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Analytical Studies > Analysis on the 2024 Apulia Summit
G7 Summits > 2024 Apulia Summit

Promising Prospects for Italy's 2024 G7 Apulia Summit

John Kirton, G7 Research Group
March 13, 2024

The G7's 50th annual summit, taking place in Apulia, Italy, on June 13–15, 2024, is a landmark event in several ways. It marks the first half century of G7 summits' contribution to global governance, since their start at Rambouillet, France, in 1975 (Kirton 2024). It builds on the strong foundation set by the Hiroshima Summit on May 19–21, 2023, and the follow-up virtual summits on December 6, 2023, and February 24, 2024 (see Appendix A). The Apulia Summit will confront a full range of interconnected crises, starting with Russia's war against Ukraine in Europe and Hamas's war against Israel in the Middle East, accompanied by climate change, energy, economic, financial, food and health insecurity crises, declines in development, decreasing debt sustainability and democracy, especially in Africa and the Indo-Pacific region, and newer challenges from migration and refugees and from artificial intelligence (AI). Meeting at the crossroads of Europe, the Mediterranean, North Africa and the Middle East, G7 leaders will address these crises and work with their guests invited from key countries and the major multilateral and regional organizations.

In Apulia, the G7 leaders of Italy, the United States, Japan, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Canada and the European Union will build on the results of the G20 summits in New Delhi on September 9–10, 2023, and the subsequent virtual G20 one on November 22, and the other major multilateral summits that followed, including the special G7 summit hosted by Italy in Kyiv on February 24, 2024, as well as the G7 ministerial meetings that Italy is mounting before the Apulia Summit, with an eye to many coming afterward. But at Apulia G7 leaders will have the unique responsibility to confront and control the deadly conflicts, climate and other crises and challenges in ways that fulfill their shared, distinctive foundational mission of protecting the principles and practices of open democracy and individual liberty within their own countries and promoting these principles globally.

All the G7 leaders participating at Apulia will be veterans of G7 summits. They will be led by the first female and youngest Italian prime minister Giorgia Meloni, at her second annual G7 summit and her first as host. She will be joined Canadian prime minister Justin Trudeau and French president Emmanuel Macron at their ninth, US president Joe Biden and German chancellor Olaf Scholz at their fourth, Japanese prime minister Fumio Kishida at his third, and UK prime minister Rishi Sunak at his second. The EU Commission's President Ursula von der Leyen will be at her fifth and the EU Council's President Charles Michel at his fifth and last. These leaders will be reinforced by several invited guest leaders directly relevant to the summit's work.

Security, the G7 leaders' first priority, begins with the dangers of deadly conflicts in Europe, the Middle East and Gulf, and military confrontations in the Indo-Pacific and Asia. These threats arise from Russia's invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, the Hamas attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, Iran's support for Israel's enemies and drive to become a nuclear weapons state, a nuclear-armed North Korea increasingly threatening neighbouring South Korea and Japan, a militarizing China signalling that it intends to acquire Taiwan, poor civilian reactor safety, and the need for nuclear disarmament and control of chemical, biological and radiological weapons of mass destruction. It embraces crime and corruption and the overall need to defend democracy and human rights everywhere, amid the growing disinformation, polarisation and interference in democratic elections enabled by digital communication and AI.

The second priority of development, debt, Africa and emerging economies starts with restoring development in poor countries, reducing their soaring, unsustainable debts, and reinforcing progress towards the United Nations' Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) due by 2030.

The issue of migration and refugees, the third priority, covers the involuntary migrants and refugees displaced within their own countries, people driven from poor to rich countries by conflict, climate change and poverty, and people migrating legally to provide their new countries with the workers they need.

The climate-energy nexus, the summit's fourth priority, is led by climate change, biodiversity loss, and pollution in the air, oceans, fresh water and land from plastics, chemicals and other human waste. Human activity is now relentlessly driving the post-industrial global temperature rise beyond its liveable limits of 1.5°C, fuelling more frequent, persistent, intense and widespread extreme weather events, including historic floods, droughts and heatwaves and approaching critical ecological tipping points beyond which there is no return. It has created a triple crisis along with biodiversity loss and pollution.

The energy security component of this priority features clean and renewable sources as the future fuel of choice. This issue includes demand management, energy efficiency, hydro-electricity, solar and wind power, and the newer sources of geothermal, tidal and wave power, small nuclear reactors, and the prospective technologies of green hydrogen and ammonia. Hydrocarbons, notably oil and natural gas – offered as "just transition" fuels – continue to be relevant.

Meloni identified Apulia's fifth priority at the UN Food Systems Summit on July 24, 2023, when she stated that "food security will also be high on the agenda of our G7 Presidency in the next year." This issue centres on the immediate need to feed the rising number of famine-stricken countries and people. It extends to crafting exports and imports – amid inflation, sanctions and conditions about environmental, social and governance issues – in ways that help provide affordable, accessible, appropriate food and create the agricultural products, services, practices and innovation that produce sustainable development with healthy food for all.

AI, the sixth priority, includes developing rules for its governance that enable its innovative potential to expand, within guardrails that ensure privacy, safety, intellectual property protection and the integrity of information in the political, economic social, artistic and other spheres.

Also on the agenda are the G7's traditional built-in subjects.

The economy and finance start with the G7's traditional concern with strengthening non-inflationary, shared economic growth through fiscal, monetary and exchange rate policy and strengthening financial stability through better financial regulation and supervision, including of banks and now shadow banks, private investments (including private equity), pension funds, insurance, accounting, sovereign wealth funds and crypto currency. It includes G7 leaders' new focus on economic security and resilience by diversifying supply chains through cooperation among themselves and with other democracies and developing countries that need to export their way to prosperity and secure inward investment and infrastructure partnerships to help.

Travel, tourism and culture, a key concern, features Italy, which has a tourist-dependent economy with many international tourists, the most world UNESCO-certified heritage sites, and an internationally famous cultural heritage reaching back several millennia and growing vibrantly today. Travel, tourism and culture are similarly important to many countries, as they foster economic development, poverty reduction, women and youth empowerment, ecological enhancement, intercultural understanding and peace.

Health, a perennial summit subject since 2014, includes continuing to control the Covid-19 pandemic as new variants continue to arise, preventing, preparing and responding to new pandemics, and addressing outbreaks of measles, mpox, Ebola, polio and HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria, other infectious and chronic, non-communicable diseases, zoonoses and antimicrobial resistance. It adds an emphasis on mental health, exacerbated by Covid-19, and brain health, as dementia spreads among the rapidly aging populations in most G7 members and many beyond, and the links between health and climate change intensify. In response, G7 leaders will seek to strengthen universal health coverage, primary health care and an integrated global health architecture through a new pandemic treaty, better International Health Regulations and a richer Pandemic Fund, all with a more powerful and better financed World Health Organization at the core.

