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Analytical Studies > Analysis on the 2023 Hiroshima Summit
G7 Summits > 2023 Hiroshima Summit

The Performance of the G7 Leaders' December Virtual Summit

John Kirton and Brittaney Warren, G7 Research Group
December 13, 2023

G7 leaders held a virtual summit on December 6, 2023, toward the end of Japan's presidency, to review and build on their accomplishments and address new issues that had arisen since their regular, in-person summit in Hiroshima on May 19–21. This was their third special summit in 2023 (after a virtual one on February 24 and one with North Atlantic Treaty Organization leaders in Vilnius on July 11–12) and thus their fourth one in all under Japan's presidency.

All G7 leaders attended on December 6, as they all have at every one since their first at Rambouillet, France, in 1975. They were joined on screen by Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky, as their only invited guest. He was the lead-off speaker at the summit, showing that Russia's invasion of Ukraine was still the first priority for the G7 leaders.

At the end of their virtual summit, G7 leaders issued a public, collective statement of 70 paragraphs and 5,176 words. A summary produced by Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs described what Prime Minister Fumio Kishida had proposed and what he and his colleagues discussed and agreed during each of the summit sessions.

In their decision making, G7 leaders made 108 public, collective, precise, future-oriented, politically obligatory commitments, as presented in the statement and identified by the G7 Research Group (see Appendix a). This compares with the 653 commitments they made at their regular, annual Hiroshima Summit in May, which was the highest ever for any such summit.

By subject, the December commitments were led by those on regional security, with 37 commitments for 34% for the total. This compares with 67 regional security commitments made at Hiroshima, for 10%, in third place. The December ones came above all on Russia's continuing war against Ukraine, and now the Hamas attack on Israel starting on October 7 and subsequent Israel-led humanitarian crisis in Palestine.

Trade came second in December, with 14 commitments for 13% of the total. This compares with 51 at Hiroshima, for 8%, in fifth place. The December ones were overwhelmingly on the recently introduced concept of economic coercion and resilience.

Development came third, with 11 commitments for 10% of the total. This compares with Hiroshima's 29 for 4%, in ninth place.

Energy came fourth, with eight commitments for 7% of the total. This compares with Hiroshima's 83 commitments for 13% and the first-place rank.

Climate change, the companion to the issue of energy, came in only eighth place, with four commitments for 4%. This compares with Hiroshima's 55 commitments for 8% in fourth place. The December summit took place during the 28th Conference of the Parties (COP28) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in Dubai from November 30 to December 13. The low eighth-place ranking of climate change among the December summit decisions suggests that G7 leaders left the subject to COP28, which is essentially at the ministerial level, rather than try to push that meeting to higher performance.

The natural environment, another companion, came 13th, with two commitments for 2%. In Hiroshima it had ranked sixth, with 45 commitments for 7%.

Three issues moved up in their ranking: health, now fifth; macroeconomics, now sixth; and peace and security now ninth.

Two issues moved down: food and agriculture, which dropped to 10th from second at Hiroshima; and gender now 14th down from 10th at Hiroshima.

The issue of digital/information and communications technologies (ICT) ranked seventh at both summits.

In the delivery of these commitment over the next year, predicted compliance is at an overall average of 81%, using the G7 Research Group's machine-learning tool and compliance simulator developed by Jessica Rapson. By subject, ranking highest are commitments on ICT/digital economy with a predicted 86% compliance, energy with 81%, and regional security and non-proliferation each with 80%. Coming in next are health, human rights and the environment, each predicted with 79%. Trade comes next with a predicted 75%, followed by development, macroeconomic growth, climate change, food and agriculture, international institutional reform, migration and refugees, and infrastructure each with 74%. Last, with the lowest predicted compliance, is gender for 59%.

The December 6 summit was thus a useful addition and capstone to the G7 leaders' personal governance in 2023. They made the first commitments on the new security shock of the deadly Hamas attack on Israel on October 7 and gave greater emphasis than they had at Hiroshima in May in their decisions on health, macroeconomics and peace and security overall. But they gave far less to climate change, energy and the natural environment, which together constitute the only existential threat to life on the planet as a whole. And while their overall predicted compliance with their commitments over the coming year was a high 81%, they still must find ways to improve it, to strengthen others' trust in their global governance and to meet the many urgent vital needs that all people on the planet have.

