

Promising Prospects for Italy's 2024 G7 Apulia Summit

John Kirton, Director, G7 Research Group
June 8, 2024 (updated from May 28, 2024)

The G7's 50th annual summit, taking place in Apulia, Italy, on June 13–15, 2024, is a landmark event in several ways. It marks the first half century of G7 summits' contribution to global governance, since their start at Rambouillet, France, in 1975 (Kirton 2024). It builds on the strong performance of the Hiroshima Summit on May 19–21, 2023, and its follow-up summits on December 6, 2023, February 24, 2024, and April 14, 2024 (see Appendix A). The Apulia Summit confronts a wide array of interconnected crises, starting with Russia's war against Ukraine in Europe, deadly conflicts in the Middle East, and military advances by China in Asia, accompanied by climate change, energy, economic, financial, food and health insecurity, declines in development, debt sustainability and democracy, especially in Africa, and newer challenges from migration and refugees and from artificial intelligence (AI). Meeting at the crossroads of Europe, the Mediterranean, North Africa and the Middle East, G7 leaders will address these crises and work with their invited guests from the key countries of Brazil, India, South Africa, Argentina, and Türkiye in the G20, Tunisia, Egypt, Algeria and Kenya from Africa, as well as Ukraine and Pope Francis. Invited guests will also come from the major multilateral and regional organizations most relevant to the summit's priorities.

In Apulia, the G7 leaders of Italy, the United States, Japan, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Canada and the European Union will build on the results of the G20 summit in New Delhi on September 9–10, 2023, and the subsequent virtual G20 one on November 22, and the other major plurilateral summits that followed, including the special G7 summit hosted by Italy in Kyiv on February 24, 2024, and another virtually on April 14, as well as the many G7 ministerial meetings that Italy mounted before the Apulia Summit, with an eye to the many coming after. But at Apulia G7 leaders will have the unique responsibility to confront and control the deadly conflicts, other crises and challenges in ways that fulfill their shared, distinctive foundational mission of protecting the principles and practices of open democracy and individual liberty within their own countries and globally promoting them.

All the G7 leaders participating at Apulia will be veterans of G7 summits. They will be led by the first female and youngest Italian prime minister Giorgia Meloni, at her second annual G7 summit and her first as host. Canadian prime minister Justin Trudeau and French president Emmanuel Macron will be at their ninth, US president Joe Biden and German chancellor Olaf Scholz at their fourth, Japanese prime minister Fumio Kishida at his third, and UK prime minister Rishi Sunak at his second. The EU Commission's President Ursula von der Leyen will be at her fifth and the EU Council's President Charles Michel at his fifth and last.

Security, the G7 leaders' first priority, begins with the deadly conflicts in Europe, and the Middle East and Gulf, and military confrontations in the Indo-Pacific and Asia. These threats arise from Russia's invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, the Hamas attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, and Israel's attacks in Gaza in response, Iran's support for Israel's enemies and its attack on Israel itself, a nuclear-armed North Korea increasingly threatening neighbouring South Korea and Japan, a militarizing China preparing to seize Taiwan by force, and the need for nuclear disarmament and control of weapons of mass destruction. It embraces crime and corruption and the overall need to defend democracy and human rights everywhere, amid the growing disinformation, polarization and interference in democratic elections enabled by digital communication and AI.

The second priority of development, debt, Africa and emerging economies starts with restoring development in poor countries, reducing their unsustainable debt levels and reinforcing progress toward the United Nations' Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) due by 2030, and partnering with Africa in equal ways.

The third priority of migration and refugees covers the involuntary migrants and refugees displaced within their own countries, people driven from poor to rich countries by conflict, climate change and poverty, and people migrating legally to provide their new countries with the workers and taxpayers they need.

The fourth priority of the climate-energy nexus is led by climate change, biodiversity loss and pollution in the air, oceans, fresh water and land from plastics, chemicals and other human waste. Human activity is now relentlessly driving the post-industrial global temperature increase beyond 1.5°C toward unliveable limits, fuelling more frequent, persistent, intense and widespread extreme weather events, including historic heatwaves, floods and droughts and approaching critical ecological tipping points beyond which there is no return.

The energy security component of this priority features clean and renewable sources as the future fuel of choice. This requires phasing out fossil fuel subsidies and relying on demand management, energy efficiency, hydroelectricity, solar and wind power, and the newer sources of geothermal, tidal and wave power, small nuclear reactors, and the prospective technologies of green hydrogen and ammonia. Hydrocarbons, notably oil and natural gas – offered as “just transition” fuels – continue to be relevant.

The fifth priority of food security was identified by Meloni (2023b) at the UN Food Systems Summit on July 24, 2023, as “high on the agenda of our G7 Presidency in the next year.” It centres on the immediate need to feed the rising number of famine-stricken countries and people. It extends to crafting exports and imports – amid inflation, sanctions, and environmental, social and governance concerns – in ways that help provide affordable, accessible, appropriate food and create the agricultural products, services, practices and innovation that produce sustainable development with healthy food for all.

The sixth priority of artificial intelligence includes developing rules for its governance that enable its innovative potential to expand, within guardrails that ensure privacy, safety, intellectual property protection and the integrity of information in the political, economic social, cultural, artistic and other spheres.

The G7's traditional built-in agenda starts with the economy and finance. It includes strengthening non-inflationary, shared economic growth through fiscal, monetary and exchange rate policy and strengthening financial stability through better financial regulation and supervision, including of banks and shadow banks, private investments (including private equity), pension funds, insurance, accounting, sovereign wealth funds and crypto currency. It also involves G7 leaders' new focus on economic security and resilience by diversifying supply chains through cooperation among themselves and with other democracies and the developing countries that need to export their way to prosperity and secure inward investment and infrastructure partnerships to help. Travel, tourism and culture are a key concern of Italy, which has a tourist-dependent economy, the most world UNESCO-certified heritage sites, and an internationally famous cultural heritage reaching back several millennia and growing vibrantly today. Travel, tourism and culture are similarly important to many countries, as they foster economic development, poverty reduction, women and youth empowerment, ecological enhancement, intercultural understanding and peace.

Health, a perennial summit subject, includes controlling Covid-19 as new variants arise, preventing, preparing and responding to new pandemics, and addressing outbreaks of measles, mpox, Ebola, polio and HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, H1N1 influenza, other infectious and chronic, non-communicable diseases, zoonoses, antimicrobial resistance and disabilities. It adds an emphasis on mental health, exacerbated by Covid-19, and brain health, as dementia spreads among the rapidly aging populations in most G7 members and many beyond, and the links between health and climate change intensify. In response, G7 leaders will seek to strengthen universal health coverage, primary health care and an integrated global health architecture through a new pandemic treaty, better International Health Regulations and a richer Pandemic Fund, all with a more powerful and better financed World Health Organization (WHO) at the core.

Social well-being more broadly includes fostering better jobs and labour standards, gender equality, education and human capital, and care for children, youth, and the elderly.

Strengthening the G7-centred system of global governance involves improving implementation of G7 summit commitments, the multilateral institutions in the UN system, trust in multilateralism amid a changing balance of power and cascading crises, and the G7's relationship with the major growing democracies led by India, with the G20 – which Brazil hosts in 2024 – and with civil society, represented by the formal and informal G7 engagement groups.

In addressing this very broad, demanding, interconnected agenda, G7 leaders will be guided by their Italian host's emphasis on partnership with the Global South and between East and West, on G7 unity, and on the issues of Ukraine, economic security, energy security, migration and Africa.

Schools of Thought

The first school of thought about the summit's performance sees the G7 getting its swagger back, at least for a short time. Kevin Carmichael (2024) highlights the G7's agreement to use the profits from seized Russian assets to help Ukraine, saying the G7's resurgence is because the G20 “has accomplished little of consequence for years,” the US has booming economic growth, productivity, population, clean technology and AI spending. But he cautions that the expanding BRICS could soon “represent a third of global GDP [gross domestic product], more than half of all oil production and a lot of economic opportunity.”

The Argument

The Apulia Summit promises to produce a strong performance. It will be led by its very strong support for Ukraine and the other European democracies in the face of Russia's aggression. It will make significant progress on climate change, the environment, energy and Africa and substantial progress on food security and AI. Advances will be solid on development, the Indo-Pacific region, migration, and the economy. But they will be small on the Middle East conflict, including protecting civilians, containing the deadly conflict in Gaza, the Gulf and Red Sea, in Lebanon, and from Iran, and bringing a political solution and peace to the Middle East.

This strong overall performance will be propelled by the strong shock-activated vulnerability of G7 members to deadly conflicts and climate change, the failure of the multilateral organizations to respond effectively, G7 members' substantial globally predominant and internally equalizing capability, their strong, if strained, democratic political commonality, despite their leaders' low domestic political support, and by the significant value they place on their personal G7 club at the hub of a growing network of global summit governance. Despite their differences, they all know that they have nowhere else to go to control the complex, interconnected crises they commonly confront.

Priorities, Plans and Preparations

Italy's priorities, plans and preparations for the Apulia Summit were first publicly presented by Meloni at a news conference at the Hiroshima Summit in the early hours of June 21, 2023, just before she left early to return home to deal with the devastating floods in Italy's north (see Appendix B).

She announced that the summit would be held in Apulia in mid June, immediately after the European Parliament elections whose dates were still to be finalized (Meloni 2023a). She said: "At a summit where the Global South will be a key focus, we will be taking the major world leaders to the south of Italy, and we have chosen Puglia because, from this point of view, it has symbolic meaning linked to its geographical position. Over the centuries, Puglia has acted as a bridge between East and West. As you will remember, Pope Francis also chose the capital of the Puglia region, Bari, for a historic meeting with the heads of the Eastern Orthodox and Eastern Catholic Churches in 2018, which was an unprecedented ecumenical event. In essence, the Puglia region symbolises East and West embracing, and we believe this is also the best way to overcome the narrative of the West being on one side with the rest of the world on the other, which is clearly fuelled by adversary propaganda."

At Hiroshima, Meloni (2023a) said the Italian presidency priorities would include Ukraine, in the context that prevailed at the Apulia Summit's time, and reaffirming the G7's unity and respect for the rule of international law, especially in the current conflict. They would also include economic security, building on the 2023 summit's results, energy security, migration as a key issue, and Africa and more cooperation with it. This would advance the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment, "an infrastructure plan by the G7 countries to strengthen supply chains, investing in the Global South," which was very similar to Italy's Mattei Plan for Africa. The Mattei Plan's purpose was "how to cooperate with African countries, bringing investments in connection infrastructure, especially with regard to energy, and solving various problems together: the problem of energy supplies in Europe, but also the problem of how to help African countries to develop better" with a focus on Italy.

This led to the problem of migration "because, after all, the most structural way to solve this problem is to defend the right, which is not guaranteed today, of many people not to have to flee their homes and their lands, abandoning their lives in search of a different and better life" (Meloni 2023a). Within the G7, Italy would again raise migration, human trafficking and how to tackle illegal migration.

Economic security included supply chains, a longstanding concern of Meloni's, and how dangerous it was to depend so significantly on factors beyond a country's control. The need now was to understand what G7 strategic supply chains were and which ones were essential and to choose strategies to strengthen the economy and security. AI would also be addressed.

Further guidance came from an address by Luca Ferrari, who was Italy's G7 and G20 sherpa and former ambassador to China and Saudi Arabia, at a hybrid event held by the Istituto Affari Internazionali a few weeks after the Hiroshima Summit.

Later, at the final G7 sherpa meeting for 2023, held in Tokyo in early December, sherpas discussed how to ensure continuity from the Japanese presidency to the Italian presidency. Italy wished to maintain the importance of adherence to international law and standing up for Ukraine's sovereignty and integrity. Since October 7 the crisis in Middle East had become a big preoccupation and certainly would remain so into 2024. The Italians telegraphed an emphasis on Africa as their geographic focus. They indicated that some areas of focus would be on promoting sustainable development, climate

and environment issues, food and energy security, and gender equality, as well as addressing the root causes of illegal immigration. It was a broad agenda, with Africa as a clear priority. Italy also planned to mount many ministerial meetings and continue to have many working groups.

Italy's evolving summit priorities were publicly announced when the deputy prime minister and foreign minister Antonio Tajani read Meloni's prepared text to the annual Conference of Ambassadors in Rome on December 19, 2023 (Vagnoni 2024) (see Appendix B). The nine priorities identified were, in order, Ukraine, the Middle East, developing countries and emerging economies, Africa, the Indo-Pacific, migration, the climate-energy nexus, food security and AI governance. Ukraine was in first place, as it had been at the very start on June 21, 2023. But new now were the Middle East (since the events of October 7, 2023), the Indo-Pacific region, climate (as part of the energy nexus) and food security. Gone as a separate item was economic security including supply chains. Remaining, if in a different order, were the developing countries and emerging economies of the Global South, Africa, migration and AI.

Ministerial Meetings

On January 5, 2024, the Italian presidency announced the schedule of G7 ministerial meetings for 2024. There would be 21 ministerial meetings, for 20 different ministers, starting on March 13 and ending in November. Taking place before the summit came the six meetings for, in order: industry, tech and digital; transport; foreign affairs; climate, energy and environment; justice; and finance. After the summit would come 13 more, for education, science and technology, trade, urban development, labour and employment, culture, agriculture, interior, gender equality and women's empowerment, health, inclusion and disability, and tourism. Another three, with dates not yet announced, would be for foreign affairs, development and defence (see Appendix C-1).