Social well-being more broadly includes fostering better jobs and labour standards, gender equality, education and human capital, and care for children, youth and the elderly.

Strengthening the G7-centred system of global governance starts with improving implementation of G7 summit commitments. It extends to the G7's work with multilateral institutions in the UN system, trust in multilateralism amid a changing balance of power and cascading crises, the G7's relationship with the major growing democracies led by India, with the G20 – which Brazil hosts in 2024 – and with civil society, represented by the formal and informal G7 engagement groups.

In addressing this very broad, demanding and interconnected agenda, G7 leaders will be guided by their Italian host's emphasis on partnership with the Global South and between East and West, on G7 unity, and on the issues of Ukraine, economic security, energy security, migration and Africa.

As of late February 2024, the Apulia Summit promises to produce a significant performance. It will be led by its strong support for Ukraine and the other European democracies in the face of Russia's aggression, building on the special G7 Kyiv Summit, and by its firm defence of a democratic Israel and efforts to contain and control the deadly conflict in Gaza, the Gulf and Red Sea to the south, Lebanon to the north and Iran just beyond. Advances will be substantial on climate change, the environment and energy, and Africa. They will be solid on development, the Indo-Pacific region, migration, food security, AI and the economy.

This significant performance will be propelled by the strong shock-activated vulnerability of G7 members to further deadly conflicts and climate change, the failure of the multilateral organizations to respond effectively, G7 members' substantial globally predominant and internally equalizing capability in key components, their high, if strained, democratic political commonality, the G7 leaders' low domestic political support and the significant value they place on their personal G7 club at the hub of a growing network of global summit governance.

Priorities, Plans and Preparations

Italy's priorities, plans and preparations for the Apulia Summit were first publicly presented by Meloni at a news conference at the Hiroshima Summit in the early hours of June 21, 2023, just before she left early to return home to deal with the devastating floods in Italy's north (see Appendix B).

She announced that the summit would be held in Apulia in mid June, immediately after the European Parliament elections whose dates were still to be finalized (Meloni 2023). She said: "At a summit where the Global South will be a key focus, we will be taking the major world leaders to the south of Italy, and we have chosen Puglia because, from this point of view, it has symbolic meaning linked to its geographical position. Over the centuries, Puglia has acted as a bridge between East and West. As you will remember, Pope Francis also chose the capital of the Puglia region, Bari, for a historic meeting with the heads of the Eastern Orthodox and Eastern Catholic Churches in 2018, which was an unprecedented ecumenical event. In essence, the Puglia region symbolises East and West embracing, and we believe this is also the best way to overcome the narrative of the West being on one side with the rest of the world on the other, which is clearly fuelled by adversary propaganda."

At Hiroshima, Meloni (2023) said the Italian presidency priorities would include Ukraine, in the context that prevailed at the Apulia Summit's time, reaffirming the G7's unity and respect for the rule of international law, especially in the current conflict. They would also include economic security, building on the 2023 summit's results, energy security, migration as a key issue, and Africa and more cooperation with it. This would advance the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment, "an infrastructure plan by the G7 countries to strengthen supply chains, investing in the Global South," which was very similar to Italy's Mattei Plan for Africa. The Mattei Plan's purpose was "how to cooperate with African countries, bringing investments in connection infrastructure, especially with regard to energy, and solving various problems together: the problem of energy supplies in Europe, but also the problem of how to help African countries to develop better" with a focus on Italy.

This led to the problem of migration "because, after all, the most structural way to solve this problem is to defend the right, which is not guaranteed today, of many people not to have to flee their homes and their lands, abandoning their lives in search of a different and better life" (Meloni 2023). Within the G7, Italy again raised migration, human trafficking and how to tackle illegal migration.

Economic security included supply chains, a longstanding concern of Meloni's, and how dangerous it was to depend so significantly on factors beyond a country's control. The need now was to understand what G7 strategic supply chains were, which ones were essential and chose strategies to strengthen the economy and security. Artificial intelligence would also be addressed.

Further guidance came from an address by Luca Ferrari, Italy's G7 and G20 sherpa and former ambassador to China and Saudi Arabia at a hybrid event held by the Istitute Affari Internazionali a few weeks after the Hiroshima Summit.

Later, at the final G7 sherpa meeting for 2023, held in Tokyo in early December, sherpas discussed how to ensure continuity from the Japanese presidency to the Italian presidency. Italy wished to maintain the importance of adherence to international law and standing up for Ukraine's sovereignty and integrity. Since October 7 the crisis in Middle East had become a big preoccupation and certainly would remain so into 2024. The Italians telegraphed an emphasis on Africa as their geographic focus. They indicated that some areas of focus would be on promoting sustainable development, climate and environment issues, food and energy security, and gender equality, as well as addressing the root causes of illegal immigration. It was a broad agenda, with Africa as a clear priority. Italy also planned to mount many ministerial meetings and continue to have many working groups.

Italy's evolving summit priorities were publicly announced when the deputy prime minister and foreign minister Antonio Tajani read Meloni's prepared text to the annual Conference of Ambassadors in Rome on December 19, 2023 (Vagnoni 2024) (see Appendix B). The nine priorities identified were, in order, Ukraine, the Middle East, developing countries and emerging economies, Africa, the Indo-Pacific, migration, the climate-energy nexus, food security and AI governance. Ukraine was in first place, as it had been at the very start on June 21, 2023. But new now were the Middle East (since the events of October 7, 2023), the Indo-Pacific region, climate (as part of the energy nexus) and food security. Gone as a separate item was economic security including supply chains. Remaining, if in a different order, were the developing countries and emerging economies of the Global South, Africa, migration and AI.

Ministerial Meetings

On January 5, 2024, the Italian presidency announced the schedule of G7 ministerial meetings for 2024. There would be 21 ministerial meetings, for 20 difference ministers, starting on March 13 and ending in November. Taking place before the summit came the six for, in order, industry, tech and digital; transport; foreign affairs; climate, energy and environment; justice; and finance. After the summit would come 13 more: education, science and technology, trade, urban development, labour and employment, culture, agriculture, interior, gender equality and women's empowerment, health inclusion and disability, and tourism. Another three, with dates not yet announced, would be for foreign affairs, development and defence (see Appendix C-1).