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Appendix A: G7 Commitments Made on December 6, 2023 ↩

Notes:
* To predict "institutional reform" the issue area "UN reform" was used.
N/A = Issue area not included the G7 Compliance Simulator.
ICT = information and communications technologies

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Commitments

1. We reaffirm our commitment made at the G7 Summit in Hiroshima, which is a city that suffered an atomic bombing and now has become a symbol of peace. (non-proliferation)
2. We remain committed to upholding the rule of law, which protects all nations, especially the vulnerable, as well as global security and human dignity in all parts of the world. (peace and security) (human rights/liberty)

Ukraine

3. Our steadfast commitment to supporting Ukraine's fight for its independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity will never waver. (regional security)
4. We are taking additional steps today to support Ukrainians in their pursuit of a comprehensive, just and lasting peace that will uphold all the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations (UN), including respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty. (regional security)
5. We are determined to support an independent, democratic Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders. (regional security) (democracy)
6. We continue to support Ukraine in further developing President Zelenskyy's Peace Formula. (regional security)
7. As stated in the Joint Declaration of Support for Ukraine on July 12, 2023, we are formalizing our enduring support to Ukraine through specific, bilateral, long-term security commitments and arrangements. (regional security)
8. Our commitment remains to restrict exports of all items critical to Russia's military and industrial base, including those used on the battlefield (regional security)
9. We will work to further curtail Russia's use of the international financial system to further its war in Ukraine, including Russia's efforts to use the international financial system to facilitate its expansion of its military industrial base. (regional security)
10. We will update our measures. (regional security)
11. We will step up our efforts against evasion and circumvention of our sanctions and export controls measures. (regional security)
12. We continue to take actions against third country actors who materially support Russia's war including by imposing additional measures on entities where appropriate in third countries. (regional security)
13. We are targeting Russian military procurement networks and those who help Russia acquire machine tools, equipment and key inputs. (regional security)
14. We are limiting Russia's ability to fund its illegal war by taking steps to limit Russia's energy revenue and its future extractive capabilities. (regional security)
15. We are determined to accelerate work on this path so that Russia is no longer able to weaponize energy against us. (regional security)
16. We commit to tightening compliance and enforcement of the price cap policy on Russian oil, including by imposing sanctions on those engaged in deceptive practices and by updating our compliance rules and regulations as necessary. (regional security)
17. We will also continue efforts to curtail Russia's revenue from other relevant sectors. (regional security)
18. We will also continue efforts to reduce Russia's revenue from metals. (regional security)
19. We will introduce import restrictions on non-industrial diamonds, mined, processed, or produced in Russia, by January 1, 2024, followed by further phased restrictions on the import of Russian diamonds processed in third countries targeting March 1, 2024. (regional security)
20. To further the effectiveness of these measures, those G7 members who are major importers of rough diamonds will establish a robust traceability-based verification and certification mechanism for rough diamonds within the G7 by September 1, 2024, and we will continue to consult with partners, including producing and manufacturing countries on its design and implementation. (regional security)
21. We will continue consultations among G7 members and with other partners including producing countries as well as manufacturing countries for comprehensive controls for diamonds produced and processed in third countries on measures for traceability. (regional security)
22. As Russia seeks to use winter as a weapon against the Ukrainian people, we are increasing our efforts to provide humanitarian aid and critical energy assistance. (regional security)
23. We are supporting Ukraine's recovery and reconstruction, including through the Multi-agency Donor Coordination Platform for Ukraine (regional security)
24. [We are]…working to encourage further involvement of our private sector. (regional security)
25. We [look forward to successful completion of the upcoming review of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) program for Ukraine and] support Ukraine's continued reform agenda including the efforts for its European path. (regional security)
26. We reaffirm that consistent with our respective legal systems, Russia's sovereign assets in our jurisdictions will remain immobilized until Russia pays for the damage it caused to Ukraine. (regional security)
27. In light of the urgency of disrupting Russia's attempts to destroy the Ukrainian economy and failure to abide by its international law obligations, we will explore all possible avenues to aid Ukraine in obtaining compensation from Russia, consistent with our respective legal systems and international law. (regional security)
28. We reiterate our commitment to holding those responsible to account consistent with international law, including by supporting the efforts of international mechanisms, such as the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the International Centre for the Prosecution of the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine (ICPA) at Eurojust (regional security) (human rights/liberty)
29. We support all efforts, including those of the UN, to facilitate exports of Ukraine's grain and other agricultural products. (regional security)