This was a new peak in the number of ministerial meetings, the number of different ministries at the core of each one, and the number of ministries involved overall. Two new ministerial meetings appeared, those for inclusion and disability, and for defence. The defence ministerial was spurred by the unprecedented shocks of the two deadly nearby wars unfolding at the same time – that by Russia in Ukraine, and that by Hamas against Israel in Gaza and Iranian affiliates surrounding Israel in the Middle East and in the Gulf and Red Sea. However, the reference to the defence ministers' meeting was subsequently dropped from the schedule, only later to reappear.

Eight weeks later, four more ministerial meetings had been added and taken place. The first ministerial meeting of Italy's presidency, chaired by Minister Tajani, was for trade ministers, virtually on February 7, 2024. Its concluding [joint communiqué](#) contained 904 words, 15 paragraphs and 20 commitments, with three high binding and 17 low binding ones (see Appendix C-2). Of the 20 commitments, 19 focused on the World Trade Organization (WTO) and one on development, especially in Africa.

The second ministerial meeting took place for foreign ministers, on the margins of the Munich Security Conference, on February 17. Its [chair's summary](#) contained 1,909 words, 33 paragraphs and 24 commitments, with 13 on Ukraine, nine on the Middle East and the Red Sea, one on Iran's nuclear program and one general one. Of the 24 commitments, four were high binding ones and 20 low binding ones.

The third ministerial meeting, announced on February 19, was held virtually the following day for transport ministers, to discuss the impact of the Red Sea crisis. This "extraordinary" meeting issued a "[Declaration Issued by the G7 Transport Ministers on the Red Sea Escalating Crisis](#)," on February 20. Its 593 words and seven paragraphs contained two commitments – to support countries

defending their vessels from attacks, and to protect seafarers and vessels. One was a low binding and the other a high binding one.

The fourth ministerial meeting took place virtually among health ministers on February 28. Its concluding statement, focused on improving the global health architecture and pandemic prevention, preparedness and response, contained 956 words and eight commitments. It referenced shocks three times, all on the Covid-19 pandemic.

The fifth ministerial meeting, and the first initially scheduled one, took place among ministers of industry, technology and digital on March 14–15 in Verona and Trento. It issued a declaration of 4,595 words and four annexes for a total of 6,050 words. It contained 42 commitments, with 33 in the declaration and nine in the annexes. AI was noted specifically in 30 paragraphs for 48% of the 62 paragraphs in the declaration. The declaration identified four shocks and two vulnerabilities.

The sixth meeting was for transport ministers in Milan on April 11–13. It was “an opportunity to take stock of how the G7 countries intend to face the challenges of the future of mobility in an era of increasing instability” (Italy's G7 Presidency 2024c). Ministers would look “at both sides of the same coin”: the need to strengthen transport systems against future shocks, such as AI, geopolitical tensions, climate change and cyberattacks, and also “envisaging initiatives and solutions to promote more modern, efficient and sustainable infrastructure,” which are the “backbone of global connectivity, ensuring the free movement of people, goods and services, and generating positive spillovers through societies and economic development.” They would discuss managing “mobility in a scenario characterized by growing instability and exogenous shocks that put global connectivity at risk ... in light of the impact on economy and society, in particular for the most vulnerable, and in the relationship with the so-called ‘Global South.’” They would thus seek to “enhance coordination and increase the level of preparedness and response in the event of extreme and unforeseen events, ensuring the continuity of transport systems and the right to individual and collective mobility, a pillar of democratic and liberal societies.”

On April 13 the transport ministers issued their outcome document: “The Future of Mobility: Ensuring Global Connectivity in an Uncertain World.” Its 5,803 words contained 40 commitments, with 15 highly binding and 35 low binding ones. It made 10 references to specific shocks, and many more to the general poly-crisis and crises that the world faced. The 10 shocks included four on “Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine” and two each on climate change and the Covid-19 pandemic. The Houthi attacks in the Red Sea had one.

On April 17 G7 finance ministers and central bank governors met in Washington DC. They produced a communiqué of 3,192 words. It contained 45 commitments, led by 12 on the Russia-Ukraine war and 11 on development, followed by health, climate and taxation with four each, macroeconomics with three, financial regulation, international financial institution reform and regional security in the Middle East with two each, and Iran with one.

The foreign ministers' meeting took place in Capri on April 17–19, the first of the two G7 foreign ministers' meetings to be hosted in Italy in 2024. Before the meeting, Minister Tajani said the goal was “to strengthen the role of the G7 as the main forum for dialogue among leading liberal democracies and as a driver of stability to face major global crises” (Italy's G7 Presidency 2024b). The ministers' discussions would focus on the “main issues at the centre of the international debate, starting with the situation in the Middle East,” including the “humanitarian crisis and the pursuit of a meaningful and effective political approach towards the ‘two peoples, two States’ solution.” They would also address the “tense situation” in the Red Sea, including the impact of regional tensions on trade routes. Russia's aggression against Ukraine remained “central to the G7 agenda,” with the Italian Presidency intending to “confirm the G7's solid and all-round support for Kyiv, providing

military, political and financial assistance in the pursuit of a just and lasting peace.” Ministers would also discuss the stability of the Indo-Pacific region, a priority for trade. Seeking an equal partnership with Africa, they would also address the “development/migration nexus,” including the root causes of illegal migration. Their agenda would also cover food security, energy security, the fight against climate change, cyber security and AI.

When they met, the foreign ministers issued three communiqués totalling 17,287 words and containing 205 commitments. The first communiqué, on “Addressing Global Challenges,” had 13,850 words and 155 commitments. The second, on the Middle East, had 1,530 words and 16 commitments. The third, on Ukraine, had 1,907 words and 34 commitments.

By subject, the 155 commitments in the main document were led by regional security with 37 commitments, non-proliferation with 14, digital with 12, and infrastructure with 10 and crime and corruption also with 10. Then came foreign interference with eight; migration and refugees, food and agriculture, and health with seven each; trade (including supply chains) with six; UN reform, energy, and gender with five each; Africa with four; climate change, the environment, conflict prevention and development with three each; disasters and human rights with two each; and G20 cooperation and another general issue with one each.

In Turin on April 29–30, the climate, energy and environment ministers made 320 commitments on 15 subjects. Those subjects were led by climate change with 85 (with 54 on climate change and 31 on climate finance), followed by biodiversity and forests with 74, energy 69, development 26, pollution 17, resource efficiency 13 and critical minerals 13. Then came gender with six, international cooperation and labour with four each, regional security (Russia and Ukraine) and health with three each, Indigenous peoples with two, and food and agriculture with one.

On May 10, justice ministers met in Venice, for the third time in three years. There they issued the Venice Declaration of 1,859 words plus an annex of 1,516 words, for 3,375 words in all. The declaration contained 24 commitments, with the new Venice Justice Group having 10, Russia and Ukraine four, international cooperation also four, Ukraine and anti-corruption two, and human trafficking and migrant smuggling three, and synthetic drugs one. These commitments noted two shocks, both from Russian aggression against Ukraine. The annex – the G7 Justice Ministers’ Pledge to Support Anti-Corruption Efforts for the Reconstruction of Ukraine – contained 1,516 words and 11 commitments.

On May 23-25, finance ministers and central bank governors met in Stresa, joined by Ukraine’s finance minister. According to the media handbook issued shortly before the meeting, the ministers and bank governors would build on their previous meetings, with an agenda that included support for Ukraine and dealing with Russian financial assets, AI, the global economy, multilateral development banks, and initiatives on health and finance and international taxation (Italy’s G7 Presidency 2024a).

During the meeting, the G7 ministers and bank governors met with Brazil, Mauritania (representing the African Union), Korea and Saudi Arabia, during which they discussed AI, development and cross-border payments, and cooperation with the G20. In addition to the usual participation of the heads of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, Organisation for Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the Financial Stability Board, they also received contributions from the African Development Bank, Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, the Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures’ Secretariat and the Financial Action Task Force.

The ministers and bank governors issued a communiqué that listed seven annexes, which included a summary and full version of the “Finance Track Menu of Policy Options for a Just Transition

towards Net Zero,” a summary and full version of the “High-Level Framework for Public-Private Insurance Programmes against Natural Hazards.” The remaining annexes were reports submitted to the ministers and bank governors: a progress report from the OECD on tax cooperation, an update from the World Bank on the supporting the green energy transition in Africa, a note from the African Development Bank on the Alliance for Green Infrastructure in Africa and a background note from Gavi on the African Vaccine Manufacturing Accelerator.

The communiqué itself had 6,490 words and contained 84 commitments. The commitments were led by those on digital, information and communications technologies (ICT), and AI with 11 (with digital/ICT and cyber having six and AI five), regional security in Russia and Ukraine 10, trade and investment (including supply chains and overcapacity) 10 and health also 10. Then came financial regulation and development with nine each, climate change with eight, tax with six, reform of the international financial institutions and multilateral development banks with two, regional security (Middle East) with two, and one each for cooperation with the G20, the multilateral system, economic resilience and security, and crime, plus three other commitments.

By May 25, there had been 11 ministerial meetings within four months, led by the foreign ministers and finance ministers with two each, followed by those for 10 other portfolios with one each. Together the 11 meetings had each produced an outcome document, together totalling 69,768 words (excluding the May 25 annexes) and containing 825 commitments. This was vastly more on all counts than the G20 ministerial meetings had produced.

The Special Kyiv Summit on February 24

On February 24, on the second anniversary of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, G7 leaders held a special summit, in hybrid form from Kyiv, the capital city of a country under the constant threat of Russian attack. They produced a strong performance, due to the surprising physical attendance of the G7 leaders of Italy, Canada and the EU at the side of Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky and to their concluding consensus [statement](#) with its 36 commitments to support Ukraine for “as long as it takes” to win the war. The picture of the physical presence of three G7 leaders in Kyiv and at the summit itself, as much as these promises on paper, showed that the G7 had come a long way to helping Ukraine win its war since the start on February 24, 2022, and that it could and would go all the way to win it in the end.

The summit had been announced on February 20, four days after the death of the imprisoned Russian dissident Alexei Navalny. The Italian presidency said that G7 leaders would hold a virtual special summit on February 24, with Zelensky invited. A joint declaration would appear at the end.

The summit was expected to agree on new sanctions, based on a new package from the EU and US approval of sanctions, as Italy believed that Russia was suffering from the G7's economic sanctions (Pascale 2024).

The Kyiv Summit's strong performance is confirmed by a close look at the six major dimensions of summit performance.

First, in the summit leaders' domestic political management, on the morning of February 24, Meloni, von der Leyen, Trudeau and Alexander De Croo, prime minister of Belgium, which held the six-month presidency of the Council of the EU, participated in a ceremony with Zelensky at Hostomel Airport to honour those who had defended it on that day in 2022. The leaders' arrival in Kyiv was announced only that morning, for security reasons (Anadolu Staff 2024). In her speech Meloni (2024) said that the Ukrainians who defended the airport “also defended us” and “that this land is a piece of our home, and that we will do our part to defend it.”

Attendance at the hybrid G7 summit, starting at 16h00 CET, was almost complete. All the G7 leaders who did not travel to Kyiv participated online except Macron, who was represented by his foreign minister Stéphane Séjourné so Macron could speak with dissatisfied French farmers at the Paris Agricultural Show.

Second, in the summit's public deliberation, at the summit's end, G7 leaders issued a [statement](#) of five pages, 19 paragraphs and 1,816 words. It exclusively addressed Russia's invasion of Ukraine and developments within Russia itself, led by the murder of Navalny several days before.

Third, in its principled and normative direction setting, in their statement, G7 leaders affirmed their distinctive foundational missions of protecting and promoting democracy and human rights seven times, both in Ukraine and Russia. Four affirmations were of democracy and three of human rights.

Fourth, in the summit's decision making, its statement contained 36 precise, future-oriented, politically obligatory commitments (see Appendix D). All addressed Russia's invasion of Ukraine and developments within Russia and the support Russia received from North Korea, Iran and China. This decision-making performance was less than the German-hosted G7 summit on February 24, 2022, which produced 52 commitments across 15 subjects, including one on Russia's invasion of Ukraine that day. Kyiv's 35 commitments were also fewer than the 39 produced by the Japanese-hosted G7 summit on the first anniversary, almost all of which were on Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The Kyiv Summit's fewer and more focused commitments were caused by the summit's hybrid format and location in the capital of a country at war with Russia, vulnerable to a possible deadly missile attack at any time. This required a set of strong, simple, singularly focused commitments, all about the clear and present danger at hand.

Statement on Iran on March 15

On March 15, the G7 leaders issued their second [statement](#), calling on third parties – and specified Iran – to stop providing material support to Russia's war against Ukraine or face serious consequences.

The Virtual Summit on Iran on April 14

On the afternoon of April 14, G7 leaders met virtually in response to the Iranian missile attack on Israel the evening before. They issued a [statement](#) with six commitments, four on Iran and two on the crisis in Gaza. They identified two shocks, one on "Iran's direct and unprecedented attack against Israel" and the second on "the crisis in Gaza."