This was a new peak in the number of ministerial meetings, the number of different ministries at the core of each one, and the number of ministries involved overall. Two new ministerial meetings appeared, those for inclusion and disability, and for defence. The defence ministerial was spurred by the unprecedented shocks of the two deadly nearby wars unfolding at the same time – that by Russia in Ukraine, and that by Hamas against Israel in Gaza and Iranian affiliates surrounding Israel in the Middle East and down in the Gulf and Red Sea. However, the reference to the defence ministers' meeting was subsequently dropped from the schedule.

Eight weeks later, four more ministerial meetings had been added and taken place. The first ministerial meeting of Italy's presidency took place for trade ministers, virtually on February 7, 2024, chaired by Tajani. Its concluding joint communiqué contained 908 words, 15 paragraphs and 20 commitments, with three high binding and 17 low binding ones (see Appendix C-2). Of the 20 commitments, 19 focused on the World Trade Organization (WTO) and one on development, especially in Africa.

The second ministerial meeting took place for foreign ministers, on the margins of the Munich Security Conference, on February 17. Its chair's summary contained 1,909 words, 33 paragraphs and 24 commitments, with one general one, 13 on Ukraine, nine on the Middle East and the Red Sea, and one on Iran's nuclear program. Of the 24 commitments, four were high binding ones and 20 low binding ones.

The third new ministerial meeting, announced on February 19, was held virtually the following day for transport ministers to discuss the impact of the Red Sea crisis. This "extraordinary" meeting issued a "Declaration Issued by the G7 Transport Ministers on the Red Sea Escalating Crisis," on  February 20. Its 593 words and seven paragraphs contained two commitments – to support countries defending their vessels from attacks, and to protect seafarers and vessels. One was a low binding and the other a high binding one.

The Special Kyiv Summit on February 24

On February 24, on the second anniversary of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, G7 leaders held a special summit, for the first time in hybrid form from Kyiv, the capital city of a country under the constant threat of Russian attack. They produced a strong performance, due to the surprising attendance of the G7 leaders of Italy, Canada and the EU at the side of Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky and to their concluding consensus statement with its 235 commitments to support Ukraine for "as long as it takes" to win the war. The picture of the physical presence of three G7 leaders in Kyiv and the summit itself, as much as the promises on paper, showed that the G7 had come a long way to helping Ukraine win its war since the start on February 24, 2022, and that it could and would go all the way to win it in the end.

The summit had been announced on February 20, four days after the death of the imprisoned Russian dissident Alexi Navalny. The Italian presidency said that G7 leaders would hold a virtual special summit on February 24, with Zelensky invited. A joint declaration would appear at the end.

The was expected to agree on new sanctions, based on a new package from the EU and US approval of sanctions, as Italy believed Russia was suffering from the G7's economic sanctions (Pascale 2024).

On the morning of February 24, Meloni, von der Leyen, Trudeau and Alexander De Croo, prime minister of Belgium, which held the six-month presidency of the Council of the EU, participated in a ceremony with Zelensky at Hostomel Airport to honour those who had defended it on that day in 2022. The leaders' arrival in Kyiv was announced only that morning, for security reasons (Anadolu Staff 2024). In her speech Meloni (2024) said that the Ukrainians who defended the airport "also defended us" and "that this land is a piece of our home, and that we will do our part to defend it."

Attendance at the hybrid G7 summit, starting at 16h00 CET, was almost complete. All the G7 leaders who did not travel to Kyiv participated online except Macron, who was represented by his foreign minister Stéphane Séjourné so he could speak with dissatisfied French farmers at the Paris Agricultural Show.

At the summit's end, G7 leaders issued a statement of five pages, 19 paragraphs and 1,816 words. It exclusively addressed Russia's invasion of Ukraine and developments within Russia itself, led by the murder of Navalny several days before.

In their statement, G7 leaders affirmed their distinctive foundational missions of protecting and promoting democracy and human rights seven times, both in Ukraine and Russia. Four affirmations were of democracy and three of human rights.

The statement contained 36 precise, future-oriented, politically obligatory commitments (see Appendix D). All addressed Russia's invasion of Ukraine and developments within Russia and the support Russia received from North Korea, Iran and China. This decision-making performance was comparable to the German-hosted G7 summit on February 24, 2022, which produced 52 commitments across 15 subjects, including one on Russia's invasion of Ukraine that day. Kyiv's 35 commitments were also fewer than the 39 produced on the Japanese-hosted G7 summit the first anniversary, almost all of which were on Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The Kyiv Summit's fewer and more focused commitments were caused by the summit's hybrid format and location in the capital of a country at war with Russia, vulnerable to a possible deadly missile attack at any time. This required a set of strong, simple, singularly focused set of commitments, all about the clear and present danger at hand.

Compliance Momentum

Strong momentum for summit compliance came from the member governments' compliance with the priority commitments made at the June 2023 Hiroshima Summit. The interim compliance report of the G7 Research Group (2024) showed that by December 3, 2023, compliance with the 20 assessed commitments already averaged a very strong 91%. It was led by the United States at 98%, followed by France at 95%, the United Kingdom, the European Union, Canada and Germany at 93% each, and Japan and Italy at 83%. Italy stood at the bottom of the list, as it often did (see Appendix E).

By subject, Hiroshima's interim compliance was led eight commitments with 100%, on the issues non-proliferation, climate change (emission reduction policies), energy (clean energy technologies), energy (low carbon and renewable hydrogen markets), food and agriculture (food safety and sustainable production), education (inclusivity and equity), macroeconomics (fiscal sustainability and price stability) and development (official development assistance) (G7 Research Group 2024).

This was followed by 94% for regional security sanctions, environment (conservation measures), food and agriculture (healthy and safe diets), health (life expectancy) and digital economy (digital ecosystem with trust) (G7 Research Group 2024). Then came four with 81% on regional security (security assistance for Ukraine), climate change (domestic mitigation measures), gender (labour markets) and trade (resilient supply chains). At the bottom, with 75%, were commitments on human rights (forced labour), labour and employment (job creation) and crime and corruption (synthetic drugs).

Predicted full compliance for the full period until Apulia was also promising. It averaged 86% of all of Hiroshima's six AI (digitalization) commitments, 79% for its one on the health disease of dementia, 74% for the one macroeconomics and 79% for those made since 2016 that were due for delivery by 2025.

Prospective Commitments

As of mid January, based on the 2023 G7 Hiroshima Summit Interim Compliance Report, the Apulia Summit was likely to make several commitments on many key subjects (G7 Research Group 2024). They included:

• To continue to keep Russian assets abroad frozen until Russia compensates Ukraine for the damage Russia has done in its war there.
• To explore using the interest from these frozen Russian assets to help finance Ukraine now or even start to do so in ways that respect international and domestic law, financial stability, and the use of G7 currencies for international payments and investment (Dubois and Fleming 2023; Financial Times 2023, Tamma and Politi 2023; Hinrichsen 2024).
• To expand the ban on imports of non-industrial diamonds from Russia, beyond their agreement on December 6, 2023, to ban them for themselves starting January 1, 2024, and to ban stones processed in third countries starting March 1, 2024 (Foy and Dempsey 2023).
• To support Ukraine in developing its desired energy system that is more decentralized, resilient, cleaner and integrated with Europe, and secure the investment that will make it a clean energy hub (US Department of State 2023).