Middle East

30. We will continue to coordinate our efforts to isolate Hamas and ensure it cannot threaten Israel. (regional security)
31. [At the same time, more urgent action is needed to address the deteriorating humanitarian crisis in Gaza and minimize civilian casualties.] We support and encourage further humanitarian pauses to enable this. (regional security)
32. The population is increasingly vulnerable, and with winter approaching, we must continue to increase the flow of humanitarian aid to Gaza to meet fully the needs on the ground, including by opening additional crossings. (regional security)
33. We [call on the international community to fully fund the UN's flash appeal and] are contributing to that effort. (regional security)
34. We, along with partners in the region, are working intensively to prevent the conflict from escalating further and spreading more widely. (regional security)
35. We are committed to working closely with partners to assist in building the conditions for sustainable long-term solutions for Gaza. (regional security)
36. We remain committed to a Palestinian state as part of a two-state solution that enables both Israelis and Palestinians to live in a just, lasting, and secure peace. (regional security)
37. We remain determined that Iran must never develop a nuclear weapon (regional security)

Indo-Pacific and the Region

38. Together with regional partners, including the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its Member States, South Asian countries as well as the Pacific Island countries, we will continue our endeavors towards a free and open Indo-Pacific, which is inclusive, prosperous, secure, and based on the rule of law, and that protects shared principles. (regional security) (human rights/liberty)

Reconfirming the G7 Hiroshima Leaders' Communique, we stand together as G7 partners on the following elements, which underpin our respective relations with China:

39. We will take steps, individually and collectively, to invest in our own economic vibrancy. (macroeconomics)
40. We will reduce excessive dependencies in our critical supply chains. (trade)
41. With a view to enabling sustainable economic relations with China, and strengthening the international trading system, we will push for a level playing field for our workers and companies. (trade)
42. We will seek to address the challenges posed by China's non-market policies and practices, which distort the global economy. (macroeconomics)
43. We will counter malign practices, such as illegitimate technology transfer or data disclosure. (trade)
44. We will foster resilience to economic coercion. (trade)
45. We will keep voicing our concerns about the human rights situation in China, including in Tibet and Xinjiang where forced labor is of major concern to us. (human rights) (human rights/liberty)

Supporting Developing Economies and Strengthening International Financial Institutions

46. We reiterate our steadfast commitment to the achievement of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). (development)
47. [We remain committed to partnering with developing countries, particularly low-income countries, in]…mobilizing finance for development from all sources. (development)
48. We reaffirm our commitment to mobilizing up to $600 billion by 2027 through the G7 Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII) by scaling up public and private financing and investments through tailored country approaches and by developing key economic corridors. (infrastructure)
49. We are working to deliver better, bigger, and more effective multilateral development banks (MDBs) by enhancing operating models, improving responsiveness and accessibility, and substantially increasing financing capacity to maximize development impact (institutional reform)
50. [We are working to deliver better, bigger, and more effective multilateral development banks (MDBs) by]… making MDBs work better as a system. (institutional reform)
51. We will deliver on the G20 Leaders' commitment to collectively mobilizing more lending headroom and concessional finance to boost the World Bank's capacity to support low and middle-income countries that need help in addressing global challenges, with a clear framework for the allocation of scarce concessional resources, and to provide strong support for the poorest countries. (development)
52. The G7 [has already announced planned contributions that will unlock more than $35 billion and] will step up efforts to deliver substantial contributions to this end. (development)
53. We are committed to collectively securing an ambitious International Development Association (IDA) 21 replenishment next year. (development)
54. We will work together over the next year to encourage and support the MDBs in strengthening their efforts to mobilize private capital and domestic resources. (development)
55. At the IMF, we support the work to ensure the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust (PRGT) is on a sustainable footing to meet the growing needs of low-income countries. (development)
56. We [welcome the achievement of the $100 billion Special Drawing Rights (SDR) channeling target and] will further explore viable options for enabling the voluntary channeling of SDRs through MDBs while respecting national legal frameworks and the need to preserve the reserve asset character and status of SDRs. (development)
57. We will work together and with partners to deliver further progress on this global agenda, including through the IMF, MDB boards and the G20, as well as the discussions following the Paris Pact for People and the Planet and the G20 Compact with Africa Conference in Berlin. (development)
58. We will continue to provide developing countries support for strengthening their tax capacity to build sustainable tax revenue sources to help deliver the SDGs. (taxation)

