way that keeps pace with rapid technological developments and recognizes the central role of multilateral export control regimes as a key non-proliferation instrument and safeguard for international peace and security.

On 21 June 2024, representatives from the European Union and the United States, including EU Commissioner for Home Affairs Ylva Johansson and US Deputy Attorney General Lisa Monaco, met for the EU-US Ministerial Meeting on Justice and Home Affairs in Brussels.⁸⁷³ The representatives reaffirmed their commitment to the enforcement of sanctions and export controls in light of Russia's war effort in Ukraine.

On 24 June 2024, the Council of the European Union announced its Fourteenth package of sanctions against Russia.⁸⁷⁴ The European Union added 61 entities to its export restriction list for supporting Russia's military-industrial complex, with the expanded sanctions and restrictions targeting dual-use goods and technologies, including machine tools, chemicals, and helium imports.

⁸⁷¹ Joint Statement of the G7 Foreign Ministers' Meeting in Charlevoix, G7 Information Centre (Toronto) 14 March 2025. Access Date: 7 April 2025. <https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/foreign/250314-statement.html>

⁸⁷² Sanctions Target Iran's UAV and Ballistic Missile Procurement Networks, Department of State (Washington D.C.) 1 April 2025. Access Date: 7 April 2025. <https://www.state.gov/sanctions-target-irans-uav-and-ballistic-missile-procurement-networks/>

⁸⁷³ EU-US joint press release following the EU-US Ministerial on Justice and Home Affairs (Brussels) 20 June 2024. Access Date: 28 October 2024. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_3428

⁸⁷⁴ Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine: comprehensive EU's 14th package of sanctions cracks down on circumvention and adopts energy measures, Council of the European Union (Brussels), 24 June 2024. Access Date: 27 September 2024. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/06/24/russia-s-war-of-aggression-against-ukraine-comprehensive-eu-s-14th-package-of-sanctions-cracks-down-on-circumvention-and-adopts-energy-measures/>

On 29 June 2024, the Council of the European Union adopted additional restrictive measures against Belarus to closer align them with the sanctions on Russia and address circumvention issues.⁸⁷⁵ The Council extended the export ban to include restrictions on additional dual-use goods, professional services, and transport. Furthermore, the Council will require EU exporters to contractually prohibit the re-exportation of sensitive goods to Belarus.

On 5 September 2024, the European Commission adopted a Delegated Regulation updating the list of dual-use items contained in Annex I of Regulation (EU) 2021/821.⁸⁷⁶ This list is updated annually to remain aligned with the Multilateral Export Control Regimes (MECRs). This update adds new dual-use goods to the list, such as nuclear equipment, toxins, and noise reduction equipment, provides for the modification of control parameters, and updates technical definitions.

On 13 September 2024, the European Union condemned Iran's recent exports of ballistic missiles to Russia.⁸⁷⁷ The European Union is responding by announcing new restrictive measures against Iran, including the designation of involved entities in the missile, drone, and aviation sectors.

On 24 September 2024, the G7 issued joint guidance for industry on preventing the evasion of export controls and sanctions imposed on Russia.⁸⁷⁸ This document includes key risk indicators for sanctions circumvention and offers recommendations on best practices for compliance.

On 4 October 2024, the European Union participated in the 19th edition of the Asia Senior-Level Talks on Non-Proliferation.⁸⁷⁹ The talks, hosted by Japan for officials from various members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and interested states from outside Asia, emphasized topics such as bolstering export controls across all countries.

On 18 November 2024, the Council of the European Union announced expanded export restrictions on Iran due to the country's military support to Russia's war against Ukraine.⁸⁸⁰ These widened measures include a prohibition on the export, transfer, supply, or sale from the EU to Iran of components used in the development and production of missiles and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles.

On 26 November 2024, G7 foreign ministers called for China to end the export of dual-use materials to Russia, and for all states to end dual-use material exports to Myanmar.⁸⁸¹ The declaration also addressed Russia's veto on the renewal of the mandate of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1718 Committee Panel of

⁸⁷⁵ Belarus' involvement in Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine: new EU restrictive measures target trade, services, transport and anti-circumvention (Brussels) 29 June 2024. Access Date: 28 October 2024.