Leaders will very likely commit to the two commitments from earlier G7 summits that are due in 2024.

Leaders will also try to advance the 23 commitments due in 2025 made by G7 summits since 2015. They are led by those on the environment with eight, climate change with six, and energy with four, followed by health and gender with two each and labour-employment with one (see Appendix F).

They are also likely to commit to support or shape the major summits scheduled for the rest of 2024 and 2025. These included the UN's Summit of the Future in September 2024, and the SDGs as they started their final three-year period in 2025.

Propellors of Performance

As of March 2024, the Apulia Summit promises to produce a significant performance. This will be led by its strong support for Ukraine and the other European democracies in the face of Russia's aggression and its firm defence of a democratic Israel and efforts to contain and control the deadly conflict in Gaza, the Gulf to the south, Lebanon to the north and Iran just beyond. There will be substantial advances on climate change, the environment and energy, and Africa, and solid advances on development, the Indo-Pacific region, migration, food security, AI and the economy.

Apulia's significant performance will be propelled by the strong shock-activated vulnerability of G7 members to deadly conflicts and climate change, the failure of the multilateral organizations to respond effectively, G7 members' substantial globally predominant and internally equalizing capability on key components, their high – if challenged – democratic political commonality, the poor domestic political support of G7 leaders and the significant value they place on their personal G7 club at the hub of a growing network of global summit governance.

Shock-Activated Vulnerability

The first propeller is the strong shock-activated vulnerability of G7 members to surprising, deadly events created by acts of aggression and climate change's extreme weather events, and the energy, financial, health, food and other crises they breed (Wolf 2024).

Communiqué-reported shocks in 2024 began with those in the trade ministers' statement on February 7 (see Appendix G-1). It contained three shocks, with one on the "climate crisis," one on Russia's "war of aggression against Ukraine" and one on the "terror attacks by Hamas and others across Israel."

The chair's summary issued at the foreign ministers' meeting on February 17 contained seven shocks, with one expressing their on the "outrage at the death in detention of Alexi Navalny," two on Russia's "war of aggression" against Ukraine, and four on the terrorist attacks, catastrophic humanitarian crisis and atrocities in the Middle East.

The "Declaration Issued by the G7 Transport Ministers on the Red Sea Escalating Crisis" on February 20 identified six shocks, three on the "current crisis in the Red Sea" and another three exacerbated by it – "Russia's illegal war of aggression against Ukraine, extreme weather events, and global health concerns such as the ongoing recovery from the Covid-19 pandemic."

Propelling the Kyiv Summit to its strong performance on February 24 were the 11 physical shocks, highlighted in the G7 leaders' statement. Eight addressed Russia's aggression, brutal attacks, atrocities and threatened use of nuclear weapons. Three referred to Navalny's murder.

The World Economic Forum Global Risk Report 2024, published on January 10, 2024, identified as "the risk most likely to present a material crisis on a global scale in 2024" to be extreme weather first (from 66% of respondents), AI-generated misinformation and disinformation second (53%), societal or political polarization third (46%), cost-of-living crisis fourth 42%) and cyberattacks fifth (39%) (World Economic Forum 2024, 7–8). The most severe risks over the next two years were, in order, misinformation and disinformation, extreme weather events, societal polarization, cyber security and interstate-armed conflict.

Media-highlighted newsworthy shocks were also high (see Appendix G-2). The world's elite daily financial newspaper, the Financial Times, in the 12 days it published between January 2 and 17, distributed its front-page stories as follows: democracy (including war against democratic countries) on 92%, the economy 75%, climate and energy 50%, and health and digital 33% each. By the number of stories, the economy had 21, democracy 17, climate-energy 7, health 5 and digital 4.

From February 1 to 25, the distribution by 21 publishing days was democracy and war on 95%, economy 95%, climate and energy 33%, health 29%, and digital 24%. The distribution by number of front-page stories was democracy 44%, economy 43%, climate and energy 12%, health 11%, and digital 7%.

Physical shocks were led by Russia's escalating missile attacks on Ukraine's energy and civil infrastructure as January began, the escalating Middle East war, especially with US, UK and allied military strikes on Yemen's Houthis in the Gulf on January 12 and Russia's murder of Navalny on February 16.

Scientific shocks were high. In early January the Copernicus Institute (2024) reported that 2023 had been the hottest year in recorded history, and that the heat, reinforced by the effect of the El Niño Southern Oscillation, would get worse through to the summer of 2024 and continue to worsen.

Democratic shock-activated vulnerabilities were likely to be fuelled by the unprecedented number of elections in 2024 and the surprising results they could bring. The first such election outside the G7 came in Taiwan on January 13 was won democratically by the candidate opposed to autocratic China, and did not generate a significant response from China.

Multilateral Organizational Failure

The ministerially governed, siloed, multilateral organizations created since the 1940s failed to mount and effective response to these big, broad, interconnected shocks.

On security issues, the UN Security Council was paralyzed by the unilateral veto of its Permanent Five members Russia and China from addressing the security shocks from Russia's aggression against Ukraine, the Hamas attack on Israel and its Iranian-backed affiliates in the Middle East and Red Sea, and from the military pressure on Taiwan and Japan in the South China Sea and Indo-Pacific region as a whole. The US veto constrained support for the Palestinians also suffering from their control by Hamas and Israeli actions to counter it.

On development, debt, Africa and emerging economies, the World Bank Group and International Monetary Fund (IMF) struggled to, but fell far short of meeting their needs, even with the support of the many regional development banks, including the newer BRICS New Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Development Bank. And despite continuing pressure for reform of the IMF and World Bank to give rising emerging economies greater voice and vote, the resulting changes there were very small and slow.

On migration and refugees, the UN High Commissioner of Refugees and the International Organization for Migration failed to help the G7's European members and the US stop the growing flow of illegal migration from flowing across the Mediterranean and Middle East and through Mexico into their countries, fuelling the rise of right-wing populist parties and dissatisfaction with the leaders there.

On the climate-energy nexus, the UN climate conference in oil-rich Dubai in December 2023 failed to meet the growing global need, despite evidence about escalating, historic global heating. No World Energy Organization exists to spur the shift from hydrocarbons to renewables, leaving the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries plus with Russia competing with the G7-centred International Energy Agency with leading members such as the US, Canada and the UK still reliant on fossil fuel. And no empowered environmental organization with a comprehensive ecological mandate has emerged to coordinate and control the response to the interconnected ecological shocks.