Climate Change, Energy and Environment

59. We remain steadfast in our commitment to the Paris Agreement, keeping a limit of 1.5°C global temperature rise within reach through scaled up action in this critical decade. (climate change)
60. We [welcome the first global stocktake (GST), and] will pursue ambitious outcomes at the ongoing 28th Session of the Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC-COP 28) in Dubai, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) Presidency. (climate change)
61. We will contribute towards and support a global tripling of renewable energy capacity…by 2030 taking into consideration national circumstances, with currently 123 countries supporting those targets at COP 28. (energy)
62. [We will contribute towards and support a global]…doubling of annual energy efficiency improvements [by 2030 taking into consideration national circumstances, with currently 123 countries supporting those targets at COP 28.] (energy)
63. We will do this hand in hand with accelerating the phase out of unabated fossil fuels so as to achieve our climate ambition. (energy)
64. We commit to prioritizing concrete and timely steps towards the goal of accelerating the phase out of domestic unabated coal power generation (energy)
65. [We commit to prioritizing concrete and timely steps towards the goal of]…ending the construction of new unabated coal fired power generation. (energy)
66. Those G7 countries that opt to use nuclear energy [recognize its potential to provide affordable low carbon energy that can reduce dependence on fossil fuels, to address climate crisis, and to ensure global energy security as the source of baseload energy and grid flexibility, and] support a global aspirational goal of tripling nuclear energy capacity from 2020 by 2050 that was endorsed by a coalition of 23 countries in the margins of the COP28, recognizing the different domestic circumstances of each country. (energy)
67. We continue our implementation of our commitments to the developed country Parties' goal of jointly mobilizing $100 billion annually in climate finance by 2020 through to 2025 (climate change)
68. We underscore the need to enhance international cooperation and coordination within the G7 and beyond. (climate change)
69. In this regard, recalling our determination to support developing countries' just energy transitions, we [welcome progress achieved on Just Energy Transition Partnerships (JETPs) with partner countries and] will continue our efforts for its implementation. (energy)
70. We reiterate our commitment to the swift and full implementation of the Kunming Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework and to achievement of each of its goals and targets. (environment)
71. We are committed to ending plastic pollution, with the ambition to reduce additional plastic pollution to zero by 2040 including through an international legally binding instrument. (environment)

Economic Resilience and Economic Security

72. [Recalling the G7 Statement on Economic Resilience and Economic Security and recognizing that the weaponization of economic vulnerabilities is becoming a growing concern for G7 members and other countries,] we are determined to continue making progress to enhance our strategic coordination on these issues, including through the G7's Coordination Platform on Economic Coercion. (trade)
73. We will increase our collective assessment, preparedness, deterrence, and response to economic coercion (trade)
74. [We will]…further promote cooperation with partners beyond the G7. (trade)
75. We will also coordinate, as appropriate, to support targeted states, economies and entities as a demonstration of solidarity and resolve to uphold the rule of law. (trade) (human rights/liberty)
76. We will further step up our collaboration based on the principles on resilient and reliable supply chains, including for critical minerals, semiconductors and batteries, which are now supported by a broader number of partners beyond the G7. (trade)
77. We [welcome the successful launch of the "Partnership for RISE (Resilient and Inclusive Supply-chain Enhancement)" and] continue to support its implementation with speed and quality. (trade)
78. We affirm our [shared responsibility and] determination to coordinate on preventing the cutting-edge technologies we develop from being used to further military capabilities that threaten international peace and security. (peace and security)
79. To this end, we will share, as appropriate, information and experiences to further develop common understanding of such risks and the policy tools needed to address them (peace and security)
80. [To this end, we will]…take further actions where necessary, including those related to export and investment, corresponding to the circumstances of each country. (trade)
81. We will further strengthen multilateral efforts to cooperate in the field of export controls to ensure gaps in our dual use technology protection ecosystem cannot be exploited. (trade)
82. We will increase our efforts to implement risk-based policies and measures to promote research security and research integrity. (macroeconomics)
83. We reiterate our commitment to working and coordinating on economic resilience and economic security through the G7 framework to make year-on-year progress in a holistic manner. (macroeconomics)