G7 Leaders' Statement on Synthetic Drug Threats on April 29

On April 29, G7 leaders issued their third [statement](#), this one on the single subject of "their joint effort to fight the production, distribution, and sale of illicit synthetic drugs, and the criminal networks which traffic these drugs." It contained 513 words and 13 commitments, all on the synthetic drug threats.

G7 Leaders' Statement on Gaza on June 3

On June 3, G7 leaders issued another statement, on the single subject of Gaza. It contained two commitments. The first said "We ... fully endorse and will stand behind the comprehensive deal outlined by President Biden." The second stated "We reaffirm our support for a credible pathway towards peace leading to a two State solution."

By June 8, with five summits or statements, G7 leaders had already made 57 commitments, with 36 on Russia's invasion of Ukraine, followed by eight on the Middle East.

Compliance Momentum

Strong momentum for the Apulia Summit's performance came from G7 member governments' compliance with the priority commitments made by their leaders at the June 2023 Hiroshima Summit. The interim compliance report of the G7 Research Group (2024) showed that by December 3, 2023, compliance with the 20 assessed commitments already averaged a very strong 91% (G7 Research Group 2024). It was led by the United States at 98%, followed by France at 95%, the United Kingdom, the European Union, Canada and Germany at 93% each, and Japan and Italy at 83%. Italy stood at the bottom of the list, as it often did (see Appendix E).

By subject, Hiroshima's interim compliance was led by eight commitments with 100%, those on non-proliferation, climate change (emission reduction policies), energy (clean energy technologies), energy (low carbon and renewable hydrogen markets), food and agriculture (food safety and sustainable production), education (inclusivity and equity), macroeconomics (fiscal sustainability and price stability) and development (official development assistance) (G7 Research Group 2024b).

This was followed by 94% for regional security sanctions, environment (conservation measures), food and agriculture (healthy and safe diets), health (life expectancy) and digital economy (digital ecosystem with trust) (G7 Research Group 2024). Then came four with 81% on regional security (security assistance for Ukraine), climate change (domestic mitigation measures), gender (labour markets) and trade (resilient supply chains). At the bottom, with 75%, were human rights (forced labour), labour and employment (job creation) and crime and corruption (synthetic drugs).

Predicted full compliance for the full period until Apulia was also promising. It averaged 86% of all of Hiroshima's six AI (digitalization) commitments, 79% for its one on the health disease of dementia, 74% for the one macroeconomics and 79% for those made since 2016 that were due for delivery by 2025.

The final compliance was at 96%, as identified in the final compliance report published on June 5 (G7 Research Group 2024a). Canada, the European Union, France and the United States all ranked first with an average compliance score of 98% each, followed by Germany and the United Kingdom each at 95%. These members were followed by Italy and the 2023 host, Japan, at 93%.

Of the 20 commitments assessed, four more commitments now had 100% compliance: one on environmental conservation measures, one on food and agriculture (healthy and safe diets), one on life expectancy, and one on sanctions imposed on Russia and its allies. Five commitments had 94%: on the digital ecosystem with trust, gender and labour markets, job creation and domestic mitigation measures on climate change. The commitment on security assistance for Ukraine rose to 88%, and the human rights commitment on forced labour rose to 81%. The commitment on the synthetic drug threat remained the lowest at 75%.

Invited Guest Leaders

By June 8, the Italian host had invited 15 guest leaders to the Apulia Summit. They consisted of six G20 members (Argentina, Brazil, India, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and Türkiye), five African leaders (Algeria, Egypt, Kenya, Mauritania and Tunisia), the leaders of Jordan, Ukraine and the United Arab Emirates, and the Vatican.

This was six more than the nine the Japanese host had invited the year before. Japan's guest list focused on the Asia-Pacific (Australia, Cook Islands and chair of the Pacific Islands Forum; India and host of G20's New Delhi Summit; Indonesia and chair of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations; Korea; Vietnam) as well as Brazil, the Comoros and chair of the African Union; and Ukraine. Among G20 members, both India and Brazil alone had been invited in both 2023 and 2024.

Italy's six invited G20 members help Italy advance its priorities of G7 partnership with the Global South and emerging and developing economies, especially as they include the past, present and next year's G20 host (India, Brazil and South Africa). Argentina has many citizens of Italian origin. And Türkiye, the only Middle Eastern member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and Saudi Arabia play an important role in the G7's goals regarding its two top priorities of the wars against Ukraine and in the Middle East.

The five African leaders (including South Africa) are important for Italy's priority on a new partnership with Africa. Egypt is also important for the Middle East conflict and democratic Kenya is key for the clean energy transition.

Jordan, the United Arab Emirates and Ukraine are key for the Ukrainian and Middle East conflicts. The Vatican is important as a pioneer of Italy's approach to its AI priority at Apulia, focused on the concept of "algoethics" or human-centred ethical AI.

In 2023 Japan also invited seven heads of international organizations: António Guterres of the United Nations, David Malpass of the World Bank, Fatih Birol of the International Energy Agency (IEA), Kristalina Georgieva of the IMF, Mathias Cormann of the OECD, Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala of the WTO and, virtually, Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus of the WHO. Italy has also invited African Union commission chair Moussa Faki Mahamat.

Prospective Advances and Commitments

The Apulia Summit is likely to make several advances and commitments on many key subjects (G7 Research Group 2024). They include:

Russia and Ukraine

- To continue to keep \$300 billion of Russian assets abroad frozen until Russia compensates Ukraine for the damage Russia has done in its war there.
- To use the interest from these frozen Russian assets to help finance Ukraine now, in ways that respect international and domestic law, financial stability, and the use of G7 currencies for international payments and investment (Dubois and Fleming 2023; *Financial Times* 2023; Tamma and Politi 2023; Hinrichsen 2024). The amount raised would be more than \$3 billion, already agreed to by the EU, and up to \$50 billion from the interest on the frozen Russian assets (Tamma, Dubois and Fleming 2024). A US proposal, backed by Canada and the UK, for a G7 loan guaranteed by future profits from the interest on frozen Russian assets could produce \$50 billion disbursed to Ukraine in the few months after Apulia, well before the US elections in November (Tamma, Foy and Politi 2024). One option, backed by most EU countries led by Germany, is for the US alone to borrow the money, with the EU assuring the US that the European windfall profits would help repay the loan. A second option, favoured by the US, is that the EU alone borrow the money under its Macro Financial Assistance regime, guaranteeing repayment from the EU budget, a plan requiring majority rather than unanimous support from EU members but also approval by the European Parliament (Strupezewski 2024). A compromise could have each G7 member take out a loan, relative to the Russian assets they are holding or to its GDP, or to have the IMF or World Bank guarantee the loan.

- To provide substantial new military and financial support for Ukraine from their own governments, including new air defence systems that Ukraine urgently needs.
- To tighten the oil price cap on Russian oil exports to improve enforcement and act against the shadow fleet of tankers taking Russian oil to export markets.
- To shrink and perhaps close the “refining loophole” that exempts Russian oil refined in third countries into products such as gasoline and diesel to escape sanctions of Russian oil exports (Pavlova 2024).
- To transition from Russian natural gas delivered by pipeline.
- To restrict now and later ban Russian exports of liquefied natural gas into and through G7 members by a specified cut-off date, as the EU has promised to do by 2027 in its RePower EU plan (*Financial Times* 2024e).
- To reduce dependence on Russia nuclear energy supplies and uranium.
- To expand the ban on imports of non-industrial diamonds from Russia, beyond the G7 agreement on December 6, 2023, to ban them for themselves starting January 1, 2024, and to ban stones processed in third countries starting March 1, 2024 (Foy and Dempsey 2023).
- To support Ukraine in developing its desired energy system that is more decentralized, resilient, cleaner and integrated with Europe, and secure the investment that will make it a clean energy hub (US Department of State 2023).
- To strengthen secondary sanctions against countries, such as China, that ship domestic and imported dual-use products on to Russia.

Middle East

- To ask Israel to continue to allow the Palestine Monetary Authority to use the Bank of Israel to process payments into and out of Gaza (Jones 2024).
- To support Joe Biden’s three-phase peace plan announced on May 31 (Ghattas 2024) (see Appendix F).
- To provide more humanitarian relief, including food, medical assistance, fuel and housing.

Climate Change, Energy and the Environment

- To increase electricity storage capacity sixfold from 2022 to 2030 (Mooney, Bryan and Hancock 2024).
- To phase out using unabated coal power by or possibly before 2035.
- To raise at least \$11 billion for a World Bank fund to help developing countries control climate change and health pandemics (Williams 2024).
- To establish a public-private partnership for a Blended Coffee Sustainability and Resilience Fund (International Coffee Organization 2024).

Africa and the Indo-Pacific

- To commit to contributing to the key elements of Italy's Mattei Plan, starting with partnerships to develop clean energy infrastructure in Africa and connected to Europe. Similar commitments will arise on health and education. The G7's existing Global Partnership of Infrastructure Investment, unveiled at the Elmau Summit in 2022, will be mobilized in support.
- To promise action against China's subsidies and dumping on high tech and green products, theft of intellectual property and G7 members' need to diversify and render resilient their supply chains, through friend-shoring, near-shoring and building domestic capacity to enhance their economic security.
- To act against Chinese dual-use products being sent to Russia to support its war effort, and signal their strong support for a free and open Indo-Pacific, respect for the rules and decisions of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, and solidarity with democratic politics, a category that includes Taiwan (but perhaps not by name in the Apulia communiqué).
- To condemn the suppression of human rights in Hong Kong, and North Korea's abductions of Japanese nationals, support for Russia's war against Ukraine, development of its nuclear weapons capabilities and violation of UN sanctions.

Migration

- To emphasize the framework and focus set by Meloni from the start, beginning with reducing poverty in Africa, so people can enjoy their basic right to live where they were born.
- To stop the trafficking of women and children from poorer countries into richer ones, as an important contribution to women's rights and the G7's emphasis on women's empowerment and gender equality.
- To stop human smugglers, which is a key component of crime and corruption in the sending, transit and receiving countries.
- To note, as Canada's Justin Trudeau has long argued at G7 and G20 summits, that legal, controlled immigration is good for the receiving countries, especially for the aging labour force in G7 countries. They will emphasize the need for only small additional restrictions, such as those imposed in the two weeks before the Apulia Summit by Germany's Scholz after an Afghan refugee committed a terrorist act against a police officer that killed him, and by US president Biden by an executive order to control the surge in refugee claimants entering the US from Mexico.

Artificial Intelligence

- To build on the Hiroshima AI Process they launched last year, and where their compliance with their commitments has been very high, by further developing the principles, plan and process for building ethical, human-centric AI.
- To emphasize how AI can contribute to human health, climate change control, the labour force and productivity in the aging societies that almost all of them have.
- Set the stage for G7 and global regulation, first among those already launched by the EU, US and Canada, but in ways that do not stifle the rapid development of AI in the US and other G7 members, which is vastly superior to what authoritarian Russia, China, Iran and North Korea have.

Trade, Investment, Infrastructure and Tourism

- To act against China's low-cost imports into G7 members by approving more antidumping and countervail cases, or raising tariffs, to counter China's market distortions.

Health

- To support the revised International Health Regulations agreed at the World Health Assembly in late May and to quickly implement them.
- To support and act to achieve a new "pandemic pact" by 2025.
- To support the existing Pandemic Fund.

Other

G7 leaders will very likely commit to the two commitments from earlier G7 summits that are due in 2024. They will also try to advance the 23 commitments due in 2025 made by G7 summits since 2015. These are led by those on the environment with eight, climate change with six, and energy with four, followed by health and gender with two each and labour and employment with one (see Appendix G).

They are also likely to commit to support or shape the major summits scheduled for the rest of 2024 and 2025. These included the UN's Summit of the Future in September 2024, and the SDGs as they started their final three-year period in 2025.

Propellers of Performance

The Apulia Summit's prospective strong performance will be led by its strong support for Ukraine and the other European democracies in the face of Russia's aggression, its substantial advances on climate change, the environment, energy, and Africa, and its solid advances on development, the Indo-Pacific region, migration, food security, AI and the economy.

It will be propelled by the strong shock-activated vulnerability of G7 members to deadly conflicts and climate change, the failure of the multilateral organizations to respond effectively, G7 members' substantial globally predominant and internally equalizing capability on key components, their high – if challenged – democratic political commonality, the poor domestic political support of G7 leaders and the significant value they place on their personal G7 club at the hub of a growing network of global summit governance.

Shock-Activated Vulnerability

The first propeller is the strong shock-activated vulnerability of G7 members to surprising, deadly events created by acts of aggression and climate change-intensified extreme weather events, and the energy, financial, health, food and other crises they breed (Wolf 2024) (see Appendix H).

Communiqué-reported shocks at the leaders' level in 2024 began when the Kyiv Summit communiqué on February 24 identified 11 shocks. Eight shocks addressed Russia's aggression, brutal attacks, atrocities and threatened use of nuclear weapons. The remaining three referred to the murder of Navalny.