On AI, the International Telecommunication Union had tried to respond to its rapid development but was too slow and too beset by competitions between China, Russia and their allies, on the one hand, and G7 democracies, on the other, to lead the creation of an effective global governance regime.

On the key economic, finance and development issues, the IMF and World Bank failed to accurately forecast and thus try to prevent the declining growth in gross domestic product (GDP) in all G7 members in their forecasts just before 2024 began. However, as their executive boards and leaders were controlled by G7 members, they did better in modifying their missions and mobilizing resources to meet the crisis of climate change, biodiversity loss and health threats, within the severe constraints that their constitutions, professional expertise and organizational culture allowed. And the WTO, at its ministerial conference in late February, did little to overcome the many deadlocks that largely paralyzed it.

On food security, the Food and Agriculture Organization, International Fund for Agricultural Development, and the World Food Programme, all headquartered in Rome, seldom meet at the leaders' level and have prioritized the production of food over the preservation of the world forests and agricultural lands that they have assumed responsibility for.

The greatest gaps in the subjects of the shock-activated vulnerability versus the multilateral organization failure coincided well with the priorities and prospective performance of the Apulia Summit in June – above all on security, the climate and energy nexus, and AI.

Predominant Equalizing Capability

The globally predominant and internally equalizing capability of G7 members is small, but on key components in military, financial and AI capabilities it is high.

The level of the G7's global predominance in overall capabilities is small, as the G7 now has only about one-third of global GDP, at current exchange rates.

In GDP growth at current exchange rates, the G7's global predominance and internal equality declined as 2024 got underway (see Appendix H). On February 5, 2024, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) forecast that GDP growth would be 2.9% for the world and for the G20 economies, with China at 4.7%. But it would be only 2.1% for the US and even less for all other G7 members, with the 17-member Eurozone at 0.6%, Germany 0.3%, France 0.6%, UK 0.7%, Italy 0.7%, and OECD members as a whole 1.8%.

This was a continuation of the earlier trends of US predominance within the G7. In late October 2023, the IMF estimated that real GDP growth from the fourth quarter of 2019 to the second quarter of 2023 was strongly led by the US at just over 6%, followed far behind with Canada at 3.5%, Italy with 3.3%, the Eurozone 3%, Japan 3% and the UK 1.8% (Chazan 2023).

The G7's internal equalization in overall currency capabilities was also small as 2024 got underway. The US dollar index against a basket of six other major currencies, the best measure of overall relative capability, rose to a one-month high of almost 104 on January 16, 2024, after falling strongly from its peak of 107 in the summer of 2023 (Financial Times 2024a). On February 6, 2024, it rose to its highest level since November 2023, climbing 3.2% over the previous five weeks after falling over 5% between October 1 and late December (Financial Times 2024b). In mid November, the US dollar was headed for its largest weekly drop since mid July, and the yen started to strengthen since its fall throughout 2023.

However, in the specialized military capabilities – key for prevailing in Ukraine, the Middle East, the Indo-Pacific region and elsewhere – the G7's global predominance was strong. Yet its internal equality was low, again due to the commanding global lead of the US. This had a powerful constraining effect, as for the first seven weeks of 2024, the Republican-controlled House of Representatives refused to let the Biden administration send additional military or financial support to a beleaguered, retreating Ukraine, leading to the fall of the Ukrainian-controlled city of Ardivikia to Russian forces on February 17.

Common Political Characteristics

The common political characteristics of G7 members remained high, despite challenges from anti-democratic forces within several members, led by the US. All G7 members ranked above 80% on their electoral democracy index score for free and fair elections, free media, rights of association guarantees, as compiled by the University of Gothenburg's V-Dem Institute, even if they had all dipped a bit in the most recent years (Financial Times 2024c). The all ranked well above the other leading G20 and BRICS members of South Africa with 70%, Brazil with under 70%, India 40%, Russia 20%, China with under 10%, even though democratic Australia, South Korea, and Argentina also had over 80% and Mexico 60%, Indonesia just under 60% and Turkey 30%. In the US was challenged by former president Trump, running for the presidency again, but so far doing so within the established, constitutionally created, electoral system, while awaiting the final judicial systems' judgement on whether he had violated these rules.

Domestic Political Control

As of March 2024, the domestic political control of the G7 leaders is low.

The G7 summit experience of G7 leaders is significant, as all are veterans of this forum. Meloni, the host, will be at her second summit, Trudeau and Macron at their ninth, Biden and Scholz at their fourth, Kishida at his third, Sunak at his second, and von der Leyen at her fifth and Michel at his fifth and last. Together they bring 34 years of regular G7 summit experience, for an average of 4.25 years for each.

But back at home, their legislative control is low, with all but the UK's Sunak leading coalition governments or parties without a majority in both legislative chambers (see Appendix I-1). Biden's Democrats control only the Senate, and that by a very slim majority. The LDP's Kishida has a coalition with the New Komeito Party. Social Democratic Sholz has a three-party coalition with the Greens and Free Democrats. Macron's Renaissance party has lost control of the National Assembly in recent elections. Meloni leads a multiparty coalition. Trudeau's Liberals depends for their parliamentary survival on a supply and confidence agreement with the New Democrat Party. And von der Leyen's party depended on a coalition for its majority in the European Parliament.

The next elections for these leaders are approaching (see Appendix I-2). They are led by Biden on November 5, 2024, followed in 2025 by Sunak by January 28, Trudeau by October 30, Scholz by October 26, and Kishida by October 31. There are none scheduled in 2026; in 2027 Macron's will be in April and Meloni's in December. Apart from Biden, all could choose or be forced to call an early election.

The domestic political popularity of all G7 and leaders and their parties is low. Polls on January 30, 2024, showed that the public approval of all G7 leaders was a net negative, with Meloni at −6%, Biden −18%, Trudeau −25%, Sunak −36%, Macron −44% and Scholz −56% (see Appendix I-3).

A poll by Quinnipac University on February 20 showed that in the US public approval of the Democratic Party's presidential candidate was only 49%. In Japan, on February 15 Kishida's cabinet was at a new low of 16.9% in a Jiji Press poll (see Appendix I-4).

Club at the Hub

G7 leaders place a high value on the G7 as their personal club at the hub of a growing network of global summit governance. As host, Meloni took the traditional pre-summit tour to meet with her fellow G7 leaders, announcing on February 18 that she would visit the United States on March 1 and Canada on March 2. Following speculation about a virtual G7 summit to mark the second anniversary of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, as they had on the first anniversary in 2023, the Italian presidency on February 20 announced that it would.
 