<https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/06/29/belarus-involvement-in-russia-s-war-of-aggression-against-ukraine-new-eu-restrictive-measures-target-trade-services-transport-and-anti-circumvention/>

⁸⁷⁶ 2024 Update of the EU Control List of Dual-Use Items (Brussels) 1 October 2024. Access Date: 11 November 2024.

https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/news/2024-update-eu-control-list-dual-use-items-2024-10-01_en

⁸⁷⁷ Iran: Statement by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union (Brussels) 13 September 2024. Access Date: 11 November 2024. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/09/13/iran-statement-by-the-high-representative-on-behalf-of-the-european-union/>

⁸⁷⁸ Preventing Russian Export Control & Sanctions Evasion Guidance, the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action (Berlin) 24 September 2024. Access Date: 1 November 2024. <https://www.bmwk.de/Redaktion/DE/Downloads/G/g7-guidance-for-industry-preventing-russian-export-control-and-sanctions-evasion.pdf>

⁸⁷⁹ The 19th Asia Senior-Level Talks on Non-Proliferation (ASTOP), Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Tokyo) 4 October 2024. Access Date: 11 December 2024. https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/pressite_000001_00626.html

⁸⁸⁰ Iran: EU widens restrictive measures in view of Iran support of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine and lists one individual and four entities, Council of the European Union (Brussels) 18 November 2024. Access Date: 11 December 2024. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/11/18/iran-eu-widens-restrictive-measures-in-view-of-iran-support-of-the-russian-war-of-aggression-against-ukraine-and-lists-one-individual-and-four-entities/>

⁸⁸¹ G7 Foreign Ministers' Meeting Statement G7 Information Centre (Fiuggi – Anagni) 26 November 2024. Access Date: 11 December 2024. <https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/foreign/241126-statement.html>

Experts on North Korea Sanctions, as well as the dangers presented by the possible transfer of ballistic and nuclear missile technology to the North Korea by Russia.

On 14 January 2025, the EU and Japan held a Dialogue on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, reinforcing their shared commitment to global peace and stability, with a focus on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, underscoring the importance of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.⁸⁸² The dialogue emphasized Japan's shared commitment with the EU to promote global peace and stability through collaborative efforts in arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation.

On 30 January 2025, the European Commission published a report examining patterns of Member State exports of dual-use items from 2022-2024.⁸⁸³ As the first annual report prepared under the terms of the EU Export Control Regulation, the report demonstrates increased scrutiny on the part of both the EU and Member States when considering the export of dual-use items. Additionally, the report includes information on Member States' licensing data to increase transparency and allow for an improved understanding of how export controls are applied across the EU.

On 24 February 2025, the Council of the European Union adopted its sixteenth sanctions package against Russia.⁸⁸⁴ The new measures include extended dual-use export restrictions that cover industrial goods and software, in addition to tightened exemptions for certain advanced technology exports. The package also restricts exports to over 50 more companies involved in Russia's military-industrial complex or sanctions circumvention.

On 14 March 2025, the G7 foreign ministers met in Charlevoix to reaffirm their commitments to non-proliferation.⁸⁸⁵ This included condemning China's provision of weapons and dual-use components to Russia for use in the war against Ukraine. The leaders' emphasized the importance of international rules and norms for protecting global security.

On 27 March 2025, the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy attended the 20th EU-Central Asia Ministerial Meeting.⁸⁸⁶ The participants reaffirmed their commitments to international arms control, disarmament and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, the EU shared information about its measures to prevent sanctions circumvention and re-exports of high priority items, on which the participants agreed to continue their cooperation.

The European Union has fully complied with its commitment to strengthen effective export controls on materials, technology, and research that could be used for military purposes in a way that keeps pace with rapid technological developments and recognizes the central role of multilateral export control regimes as a key non-proliferation instrument and safeguard for international peace and security. The European Union has taken strong action towards strengthening its export controls by aligning restrictions on Belarus and updating the dual-use export control list, and weak action by offering verbal support during the EU-US Ministerial Meeting.

⁸⁸² Japan-EU Dialogue on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Tokyo) 16 January 2025. Access Date: 8 February 2025. https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/pressite_000001_00920.html

⁸⁸³ Report Highlights EU's Approach to Export Controls of Dual-Use Items, European Commission (Brussels) 31 January 2025. Access Date: 15 February 2025. https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/news/report-highlights-eus-approach-export-controls-dual-use-items-2025-01-31_en

⁸⁸⁴ Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/389 of 24 February 2025 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, EUR-Lex (Brussels) 25 February 2025. Access Date: 10 May 2025. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L_202500389

⁸⁸⁵ Joint Statement of the G7 Foreign Ministers' Meeting in Charlevoix, G7 Information Centre (Toronto) 14 March 2025. Access Date: 7 April 2025. <https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/foreign/250314-statement.html>

⁸⁸⁶ Joint communiqué - 20th EU-Central Asia Ministerial Meeting, Council of the European Union (Brussels) 27 March 2025. Access Date: 6 April 2025. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/03/27/joint-communique-20th-eu-central-asia-ministerial-meeting/>

The updates to the dual-use export control list also demonstrates a commitment for European Union regulations to meet and surpass MECR standards. The European Union's participation at the Asia Senior-Level Talks on Non-Proliferation and their advancement of export controls at those forums recognizes the central role of MECRs.

Thus, the European Union receives a score of +1.

Analyst: Jeanne Brownell