The "G7 Leaders Statement on Iran's Attack Against Israel" on April 14 identified two shocks, one on the Iranian attack and the other on the "crisis in Gaza."

The “G7 Leaders Statement on Synthetic Drugs Threats” identified one shock, the “critical public health emergency” of synthetic drugs.

At the ministerial level, communiqué-reported shocks in 2024 began with those in the trade ministers’ statement on February 7 (see Appendix H-2). It contained three shocks, with one on the “climate crisis,” one on Russia’s “war of aggression against Ukraine” and one on the “terror attacks by Hamas and others across Israel.”

The chair’s summary issued at the foreign ministers’ meeting on February 17 contained seven shocks, with one expressing their “outrage at the death in detention of Alexei Navalny,” two on Russia’s “war of aggression” against Ukraine, and four on the terrorist attacks, catastrophic humanitarian crisis and atrocities in the Middle East.

The “Declaration Issued by the Transport Ministers on the Red Sea Escalating Crisis” on February 20 identified six shocks, three on the “current crisis in the Red Sea” and another three exacerbated by it – “Russia’s illegal war of aggression against Ukraine, extreme weather events, and global health concerns such as the ongoing recovery from the Covid-19 pandemic.”

The health ministers on February 28 identified three shocks, all on health.

The industry, tech and digital ministers on March 14–15 identified four shocks: two on Russia and Ukraine, one on the environment and one general.

The transport ministers on April 11–13 identified 10 shocks, with four on Ukraine, and two each on the Middle East, climate and health.

The finance ministers on April 17 identified seven shocks, with Russia’s aggression against Ukraine taking three, the Hamas attack on Israel two, Iran’s attack on Israel one and one general shock.

The foreign ministers on April 19, in their three communiqués, identified seven shocks, with two general shocks and two also on Covid-19, and Russia and Ukraine, Hamas and Israel, and Iran and Israel having one each.

The climate, energy and environment ministers on April 30 identified five shocks, with four on climate and one on Ukraine.

The justice ministers on May 10 identified six shocks, with all on Ukraine.

The finance ministers and central bank governors on May 25 identified eight shocks, with six Russia and Ukraine and two on Covid-19.

By the end of May, the 11 ministerial meetings and statements had identified a total of 66 shocks. They were led by Russia and Ukraine with 28 and the Middle East with 15, then health with 10, climate and the environment with nine, and four general shocks.

The World Economic Forum’s Global Risk Report 2024, published on January 10, 2024, identified as “the risk most likely to present a material crisis on a global scale in 2024” to be extreme weather first (from 66% of respondents), AI-generated misinformation and disinformation second (53%), societal or political polarization third (46%), the cost-of-living crisis fourth (42%) and cyberattacks fifth (39%) (World Economic Forum 2024, 7–8). The most severe risks over the next two years were, in order, misinformation and disinformation, extreme weather events, societal polarization, cyber security and interstate-armed conflict.

Media-highlighted newsworthy shocks were also high (see Appendix H-3). The world's elite daily financial newspaper, the *Financial Times*, in the 24 days it published between January 2 and 31, distributed its front-page stories as follows: democracy (including war against democratic countries) on 96%, the economy 83%, climate and energy 38%, and health 25% and digital 29%. By the number of stories, democracy had 43, the economy 40, climate and energy one, health seven and digital seven.

From February 1 to 29, the distribution by 25 publishing days was democracy and war on 96%, economy 84%, climate and energy 32%, digital 28% and health 24%. The distribution by number of front-page stories was democracy 49%, economy 40%, climate and energy 12%, digital 9% and health 8%.

From March 1 to 31, the distribution by the 24 available publishing days was democracy and war on 96%, economy 50%, climate and energy 21%, digital 42% and health 17%. The distribution by number of front-page stories was democracy 48%, economy 18%, climate and energy 5%, digital 13% and health 4%.

From April 1 to 30, the distribution by the 25 available publishing days was democracy and war on 88%, economy 80%, climate and energy 40%, digital 36% and health 28%. By the 89 stories, it was democracy and war 56%, economy 37%, climate and energy 16%, digital 11% and health 10%.

From May 1 to 24, the distribution by the 27 publishing days was democracy and war on 96%, economy 74%, climate and energy 41%, digital 33% and health 15%. By the 105 stories, it was democracy and war 50%, economy 31%, climate and energy 12%, digital 10% and health 5%.

From June 1 to 8, the distribution on the seven publishing days, was democracy and war 100%, economy 71%, climate and energy 71%, digital 14%, and health 0%. By the 25 stories, it was democracy and war 48%, economy 28%, climate-energy 24%, digital 4% and health 0%.

This suggested that the Apulia leaders would focus heavily on Russia and Ukraine, the Middle East, then the economy and climate and energy, and less on digitalization and AI and on health.

Physical shocks were led by Russia's escalating missile attacks on Ukraine's energy and civil infrastructure as January began, the escalating Middle East war, especially with US, UK and allied military strikes on Yemen's Houthis in the Gulf on January 12, Russia's murder of Navalny on February 16, and Iran's attack on Israel on April 13.

Scientific shocks were high. In early January the Copernicus Climate Change Service (2024a) reported that 2023 had been the hottest year in recorded history, and that the heat, reinforced by the effect of the El Niño Southern Oscillation, would get worse through to the summer of 2024 and continue after. In early June, the World Meteorological Organization confirmed that the "past nine years had been the warmest on record" and that the trend would continue even when the cooling El Niña effect came in late summer or autumn (Bryan and Bernard 2024). On June 5, the Copernicus Climate Change Service (2024b) announced that "the global average temperature for the last 12 months (June 2023–May 2024) is the highest on record, at 0.75°C above the 1991–2020 average and 1.63°C above the 1850–1900 pre-industrial average," and that "the global average temperature for May 2024 was 1.52°C above the 1850–1900 pre-industrial average, marking the 11th consecutive month (since July 2023) at or above 1.5°C."

Democratic shock-activated vulnerabilities were likely to be fuelled by the unprecedented number of elections in 2024 and the surprising results they could bring. The first such election outside the G7

came in Taiwan on January 13 was won democratically by the candidate opposed to autocratic China, and did not generate a significant response from China. But the victor's inaugural address in late May led China to militarily blockade Taiwan for three days.

Multilateral Organizational Failure

The ministerially governed, siloed, multilateral organizations created since the 1940s failed to mount an effective response to these big, broad, interconnected shocks.

On security issues, the UN Security Council was paralyzed by the unilateral veto of its Permanent Five members Russia and China from addressing the security shocks from Russia's aggression against Ukraine, the Hamas attack on Israel and its Iranian-backed affiliates in the Middle East and Red Sea, and from the military pressure on Taiwan and Japan in the South China Sea and Indo-Pacific region as a whole. The US veto constrained support for the Palestinians also suffering from their control by Hamas and Israeli actions to counter it.

On development, debt, Africa and emerging economies, the World Bank Group and IMF did better, but fell far short of meeting the needs, even with the support of the many regional development banks, including the newer BRICS New Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Development Bank. And despite continuing pressure for reform of the IMF and World Bank to give rising emerging economies greater voice and vote, the resulting changes there were very small and slow.

On migration and refugees, the UN High Commissioner of Refugees and the International Organization for Migration failed to help the G7's European members and the US stop the growing flow of illegal migration from flowing across the Mediterranean and Middle East and through Mexico into their countries, fuelling the rise of right-wing populist parties and dissatisfaction with the leaders there.

On the climate and energy nexus, the UN climate conference in oil-rich Dubai in December 2023 failed to meet the growing global need, despite evidence about escalating, historic global heating. No World Energy Organization arose to spur the shift from hydrocarbons to renewables, leaving the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries plus Russia competing with the G7-centred IEA, with leading members such as the US, Canada and the UK still reliant on fossil fuels. And no empowered environmental organization with a comprehensive ecological mandate emerged to coordinate and control the response to the interconnected ecological shocks. On June 4, the IEA confirmed that "clean energy plans still fall almost a third short of what is needed to reach a renewable energy goals for 2030 agreed at UN climate talks last year" (Bryan 2024, 4).

On AI, the International Telecommunication Union tried to respond to its rapid development but was too slow and too constrained by competition between China, Russia and their allies, on the one hand, and G7 democracies, on the other, to lead the creation of an effective global governance regime.

On the key economic, finance and development issues, the IMF and World Bank failed to accurately forecast and thus try to prevent the declining growth in gross domestic product (GDP) in all G7 members in their forecasts just before 2024 began. However, as their executive boards and leaders were controlled by G7 members, they did better in modifying their missions and mobilizing resources to meet the crisis of climate change, biodiversity loss and health threats, within the severe constraints that their constitutions, professional expertise and organizational culture allowed. And the WTO, at its ministerial conference in late February, did little to overcome the many deadlocks that largely paralyzed it.

On food security, the Food and Agriculture Organization, International Fund for Agricultural Development and the World Food Programme, all headquartered in Rome, seldom meet at the leaders' level and prioritized the production of food over the preservation of the world forests and agricultural lands that they had assumed responsibility for.

The greatest gaps in the subjects of the shock-activated vulnerability versus the multilateral organizations' response coincided well with the priorities and prospective performance of the Apulia Summit in June – above all on security, the climate and energy nexus, and AI.

Predominant Equalizing Capability

The globally predominant and internally equalizing capability of G7 members is small overall, but is high on key specialized capabilities in the military, financial and AI spheres (see Appendix I).

The level of the G7's global predominance in overall capabilities is small, as the G7 now has only about one-third of global GDP, at current exchange rates.

In April 2024, the IMF (2024b) identified the biggest economies in the world being led by the US with GDP of \$28.78 trillion, followed by China at \$18.53 trillion, Germany \$4.59 trillion, Japan \$4.11 trillion, India \$3.94 trillion, UK \$3.50 trillion, France \$3.13 trillion, Brazil \$2.33 trillion, Italy \$2.33 trillion and Canada \$2.24 trillion. All G7 countries ranked within the global top 10, together possessing 66% of its total, with the US alone having 59% of the G7 total. If the other members of the EU are added to the G7 total, its share would be larger and that of the US smaller, but still predominant.

In GDP growth at current exchange rates, the G7's global predominance and internal equality declined as 2024 got underway, but the latter began to increase in April (see Appendix I). On February 5, 2024, the OECD forecast that GDP growth would be 2.9% for the world and for the G20 economies, with China at 4.7% (OECD 2024). But it would be only 2.1% for the US and even less for all other G7 members, with the 17-member Eurozone at 0.6%, Germany 0.3%, France 0.6%, UK 0.7%, Italy 0.7%, and OECD members as a whole 1.8%.

This was a continuation of the earlier trends of US predominance within the G7. In late October 2023, the IMF had estimated that real GDP growth from the fourth quarter of 2019 to the second quarter of 2023 was strongly led by the US at just over 6%, followed far behind with Canada at 3.5%, Italy with 3.3%, the Eurozone 3%, Japan 3% and the UK 1.8% (Chazan 2023).

The G7's internal equalization in overall currency capabilities was also small as 2024 got underway. The US dollar index against a basket of six other major currencies, the best measure of overall relative capability, rose to a one-month high of almost 104 on January 16, 2024, after falling strongly from its peak of 107 in the summer of 2023 (*Financial Times* 2024a). On February 6, 2024, it rose to its highest level since November 2023, climbing 3.2% over the previous five weeks after having fallen over 5% between October 1 and late December (*Financial Times* 2024b). On April 11, the US dollar reached a 34-year high against the yen, but by May 4 had slid to 105 against the basket of six currencies (Lewis and Hughes 2024). From the start of 2024 to mid-April it had risen 5% against the basket of key currencies, but then slid from its peak of 106 in late April to 104.5 by May 20 (McDougall and Uddin 2024). On June 3, it was just above 104 (*Financial Times* 2024c).

However, in specialized military capabilities – key for prevailing in Ukraine, the Middle East, the Indo-Pacific region and elsewhere – the G7's global predominance was strong. Yet its internal equality was low, again due to the commanding global lead of the US. This had a powerful constraining effect, as for the first few months of 2024, the Republican-controlled House of Representatives refused to let the Biden administration send additional military or financial support

to a beleaguered, retreating Ukraine, leading to the fall of the Ukrainian-controlled city of Avdiivka to Russian forces on February 17, and Russian advances toward Kharkiv afterwards. By May a bipartisan Congressional deal allowed much more US military equipment and money flow to Ukraine.

In specialized financial capabilities, the US dollar is involved in 88% of all international currency transactions and has 58% of global currency reserves (Tooze 2024).

In AI and related advanced technologies, US capabilities vastly exceed those of China and Russia, especially when reinforced by the other G7 democracies (Takach 2024).

Common Political Characteristics

The common political characteristics of G7 members remained high, despite challenges from anti-democratic forces within several members, led by the US due to former president Donald Trump. All G7 members ranked above 80% on their electoral democracy index score for free and fair elections, free media, rights of association guarantees, as compiled by the University of Gothenburg's V-Dem Institute, even if they had all dipped a bit in the most recent years (*Financial Times* 2024d). They all ranked well above the other leading G20 and BRICS members of South Africa with 70%, Brazil with under 70%, India 40%, Russia 20%, China with under 10%, even though democratic Australia, Korea and Argentina also had over 80%, Mexico had 60%, Indonesia had just under 60% and Türkiye had 30%. In the US even Trump, running for the presidency again, was so far doing so within the established, constitutionally created, electoral system, while awaiting the final judicial systems' judgements on whether he had violated these rules.