This continued the recent tradition since 2021 of holding special summits at the start of the new host's year. Although no such special summits were scheduled for the rest of the year, another could take place, as in 2023, on the margins of the summit of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in Washington DC on July 9–11, 2024. Another could take place on the margins of the UN's Summit of the Future, co-facilitated by Germany and Namibia, in New York on September 22–23, and on the margins of the G20's Rio Summit, hosted by Brazil on November 18–19, 2024. This would depend, inter alia, on Biden's schedule and political and physical calculations, as the US presidential elections on November 5 approached.

References

Anadolu Staff (2024). "Italy's Premier to Lead G7 Leaders' Videoconference Meeting from Kiev," Anadolu Agency Website, February 24. https://www.aa.com.tr/en/russia-ukraine-war/italy-s-premier-to-lead-g7-leaders-videoconference-meeting-from-kyiv/3146856.

Chazan, Guy (2023). "A Difficult Adjustment," Financial Times, October 25, p. 15.

Copernicus Institute (2024). "Copernicus: 2023 Is the Hottest Year on Record, with Global Temperatures Close to the 1.5°C Limit," January 9. https://climate.copernicus.eu/copernicus-2023-hottest-year-record.

Dubois, Laura and Sam Fleming (2023). "G7 Weighs Legal Case for Seizing Russia's Frozen Assets," Financial Times, December 21, p. 3.

Financial Times (2023). "The Pitfalls of Seizing Russia Assets to Fund Ukraine," December 22, p. 16.

Financial Times (2024a). "The Day in the Markets," January 17, p. 11.

Financial Times (2024b). "The Day in the Markets," February 6, p. 9.

Financial Times (2024c). "Democracy under Threat in the 'Year of Elections'." The World: Democracy in 2024 (insert), January 17, p. 5.

Foy, Henry and Harry Dempsey (2023). "Diamonds: Russia Stones Face G7 Ban," Financial Times, December 7, p. 4.

G7 Research Group (2024). "2023 G7 Hiroshima Summit Interim Compliance Report," February 19, 2024. https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/evaluations/2023compliance-interim/index.html.

Hinrichsen, Simon (2024). "Seizing Russia's Reserves Is the Right Thing to Do," Financial Times, January 3, p. 9.

International Monetary Fund (2024). "Moderating Inflation and Steady Growth Open Path to Soft Landing," International Monetary Fund, January 30. https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2024/01/30/world-economic-outlook-update-january-2024.

Kirton, John (2024). "The G7 Alliance's Expanding Effectiveness," Wilson Quarterly, Winter. https://www.wilsonquarterly.com/quarterly/the-new-multilateralism/the-g7-alliances-expanding-effectiveness.

Meloni, Giorgia (2023). "President Meloni's press conference at the G7 Summit," Hiroshima, May 20. https://www.governo.it/en/articolo/president-meloni-s-press-conference-g7-summit/22679.

Meloni, Giorgia (2024). "President Meloni's speech at Hostomel airport on second anniversary of Russia's aggression against Ukraine," Kyiv, February 24. https://www.governo.it/en/articolo/president-Russia-s-speech-hostomel-airport-second-anniversary-russia-s-aggression-against.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2024. "Growth Continuing at a Modest Pace Through 2025, Inflation Declining to Central Bank Targets," February 5, 2024. https://www.oecd.org/newsroom/growth-continuing-at-a-modest-pace-through-2025-inflation-declining-to-central-bank-targets.htm.

Pascale, Federica (2024). "Italians increasingly sceptical of EU's positive role in Ukraine war," Euractiv, February 22. https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/Ukraine-increasingly-sceptical-of-eus-positive-role-in-ukraine-war.

Tamma, Paola and James Politi (2023). "US Puts Forward G7 Plan to Seize $300bn in Russian Assets," Financial Times, December 29, p. 2.

US Department of State (2023). "Secretary Blinken's Meeting with G7+ Partners on Ukraine Energy Sector Support," Office of the Spokesperson November 21. https://www.state.gov/secretary-blinkens-meeting-with-g7-partners-on-ukraine-energy-sector-support-2.

Vagnoni, Giselda (2024). "Italy to Put Africa Development, AI at Heart of Its G7 Presidency," Reuters, January 5. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/africa-ai-be-key-g7-issues-italy-meloni-says-2024-01-04.

Wolf, Martin (2024). "What We Know About the Global Outlook," Financial Times, January 17, p. 17.

World Economic Forum (2024). "Global Risks Report 2024." January 10, 2024. https://www.weforum.org/publications/global-risks-report-2024.

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Appendix A: G7 Summit Performance, 1975–2023 ↩

Updated: Brittaney Warren, October 14, 2023.
Notes: n/a = not available.
Grade: Kirton scale is A+ Extremely Strong, Striking, Standout, Historic; A Very Strong; A− Strong; B+ Significant; B Substantial; B− Solid; C Small; D Very Small; F Failure (including made things worse).
Domestic political management: # communiqué compliments = the number of favourable references to G7/G8 members by name. Spread = number of G7/G8 members complimented.
Deliberation: # days = the duration of the summit; # statements = number of official statements issued in the leaders' name; # words = number of words contained in the official statements.
Direction setting: # affirmations of G7/G8 core values of open democracy, individual liberty and human rights contained in official documents.
Decision making: # commitments contained in the official documents.
Delivery: Compliance: compliance with selected commitments assessed as follows: 1975–1989 assessed elsewhere by George von Furstenberg and Joseph Daniels; 1990–1995 assessed elsewhere by Ella Kokotsis; 1996– assessed by the G7 Research Group. # commitments: number of commitments assessed.
Development of global governance: # ministerials created = number of institutions at the ministerial level created; # official-level groups created = number of institutions at the officials level created. Institutions created at or by the summit, or during the hosting year, at least in the form of having one meeting take place.
Participation: # members = number of leaders of full members, including those representing the European Community from the start; Russia started as a participant in 1991 and became a full member in 1998; the G4 met in 1974 without Japan and Italy and later that year the G6 (without Canada) met. # participating countries = number of full members plus number of leaders from other countries. # participating international organizations = number of heads of international organizations.