Trade

84. We [underscore the need to pursue WTO reform to improve all its functions through an inclusive member driven process, and] remain committed to conducting discussions with a view to having a fully and well-functioning dispute settlement system accessible to all members by 2024. (trade)
85. We will continue to work towards concrete and ambitious outcomes at the upcoming 13th WTO Ministerial Conference. (trade)

Food Security

86. We [recognize the continuing urgency and] renew our commitment to working together with partners beyond the G7 to build resilient and sustainable agriculture and food systems (food and agriculture)
87. [We [recognize the continuing urgency and] renew our commitment to working together with partners beyond the G7 to] progressively realize the right to adequate food and nutrition for all, in particular by ensuring open and fair agricultural trade, promoting resilient food supply chains and improving agricultural productivity in a sustainable manner. (food and agriculture)

Health

88. We renew our commitment to developing and strengthening the global health architecture (GHA) for future health emergencies (health)
89. [We renew our commitment to]…achieving more resilient, equitable, and sustainable universal health coverage (UHC) (health)
90. [We renew our commitment to]…promoting health innovations. (health)
91. We reaffirm our commitment to enhancing governance, international norms and regulations including through the negotiations on the future international agreement on pandemic prevention, preparedness, and response (PPR) (WHO CA+). (health)
92. We also commit to financing for PPR, including through the Pandemic Fund, enhanced manufacturing capacity globally, and the exploration of a rapid response financing framework. (health)
93. Building on the G7 Hiroshima Vision for Equitable Access to medical countermeasures (MCMs), [we welcome the collaborative progress made on the MCM Delivery Partnership for equitable access (MCDP) and also] commit to explore further means to coordinate and mobilize surge financing for production, procurement, and delivery of MCMs, including development financing solutions. (health)
94. We will further promote comprehensive sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR). (health)

Digital

95. We renew our commitment to advancing international discussions on inclusive artificial intelligence (AI) governance and interoperability between AI governance frameworks, [while we recognize that approaches and policy instruments to achieve the common vision and goal of trustworthy AI may vary across G7 members, to achieve our common vision and goal of safe, secure, and trustworthy AI, in line with our shared democratic values.] (ICT and digital economy)
96. We look forward to further advancing the Hiroshima AI Process in accordance with the work plan developed by relevant Ministers. (ICT and digital economy)
97. We commit to working together for further advancing the Data Free Flow with Trust (DFFT) (ICT and digital economy)

Conclusion

98. As we look to the 2024 Italian G7 Presidency, and in our support to the Brazilian G20 Presidency, we will strive towards a peaceful and prosperous world, building on the outcomes achieved in Hiroshima. (peace and security)
99. Under the Italian Presidency, we will continue our support to Ukraine (regional security)
100. We will promote mutually beneficial partnerships with developing and emerging countries, particularly in Africa. (development)
101. We will address key issues, such as economic security and resilience (macroeconomics)
102. [We will address key issues, such as]…sustainable development (development)
103. [We will address key issues, such as]…food security (food and agriculture)
104. [We will address key issues, such as]…energy security (energy)
105. [We will address key issues, such as]…gender equality (gender)
106. [We will address key issues, such as]…AI (ICT and digital economy)
107. [We will address key issues, such as]…irregular migration (migration and refugees)
108. [We will address key issues, such as]…human trafficking. (human rights)

Coding Clarifications, December 8, 2023

• Strong versus soft (i.e., endorsements) commitments
• Present versus future tense ("we are…")
• "We ask/task/direct ministers" – exclude
• "We stress the need" – excluded unless text also says G7
• "We highlight the need" – excluded unless text also says G7
• "We [qualifying verb] the need" – excluded unless text also says G7
• "We need" – always included
• "We must" – always inlcuded
• "Endorse" – excluded

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