Domestic Political Control

G7 leaders' domestic political control, however, was low, reducing their ability to comply with their Apulia commitments back home and perhaps deterring them from making more ambitious ones there.

Leaders' G7 summit experience is significant, as all are veterans of this forum. Meloni, the host, will be at her second summit, Trudeau and Macron at their ninth, Biden and Scholz at their fourth, Kishida at his third, Sunak at his second, and von der Leyen at her fifth and Michel at his fifth and last. Together they bring 34 years of regular G7 summit experience, for an average of 4.25 years for each.

But at home, their legislative control is low, with all but the UK's Sunak leading coalition governments or parties without a majority in both legislative chambers (see Appendix J-1). Biden's Democrats control only the Senate, and that by a very slim majority. The LDP's Kishida has a coalition with the New Komeito Party. Social Democratic Scholz has a three-party coalition with the Greens and Free Democrats. Macron's Renaissance party lost control of the National Assembly in the last election. Meloni leads a multiparty coalition. Trudeau's Liberals depends for their parliamentary survival on a supply and confidence agreement with the New Democrat Party. And von der Leyen's party depends on a coalition for its majority in the European Parliament.

The next elections for these leaders are approaching (see Appendix J-2). They are led by Sunak on July 4, 2024, and Biden on November 5, 2024, followed in 2025 Trudeau by October 30, Scholz by October 26, and Kishida by October 31. There are no elections scheduled in 2026; in 2027 Macron's will be in April and Meloni's in December. Apart from Biden, all could choose or be forced to call an early election. The domestic political popularity of all G7 leaders and their parties is low. Polls on January 30, 2024, showed that the public approval of all G7 leaders was a net negative, with Meloni at -6%, Biden -18%, Trudeau -25%, Sunak -36%, Macron -44% and Scholz -56% (see Appendix J-3).

A poll by Quinnipac University on February 20 showed that in the US public approval of the Democratic Party's presidential candidate was only 49%. In Japan, on February 15 Kishida's cabinet was at a new low of 16.9% in a Jiji Press poll (see Appendix J-4).

By late May, none of these leaders had substantially improved.

Club at the Hub

G7 leaders place a high value on the G7 as their personal club at the hub of a growing network of global summit governance. As host, Meloni took the traditional pre-summit tour to meet with her fellow G7 leaders: on February 6 she went to Japan, and on February 18 she announced she would visit the United States on March 1 and Canada on March 2. Following speculation about a virtual G7 summit to mark the second anniversary of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, as they had on the first anniversary in 2023, the Italian presidency on February 20 announced that it would. It did, followed by another on Iran on April 13 and then a statement on synthetic drugs.

The Apulia Summit could be followed by another G7 one as part of the Peace Summit in Switzerland starting on June 15.

Another could take place, as in 2023, on the margins of the summit of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization on July 9–11 in Washington DC, of the UN's Summit of the Future, co-facilitated by Germany and Namibia, in New York on September 22–23, and the G20's Rio Summit, hosted by Brazil on November 18–19. This would depend, inter alia, on Biden's schedule and political and physical calculations, as the US presidential elections on November 5 approached.

References

- Anadolu Staff (2024). "Italy's Premier to Lead G7 Leaders' Videoconference Meeting from Kiev," Anadolu Agency Website, February 24. <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/russia-ukraine-war/italy-s-premier-to-lead-g7-leaders-videoconference-meeting-from-kyiv/3146856>.
- Bryan, Kenza (2024). "IEA Says Renewables Plans Will Miss 2030 Goal," *Financial Times*, June 5, p. 4.
- Bryan, Kenza and Steven Bernard (2024), "La Nina Switch in Pacific Set to Fuel Extreme Weather This Year," *Financial Times*, June 4, p. 3.
- Carmichael, Kevin (2024). "The G7 Has Its Swagger Back, But for How Long?," *The Logic* June 1. <https://thelogic.co/comment/carmichael-the-g7-has-its-swagger-back-but-for-how-long/>.
- Chazan, Guy (2023). "A Difficult Adjustment," *Financial Times*, October 25, p. 15.
- Copernicus Climate Change Service (2024a). "Copernicus: 2023 Is the Hottest Year on Record, with Global Temperatures Close to the 1.5°C Limit," January 9. <https://climate.copernicus.eu/copernicus-2023-hottest-year-record>.
- Copernicus Climate Change Service (2024b). "Copernicus: May 2024 Is the 12th Consecutive Month with Record-High Temperatures," June 5. <https://climate.copernicus.eu/copernicus-may-2024-12th-consecutive-month-record-high-temperatures>.
- Dubois, Laura and Sam Fleming (2023). "G7 Weighs Legal Case for Seizing Russia's Frozen Assets," *Financial Times*, December 21, p. 3.
- Financial Times* (2023). "The Pitfalls of Seizing Russia Assets to Fund Ukraine," December 22, p. 16.
- Financial Times* (2024a). "The Day in the Markets," January 17, p. 11.
- Financial Times* (2024b). "The Day in the Markets," February 6, p. 9.
- Financial Times* (2024c). "The Day in the Markets," June 4, p. 11.
- Financial Times* (2024d). "Democracy under Threat in the 'Year of Elections'." *The World: Democracy in 2024* (insert), January 17, p. 5.
- Financial Times* (2024e). "The EU Should Call Time on Russian LNG Imports," FT View, May 13, p.18.
- Foy, Henry and Harry Dempsey (2023). "Diamonds: Russia Stones Face G7 Ban," *Financial Times*, December 7, p. 4.

- G7 Research Group (2024a). “2023 G7 Hiroshima Summit Final Compliance Report,” June 5. <https://globalgovernanceprogram.org/g7/evaluations/2023compliance-final/index.html>.
- G7 Research Group (2024b). “2023 G7 Hiroshima Summit Interim Compliance Report,” February 19. <https://globalgovernanceprogram.org/g7/evaluations/2023compliance-interim/index.html>.
- Ghattas, Kim (2024). “Biden Has Put His Credibility on the Line with the Gaza Plan,” *Financial Times*, June 5, p. 15.
- Hinrichsen, Simon (2024). “Seizing Russia’s Reserves Is the Right Thing to Do,” *Financial Times*, January 3, p. 9.
- International Coffee Organization (2024). “ICO Partners with G7 to Enhance Climate Adaptation and Sustainability in the Coffee Global Value Chain,” May 3. <https://icocoffee.org/documents/cy2023-24/pr-353e-g7-communicue.pdf>.
- International Monetary Fund (2024a). “Moderating Inflation and Steady Growth Open Path to Soft Landing,” International Monetary Fund, January 30. <https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2024/01/30/world-economic-outlook-update-january-2024>.
- International Monetary Fund (2024b). “World Economic Outlook Database: April 2024 Edition.” <https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/weo-database/2024/April>.
- Italy’s G7 Presidency (2024a). “Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors Meeting: 23–25 May 2024, media handbook. <https://www.g7italy.it/wp-content/uploads/Media-Handbook-Stresa-ENG-1-3.pdf>.
- Italy’s G7 Presidency (2024b). “Foreign Affairs Ministers’ Meeting: 17–19 April 2024,” media handbook. <https://www.g7italy.it/wp-content/uploads/Media-Handbook-ENG-Capri.pdf>.
- Italy’s G7 Presidency (2024c). “Ministers’ Meeting on Transport: 11–13 April 2024,” media handbook. https://www.g7italy.it/wp-content/uploads/Media_Handbook_ENG-Milano.pdf.
- Jones, Claire (2024). “Yellen Warns Israel Not to End Waiver for Palestinian Banks,” *Financial Times*, May 24, p. 3.
- Kirton, John (2024). “The G7 Alliance’s Expanding Effectiveness,” *Wilson Quarterly*, Winter. <https://www.wilsonquarterly.com/quarterly/the-new-multilateralism/the-g7-alliances-expanding-effectiveness>.
- Lewis, Leo and Jennifer Hughes (2024). “Dollar Hits 34-Year High Against Yen after US Inflation Data Is Stronger Than Expected,” *Financial Times*, April 12, p. 9.
- McDougall, Mary and Rafe Uddin (2024). “Dollar Rally Reverses as Falling Inflation Lifts Rate Cut Hopes,” *Financial Times*, May 21, p. 10.
- Meloni, Giorgia (2023a). “President Meloni’s press conference at the G7 Summit,” Hiroshima, May 20. <https://www.governo.it/en/articolo/president-meloni-s-press-conference-g7-summit/22679>.
- Meloni, Giorgia (2023b). “President Meloni’s speech at the United Nations Food Systems Summit”, Rome, July 23. <https://www.governo.it/en/node/23272>.
- Meloni, Giorgia (2024). “President Meloni’s speech at Hostomel airport on second anniversary of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine,” Kyiv, February 24. <https://www.governo.it/en/articolo/president-Russia-s-speech-hostomel-airport-second-anniversary-russia-s-aggression-against>.
- Mooney, Attracta, Kenza Bryan and Alica Hancock (2024). “G7 Plans Sixfold Growth in Electricity Storage,” *Financial Times*, April 27–29, p. 4.
- Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2024). “Growth Continuing at a Modest Pace Through 2025, Inflation Declining to Central Bank Targets,” February 5, 2024. <https://www.oecd.org/newsroom/growth-continuing-at-a-modest-pace-through-2025-inflation-declining-to-central-bank-targets.htm>.
- Pascale, Federica (2024). “Italians increasingly sceptical of EU’s positive role in Ukraine war,” Euractiv, February 22. <https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/Ukraine-increasingly-sceptical-of-eus-positive-role-in-ukraine-war>.
- Pavlova, Irina (2024). “Defunding the War: A Swift EU Ban on Russian LNG,” *Ukrainska Pravda*, June 6. <https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/columns/2024/06/6/7459496/>.
- Strupczewski, Jan (2024). “How G7, EU Plan to Leverage Frozen Russian Assets for Ukraine,” *Reuters News*, June 6. <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/how-g7-eu-plan-leverage-frozen-russian-assets-ukraine-2024-06-06/>.
- Takach, George (2024). *Cold War 2.0: Artificial Intelligence in the New Battle between China, Russia, and America*. Simon and Schuster.
- Tamma, Paola and James Politi (2023). “US Puts Forward G7 Plan to Seize \$300bn in Russian Assets,” *Financial Times*, December 29, p. 2.
- Tamma, Paola, Laura Dubois and Sam Flemming (2024). “The Heated Debate over Frozen Assets,” *Financial Times* May 3, p. 15.

- Tamma, Paola, Henry Foy and James Politi (2024). "G7 Allies Warm to US Proposals to Rush Ukraine Funds as Trump Threat Rises," *Financial Times*, May 20, p. 1.
- Tooze, Adam (2024). "Dangers Of Dollar Nationalism Hang over the World Economy," *Financial Times*, May 13, p. 19.
- US Department of State (2023). "Secretary Blinken's Meeting with G7+ Partners on Ukraine Energy Sector Support," Office of the Spokesperson November 21. <https://www.state.gov/secretary-blinkens-meeting-with-g7-partners-on-ukraine-energy-sector-support-2>.
- Vagnoni, Giselda (2024). "Italy to Put Africa Development, AI at Heart of Its G7 Presidency," Reuters, January 5. <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/africa-ai-be-key-g7-issues-italy-meloni-says-2024-01-04>.
- Williams, Aime (2024). "Wealthy Nations Pledge \$11bn for Global Crises," *Financial Times*, April 22, p. 4.
- Wolf, Martin (2024). "What We Know About the Global Outlook," *Financial Times*, January 17, p. 17.
- World Economic Forum (2024). "Global Risks Report 2024." January 10. <https://www.weforum.org/publications/global-risks-report-2024>.