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Appendix B: Italy's 2024 Summit Priorities ↩

As set out on June 21, 2023

1. Global South
2. Ukraine
3. Economic security, including supply chains, building on the 2023 summit's results
4. Energy security
5. Migration, human trafficking and how to tackle illegal migration, as a key issues
6. Africa, more cooperation, including Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment
7. Artificial intelligence

As set out on December 19, 2023

1. Ukraine
2. Middle East
3. Developing countries, emerging economies
4. Africa
5. Indo-Pacific
6. Migration
7. Climate-energy nexus
8. Food security
9. Artificial intelligence governance

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Appendix C: G7 Ministerial Meetings in 2024 ↩

C-1: G7 Ministerial Meeting Schedule (as of March 1, 2024)

Held

1. February 7: Trade ministers hold virtual meeting, issue statement
2. February 17: Foreign ministers meet at Munich Security Conference, issue chair's summary
3. February 20: Transport ministers meet virtually, issue declaration
4. February 28: Health ministers meet virtually, issue statement

Scheduled

1. March 13-15 in Verona and Trento: Industry, tech and digital
2. April 11-13 in Milano: Transport
3. April 17-19 in Capri: Foreign affairs
4. April 28-30 in Turin: Climate, energy and environment
5. May 9-10 in Venice: Justice
6. May 23-25 in Stresa: Finance
7. June 27-29 in Trieste: Education
8. July 9-11 in Bologna and Forlì: Science and technology
9. July 16-17 in Villa San Giovanni and Reggio Calabria: Trade
10. July 24-26 in Genoa: Urban development
11. September 11-13 in Cagliari: Labour and employment
12. September 19-21 in Positano: Culture
13. September 26-28 in Siracusa: Agriculture
14. October 2-4 (TBC) in Avellino: Interior
15. October 4-6 in Matera: Gender equality and women's empowerment
16. October 9-11 in Ancona: Health
17. October 14-16 in Assisi and Perugia: Inclusion and disability
18. November 13-14 in Toscana (TBC): Tourism
19. Others still to be confirmed
    Foreign affairs in Fiuggi
    Development in Pescara
    Defence in Naples (included in the original list and subsequently removed from the website schedule)

C-2: G7 Ministerial Meetings Performance

Notes:

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Appendix D: Commitments, G7 Kyiv Summit, February 24, 2024 ↩

2024V-01 [We the Leaders of the Group of Seven (G7) met today with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to] reaffirm our unwavering support for Ukraine

2024V-02 We will hold those culpable for Navalny's death accountable, including by continuing to impose restrictive measures in response to human rights violations and abuses in Russia and taking other actions.

2024V-03 We will continue to support Ukraine's right to self-defence and reiterate our commitment to Ukraine's long-term security, including by concluding and implementing bilateral security commitments and arrangements, based on the Joint Declaration of Support for Ukraine we endorsed in Vilnius last July.

2024V-04 We are stepping up our security assistance to Ukraine and are increasing our production and delivery capabilities, to assist the country.

2024V-05 We will help Ukraine meet its urgent financing needs,

2024V-06 [We will help Ukraine meet its urgent financing needs,] and assist other vulnerable countries severely affected by the impacts of Russia's war.

2024V-07 We urge the approval of additional support to close Ukraine's remaining budget gap for 2024.

2024V-08 We will continue to work, with the Ukrainian authorities and International Financial Institutions through the Multi-agency Donor Coordination Platform for Ukraine

2024V-09 [We will continue to work, with the Ukrainian authorities and International Financial Institutions through the Multi-agency Donor Coordination Platform for Ukraine] and by leveraging private investments.

2024V-10 We will never recognise so-called "elections", past and future, held by Russia in the territories of Ukraine, nor their results.

2024V-11 We remain committed to holding those responsible accountable for their atrocities against the people of Ukraine, in line with international law.

2024V-12 We support investigations by the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, the Prosecutor-General of Ukraine, and other national prosecutors within their jurisdictions.

2024V-13 Finally, we will continue to support Ukrainian displaced persons and refugees and protect those in need.

2024V-14 We reiterate our support for the Council of Europe Register of Damage for Ukraine.

2024V-15 We will continue to help Ukraine export its grain and agricultural products to the most vulnerable nations, including through the implementation of the Grain Verification Scheme that Ukraine will lead this year.

2024V-16 We will continue to raise the cost of Russia's war, degrade Russia's sources of revenue and impede its efforts to build its war machine, as demonstrated by our recently approved sanctions packages.

2024V-17 We remain committed to fully implementing and enforcing our sanctions on Russia and adopting new measures as necessary.

2024V-18 We remain committed to fully implementing and enforcing our sanctions on Russia] and adopting new measures as necessary.

2024V-19 We continue to counter, in close cooperation with third countries, any attempts to evade and circumvent our sanctions and export control measures.

2024V-20 We will impose additional sanctions on companies and individuals in third countries who help Russia acquire weapons or key inputs for weapons.

2024V-21 We will also impose sanctions on those who help Russia acquire tools and other equipment that aid Russian weapons production or military-industrial development.

2024V-22 We will continue to apply significant pressure on Russian revenues from energy and other commodities.

2024V-23 We will continue to take steps to tighten compliance and enforcement of the oil price cap.

2024V-24 While working to maintain supply stability, we will respond to price cap violations, including by imposing additional sanctions measures on those engaged in deceptive practices while transporting Russian oil and against the networks Russia has developed to extract additional revenue from price cap violations.

2024V-25 We will continue taking steps to limit Russia's future energy revenues.

2024V-26 We will continue to impede Russia's development of future energy projects and disrupt its development of alternatives for energy shipping and other services.

2024V-27 We will continue efforts to reduce Russia's revenues from metals.

2024V-28 We will continue to take action against third-country actors who materially support Russia's war including by imposing additional measures on entities, where appropriate, in third countries.

2024V-29 We call on financial institutions to refrain from supporting Russia's war machine and we will take appropriate steps, consistent with our legal systems, to deter this behaviour.

2024V-30 We are determined to dispel any false notion that time is on Russia's side, that destroying infrastructure and livelihoods has no consequences for Russia, or that Russia could prevail by causing Ukraine to fail economically. Russia should not be able to indefinitely delay payment it owes.

2024V-31 We are determined to ensure full accountability and we support Ukraine in obtaining compensation for the loss, injury and damage resulting from Russia's aggression.

2024V-32 We reaffirm that, consistent with our respective legal systems, Russia's sovereign assets in our jurisdictions will remain immobilized until Russia pays for the damage it caused to Ukraine.

2024V-33 We welcome the adoption of the EU legal acts concerning extraordinary revenues of central securities depositories gained from Russia's immobilised sovereign assets and encourage further steps to enable their use, consistent with applicable contractual obligations and in accordance with applicable laws.

2024V-34 We ask our ministers to continue their work and update ahead of the Apulia Summit on all possible avenues by which immobilized Russian sovereign assets could be made use of to support Ukraine, consistent with our respective legal systems and international law.

2024V-35 As we move forward, we continue our support to Ukraine in further developing President Zelenskyy's Peace Formula

2024V-36 [We continue our support to Ukraine in further developing President Zelenskyy's Peace Formula] and commit ourselves to supporting a comprehensive, just and lasting peace consistent with the principles of the UN Charter, international law and respectful of Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity.

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Appendix E: Italy and G7 Compliance, 1975–2021 ↩

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Appendix F: G7 Commitments with 2025 Timeline ↩

Compiled by Brittaney Warren, September 25, 2023. Coded by John Kirton, November 26, 2023.
Note: The 23 commitments due in 2025 made by G7 summits since 2015 are led by those on the environment with eight, climate change with six and energy with four, followed by health and gender with two each and labour and employment with one.

2015 Elmau (1)
2015-283: [We will continue to take steps] to reduce the gender gap in workforce participation within our own countries by 25% by 2025, taking into account national circumstances including by improving the framework conditions to enable women and men to balance family life and employment, including access to parental leave and childcare. (core gender) (labour-employment related)

2016 Ise-Shima (2)
2016-166: We remain committed to the elimination of inefficient fossil fuel subsidies and encourage all countries to do so by 2025. (core energy finance)
2016-226: Galvanize international efforts to combat malnutrition and to hold the rise of obesity and over-weight targeting most vulnerable populations - mothers, children and adolescent girls - and consistent with the WHO [World Health Organization] Comprehensive Implementation Plan on Maternal, Infant and Young Child Nutrition, including: (i) the activities within the Decade of Action on Nutrition 2016-2025 and by various initiatives such as Scaling Up Nutrition (core health) (food-agriculture-related)

2017 Taormina (1)
2017-152: Consider adopting measures that support an increased uptake by fathers of parental leave, by 2025. (core gender)

2018 Charlevoix (0)
None

2019 Biarritz (0)
None

2020 Virtual (0)
None

2021 Cornwall (5)
2021-14: [We commit to]…increasing and improving climate finance to 2025 (core climate change finance)
2021-189: More broadly, we reaffirm our existing commitment to eliminating inefficient fossil fuel subsidies by 2025, [and call on all countries to join us, recognising the substantial financial resource this could unlock globally to support the transition and the need to commit to a clear timeline]. (core energy - finance)
2021-204: We reaffirm the collective developed country goal to jointly mobilise $100 billion per year from public and private sources, through to 2025 in the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency on implementation. (core climate change - finance)
2021-224: Third, we will work intensively towards increasing investment in the protection, conservation and restoration of nature, including committing to increase finance for nature-based solutions through to 2025. (core environment - finance)
2021-326: Working intensively towards increasing finance for nature from all sources throughout the next five years: in particular, we commit to increase our finance contributions for nature-based solutions through to 2025. (core environment - finance)

2022 Elmau (6)
2022-32: We renew our strong commitment and will intensify our efforts to delivering on the collective USD 100 billion climate finance mobilisation goal as soon as possible and through to 2025. (core climate change - finance)
2022-34: We commit to working alongside others towards the implementation of the Glasgow Climate Pact's call to collectively at least double the provision of climate finance for adaptation to developing countries from 2019 levels by 2025. (core climate change - finance)
2022-39: We are committed to mobilising resources from all sources and to substantially increasing our national and international funding for nature by 2025 to support the implementation of an ambitious global framework. (core environment - finance)
2022-41: We commit to ensure our international development assistance does no harm to nature by 2025, and delivers positive outcomes overall for people, climate, and nature. (core environment) (development-related)
2022-48: We [stress that fossil fuel subsidies are inconsistent with the goals of the Paris Agreement and] reaffirm our commitment to the elimination of inefficient fossil fuel subsidies by 2025. (core energy - finance)
2022-161: By 2025, we will increase the share of our ODA [official development assistance] employment and skills promotion programmes that is directed specifically towards green sectors and greening traditional sectors in alignment with our emerging and developing partner countries' strategies, and subject to our budgetary processes. (core labour and employment) (development-related)

2023 Hiroshima (8)
2023-116: We reaffirm our commitments to the developed country Parties' [to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change] goal of jointly mobilizing $100 billion annually in climate finance by 2020 through to 2025 in the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency on implementation. (core climate change - finance)
2023-123: We continue to accelerate efforts to respond to the Glasgow Climate Pact that urges developed countries to at least double their collective provision of climate finance for adaptation to developing countries from the 2019 level by 2025, in the context of achieving a balance between mitigation and adaptation in the provision of scaled-up financial resources. (core climate change - finance) (development related)
2023-143: We will make as much progress as possible on these issues…by the UN Ocean Conference in 2025. (core environment)
2023-144: [We will make as much progress as possible]…on the broader agenda of ocean protection by the UN Ocean Conference in 2025. (core environment)
2023-147: We will identify incentives, including subsidies, harmful to biodiversity by 2025, and redirect or eliminate them while scaling up positive incentives for the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity by 2030 at the latest, taking initial steps without delay. (core environment - finance)
2023-148: We reiterate our commitment to substantially increase our national and international funding for nature by 2025. (core environment - finance)
2023-178: We reaffirm our commitment to the elimination of inefficient fossil fuel subsidies by 2025 or sooner (core energy - finance)
2023-248: We recommit to working alongside global partners to assist countries to achieve UHC [universal health coverage] by supporting primary health care (PHC) and developing and restoring essential health services, to achieve better than pre-pandemic levels by the end of 2025, as part of our effort to strengthen health systems in ordinary times. (core health)

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Appendix G: Shock-Activated Vulnerabilities ↩

G-1: Ministerial Meetings' Shock-Activated Vulnerabilities

Note: Ukraine includes Russia.

G-2: Media-Highlighted Shock-Activated Vulnerabilities

Notes: Coded by John Kirton, January 14, 2024.
Excludes appearance in any continuation of the story on inside pages.
Health-economy and health-climate are their co-appearance on the front-page part of the same story.
Numbers are % of stories on front page.
Climate includes biodiversity, environment, energy.
Democracy includes elections etc. within a country, and war between democracies and non-democracies.

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Appendix H: Forecasted Growth in Gross Domestic Product for 2024 ↩

Sources: "Growth Continuing at a Modest Pace Through 2025, Inflation Declining to Central Bank Targets," Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, February 5, 2024; "Moderating Inflation and Steady Growth Open Path to Soft Landing," International Monetary Fund, January 30, 2024.

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Appendix I: G7 Leaders' Domestic Political Control ↩

I-1: Legislative Control

I-2: Next G7 Elections

I-3: Public Approval of G7 Leaders

I-4: Public Approval of G7 Leaders' Party in 2024

Note: − is % approval minus % disapproval

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