Appendix A: G7 Summit Performance, 1975–2023

Year	Grade	Domestic political management		Deliberation			Direction setting	Decision making	Delivery		Development of global governance		Participation		
		# communiqué compliments	Spread	# days	# statements	# words	# references to core values	# commitments	Compliance	# assessed	# ministerials created	# official-level groups created	# members	# participating countries	# participating international organizations
1975	A-	2	29%	3	1	1,129	5	15	54%	2	0	1	6	0	0
1976	D	0	0%	2	1	1,624	0	10	n/a	n/a	0	0	7	0	0
1977	B-	1	13%	2	6	2,669	0	55	n/a	n/a	0	1	8	0	0
1978	A	1	13%	2	2	2,999	0	50	57%	3	0	0	8	0	0
1979	B+	0	0%	2	2	2,102	0	55	n/a	n/a	1	2	8	0	0
1980	C+	0	0%	2	5	3,996	3	54	n/a	n/a	0	1	8	0	0
1981	C	1	13%	2	3	3,165	0	48	50%	2	1	0	8	0	0
1982	C	0	0%	3	2	1,796	0	39	15%	1	0	3	9	0	0
1983	B	0	0%	3	2	2,156	7	39	22%	2	0	0	8	0	0
1984	C-	1	13%	3	5	3,261	0	31	27%	2	1	0	8	0	0
1985	E	4	50%	3	2	3,127	1	24	64%	2	0	2	8	0	0
1986	B+	3	25%	3	4	3,582	1	39	29%	1	1	1	9	0	0
1987	D	2	13%	3	7	5,064	0	53	65%	1	0	2	9	0	0
1988	C-	3	25%	3	3	4,872	0	27	n/a	n/a	0	0	8	0	0
1989	B+	3	38%	3	11	7,125	1	61	47%	4	0	1	8	0	0
Average/ Total								600/ 40	43%	20					
1990	D	3	38%	3	3	7,601	10	78	45%	4	0	3	8	0	0
1991	B-	1	13%	3	3	8,099	8	53	69%	2	0	0	9	1	0
1992	D	1	13%	3	4	7,528	5	41	86%	3	1	1	8	0	0
1993	C+	0	0%	3	2	3,398	2	29	79%	2	0	2	8	1	0
1994	C	1	13%	3	2	4,123	5	53	86%	2	1	0	8	1	0
1995	B+	3	25%	3	3	7,250	0	78	65%	1	2	2	8	1	0
1996	B	1	13%	3	5	15,289	6	128	71%	23	0	3	8	1	4
1997	C-	16	88%	3	4	12,994	6	145	63%	11	1	3	9	1	0
Average/ Total								606/ 76	71%						
1998	B+	0	0%	3	4	6,092	5	73	71%	13	0	0	9	0	0
1999	B+	4	22%	3	4	10,019	4	46	73%	10	1	5	9	0	0
2000	B	1	11%	3	5	13,596	6	105	87%	29	0	4	9	4	3
2001	B	1	11%	3	7	6,214	3	58	74%	20	1	2	9	0	0
2002	B+	0	0%	2	18	11,959	10	187	68%	24	1	8	10	0	0
2003	C	0	0%	3	14	16,889	17	206	81%	20	0	5	10	12	5
2004	C+	0	0%	3	16	38,517	11	245	77%	33	0	15	10	12	0
2005	A-	8	67%	3	16	22,286	29	212	83%	28	0	5	9	11	6
2006	B+	6	44%	3	15	30,695	256	317	70%	28	0	4	10	5	9
2007	B+	12	100%	3	8	25,857	86	329	77%	31	0	4	9	9	9
2008	B+	8	78%	3	6	16,842	33	296	73%	29	1	4	9	15	6
2009	B	13	67%	3	10	31,167	62	254	77%	27	2	9	10	28	10
2010	C	10	89%	2	2	7,161	32	44	75%	21	0	1	10	9	0
2011	B+	14	67%	2	5	19,071	172	196	78%	18	1	0	10	7	4
2012	B+	7	67%	2	2	3,640	42	81	78%	22	0	1	10	4	1
2013	B+	13	60%	2	4	13,494	71	214	79%	27	0	0	10	6	1
Average/ Total 1998–2013								2,863/ 179	76%						
Average/ Total 1990–2013								3,446/ 144	74%						
2014	B	6	44%	2	1	5,106	42	141	85%	24	1	0	9	0	0

Year	Grade	Domestic political management		Deliberation			Direction setting	Decision making	Delivery		Development of global governance		Participation		
		# communiqué compliments	Spread	# days	# statements	# words	# references to core values	# commitments	Compliance	# assessed	# ministerials created	# official-level groups created	# members	# participating countries	# participating international organizations
2015	B+	2	25%	2	2	12,674	20	376	79%	35	1	4	9	6	6
2016	B-	22	63%	2	7	23,052	95	342	69%	28	1	1	9	7	5
2017	B	2	25%	2	4	8,614	158	180	79%	22	1	2	9	5	6
2018	B+	0	0%	2	8	11,224	56	315	78%	42	1		9	12	4
2019	B-	6	57%	3	10	7,202		71	76%	27	1	0	9	8	8
2020	B+	0	0%	1	1	795	0	25	94%	20	0	0	9	4	n/a
2021	A-	4	50%	3	3	20,677	130	429	89%	29	0	0	9	4	3
2022	A-	1	13%	3	8	19,179	118	545	92%	21	0	0	9	6	9
2023	A	17	75%	3	6	30,046	57	698	-	-	0	0	9	9	7
Average/ Total 2014–2023		60/ 6		23	50/ 5	138,587/ 13,858	676/ 75	3,122/ 312	82%	248/ 28	6	7	9	61/ 6	48/ 5
Total		204	27.57	129	268	527,017	1,575	7,093	15.98	696	21	102	429	189	106
Average		4.2	0.6	2.6	5.5	10,755.4	32.8	147.8	0.4	16.5	0.4	2.1	8.8	3.9	2.2

Updated: Brittany Warren, October 14, 2023.

Notes: n/a = not available.

Grade: Kirton scale is A+ Extremely Strong, Striking, Standout, Historic; A Very Strong; A- Strong; B+ Significant; B Substantial; B- Solid; C Small; D Very Small; F Failure (including made things worse).

Domestic political management: # communiqué compliments = the number of favourable references to G7/G8 members by name. Spread = number of G7/G8 members complimented.

Deliberation: # days = the duration of the summit; # statements = number of official statements issued in the leaders' name; # words = number of words contained in the official statements.

Direction setting: # affirmations of G7/G8 core values of open democracy, individual liberty and human rights contained in official documents.

Decision making: # commitments contained in the official documents.

Delivery: Compliance: compliance with selected commitments assessed as follows: 1975–1989 assessed elsewhere by George von Furstenberg and Joseph Daniels; 1990–1995 assessed elsewhere by Ella Kokotsis; 1996– assessed by the G7 Research Group. # commitments: number of commitments assessed.

Development of global governance: # ministerials created = number of institutions at the ministerial level created; # official-level groups created = number of institutions at the officials level created. Institutions created at or by the summit, or during the hosting year, at least in the form of having one meeting take place.

Participation: # members = number of leaders of full members, including those representing the European Community from the start; Russia started as a participant in 1991 and became a full member in 1998 until its last participation in 2013; the G4 met in 1974 without Japan and Italy and later that year the G6 (without Canada) met. # participating countries = number of full members plus number of leaders from other countries. # participating international organizations = number of heads of international organizations.

Appendix B: Italy's 2024 Summit Priorities

As set out on June 21, 2023

- Global South
- Ukraine
- Economic security, including supply chains, building on the 2023 summit's results
- Energy security
- Migration, human trafficking and how to tackle illegal migration, as a key issue
- Africa, more cooperation, including Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment
- Artificial intelligence

As set out on December 19, 2023

1. Ukraine
2. Middle East
3. Developing countries, emerging economies
4. Africa
5. Indo-Pacific
6. Migration
7. Climate-energy nexus
8. Food security
9. Artificial intelligence governance

Appendix C: G7 Ministerial Meetings in 2024

C-1: G7 Ministerial Meeting Schedule (as of May 28, 2024)

Held			
Date	Portfolio	Location	Outcome
Feb 7	Trade	virtual	Statement
Feb 17	Foreign	Munich Security Conference	Chair's summary
Feb 20	Transport	virtual	Declaration
Feb 28	Health	virtual	Statement
Mar 13-15	Industry, tech and digital	Verona and Trento	Declaration
Apr 11-13	Transport	Milan	Declaration
Apr 17	Finance and central bankers	Washington DC	Statement
Apr 17-19	Foreign	Capri	Communiqués (3)
Apr 28-30	Climate, energy and environment	Turin	Communiqué, 2 annexes
May 9-10	Justice	Venice	Communiqué, 1 annex
May 23-25	Finance ministers and central bankers	Stresa	Communiqué, 7 annexes
Scheduled			
Jun 27-29	Education	Trieste	
Jul 9-11	Science and technology	Bologna and Forli	
Jul 16-17	Trade	Villa San Giovanni/Reggio Calabria	
Sep 11-13	Labour and employment	Cagliari	
Sep 19-21	Culture	Napoli	
Sep 26-28	Agriculture	Siracusa	
Oct 2-4 (TBC)	Interior	Avellino	
Oct 4-6	Gender equality/women empowerment	Matera	
Oct 9-11	Health	Ancona	
Oct 14-16	Inclusion and disability	Assisi and Perugia	
Oct 18-20	Defence	Naples	
Oct 24-25	Development	Pescara	
Nov 13-14	Tourism	Florence	
Nov 17-19	Urban sustainable development	Genoa	
Date TBC	Foreign	Fiuggi	

Total: 26 meetings of 21 different ministerial portfolios, led by foreign affairs with three; trade, transport and health with two each; and the first ever ones for inclusion and disability and for defence. They were held from February 7 through to at least November 3.

C-2: G7 Ministerial Meetings Performance

Date	Subject	Words	Democracy/ Human rights	Decisions	Development of global governance
Feb 7	Trade	904		20	
Feb 17	Foreign	1,909		24	
Feb 20	Transport	593		2	
Feb 28	Health	956		8	
Mar 14-15	Industry, technology and digital	6,050		42	
April 11-13	Transport	5,803		40	
April 17	Finance and central bankers	3,192		45	
April 18	Foreign	17,287		205	
April 29-30	Climate, energy, environment	23,209		320	
May 10	Justice	3,375		35	
May 25	Finance and central bankers	6,490		84	
Total	11	69,768		825	

Appendix D: Commitments, G7 Kyiv Summit, February 24, 2024

2024V-01 [We the Leaders of the Group of Seven (G7) met today with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to] reaffirm our unwavering support for Ukraine

2024V-02 We will hold those culpable for Navalny's death accountable, including by continuing to impose restrictive measures in response to human rights violations and abuses in Russia and taking other actions.

2024V-03 We will continue to support Ukraine's right to self-defence and reiterate our commitment to Ukraine's long-term security, including by concluding and implementing bilateral security commitments and arrangements, based on the Joint Declaration of Support for Ukraine we endorsed in Vilnius last July.

2024V-04 We are stepping up our security assistance to Ukraine and are increasing our production and delivery capabilities, to assist the country.

2024V-05 We will help Ukraine meet its urgent financing needs,

2024V-06 [We will help Ukraine meet its urgent financing needs,] and assist other vulnerable countries severely affected by the impacts of Russia's war.

2024V-07 We urge the approval of additional support to close Ukraine's remaining budget gap for 2024.

2024V-08 We will continue to work, with the Ukrainian authorities and International Financial Institutions through the Multi-agency Donor Coordination Platform for Ukraine

2024V-09 [We will continue to work, with the Ukrainian authorities and International Financial Institutions through the Multi-agency Donor Coordination Platform for Ukraine] and by leveraging private investments.

2024V-10 We will never recognise so-called "elections", past and future, held by Russia in the territories of Ukraine, nor their results.

2024V-11 We remain committed to holding those responsible accountable for their atrocities against the people of Ukraine, in line with international law.

2024V-12 We support investigations by the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, the Prosecutor-General of Ukraine, and other national prosecutors within their jurisdictions.

2024V-13 Finally, we will continue to support Ukrainian displaced persons and refugees and protect those in need.

2024V-14 We reiterate our support for the Council of Europe Register of Damage for Ukraine.

2024V-15 We will continue to help Ukraine export its grain and agricultural products to the most vulnerable nations, including through the implementation of the Grain Verification Scheme that Ukraine will lead this year.

2024V-16 We will continue to raise the cost of Russia's war, degrade Russia's sources of revenue and impede its efforts to build its war machine, as demonstrated by our recently approved sanctions packages.

2024V-17 We remain committed to fully implementing and enforcing our sanctions on Russia and adopting new measures as necessary.

2024V-18 We remain committed to fully implementing and enforcing our sanctions on Russia] and adopting new measures as necessary.

2024V-19 We continue to counter, in close cooperation with third countries, any attempts to evade and circumvent our sanctions and export control measures.

2024V-20 We will impose additional sanctions on companies and individuals in third countries who help Russia acquire weapons or key inputs for weapons.

2024V-21 We will also impose sanctions on those who help Russia acquire tools and other equipment that aid Russian weapons production or military-industrial development.

2024V-22 We will continue to apply significant pressure on Russian revenues from energy and other commodities.

2024V-23 We will continue to take steps to tighten compliance and enforcement of the oil price cap.

2024V-24 While working to maintain supply stability, we will respond to price cap violations, including by imposing additional sanctions measures on those engaged in deceptive practices while transporting Russian oil and against the networks Russia has developed to extract additional revenue from price cap violations.

2024V-25 We will continue taking steps to limit Russia's future energy revenues.

2024V-26 We will continue to impede Russia's development of future energy projects and disrupt its development of alternatives for energy shipping and other services.

2024V-27 We will continue efforts to reduce Russia's revenues from metals.

2024V-28 We will continue to take action against third-country actors who materially support Russia's war including by imposing additional measures on entities, where appropriate, in third countries.

2024V-29 We call on financial institutions to refrain from supporting Russia's war machine and we will take appropriate steps, consistent with our legal systems, to deter this behaviour.

2024V-30 We are determined to dispel any false notion that time is on Russia's side, that destroying infrastructure and livelihoods has no consequences for Russia, or that Russia could prevail by causing Ukraine to fail economically. Russia should not be able to indefinitely delay payment it owes.

2024V-31 We are determined to ensure full accountability and we support Ukraine in obtaining compensation for the loss, injury and damage resulting from Russia's aggression.

2024V-32 We reaffirm that, consistent with our respective legal systems, Russia's sovereign assets in our jurisdictions will remain immobilized until Russia pays for the damage it caused to Ukraine.

2024V-33 We welcome the adoption of the EU legal acts concerning extraordinary revenues of central securities depositories gained from Russia's immobilised sovereign assets and encourage further steps to enable their use, consistent with applicable contractual obligations and in accordance with applicable laws.

2024V-34 We ask our ministers to continue their work and update ahead of the Apulia Summit on all possible avenues by which immobilized Russian sovereign assets could be made use of to support Ukraine, consistent with our respective legal systems and international law.

2024V-35 As we move forward, we continue our support to Ukraine in further developing President Zelenskyy's Peace Formula

2024V-36 [We continue our support to Ukraine in further developing President Zelenskyy's Peace Formula] and commit ourselves to supporting a comprehensive, just and lasting peace consistent with the principles of the UN Charter, international law and respectful of Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Appendix E: Italy and G7 Compliance, 1975–2021

Subject	Italy's compliance	G7 compliance	Italy-G7 compliance	# Commitments assessed
Overall	63%	76%	-13%	675
Macroeconomics	71%	84%	-13%	24
Financial regulation	65%	79%	-14%	10
Trade	58%	68%	-10%	52
Development	61%	75%	-14%	60
Labour and employment	90%	84%	+6%	7
Education	50%	69%	-19%	13
Social policy	100%	86%	+14%	5
Gender	44%	68%	-24%	23
ICT/Digitalization	77%	85%	-8%	16
Climate change	55%	74%	19%	99
Environment	62%	81%	-19%	26
Food and agriculture	57%	78%	-21%	14
Health	62%	81%	-16%	91
Migration and refugees	60%	87%	-27%	5
Crime and corruption	64%	73%	-9%	46
Conflict prevention	50%	76%	-26%	8
Terrorism	75%	78%	-3%	36
Regional security	76%	79%	-3%	44
Weapons proliferation	63%	81%	-18%	36
Nuclear Safety	50%	75%	-25%	2
East-West relations	0%	50%	-50%	2
Democracy	64%	75%	-11%	11
Human rights	70%	81%	-11%	6
United Nations reform	50%	60%	-10%	4
International cooperation	100%	100%	0%	5
Infrastructure	100%	100%	0%	1
Transparency	100%	81%	+19%	2
Heiligendamm Process	100%	100%	0%	1

Appendix F: Progress on Middle East Peace at Apulia

On May 31, 2024, US president Joe Biden announced from the White House a plan for peace in the Middle East. On June 3, G7 leaders issued a statement fully endorsing it. This raised the question of how these G7 leaders, meeting face to face at their summit in Apulia, Italy, on June 13–15 will bring to life the Biden Peace Plan and through it the long-awaited peace in the Middle East.

At Apulia, G7 leaders will easily agree that all want and need a two-state solution and that the Biden peace plan is the best way at the moment to move toward it. They will again full endorse the Biden peace plan and urge all parties to the current conflict to accept it in full and fast. But they will not delve into the details about how they could act Hamas to drop its two conditions – both unacceptable to Israel – to bring the plan and peace to life.

Since the Italian G7 presidency began on January 1, 2024, G7 leaders have issued five statements, including one on synthetic drug threats on April 29. The first [statement](#), on February 24, was exclusively on Russia and Ukraine – the G7's first priority and preoccupation from the start.

The next [statement](#), issued on March 15, called on third parties – specifically Iran – to stop providing material support to Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine or “face severe costs.”

On April 14, G7 leaders had a virtual summit and released another [statement](#), in a swift response to the Iranian missile attack on Israel the evening before. It contained six commitments, four on Iran but also two on the crisis in Gaza itself. It identified two shocks, one on “Iran's direct and unprecedented attack against Israel” and the second on “the crisis in Gaza.”

This emphasized the tight linkage G7 leaders saw between Iran and Hamas, and implied that the attack on Israel from both continued and had escalated, as Iran's direct attack on Israel on April 13, was the first one ever. This linkage raises the questions: will Hamas need a green light from Iran to accept the Biden peace plan and under would that permission come?

Then on June 3, G7 leaders issued another [statement](#), on the single subject of Gaza. It contained two commitments. The first said “We the leaders of the Group of Seven (G7), fully endorse and will stand behind the comprehensive deal outlined by President Biden.” The second stated “We reaffirm our support for a credible pathway towards peace leading to a two State solution.

The first commitment importantly emphasized a “comprehensive” deal, including all of the three stages, in the same sequence, outlined in the Biden plan, and all the elements specified therein.

This full endorsement included that of the European Union, despite and differences among its 27 members, such as Hungary.

To be sure, each G7 member has its distinctive approach to peace in the Middle East, Israel and Hamas, and thus the contents of the Biden peace plan.

These differences will be noted, but not emphasized, when each of the leaders speak at the summit table in Apulia. Here each will emphasise again, and in their collective communiqué, their full support for the Biden peace plan. They know that their full and united support is necessary to convince Hamas to drop its two reservations, both unacceptable to Israel. And G7 leaders will not be distracted by domestic political needs, such as Canadian prime minister Justin Trudeau's need to win the full support of Jewish voters in a Toronto by-election on June 24, or by international events, such as the Israeli Defence Forces' killing of civilians in Gaza.

Moreover, the G7 leaders at Apulia, and their many invited guests, have so many other priorities, starting with Russia's war against Ukraine, that they will not waste their limited time and political capital on an issue that they know they cannot control the solution too. None of the G7 leaders, with the possible exception of Biden, has Middle East peace on his or her priority list for Apulia.

G7 leaders know, if with varying degrees of certainty, that Hamas will never accept a two-state solution in the long run and will insist on a single state running "from the river to the sea" that it controls. The G7 summit was created and continues to defend democracy around the world and Israel is a democracy, while Hamas is not.

So G7 leaders will focus instead on stopping Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine.

G7 leaders feel deeply betrayed by Putin's Russia, a member of the G8 from 1998 to 2013, as it moved toward becoming a democratic polity but, in early 2014, suddenly switched to become an authoritarian one and annexed its neighbour's territory by military force.

More broadly, G7 leaders at their summits have been supporting Ukraine since 1992, as soon as it became a sovereign state. They have done far less on Israel and Palestine and have had less success there.

Moreover, three G7 countries are next door neighbours of Russia – Canada, the US and Japan, and Japan's Northern Territories have been annexed by Russia since 1945.

Appendix G: G7 Commitments with 2025 Timeline

Summit	Total	Gender	Energy	Health	Climate change	Environment	Labour and employment
1975–2014	0						
2015 Elmau	1	1					
2016 Ise-Shima	2		1	1			
2017 Taormina	1	1					
2018 Charlevoix	0						
2019 Biarritz	0						
2020 Virtual	0						
2021 Cornwall	5		1		2	2	
2022 Elmau	6		1		2	2	1
2023 Hiroshima	8		1	1	2	4	
Total	23	2	4	2	6	8	1

Compiled by Brittaney Warren, September 25, 2023. Coded by John Kirton, November 26, 2023.

Note: The 23 commitments due in 2025 made by G7 summits since 2015 are led by those on the environment with eight, climate change with six and energy with four, followed by health and gender with two each and labour and employment with one.

2015 Elmau (1)

2015-283: [We will continue to take steps] to reduce the gender gap in workforce participation within our own countries by 25% **by 2025**, taking into account national circumstances including by improving the framework conditions to enable women and men to balance family life and **employment**, including access to parental leave and childcare. (core gender) (labour-employment related)

2016 Ise-Shima (2)

2016-166: We remain committed to the elimination of inefficient **fossil fuel subsidies** and encourage all countries to do so **by 2025**. (core energy finance)

2016-226: Galvanize international efforts to combat malnutrition and to hold the rise of obesity and over-weight targeting most vulnerable populations- mothers, children and adolescent girls- and consistent with the WHO [World Health Organization] Comprehensive Implementation Plan on Maternal, Infant and Young Child Nutrition, including: (i) the activities within the **Decade of Action on Nutrition 2016-2025** and by various initiatives such as Scaling Up Nutrition (core health) (food-agriculture-related)

2017 Taormina (1)

2017-152: Consider adopting measures that support an increased uptake by fathers of parental leave, **by 2025**. (core gender)

2018 Charlevoix (0)

None

2019 Biarritz (0)

None

2020 Virtual (0)

None

2021 Cornwall (5)

2021-14: [We commit to]...increasing and improving **climate finance to 2025** (core climate change finance)

2021-189: More broadly, we reaffirm our existing commitment to eliminating inefficient **fossil fuel subsidies by 2025**, [and call on all countries to join us, recognising the substantial financial resource this could unlock globally to support the transition and the need to commit to a clear timeline]. (core energy- finance)

2021-204: We reaffirm the collective developed country goal to jointly mobilise **\$100 billion** per year from public and private sources, through **to 2025** in the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency on implementation. (core climate change- finance)

2021-224: Third, we will work intensively towards increasing investment in the protection, conservation and restoration of nature, including committing to increase **finance for nature-based solutions** through **to 2025**. (core environment- finance)

2021-326: Working intensively towards increasing finance for nature from all sources throughout the next five years: in particular, we commit to increase our **finance contributions for nature-based solutions** through **to 2025**. (core environment- finance)

2022 Elmau (6)

2022-32: We renew our strong commitment and will intensify our efforts to delivering on the collective **USD 100 billion climate finance** mobilisation goal as soon as possible and through **to 2025**. (core climate change- finance)

2022-34: We commit to working alongside others towards the implementation of the Glasgow Climate Pact's call to collectively at least double the provision of **climate finance for adaptation to developing countries** from 2019 levels **by 2025**. (core climate change- finance)

2022-39: We are committed to mobilising resources from all sources and to substantially increasing our national and international **funding for nature by 2025** to support the implementation of an ambitious global framework. (core environment- finance)

2022-41: We commit to ensure our **international development assistance** does no harm to **nature by 2025**, and delivers positive outcomes overall for people, climate, and nature. (core environment) (development-related)

2022-48: We [stress that fossil fuel subsidies are inconsistent with the goals of the Paris Agreement and] reaffirm our commitment to the elimination of inefficient **fossil fuel subsidies by 2025**. (core energy- finance)

2022-161: **By 2025**, we will increase the share of our **ODA** [official development assistance] employment and skills promotion programmes that is directed specifically towards **green sectors and greening traditional** sectors in alignment with our emerging and **developing** partner countries' strategies, and subject to our **budgetary** processes. (core labour and employment) (development-related)

2023 Hiroshima (8)

2023-116: We reaffirm our commitments to the developed country Parties' [to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change] goal of jointly mobilizing **\$100 billion annually in climate finance** by 2020 through **to 2025** in the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency on implementation. (core climate change- finance)

2023-123: We continue to accelerate efforts to respond to the Glasgow Climate Pact that urges developed countries to at least double their collective provision of climate finance for adaptation to **developing countries** from the 2019 level **by 2025**, in the context of achieving a balance between mitigation and adaptation in the provision of scaled-up financial resources. (core climate change- finance) (development related)

2023-143: We will make as much progress as possible on these issues...by the UN Ocean Conference **in 2025**. (core environment)

2023-144: [We will make as much progress as possible]...on the broader agenda of ocean protection by the UN Ocean Conference **in 2025**. (core environment)

2023-147: We will identify incentives, including **subsidies**, harmful to biodiversity **by 2025**, and redirect or eliminate them while scaling up positive incentives for the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity by 2030 at the latest, taking initial steps without delay. (core environment- finance)

2023-148: We reiterate our commitment to substantially increase our national and international funding for nature **by 2025**. (core environment- finance)

2023-178: We reaffirm our commitment to the elimination of inefficient **fossil fuel subsidies by 2025** or sooner (core energy- finance)

2023-248: We recommit to working alongside global partners to assist countries to achieve UHC [universal health coverage] by supporting primary health care (PHC) and developing and restoring essential health services, to achieve better than pre-pandemic levels **by the end of 2025**, as part of our effort to strengthen health systems in ordinary times. (core health)

Appendix H: Shock-Activated Vulnerabilities

H-1: Summit's Shock-Activated Vulnerabilities

Date	Subject	Total		Russia	Iran	Gaza	Health
Feb 24 Kyiv	Russia/Ukraine	11		11			
Apr 14	Iran/Israel	2			1	1	
Apr 29	Synthetic drugs	1				1	
Total		14		11	1	2	1

H-2: Ministerial Meetings' Shock-Activated Vulnerabilities

Date	Portfolio	Total	Russia/ Ukraine	Middle East	Climate/ environment	Health	General
Feb 7	Trade	3	1	1	1	0	0
Feb 17	Foreign	7	3	4	0	0	0
Feb 20	Transport	6	1	3	1	1	0
Feb 29	Health	3	0	0	0	3	0
Mar 14-15	Industry, tech, digital	4	2	0	1	0	1
Apr 11-13	Transport	10	4	2	2	2	0
Apr 17	Finance	7	3	3	0	0	1
Apr 19	Foreign	7	1	2	0	2	2
Apr 28-30	Climate, energy, environment	5	1	0	4	0	0
May 10	Justice	6	6	0	0	0	0
May 25	Finance	8	6	0	0	2	0
Total		66	28	15	9	10	4

Note: Ukraine includes Russia, especially "Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine." Shocks include "shocks," especially discrete, specific ones, "emergency," "attack."

H-3: Media-Highlighted Shock-Activated Vulnerabilities

Date 2024	Health	Economy	Climate	Digital	Democracy	Health-Economy	Health-Climate	G7	G20
January									
2 Tue	25	50	25	0	0				
3									
4	0	67	0	0	33				
5	0	50	0	0	50				
6-7	50	75	0	0	50				
8 Mon	0	50	0	0	50				
9									
10	0	0	33	0	33				
11	25	0	0	25	75				
12	0	0	50	25	50				
13-14	25	25	25	0	25				
15 Mon	0	75	25	0	25				
16	0	100	25	25	25				
17	0	50	0	25	25				
18	33	67	0	0	33				
19	0	67	0	0	33				
20-21	0	50	25	25	25				
22 Mon	0	25	25	0	75				
23	0	25	0	25	25				
24	0	33	0	0	67				
25	0	50	0	0	25				
26	0	50	50	0	100				
27-28	0	0	0	25	75				
29 Mon	0	50	0	0	75				
30	25	25	0	0	50				
31	0	75	0	0	75				
% days (24)	6 (25%)	20 (83%)	9 (38%)	7 (29%)	23 (96%)				
% stories (91)	7 (8%)	40 (44%)	11 (12%)	7 (8%)	43 (47%)				
February									
1 Thu	0	50	0	0	75				
2	50	50	50	0	25				
3-4	0	50	0	25	50				
5 Mon	0	50	25	0	25				
6	25	50	50	0	0				
7	0	25	0	0	75				
8	0	75	0	0	25				
9	0	50	25	25	25				
10-11	33	33	0	0	67				
12 Mon	0	50	0	0	50				
13	0	75	0	0	25				
14	25	0	0	0	75				
15	0	25	25	25	25				
16	50	50	25	0	50				
17-18	0	67	0	0	33				
19 Mon	0	25	0	0	75				
20	0	50	50	0	100				
21	0	25	0	25	50				
22	0	25	0	0	25				
23	0	33	0	67	33				
24-25	25	50	0	0	25				
26 Mon	0	25	0	0	50				
27	0	0	33	33	33				

Date 2024	Health	Economy	Climate	Digital	Democracy	Health-Economy	Health-Climate	G7	G20
28	0	0	0	0	100				
29	0	0	0	33	67				
N days 25	6	21	8	7	24				
% days	24%	84%	32%	28%	96%				
N stories 91	8	36	11	8	45				
% stories	8%	40%	12%	9%	49%				
March									
1 Fri	25	0	0	0	50				
2-3	25	0	0	25	50				
4 Mon	0	0	25	0	75				
5	0	0	0	25	75				
6	0	75	0	50	0				
7	0	0	0	25	75				
8	0	25	25	0	50				
9-10	0	50	0	0	25				
11 Mon	0	0	0	0	75				
12	0	0	0	0	75				
13	0	25	0	25	50				
14	0	25	0	0	50				
15	0	25	0	0	50				
16-17	0	0	25	0	100				
18 Mon	0	25	0	0	50				
19	0	0	0	25	50				
20	0	25	0	0	50				
21	25	25	0	0	25				
22	0	25	0	25	25				
23-24	25	25	25	50	25				
25 Mon	0	0	25	25	50				
26									
27	0	0	0	0	25				
28	0	75	0	0	25				
29 Fri NP									
30-31	0	0	0	25	25				
N Days 24	4	12	5	10	23				
% Days	17%	50%	21%	42%	96%				
N Stories 96	4	17	5	12	46				
% Stories	4%	18%	5%	13%	48%				
April									
1 Mon	25	50	0	25	25				
2	25	0	25	0	50				
3	0	0	25	0	75				
4	0	25	25	25	25				
5	25	50	25	0	0				
6-7	0	25	0	25	50				
8 Mon	50	50	50	0	75				
9	25	50	50	50	50				
10	0	50	0	25	75				
11	0	50	0	0	50				
12	0	25	0	0	50				
13-14	25	25	0	0	0				
15 Mon	0	0	0	0	100%			33%	
16									
17	0	50	0	0	50			25%	
18	0	25	50	0	0				

Date 2024	Health	Economy	Climate	Digital	Democracy	Health-Economy	Health-Climate	G7	G20
19	0	67	33	0	33			33%	
20-21	0	33	0	0	67				
22 Mon	67	0	33	0	67				
23	0	0	0	0	100				
24	0	50	0	0	50				
25	0	25	0	0	75				
26	0	75	50	25	75				
27-28	0	25	0	25	25				
29 Mon	0	50	0	25	75				
30	0	50	0	25	50				
N days 25	7	20	10	9	22				
% days	28%	80	40	36	88				
N stories 89	10%	37%	16%	11%	56				
May									
1 Wed	0	25	0	25	50				
2	0	75	0	0	25				
3	0	25	25	0	50				
4-5	0	50	25	0	25				
6 Mon	0	25	0	0	75				
7	0	50	0	0	50				
8	0	0	0	0	100				
9	33	67	0	0	33				
10	0	50	0	25	50				
11-12	0	0	25	25	25				
13 Mon	0	50	0	0	75				
14	0	50	0	0	50				
15	0	50	25	25	50				
16	0	75	0	0	50				
17	0	50	0	0	50				
18-19	0	25	25	25	0				
20 Mon	0	0	25	0	75			25	
21	0	50	0	0	50				
22	50	25	25	50	50				
23	33	0	33	0	67				
24	0	25	0	50	50				
25-26	0	0	67	0	33				
27 Mon	0	25	0	25	25				
28	0	25	0	25	50				
29	0	0	25	0	75				
30	25	25	50	0	50				
31	0	0	0	0	75				
N days 27	4	20	11	9	26				
% days	15%	74%	41%	33%	96%				
N stories 105	5	33	13	11	53				
% stories	5%	31%	12%	10%	50%				
June									
1-2	0	33	0	0	67				
3 M	0	0	50	25	50				
4	0	67	33	0	33				
5	0	0	33	0	33				
6	0	25	25	0	50				
7	0	25	0	0	50				
8-9	0	50	25	0	50				
N Days 7	0	5	5	5	1	7			

Date 2024	Health	Economy	Climate	Digital	Democracy	Health-Economy	Health-Climate	G7	G20
% Days	0	71%	71%	14%	100%				
N Stories 25	0	7	6	1	12				
% Stories	0	28%	24%	4%	48%				
10									
11									
12									
13									
14									
15									
N days									
% days									
N stories									

Notes: Coded by John Kirton, May 24, 2024.

Excludes appearance in any continuation of the story on inside pages.

Health-economy and health-climate are their co-appearance on the front-page part of the same story.

Numbers are % of stories on front page.

Climate includes biodiversity, environment, energy.

Democracy includes elections etc. within a country, and war between democracies and non-democracies.

Appendix I: Forecasted Growth in Gross Domestic Product for 2024

	Organisation for Co-operation and Development	International Monetary Fund
World	2.9%	2.9%
United States	2.1%	2.1%
Japan	-	0.9%
Germany	0.3%	0.5%
France	0.6%	1.0%
United Kingdom	0.7%	0.6%
Italy	0.7%	0.7%
Canada	0.9%	1.4%
Euro area (17)	0.6%	-
Spain	-	1.5%
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development members	1.8%	
China	4.7%	4.6%
India	6.2%	6.5%
Korea	2.2%	2.3%
Russia	1.8%	2.6%
Brazil	1.8%	1.7%
Mexico	2.5%	2.7%
Saudi Arabia	2.4%	2.7%
South Africa	1.0%	1.0%
Nigeria	-	3.0%
G20	2.9%	

Sources: "Growth Continuing at a Modest Pace Through 2025, Inflation Declining to Central Bank Targets," Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, February 5, 2024; "Moderating Inflation and Steady Growth Open Path to Soft Landing," International Monetary Fund, January 30, 2024.

Appendix J: G7 Leaders' Domestic Political Control

J-1: Legislative Control

United States	Joe Biden	Senate yes; House of Representatives no
Japan	Fumio Kishida	Coalition government; 2 parties control both chambers
Germany	Olaf Scholtz	Coalition government; 3 parties control both chambers
France	Emmanuel Macron	Executive lacks majority in Assemblée nationale
United Kingdom	Rishi Sunak	Majority government controls both chambers
Italy	Giorgia Meloni	Multiparty coalition government
Canada	Justin Trudeau	Minority government alliance controls lower, not upper house
European Union	Ursula von der Leyen	
	Charles Michel	

J-2: Next G7 Elections

2024		
1	European Union	June 6-9, Parliament, von der Leyen may stay, Michel goes
2	United Kingdom	July 4
3	United States	November 5, President and Congress, take office in January 2025
2025		
1	Canada	October 20, or before, to elect House of Commons
2	Germany	October 26, or before to elect the Bundestag
3	Japan	October 31, or before in all Representatives districts
2026		
2027		
1	France	April 8-23, President, first round, potential second round two weeks later
2	Italy	December 22 or before, general election

J-3: Public Approval of G7 Leaders

United States: Joe Biden		
	Aug 10, 2023	40% approve (World of Statistics)
	2023 end	39% approve
	Jan 6, 2024	-16% net
	Jan 30, 2024	-18% net (Morning Consult)
	Feb 12, 2024	-15% net (Morning Consult), 41% approve, 56% disapprove
Japan: Fumio Kishida		
	Aug 10, 2023	23% (World of Statistics)
	Feb 14, 2024	below 30% (FT p. 4)
Germany: Olaf Scholz		
	Aug 10, 2023	32% (World of Statistics)
	Jan 30, 2024	-57% (Morning Consult), 20% approve
	Feb 24, 2024	23% approve (Morning Consult)
France: Emmanuel Macron		
	Aug 10, 2023	30% (World of Statistics)
	Jan 11, 2024	27%
	Jan 30, 2024	-44% (Morning Consult), 24% approve
	Feb 24, 2024	21% approve (Morning Consult)
United Kingdom: Rishi Sunak		
	Aug 10, 2023	30% (World of Statistics)
	Jan 30, 2024	-36% (Morning Consult), 27% approve
	Feb 24, 2024	25% approve (Morning Consult)
Italy: Giorgia Meloni		
	Aug 10, 2023	43% (World of Statistics)
	Jan 30, 2024	-6% (Morning Consult), 44% approve
	Feb 24, 2024	41% approve (Morning Consult)
Canada: Justin Trudeau		
	Aug 10, 2023	41% (World of Statistics)
	Jan 30, 2024	-25% (Morning Consult)
Other Leaders		
Russia: Vladimir Putin	Aug 10, 2023	77.4% (World of Statistics)
India: Narendra Modi	Aug 10, 2023	76% (World of Statistics)
Brazil: Lula da Silva	Aug 10, 2023	52% (World of Statistics)
Mexico: Andrés Manuel López Obrador	Aug 10, 2023	61% (World of Statistics)
Australia: Anthony Albanese	Aug 10, 2023	54% (World of Statistics)
Korea: Yoon Seok-youl	Aug 10, 2023	25% (World of Statistics)

J-4: Public Approval of G7 Leaders' Party in 2024

United States: Joe Biden's Democratic Party		
	Jan 31	Biden 50%, Trump 44%, Presidential election (Quinnipiac University)
	Feb 20	Biden 49%, Trump 45%, Presidential election (Quinnipiac University)
Japan: Fumio Kishida's LDP-Coalition Cabinet		
	Jan	Kishida's Cabinet 18.6% (Jiji Press poll)
	Feb 15	Kishida's Cabinet 16.9% (Jiji Press poll)
	Mar 24	Kishida Cabinet 20% (Nikkei-TV Tokyo poll), Disapproval 66%, LDP support 28%
Germany: Olaf Scholz's SPD-led Coalition		
	Feb 7	SPD-Greens-FDP coalition 32%
	May 3	SPD 15.5%, Greens 13.6%, FDP 4.9%, CDU/CSU 30.2%, AfD 17.7% Europe Elects
Emmanuel Macron's Renaissance Party		
United Kingdom: Rishi Sunak's Conservative Party		
	May 6	Conservatives 18%, Labour 44% (YouGov)
	June 3	Conservatives 140 seats, Labour 422 seats (MRP poll for Sky News)
Italy: Giorgia Meloni's Brothers of Italy Coalition		
Canada: Justin Trudeau's Liberal Party		
	Feb 20	Liberals 23.8% Conservatives 40.6%, NDP 21.9%, Bloc 6.2%, Green 5.1% (Nanos)
	May 21	Liberals 25%, Conservatives 41%, NDP 18%, Greens 4% (Abacus)
EU	June 3	Von der Leyen's EPP leading, Le Pen's National Rally 33%, Meloni's Brothers of Italy 27%

Note: – is % approval minus % disapproval